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10. Çin Komünist Partisi genel sekreteri

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  1. Siyasi18 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    How China got caught in the crossfire of a US bacon fight

    Midwestern Americans watching television this summer may have been surprised to see China and bacon appearing together in political advertisements. “The corrupt Save Our Bacon scam in the farm bill – it’s a giveaway to Chinese corporations,” one advertisement declared over images of the Chinese flag and Chinese President Xi Jinping. “Whose side is your senator on? America or China?” Viewers might assume the advertisement was promoting yet another Republican-led effort to counter Beijing. The...

  2. Güvenlik18 AğuÇin

    Jordanian King Abdullah begins China visit amid Middle East conflict

    Abdullah, Chinese President Xi Jinping set to exchange views on bilateral, regional and international issues

    Ürdün Kralı Abdullah, Orta Doğu çatışması gölgesinde Çin'de
  3. Ekonomik18 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    Chinese President Xi Jinping leads party elite in final farewell for ex-premier Zhu Rongji

    Chinese President Xi Jinping led the party elite in paying a final tribute to former premier Zhu Rongji, who was cremated on Tuesday as national flags flew at half-mast across the country and beyond. Zhu died of an illness in Beijing last Wednesday aged 97. He served as premier from 1998 to 2003 and is regarded as the chief engineer of the country’s economic reform, having played a pivotal role in transitioning China towards a market-based economy and steering its entry into the World Trade...

    Zhu Rongji'nin ölümü, ABD-Çin ilişkilerinde kaybedilenleri hatırlatıyor
  4. Siyasi18 AğuÇin

    Xi hits out at ‘outside interference’ in Latin America in meeting with Ecuador’s president

    China firmly supports Latin American nations in upholding their autonomy and pursuing international cooperation based on their own interests, Chinese President Xi Jinping told his Ecuadorian counterpart Daniel Noboa on Tuesday. “Latin American and Caribbean nations should have freedom to choose their international partners without outside interference,” Xi said, in a veiled criticism of US interventions in the region since Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025. Like many of its Latin...

  5. Güvenlik18 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    Trump'tan Kim Jong-un'a yeni mesaj. Kuzey Kore artık çok daha güçlü

    ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Kuzey Kore lideri Kim Jong-un ile ilişkisini överek temas girişimlerine yanıt aldığını açıkladı. ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın Kuzey Kore lideri Kim Jong-un ile ilişkisine yönelik son açıklamaları, iki lider arasında yeni bir diplomasi döneminin başlayıp başlamayacağı sorusunu gündeme getirdi. Trump, Güney Kore ile ortak askeri tatbikatların kapsamının azaltılmasının ardından yaptığı açıklamada, Kim'in son temas girişimlerine yanıt verdiğini belirterek Kuzey Kore lideriyle ilişkisini övdü. Ancak uzmanlara göre bugünün Kuzey Kore'si, Trump ile Kim'in ilk kez masaya oturduğu 2018'dekinden oldukça farklı. Rusya'nın Ukrayna savaşına verdiği destek sayesinde askeri deneyim ve ekonomik kazanımlar elde eden Pyongyang, Çin'in desteğini de arkasına alarak uluslararası konumunu güçlendirdi. UKRAYNA SAVAŞI KUZEY KORE'Yİ GÜÇLENDİRDİ Kuzey Kore son yıllarda uluslararası çatışmalarda daha aktif bir rol üstlenirken özellikle Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgaline verdiği destekle öne çıktı. Uzmanlara göre Pyongyang'ın savaşa katılımı, ülkeye ekonomik ve askeri kazanımların yanı sıra gerçek savaş koşullarında önemli bir deneyim kazandırdı. Uzmanlar, Kuzey Kore'nin kara, hava ve deniz operasyonlarının yanı sıra drone kullanımı dahil “modern savaşın her alanında pratik deneyim” elde ettiğini söylüyor. Kim'in yükselen uluslararası konumu geçen yıl Pekin'deki askeri geçit töreninde de dikkat çekti. Kuzey Kore lideri, Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ve Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin ile birlikte görüntülendi. TRUMP VE KİM'İN “AŞK” DİPLOMASİSİ Trump ilk başkanlık döneminde Kim ile üç kez görüşmüş, iki lider arasındaki ilişki dünya gündeminin en dikkat çekici diplomatik süreçlerinden birine dönüşmüştü. Trump, bir dönem Kim ile ilişkilerini anlatırken ikilinin “birbirine aşık olduğunu” dahi söylemişti. Trump geçen ekim ayında Kuzey Kore'yi “bir çeşit nükleer güç” olarak nitelendirerek Washington'ın onlarca yıllık yaklaşımından farklı bir söylem kullandı. Kim ile yeniden görüşmeye “yüzde 100” açık olduğunu da söyledi. Ancak bu çağrılar uzun süre Pyongyang tarafından yanıtsız bırakıldı. Uzmanlara göre Rusya'dan aldığı kritik destek, Kim'in Washington ile görüşme ihtiyacını önemli ölçüde azalttı. KUZEY'İN FÜZE DENEMELERİ SÜRÜYOR Pyongyang son olarak Japonya'nın savunma kapasitesini güçlendirme planlarına balistik füze denemeleriyle karşılık verdi. Kuzey Kore, ABD ile Güney Kore'nin her yıl gerçekleştirdiği ortak askeri tatbikatları uzun süredir ülkeye yönelik “işgal provası” olarak görüyor ve tatbikat dönemlerinde sık sık füze denemeleri gerçekleştiriyor. Trump da 2018'de Singapur'da Kim ile gerçekleştirdiği ilk zirvenin ardından “provokatif” olarak nitelendirdiği ortak tatbikatları askıya alacağını açıklamıştı. ABD'nin bugün Güney Kore'de yaklaşık 28 bin 500 askeri bulunuyor. Amerikan askeri varlığı, barış anlaşması yerine ateşkesle sona eren 1950-1953 Kore Savaşı'nın mirası olarak devam ediyor. GÜNEY KORE HALA “BAŞ DÜŞMAN” KONUMUNDA Trump'ın Pyongyang ile yeni bir diplomatik süreç başlatma ihtimali konuşulurken Kuzey ve Güney Kore arasındaki ilişkiler ise oldukça gergin. Haziran 2025'te göreve gelen Güney Kore Devlet Başkanı Lee Jae Myung, selefi Yoon Suk Yeol'un sert politikasından uzaklaşarak Kuzey ile diyaloğu yeniden başlatmaya çalıştı. Ancak Pyongyang bu girişimleri reddetti, Güney Kore'yi “baş düşman” ülke olarak tanımladı.

    Trump İran Taslağını Sundu; Ukrayna Rusya'yı Vurdu, Kim-Putin Temasları ve Binance Verileri
  6. Diplomatik18 AğuÇin

    China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi to visit South Korea from August 19-20

    South Korean ‌President Lee Jae Myung ‌will ⁠receive Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at ⁠the Blue House to discuss bilateral relations and regional affairs and convey his ​regards to ‌Chinese President Xi Jinping

  7. Diplomatik17 AğuÇin

    Putin, Xi Jinping seek to strengthen ties amid global instability — Chinese envoy

    Zhang Hanhui specifically highlighted the milestone anniversaries of Russian-Chinese relations, including 30 years of strategic partnership, and 25 years since the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation

    Çin Elçisi: Putin ve Xi Küresel İstikrarsızlıkta Bağları Güçlendiriyor
  8. Güvenlik17 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    Jordan’s King to visit China for talks with Xi

    The trip, at the invitation of Chinese president Xi Jinping, comes as the US-allied kingdom remains caught in the middle of Washington's months-long war with Tehran.

  9. Ekonomik17 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    Xi leads event marking late leader Jiang Zemin's 100th birth anniversary

    BEIJING, Aug 17 - Top Chinese officials led by President Xi Jinping gathered in the Great Hall of the People on Monday to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of late leader Jiang Zemin, who led China in a pivotal phase in its rise from a marginal economy to a global growth engine.

  10. Siyasi17 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    China’s Xi praises former president Jiang’s contribution in show of party unity

    President Xi Jinping presides over a grand ceremony in Beijing on Monday to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of former state leader Jiang Zemin, who served as the country’s top leader between 1989 and the early 2000s and died in 2022. Xi is addressing thousands of officials and delegates from various sectors at the ceremony, held in the Great Hall of the People, delivering a speech that highlights Jiang’s contribution to the party and the country. All seven members of the Standing...

  11. Siyasi15 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    Xi calls for improving disaster prevention as floods, landslides batter China

    BEIJING, Aug 15 - Chinese President Xi Jinping called for improving the country's ability to prevent, mitigate and respond to natural disasters, after a string of deadly floods and landslides this summer.

  12. Diplomatik13 AğuÇin

    Russia-China cooperation reaches highest level thanks to Putin, Xi Jinping — envoys

    The diplomats emphasized that "the leaders’ shared understanding of Russian-Chinese relations stems from the fundamental principles underlying the dialogue between the two countries"

  13. Diplomatik12 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    Singapore and South Korea eye science opportunities as last main US-China link shatters

    As President Xi Jinping prepares for summit talks with Donald Trump in Washington next month, the United States is closing one of the few remaining openings between the two countries by targeting scientific research. This field has been one of the most durable links in the US-China relationship, but a series of new security-related restrictions on federally funded collaborations with Chinese institutions mark the latest, and arguably most consequential, step in a years-long shift away from...

  14. Diplomatik12 Ağu· BeijingÇin

    When US left Afghanistan, China moved in. So How's it going?

    When the Taliban reclaimed power five years ago, China appeared poised to capitalize on Afghanistan’s new realities. Beijing quickly took important steps to establish de facto relations with the Islamic Emirate, such as keeping its embassy open in Kabul, maintaining direct ties with Taliban leaders, and expanding political and security cooperation. In January 2024, Xi Jinping became the first head of state to accept credentials from a Taliban-appointed ambassador. Many analysts latched onto these moves as evidence that China would quickly assert great influence in Afghanistan after the hasty U.S. withdrawal in August 2021. Yet Beijing has pursued a far more cautious course, stopping short of formal recognition, which China sees as a bargaining chip for possible future use. Beijing’s clear message is that recognition will depend on how the Taliban addresses China’s interests and concerns. A security first approach Above all, Beijing wants assurances that Afghan territory will not become a launchpad for attacks on China or a base for militant groups hostile to Chinese interests. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan, Beijing alleged that armed Uyghur militants received training and material support there and that some later returned to China to carry out attacks. Since 2021, the Taliban 2.0 has delivered enough on the security front to keep Beijing engaged, but not enough to eliminate China’s concerns. Taliban authorities have restricted the activities of Uyghur militants and relocated fighters associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) — sometimes referred to as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) — away from the Afghan-Chinese border. There have been no confirmed attacks inside China that were launched from Afghan territory under the Taliban 2.0. Nonetheless, the Taliban has stopped short of expelling or handing over Uyghur militants who fought alongside them for years, and United Nations monitors continue to report on TIP’s presence in Afghanistan. “To a large extent,” the Taliban has satisfied Beijing by limiting the militants’ ability to act against Chinese interests, even while allowing them to remain in Afghanistan, according to a former Afghan diplomat, who spoke to RS on condition he not be identified. For China, that imperfect arrangement may be acceptable so long as the threat remains contained. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) has complicated matters. On one hand, Beijing views the Taliban as a necessary counter-terrorism partner against ISIS-K. On the other, ISIS-K has exposed the limits of the Taliban’s ability to protect Chinese interests and citizens. Having repeatedly targeted Chinese nationals and Chinese-linked businesses in Afghanistan, ISIS-K has also sought to recruit Uyghur militants, including TIP-associated fighters, by presenting the fight against China as part of its broader jihadist agenda. “ISIS-K has made the Taliban more valuable to Beijing and less credible at the same time,” according to Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, an associate professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Paradoxically, for Beijing, the Taliban remains an indispensable security partner precisely because the threat the Islamic Emirate promised to contain continues growing. “The Taliban is struggling to maintain security and prevent threats to Chinese interests in Afghanistan, and the two biggest threats are ISIS-K and [ETIM],” Morgan Tadych, senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, told RS. “Although [ISIS-K and ETIM] are not aligned with each other, they share a common goal of threatening Chinese interests in Afghanistan, such as mines, hotels, restaurants, and places where Chinese workers gather,” Tadych added. “Both groups perceive attacks against these locations as demonstrating their support for oppressed Uyghurs in China, and the Taliban has proven itself incapable of deterring or stopping these attacks.” The economic dimensions Although security cooperation has brought China and the Taliban closer, economic ties have been far less consequential than many had expected in 2021–22. China has long been interested in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, and Chinese companies have announced deals involving copper, oil, and gas, but few have translated into functioning projects. The Mes Aynak copper concession, signed in 2008 and repeatedly revived since the Taliban takeover, still has not reached commercial production. The Taliban terminated the Amu Darya oil project in 2025 following disputes with its Chinese operator. These episodes illustrate the difficulties of doing business in today’s Afghanistan. Contracts are difficult to enforce, the banking system remains isolated from the global economy, and political and economic decision-making is highly concentrated within the Taliban leadership. Sanctions and the challenges of transporting heavy minerals out of landlocked Afghanistan add to costs of doing business, noted Murtazashvili. Chinese companies may see opportunities in Afghanistan, but they have little reason to assume the enormous risks required to turn those opportunities into large-scale investments. Afghanistan’s limited economic importance to Beijing is also reflected in its place within China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite years of discussion about incorporating Afghanistan into China’s infrastructure network, there has been little tangible progress. Beijing’s major regional corridors run through Pakistan and Central Asia, while Afghanistan has yet to receive a flagship Chinese-backed BRI project. Pakistan as a major factor This limited economic engagement is closely tied to Afghanistan’s broader place in China’s regional strategy. For decades, Beijing largely viewed Afghanistan through a Pakistani lens, relying on Islamabad to help manage relations with Kabul. China previously supported extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, but the proposal has yet to be funded. The closure of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border amid the current conflict between the Afghan Taliban and Islamabad poses another major obstacle. “Afghanistan has marginal importance in BRI,” noted Murtazashvili. For now, China appears more interested in insulating its existing regional corridors from Afghanistan’s instability than in making the country a central node of its connectivity strategy. Militants operating in the Afghan-Pakistani border region have also attacked Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan, including projects associated with the CPEC. More recently, China has sought to mediate between Pakistan and the Taliban, underscoring how difficult it has become for Beijing to separate its Afghanistan policy from hostilities between Kabul and Islamabad. At the same time, these growing challenges have strengthened Beijing’s incentive to cultivate a direct relationship with Kabul rather than rely solely on Islamabad. China sees closer ties with the Taliban as a way to hedge at a time when Pakistan’s increasingly close ties with the West concerns Beijing. “Beijing also values the Taliban’s authoritarian rule and the resulting enforced stability, as Beijing finds Pakistan’s internal political instability as a major hindrance to their expansion in the region,” the former Afghan diplomat told RS. According to the same source, some within Pakistan’s establishment have also considered annexing the narrow Wakhan Corridor. This move would make Tajikistan Pakistan’s direct neighbor, giving Islamabad direct access to Central Asia without traversing Afghanistan. But such a move would also deny China a border with Afghanistan, which would likely not be well-received by Beijing. Five years after the Taliban’s return, China’s approach to Afghanistan looks less like a grand strategic expansion than an exercise in controlled exposure. Beijing has enjoyed direct diplomatic access to the Taliban, established limited security cooperation, and kept open the possibility of deeper economic and political ties — all while avoiding the costs of formally recognizing the Islamic Emirate or making major financial commitments. China has neither replaced the United States in Afghanistan nor appears intent on doing so. Instead, Beijing seeks to contain the security risks Afghanistan poses while preserving whatever leverage and opportunities it offers. As Murtazashvili put it, the goal is “insulation at the lowest possible price.”

    ABD Ayrıldı, Çin Afganistan'da Konumunu Güçlendiriyor
  15. NATURAL_DISASTER11 AğuÇin

    Çin'de 2020'den bu yana ilk! Roket 85 saniye sonra patladı

    Çin, ChinaSat-4B uydusunu taşıyan Long March 7A roketini Hainan eyaletindeki Wenchang Fırlatma Merkezi'nden yerel saatle 20.02'de fırlattı. Roket, 85 saniye sonra patladı. Çin resmi medyası, roketin uçuş sırasında bir anormallik yaşadığını belirtti. Olayının nedeninin araştırıldığı ifade edilirken, daha fazla detay verilmedi. 2020'DEN BU YANA İLK Çin'in Mart 2020'de Long March 7A'yı fırlatmaya yönelik ilk girişimi de başarısız olmuş, roket kalkışından kısa süre sonra patlamıştı. Roket, 1 yıl sonra başarılı bir şekilde tekrar uçuşa geçmiş, 10'dan fazla başarılı uçuş gerçekleştirmişti. Long March 7A, Çin Havacılık ve Uzay Bilimi ve Teknolojisi Şirketi'nin kuruluşu olan Çin Fırlatma Aracı Teknolojisi Akademisi tarafından tasarlanan bir uydu taşıma roketi olarak biliniyor. Uzay programı için ana fırlatıcı görevi gören Long March roketleri, ağır ve hafif yükleri uzaya taşımak için kullanılıyor. ABD İLE YOĞUN REKABET Çin Devlet Başkanı Xi Jinping, 2050 yılına kadar Çin'i uzay biliminde dünya lideri yapmayı hedefliyor ve ülke, yeniden kullanılabilir fırlatma teknolojisi, ay araştırmaları ve uydu fırlatmaları da dahil olmak üzere birçok alanda ABD ile yoğun bir rekabet içinde. 'Kral Charles öldü' anonsu ortalığı karıştırdı! Radyo 16 dakika sustu, milli marş çalındı 7.4 şiddetinde depremle sarsılan Kolombiya'da can kaybı artıyor! Felaket anı böyle görüntülendi: Kaçarken üstlerine balkon çöktü

    Çin roketi fırlatmadan 85 saniye sonra patladı: 2020'den beri ilk başarısızlık
  16. Güvenlik11 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    Why did US defence official Colby avoid mention of Scarborough Shoal in Manila speech?

    US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Elbridge Colby avoided naming Beijing or addressing escalating tensions in the South China Sea during a speech in Manila on Monday, adopting a measured tone weeks before an expected meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Despite speaking in the capital of Washington’s oldest treaty ally in Asia, Colby made no direct reference to recent confrontations between Chinese and Philippine forces near the disputed Scarborough...

  17. Ekonomik09 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    Why Malaysia’s political turmoil matters to Beijing

    As China seeks to reshape the global order, Malaysia’s political instability offers a cautionary tale about the challenges Beijing may face abroad. A recent Pew Research Centre survey found that global perceptions of China have improved relative to those of the US, driven partly by the view among some respondents that China under President Xi Jinping is more reliable than a US led by President Donald Trump. As Washington retreats from global leadership roles, Beijing has sought to present itself...

  18. Güvenlik06 AğuÇin

    State Department says Trump raised cyber scam compound issue with Xi

    President Donald Trump has talked with Chinese President Xi Jinping about Southeast Asian scam compounds, a State Department official told senators at a hearing on the transnational issue.

  19. Siyasi06 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    China buys at least 10 more cargoes of US soybeans, traders say

    China has ⁠bought at least another ⁠10 cargoes of US soybeans, three ⁠Asian traders said on Thursday, the latest in a flurry of purchases ahead of President Xi Jinping’s expected US visit next month. State-run buyer Sinograin bought 10 to 15 cargoes on Wednesday, the traders said. At least 10 cargoes were ‌for October-November shipment, one trader said. The deals follow trade talks between Washington and Beijing that, according to the White House, included Chinese commitments to buy 25 million...

  20. Güvenlik04 AğuÇin

    Trump Orders White House Helipad Construction Redo: Report

    The helipad was initially expected to be finished by the time Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives in September The post Trump Orders White House Helipad Construction Redo: Report appeared first on TWZ.

  21. Diplomatik04 Ağu· WashingtonABD

    US is the real loser if Senate passes virtue signaling Russia sanctions

    As the Senate returns to Washington for its last week in session until mid-September, it faces a long to-do list. But for many senators, the top priority is not enacting legislation that will help Americans but instead rushing to approve the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, known colloquially as the “Russia sanctions bill.” A passion project of the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, the bill is intended to increase economic pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The legislation’s backers hope that, by choking off funding for Russia’s war effort, they can force Moscow to make greater concessions in ongoing negotiations to end the four-year old conflict in Ukraine. But this logic and the bill itself are fundamentally flawed. The new legislation will have a limited effect on Russia’s fortunes; as has been the case since the beginning of the war, additional economic punishments are unlikely to be decisive in Putin’s calculus. In fact, the bill is more likely to harden the Russian position than to soften it. The bill contains three main types of provisions. First, it codifies and expands sanctions against Kremlin officials, Russian oligarchs, and Russian banks and corporations. Second, it cracks down on Russia’s shadow fleet, increasing penalties against tankers and companies accused of trying to smuggle oil or evade the Western price cap on Russian oil sales. Third and most significantly, it grants the president the authority to impose up to 100% tariffs on the top five buyers of Russian oil and natural gas, though it exempts allies who are reducing their purchases from Russia over time. The bill also allows the president to waive required penalties if deemed important for U.S. national security. To be sure, if the new bill is passed by Congress and implemented by the White House, it will be economically painful for Russia. The sanctions it prescribes would fully sever Russian banks and energy corporations from the SWIFT system, including Gazprombank, which handles energy transactions. The bill also threatens secondary sanctions and loss of access to SWIFT for third-party intermediaries that continue to process payments from or interact with sanctioned entities. Combined with the bill’s measures aimed at Russia’s shadow fleet, these new sanctions will further complicate any Russian efforts to export oil. However, after more than four years of sanctions, Russian banks and corporations have already developed alternatives. For example, they can turn to small regional banks that have little exposure to U.S. markets. They can also rely on layered shell companies that work through friendly countries, transactions conducted through “stablecoin” digital currencies, and even direct country-to-country bartering in which Russian commodities are swapped for machinery, microelectronics, or other goods. None of these approaches is convenient, but they will allow Russia to weather even the more draconian penalties included in the new bill. The bill’s tariff provisions are likely to have even less effect on Russia’s revenues. Theoretically, the legislation targets the top five buyers of Russian oil and gas, a list that would include key U.S. allies like France, Japan, Spain, Turkey, and Belgium. But members of Congress, fearful of giving Trump more authority to use tariffs punitively against U.S. allies, included a waiver for countries that account for less than 15% of Russian exports and are working to decrease their dependency on Russia over time. This list applies to just about every country that might be hit with tariffs for continuing to buy Russian oil and gas, except for three: China, India, and Hungary. Even if Trump chooses to apply tariffs to these countries, the consequences may be worse for the United States than for Russia. Tariffs on India could cause Russia real economic pain, as New Delhi has shown itself to be sensitive to threats of U.S. economic penalty. But if the conflict in Iran continues to snarl oil markets, India will face constraints on its ability to shift its demand for oil elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has already tried sanctions on India as a way to pressure Russia, and it didn’t work. It did, however, damage U.S. ties with an important partner in Asia. China is the leading buyer of both Russian natural gas and oil, and likely the primary target of the bill’s writers. But using tariffs to penalize Chinese oil purchases would be suicidal for Trump. He’s already run the experiment of putting 100% tariffs on Chinese goods, back on Liberation Day in April 2025. The result was so bad for the U.S. economy that it led to the original Trump TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). Since then, China has shown its willingness to use its dominance in rare earth minerals to retaliate against what it sees as unfair U.S. trade practices, and it would likely do so again if Trump levies tariffs under the authority of the new legislation. But even smaller tariffs on China are unlikely, since Trump is unlikely to do anything in the near term that derails his September meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the end, the new legislation is unlikely to be the knockout blow that forces Putin to give up on his core demands. The tariff provision may affect Russian oil and gas income on the margins, but its effect will be limited by the Trump administration’s higher priority political goals. Russia’s economy is under strain, but it can withstand the modest costs that Graham’s sanctions bill will impose while sustaining the war effort. More importantly, the legislation’s underlying premise — that increased economic pressure is the key to ending the war in Ukraine — is as incorrect today as it was back in 2022. Putin has made clear time and again that he is willing to pay a very high price to achieve what he considers to be an acceptable outcome in Ukraine. He views the war as existential, for Russia and for himself personally, and has been largely insensitive to economic levers since the conflict began. This is unlikely to change. In fact, the new legislation is much more likely to strengthen Russia’s resolve and work against peace. It may do this in two ways. First, it fuels Putin’s narrative that the conflict in Ukraine is really a war between Russia and the West, a storyline that can shore up domestic support and that increases the risks that the war eventually widens. Second, it confirms for Moscow that the United States is not actually interested in peace or in serving as a mediator but rather continues to harbor Biden administration-era hopes of weakening Russia over the long-term. Many in the U.S. Congress probably realize this but will vote for the bill anyway, a virtue signaling gesture taken at the expense of the voters who elected them. In fact, if there is a loser from this legislation it will be the United States, which will face economic uncertainty and the loss of geopolitical influence as more countries tire of the United States using the dollar as a weapon and look for alternatives.

  22. Diplomatik03 AğuABD

    Xi Jinping’s AI Vision

    Xi’s speech addressed the attendees at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference, but his real audience was the international community, and of course the United States.

  23. Güvenlik01 AğuÇin

    Chinese test pilot who landed plane safely after cabin leak given first-class merit award

    Chinese President Xi Jinping has honoured a veteran naval test pilot with a first-class merit award for defence science and technology. The pilot, Yang Yong, who had previously been awarded seven second- and third-class merit awards, has been testing planes launched from the country’s most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian. Yang featured in a documentary that aired this week on state broadcaster CCTV and described a life-threatening incident in which his plane lost pressure at an altitude of...

  24. Diplomatik31 Tem· WashingtonABD

    Trump envoy Steve Daines to return to Beijing as US and China lock in Xi summit agenda

    US Senator Steve Daines is expected to return to China for another round of talks ahead of President Xi Jinping’s planned September visit to Washington, according to people familiar with the preparations. The trip was intended to help finalise the agenda for what both sides hoped would be a high-stakes summit between Xi and US President Donald Trump, one of the sources said. Daines, a Montana Republican, has emerged as an important backchannel figure between Washington and Beijing. He visited...

  25. Güvenlik31 TemÇin

    China to step up unmanned technologies use in army — Xi Jinping

    According to the Chinese leader, combat readiness remains the main guideline and criterion for military modernization

  26. Güvenlik31 TemÇin

    Xi Jinping urges Chinese armed forces to ‘strengthen military application’ of AI

    Chinese President Xi Jinping has called on the People’s Liberation Army to enhance its use of AI as part of a drive to develop an intelligent military. He told a Politburo group study session that the PLA should “strengthen the military application of unmanned intelligent technologies, deepen the development and application of network information systems, and gradually build an intelligent military system,” according to state news agency Xinhua. Xi was speaking ahead of the PLA’s 99th...

  27. Diplomatik30 TemÇin

    China voices ‘serious concern’ over new US curbs in senior trade talks

    China on Thursday voiced “serious concern” over recent US economic restrictions during a video call between Vice-Premier He Lifeng, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The exchange took place as both sides sought to finalise economic deliverables ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s expected visit to the United States in September. “The Chinese side expressed serious concern over the recent economic and trade restrictions imposed by the United...

  28. İnsani30 Tem· BeijingÇin

    ‘Quite disappointed’? Trump’s mixed signals ahead of Xi’s September trip

    US President Donald Trump said he would be “quite disappointed” if his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping broke a personal promise not to arm Iran. His comment on Wednesday came alongside renewed accusations that long-time US health official Anthony Fauci, who led the US response to Covid-19, helped shield Beijing from scrutiny over the origins of the pandemic. Separately, Reuters reported that Iran was expected to receive 300 to 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air-defence missile systems within...

  29. Güvenlik30 Tem· WashingtonABD

    Trump ''Şimdi sıra bizde'' dedi, İran'a yeni dalga saldırı başladı

    ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Ürdün’deki ABD askeri unsurlarına yönelik saldırının ardından İran’a “çok sert” karşılık verileceğini söyledi. Gece yarısı İran'ın farklı bölgelerinden patlama sesleri yükseldi. Beyaz Saray’da gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtlayan Trump, saldırıya ilişkin, “Şimdi sıra bizde.” dedi. Washington ile Tahran arasında savaşı sona erdirecek bir anlaşma yapılıp yapılamayacağının ilerleyen süreçte görüleceğini belirten Trump, “Ancak onlara çok sert vuracağız.” ifadelerini kullandı. İran Devrim Muhafızları, salı günü Ürdün’de bulunan bir ABD hava üssü ile askeri merkeze çok sayıda balistik füze fırlatıldığını açıklamıştı. ABD ordusu ise birden fazla balistik füzenin hava savunma sistemleri tarafından etkisiz hale getirildiğini duyurmuştu. TRUMP’A MISIR’DAKİ TANKER SALDIRISI HAKKINDA BRİFİNG Trump, Mısır’ın Akdeniz kıyısındaki Dimyat Limanı’nda ABD’ye ait bir gaz depolama tankerinin insansız hava aracıyla vurulmasına ilişkin de bilgilendirildiğini söyledi. ABD Başkanı, saldırıyla ilgili, “Bilgilendirildim. Bu da yaşananların biraz daha devamı niteliğinde. Ancak durum düzeltilecek.” dedi. Trump, açıklamasında ayrıntı vermedi. ÇİN’DEN İRAN’A HAVA SAVUNMA SİSTEMİ İDDİASI Trump’a ayrıca İran’ın, Çin yapımı ve omuzdan ateşlenen 400’e kadar hava savunma füze sisteminin ilk sevkiyatını teslim almaya hazırlandığı yönündeki haberler soruldu. Böyle bir gelişmenin kendisi için şaşırtıcı olacağını söyleyen Trump, Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping’in İran’ın yanında savaşa katılmayacağını kendisine açık biçimde ilettiğini savundu. Trump, “Böyle şeyler olabilir ancak bu şaşırtıcı olurdu. Şi, bana bu savaşa dahil olmayacağını çok güçlü biçimde söyledi. Böyle bir durumda büyük hayal kırıklığı yaşayacağımı da biliyor.” ifadelerini kullandı. Trump, hafta başında yaptığı açıklamada Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ile Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin’in, İran adına savaşa dahil olmayacakları yönündeki sözlerine güvendiğini söylemişti. HAVA SALDIRISI BAŞLADI İlerleyen saatlerde Amerikan güçleri İran'a yönelik hava saldırısı başlattı. ABD Merkez Kuvvetler Komutanlığı'nın (CENTCOM) İran'daki askeri hedeflere yeni bir saldırı dalgası başlattığını açıklamasının ardından İran'ın güneyindeki farklı bölgelerde patlama seslerinin duyuldu. İran devlet televizyonunda yer alan haberlere göre, ülkenin güneyinde bulunan Hürmüzgan eyaletine bağlı Bender Abbas kentinde 2 ayrı patlama sesi duyuldu. Eyalet sınırları içinde yer alan stratejik konumdaki Ebu Musa ve Kiş adalarında da patlamalar meydana geldi. Keşm Adası'nda Hürmüz Boğazı yönünden ve ülkenin güneybatısındaki Huzistan eyaletine bağlı Abadan kentinde patlama sesleri duyuldu. CENTCOM: İRAN SALDIRILARINA YANIT ​​​​​​​Saldırılara ilişkin CENTCOM'un sosyal medya platformundaki hesabından yaptığı paylaşımda "İran'daki askeri hedeflerin vurulmaya başlandığı" bildirildi. Açıklamada "ABD kuvvetleri, bugün yerel saatle 20.00 itibarıyla İran'a yönelik saldırılar başlatmıştır. Söz konusu saldırılar, dün Orta Doğu'da konuşlu ABD güçlerine karşı gerçekleştirilen İran'ın saldırı girişimlerine verilen güçlü bir yanıttır." ifadeleri kullanıldı.

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  30. İnsani29 TemÇin

    Trump Says He Would Be "Quite Disappointed" If China Sells Weapons To Iran

    US President Donald Trump has stated that he would be "disappointed" if China supplied weapons to Iran, reiterating assurances he said Chinese President Xi Jinping had personally given him that Beijing would not sell arms to Tehran.

  31. Güvenlik29 TemÇin

    ABD Başkanı Trump'tan yeni tehdit! 'Çok sert karşılık vereceğiz'

    ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Mısır’da ABD’ye ait LNG tankerine yapılan dron saldırısına "çok sert" şekilde karşılık vereceklerini bildirdi. ABD Başkanı Trump, Oval Ofis'te düzenlediği basın toplantısının ardından gündeme ilişkin soruları yanıtladı. İlginizi Çekebilir Mısır'da ABD'ye ait bir LNG tankerine yapılan dron saldırısının İran kaynaklı olup olmadığı sorusuna Trump, "Konuyla ilgili bilgilendirildim. Durum hemen hemen aynı görünüyor ancak netleşecek." yanıtını verdi. ABD Başkanı, İran'ı hedef alarak "Onlara (İran'a) çok sert bir darbe indireceğiz çünkü sıra bizde. Bunun olacağını biliyorlar ama yapabilecekleri bir şey yok." değerlendirmesini yaptı. Söz konusu saldırıyı farklı bir grubun düzenlediğini ve kendilerinden hemen özür dilediklerini belirten Trump, buna karşın tanker saldırısına karşılık vermek durumunda olduklarını kaydetti. Trump, İran'ın dün gece ABD hedeflerine 5 roket fırlatmaya çalıştığını, roketlerin tamamının etkisiz hale getirildiğini ifade etti. Orta Doğu'daki Amerikan askerlerine veya tesislerine yönelik saldırıların, ABD'nin bölgeden çekilmesiyle sonuçlanıp sonuçlanmayacağı yönündeki bir soruya cevap veren ABD Başkanı Trump, "Ben böyle bir şey görmüyorum. Hayır, geri çekilmiyoruz." dedi. Trump, İran’a yönelik gümrük tarifeleri getirilmesini istediğini dile getirdi. İran'ın Çin'den 400 roket rampası alacağı yönündeki haberlerin sorulması üzerine ABD Başkanı, "Bu benim için şaşırtıcı olurdu. (Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping) Bana bu işe karışmayacağını söylemişti. Benim oldukça hayal kırıklığına uğrayacağımı biliyor." diye konuştu. ZELENSKİY'E "SAVAŞI BİTİR" ÇAĞRISI Trump, bir soru üzerine dün Beyaz Saray'da Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Volodimir Zelenskiy ile iyi bir görüşme gerçekleştirdiğini aktardı. Zelenskiy ile şu anda çok iyi anlaştığını belirten Trump, "Ona 'savaşı bitir' dedim." değerlendirmesini yaptı.

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  32. Güvenlik29 TemÇin

    US to be very disappointed if China supplied weapons to Iran — Trump

    According to the US president, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised in May not to provide military assistance to Iran

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  33. Güvenlik29 Tem· WashingtonABD

    Trump’tan İran’a tehdit: ''Şimdi sıra bizde''

    ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Ürdün’deki ABD askeri unsurlarına yönelik saldırının ardından İran’a “çok sert” karşılık verileceğini söyledi. Beyaz Saray’da gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtlayan Trump, saldırıya ilişkin, “Şimdi sıra bizde.” dedi. Washington ile Tahran arasında savaşı sona erdirecek bir anlaşma yapılıp yapılamayacağının ilerleyen süreçte görüleceğini belirten Trump, “Ancak onlara çok sert vuracağız.” ifadelerini kullandı. İran Devrim Muhafızları, salı günü Ürdün’de bulunan bir ABD hava üssü ile askeri merkeze çok sayıda balistik füze fırlatıldığını açıklamıştı. ABD ordusu ise birden fazla balistik füzenin hava savunma sistemleri tarafından etkisiz hale getirildiğini duyurmuştu. TRUMP’A MISIR’DAKİ TANKER SALDIRISI HAKKINDA BRİFİNG Trump, Mısır’ın Akdeniz kıyısındaki Dimyat Limanı’nda ABD’ye ait bir gaz depolama tankerinin insansız hava aracıyla vurulmasına ilişkin de bilgilendirildiğini söyledi. ABD Başkanı, saldırıyla ilgili, “Bilgilendirildim. Bu da yaşananların biraz daha devamı niteliğinde. Ancak durum düzeltilecek.” dedi. Trump, açıklamasında ayrıntı vermedi. ÇİN’DEN İRAN’A HAVA SAVUNMA SİSTEMİ İDDİASI Trump’a ayrıca İran’ın, Çin yapımı ve omuzdan ateşlenen 400’e kadar hava savunma füze sisteminin ilk sevkiyatını teslim almaya hazırlandığı yönündeki haberler soruldu. Böyle bir gelişmenin kendisi için şaşırtıcı olacağını söyleyen Trump, Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping’in İran’ın yanında savaşa katılmayacağını kendisine açık biçimde ilettiğini savundu. Trump, “Böyle şeyler olabilir ancak bu şaşırtıcı olurdu. Şi, bana bu savaşa dahil olmayacağını çok güçlü biçimde söyledi. Böyle bir durumda büyük hayal kırıklığı yaşayacağımı da biliyor.” ifadelerini kullandı. Trump, hafta başında yaptığı açıklamada Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ile Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin’in, İran adına savaşa dahil olmayacakları yönündeki sözlerine güvendiğini söylemişti.

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  34. Diplomatik28 Tem· BeijingÇin

    China woos Slovakia with AI, robotics pitch as EU trade friction mounts

    China and Slovakia should explore cooperation in clean energy, robotics and artificial intelligence, as the European nation navigates growing trade tensions between Beijing and the EU. That was the message Chinese President Xi Jinping gave to Peter Pellegrini in talks on Tuesday morning as part of the Slovak president’s three-day visit to China, the first by the country’s head of state in 16 years. Slovakia has relatively warm relations with China, as one of the few EU and Nato members to have...

    AB'nin Suçlaması Ortasında Çin'den Yapay Zekâda Güney Açılımı ve Erişilebilirlik Vurgusu
  35. Diplomatik27 Tem· BrasiliaBrezilya

    Brazil turns to China trade deal after Trump’s tariffs, as years of resistance end

    Chinese President Xi Jinping and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva agreed on Sunday night to accelerate negotiations for a trade agreement between China and Mercosur, a striking reversal for Brasilia, which for years led resistance to such a deal in the South American bloc. The two leaders spoke by telephone for more than an hour, according to a statement from the Brazilian presidency, and “coincided on the importance of speeding up the talks for a Mercosur-China agreement that...

  36. Güvenlik27 Tem· MoscowRusya

    North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ takes place with Kim Jong Un’s power transformed

    North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ takes place with Kim Jong Un’s power transformed Expert comment jon.wallace 27 July 2026 Pyongyang’s account of the Korean War remains a fabrication. But its rapidly growing strategic leverage is dangerously real. There is a story told by some US officials that on the night of 25 April 2019, Kim Jong Un returned to his quarters in Vladivostok and drank two 750-millilitre bottles of Absolut Vodka. If that is true, the burn of the alcohol can scarcely have snuffed out the sting of the diplomatic slight he had just suffered. Russian President Vladimir Putin, meeting Kim for the first time, had spent only a few hours with his North Korean guest before boarding a flight to Beijing. Kim was left to attend a memorial ceremony in Vladivostok alone, without his host. Kim was over two hours late to the event, remained for all of seven minutes, then retreated home to North Korea aboard his armoured train. Seven years later, the power dynamic has been dramatically inverted, and the North Korean leader has Putin’s full attention. Russia now depends on Kim for artillery shells, ballistic missiles and, most importantly, combat troops to support its war in Ukraine. Pyongyang is now incorporating the Ukrainian deployment into its own heroic mythology. Indeed, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy alleged on 25 July that Russia is preparing to receive as many as 30,000 additional North Korean soldiers, and that Pyongyang is readying more ballistic-missile launchers for Moscow. Neither North Korea nor Russia has confirmed the claim. But its plausibility reflects how radically North Korea’s international position has changed – with implications reaching beyond Russia. President Xi Jinping travelled to Pyongyang in June and called for greater exchanges between the Chinese and North Korean militaries – an unprecedented public proposal by a Chinese leader. In his column in the Rodong Sinmun, the North’s party newspaper, Xi called repeatedly for ‘strategic’ cooperation and communication. As Kim marks North Korea’s ‘Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War’ on 27 July, the young ruler has become one of Moscow’s most vital wartime partners and a strategic asset cultivated by both Russia and China. ‘Victory Day’ – marking a war that wasn’t won North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ has always rested on two foundational falsehoods. The first is that the United States and South Korea started the Korean War. In fact, it was state founder Kim Il Sung who launched an invasion across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. The second falsehood is that North Korea won the war. In truth, the armistice signed on 27 July 1953 produced no decisive victor. Measured against his original objectives, Kim Il Sung plainly failed. He had invaded to destroy the Republic of Korea and unify the peninsula under communist rule. Three years and millions of casualties later, South Korea remained hobbled but standing. And the inter-Korean boundary lay close to where the war had begun. Pyongyang’s mythology of victory rewrote its invasion into a war of national self-defence, and transformed an armistice born of battlefield stalemate into an American capitulation. To Western observers, the Victory Day ceremonies have therefore tended to symbolize North Korea’s pariah status: an isolated, Stalinist state, kept on life support by China, with no agency in international affairs except as a result of its alarming nuclear weapons programme. But this year’s familiar ceremonies unfold against a profoundly changed strategic landscape. The story of the war remains false, but the state celebrating it is more formidable than ever before. From Hanoi to the Ukrainian battlefield In 2019, such a transformation would have appeared fantastical. In February that year, Kim Jong Un travelled 4,000 km by train to a summit with President Donald Trump in Hanoi, hoping to secure sanctions relief in exchange for dismantling part of his Yongbyon nuclear complex. Trump rejected the offer and abruptly left the summit, leaving Kim to emerge empty-handed and humiliated. Kim’s meeting with Putin two months later underscored the North Korean leader’s lowly status. Then, in June 2019, President Xi finally reciprocated Kim’s four trips to China with his first visit to Pyongyang as China’s leader. But the pageantry yielded neither substantial economic relief nor strategic elevation, reaffirming Kim’s status as the junior partner. In 2019 and for several subsequent years thereafter, Kim remained a supplicant to the leaders of the US, Russia and China, certainly far from a strategic partner. International sanctions remained in place. And North Korea appeared condemned to isolation and economic stagnation. But Kim did not retreat. North Korea enshrined its nuclear status in its constitution and broadened the circumstances under which it claims it may use nuclear weapons. It repeatedly rejected denuclearization as an object of future negotiations. And it began referring to South Korea as its principal enemy – with which peaceful reunification was an impossibility. It also doubled down on an extraordinary military build-up. Since 2019, North Korea has significantly advanced its solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic-missile technology, tactical nuclear systems, submarine-related capabilities, military reconnaissance-satellites and drone programme. Related work North Korea and Russia’s dangerous partnership Of course, North Korea does exaggerate its technical feats. Yet the cumulative military transformation is unmistakable. North Korea can now threaten South Korea and Japan with an expanding range of nuclear and conventional systems while presenting an increasingly credible nuclear threat to the continental United States. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 gave Kim an opportunity. As the war dragged on, Russia’s losses mounted and reserves dwindled. North Korea stepped in, supplying enormous quantities of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. It also dispatched approximately 14,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk region following the conclusion of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June 2024. As a result, North Korea has seen military, economic and political gains. Its troops have gained experience in drone-dominated warfare, infantry operations under fire and adaptation on a modern battlefield. Russia has shielded North Korea diplomatically, dismantled UN monitoring of sanctions violations and reportedly supplied money, fuel, food and military assistance. Most consequentially, Kim has demonstrated that his impoverished country possesses resources that a major power urgently needs and cannot readily obtain on comparable terms. Pyongyang is now incorporating the Ukrainian deployment into its own heroic mythology. It has honoured soldiers killed in Russia, provided new housing for their families and opened a memorial complex celebrating their battlefield exploits. The veterans of 1950–53 embody the regime’s invented foundational victory. The troops sent to Russia since 2024 are being fashioned into a new victorious generation. Courted, but not an equal China has also reassessed North Korea’s value. Beijing still prizes stability and remains wary of Pyongyang’s provocations. Its relationship with North Korea is not the battlefield alliance Russia has forged. But Xi’s visit to Pyongyang last month, and suggestion of expanded military exchanges, indicates that China increasingly regards North Korea not merely as a troublesome neighbour to be managed, but as a prime asset to be cultivated amid its strategic competition with the United States. Of course, North Korea is no equal of China or Russia. Its economy remains diminutive. Its population is impoverished and its power overwhelmingly military. Yet it possesses scarce and valuable assets: nuclear weapons, missiles, ammunition, expendable manpower, a geostrategic location and an unusual willingness to accept risks. Both Moscow and Beijing now have reasons to preserve – and compete for – influence over Pyongyang. On 27 July, Kim once again celebrates a war North Korea started, failed to win and has lied about ever since. Dismissing the occasion as another absurd pageant, however, would be a dangerous mistake. In 1953, North Korea converted military failure into a mythology of victory. In 2026, that false mythology endures – but the power standing behind it has become ominously real.

    Zafer Günü'nde Kim Jong Un’un Dönüşen Gücü ve Stratejik Etkisi
  37. Siyasi27 Tem· TokyoJaponya

    Immigration surge a factor in rise of MAGA-like sentiments in Japan

    MAGA people feel they are being exploited by foreign countries and advocate for stricter immigration policies. In my interviews with Trump supporters or conservatives in United States, I often encounter praise for my country and its culture. In their eyes, Japan has preserved itself as a monocultural and conservative country. In their view, the opposite extreme — and a cautionary example — is illustrated by European countries that adopted lenient immigration policies and lost their original cultures. However, Japan is undergoing rapid change as the number of foreign residents is rapidly increasing. As of the end of 2025, the number of foreign residents in Japan reached a record high of approximately 4.12 million, surpassing the 4 million mark for the first time. This is more than double the figure of about 2.03 million recorded in 2012, just over 10 years earlier. In particular, since 2022 — when the Covid-19 pandemic slowly began to subside — the influx of foreign residents has exploded due to the demand for workers, resulting in an unprecedented increase of more than 1 million people over the past three years. Chinese nationals stand out among this group. Of the 4.12 million, approximately 930,000 are from China, making it the largest group by nationality and accounting for 22.6pc of the total. In the past, Chinese nationals living in Japan came as migrant workers seeking to escape poverty in their homeland. However, since 2010 — when China’s gross domestic product surpassed Japan’s — the Chinese moving to Japan have primarily been from the wealthy and middle classes. In particular, after the 2015 introduction of the business manager visa, which mainly required applicants to either have ¥5 million in capital or hire two full-time employees, the number of Chinese immigrants using this visa increased significantly. The requirements were made stricter late last year. Notably, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the administration of Chinese President Xi Jinping implemented strict “Zero Covid” policies, including lockdowns, which highlighted the political risks of living in China. Additionally, due to economic stagnation and a desire to avoid the intensifying “exam war” in China, there has been a sharp increase in education-driven immigration aimed at enrolling in prestigious Japanese universities. This recent phenomenon is called “run ri” in China, using sounds that indicate a “run to Japan” movement. This massive migration of Chinese nationals is having a significant impact on Japanese society. High-end apartments in Tokyo are being snapped up by Chinese buyers. At elementary schools in Bunkyo Ward, known as one of the best school districts in Tokyo and home to Japan’s top universities, the number of Chinese children learning at local elementary schools is surging. According to a report by The Yomiuri Shimbun, the number of foreign-national children in Bunkyo Ward more than doubled between 2019 and 2025. The statistics are not broken down by nationality, but the number of Chinese students is significant, according to the report. This phenomenon has fostered feelings bordering on hostility among the Japanese people. Japan and China are neighbors and share a certain rivalry. The Japanese do not view China favorably, as it uses its military might to intimidate neighboring countries, and they also feel a sense of frustration at having been surpassed by China’s economic power. This public sentiment has begun to be used for political purposes. In the 2025 House of Councillors election and the House of Representatives election the following year, Sanseito — which advocates “Japanese First” policies and decreasing immigration — significantly increased its number of seats. The tightening of immigration policies advocated by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi likely contributed to her Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide victory in the House of Representatives election in February. While stating that she “draws a clear line between [her] policies and xenophobia,” Takaichi moved forward with measures such as tightening the screening process for residency status and strengthening responses to crimes committed by foreign residents. These moves are epitomized by the significant tightening of the requirements for business manager visas, which resulted in a 96pc drop in the number of applications. Waseda University Prof. Shunsuke Tanabe has been conducting surveys on Japanese attitudes toward foreigners every four years. The 2025 survey results showed that the percentage of people concerned that an increase in foreign residents would disrupt public safety and order rose to 73pc, a significant increase from 56pc in 2021. Strong opposition was particularly evident regarding Chinese immigration; while 31pc were in favor or somewhat in favor when the survey began in 2009, that figure fell to less than 10pc in the 2025 survey. Generational differences were also notable: Those in their 30s and younger expressed higher favorability toward politicians and political forces considered to be on the right, such as Takaichi, Sanseito, or Trump. A higher proportion of younger people rely on social media rather than newspapers or television as their source of information, and this might have had an impact on their views. Published in Dawn, July 27th, 2026

    Japonya'da artan göç, MAGA benzeri milliyetçi duyguları körüklüyor
  38. Diplomatik27 Tem· WashingtonABD

    To end Myanmar's brutal civil war, the US will need China's help

    The Burmese people continue to suffer as the brutal civil war in Myanmar heads toward its sixth year. The conflict was recently brought home to America with China’s arrest of Min Zin, an American citizen who heads the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP)–Myanmar, located in Thailand. Beijing accused him of spying. China has increasingly close relations with the government in Naypyidaw, highlighted by the June visit to Beijing of Min Aung Hlaing, the commanding general who recently anointed himself Myanmar’s president. China helps Hlaing’s regime survive despite widespread popular opposition. For decades the borderlands of Myanmar have been aflame, as ethnic minorities fought for the autonomy promised them when the country gained independence after World War II. The Tatmadaw, or military, seized power in 1962 and has ruled the country in varying iterations ever since. In 2021, Hlaing, disappointed by the hybrid civilian-led government’s refusal to make him president, staged a coup, ending Burma’s brief experiment in limited democratic governance. In response to widespread protests, the regime “instituted curfews and other limitations on gatherings to curb the demonstrations. Doubling down, the military launched violent campaigns across the country, targeting resistance villages, and silencing and torturing dissenters, displacing thousands in the process,” according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The junta detained tens of thousands of its citizens as the nation quickly returned to civil war, this time across almost the entire country. Most of Burma now lies beyond the Tatmadaw’s control; the regime is secure only in major cities. The result is a humanitarian horror. Reports the New York Times: “Far from the spotlight fixed on Iran, Ukraine, Lebanon and other global conflicts, Myanmar, a Southeast Asian nation of about 50 million people, has quietly collapsed.” Tens of thousands have died. Hundreds of thousands have fled the country. Millions have been uprooted. Reports the European Commission: “Mass displacement continues at an alarming rate, with some 3.6 million people displaced as of December 2025, about 90% of whom have been displaced since February 2021.” The conflict is religious as well. Nearly a decade ago, the military, backed by the civilian authorities, launched a brutal campaign against the largely Muslim Rohingya. As the United Nations’ refugee agency explained, “armed attacks, massive scale violence, and serious human rights violations forced thousands of Rohingya to flee their homes in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Many walked for days through jungles and undertook dangerous sea journeys across the Bay of Bengal to reach safety in Bangladesh,” where roughly a million remain. Many of the ethnic insurgents — especially the Kachin, Chin, and Karen, as well as smaller shares of the Lahu, Lisu, and Naga — are Christian. Against them the Tatmadaw has promoted Buddhism. Reported the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs: “Stated-owned newspapers and television channels report daily about Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and his inner circle making donations to monks, or building monasteries and images of the Buddha.” The regime has demonized religious minorities. According to Georgetown University’s Berkley Center: “the military planted and perpetuated the ideology that to be nationalist is to be Buddhist. … The military successfully used the polarizing ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric in portraying non-Buddhists as threats to the state and in capitalizing Buddhists as protectors of the Burmese race and effective guardians of Buddhism.” I made my first trip to Karen-held territory more than a quarter century ago and have returned several times since. The region bordering Thailand was long ravaged by conflict, with many Burmese pushed across the border into refugee camps. A tenuous peace was established through a 2012 ceasefire, only to end after the latest coup. Washington has sanctioned the Tatmadaw and its junta, but Southeast Asia worries little about the nature of ruling regimes. Most important, neither India nor China, competing for influence in Myanmar, is squeamish about working with murderous regimes. Both hosted Hlaing in June, with enhanced economic and security cooperation on the agenda. Analyst Jason Towers noted that Chinese leader “Xi Jinping's frequent meetings and interactions with Min Aung Hlaing since the [2024] Myanmar earthquake send a strong signal that China is supporting his regime at the highest level.” Beijing has pressed insurgents in border territories to end attacks on the regime and the Tatmadaw to safeguard Burma’s natural gas and oil pipelines. China is the regime’s principal weapons supplier and has blocked proposals for a United Nations arms embargo. Beijing has played a particularly important role in empowering Burma’s air force, which, according to the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, “has increasingly deployed airstrikes on populated areas, targeting crowded markets, schools, places of worship, camps for internally displaced persons, and hospitals.” Beijing’s support may have prevented the Tatmadaw’s defeat, but the regime is still unlikely to prevail. It is estimated to control only about one-fifth of the country, half the share held by opposition forces, with the rest of the land contested. According to a Council on Foreign Relations analysis: “The People’s Defense Force (PDF) and its allies continue gaining key territory, pushing the military on the defensive in the Bamar heartland and advancing towards Mandalay. The military junta especially struggles to fight ethnic armed organizations across the country, which have made most of the territorial gains so far.” Washington’s ability to influence the junta is limited. Economy-wide sanctions targeting the energy industry would injure Burma’s people more than the junta and probably would not crash the regime, given Chinese backing. Washington should do what it can to weaken the Tatmadaw, but that requires cooperating with European governments and especially Burma’s neighbors. That won’t be easy, since China will remain the most influential foreign actor. The administration should engage Beijing on the issue, seeking to reduce its aid to Naypyidaw. Washington could offer a modus vivendi of sorts, indicating that its primary concern is humanitarian. Thus, Washington could promise to forgo any efforts to court a Burmese government resulting from changed Chinese policy. An international reform effort led by Xi could better serve Chinese as well as international interests. The Tatmadaw’s ostentatious brutality and corruption ensure continuing conflict, while Beijing’s ability to positively influence events is limited. Cornell University’s Aung Thura Ko Ko observed: “Myanmar is not a chessboard Beijing can fully control. … The greatest long-term risk for China may be anti-China sentiment, which has long existed in Myanmar.” In contrast, a push for regime change or at least reform, returning basic control to the Burmese people, could better protect Chinese interests. Defusing the conflict would reduce concerns over the security of energy supplies. Ending perceived Chinese support for the junta would relieve popular hostility toward Beijing. Indeed, the civilian regime overthrown by Hlaing had established good relations with its dominant neighbor, and China has maintained contact with opposition forces. The conflict in Myanmar rarely makes the top of the news in any Western nation. However, it remains one of the world’s worst humanitarian horrors, which President Donald Trump should address. Obviously, Myanmar, under military rule for more than six decades, is a tough case. However, China, despite its official hospitality for Hlaing, should recognize that most of its contacts with Myanmar are about problems, many of them violent. Even for China, a more democratic peace might be a better option than continued unpredictable civil war.

    Myanmar'daki İç Savaşın Sonu İçin ABD'nin Çin'e İhtiyacı Var
  39. Güvenlik27 Temİran

    Zelensky claims Russia helped Iran target US bases in Gulf

    UKRAINIAN President Volody­myr Zelensky claimed over the weekend that Russia is assisting Iran in targeting US bases in the Mid­dle East by sharing satellite surveillance. “Since the beginning of July, we have recorded active Russian satellite surveillance of the Gulf states and US military facilities located there,” Zelensky said on X. “These images subsequently appear in Iran. At the same time, there is a clear correlation between Russia’s satellite imagery of these sites and Iranian strikes — both before the attacks, in preparation for them, and afterward, to assess the damage inflicted.” The remarks came after Kyiv see­mingly opened a front against Teh­ran in the Caspian, the world’s largest inland sea, with Iran threatening retaliation after a deadly attack by Ukraine on an Iranian ship. Tehran threatens retaliation after Kyiv attacks Iranian vessel in Caspian Sea On Saturday, Zelensky claimed his country had carried out long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea against vessels transporting military cargo involving Iran. He wrote on social media that Ukrainian armed forces had achieved “very strong results with long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea — including vessels used in military cargo shipments involving Iran, as well as a warship”. Ukraine’s intelligence services, for their part, reported on Telegram that drone attacks had been carried out against “cargo vessels under international sanctions that were used to transport military cargo between Iran and Russia”. According to Iranian state television, the foreign ministry had summoned the Ukrainian charge d’aff­aires in Tehran on Saturday to protest this “hostile and criminal act”. On Sunday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi hit back at Kyiv for the attack on its commercial vessel, which he said had claimed the life of a sailor. He described it as “a blatant UN Charter violation done at Israel’s behest to drag Europe into its war”. He added that, during calls with the European Union’s Kaja Kallas and Russian top diplomat Sergei Lavrov, he “made clear that what the freeloader in Kyiv did CANNOT GO UNANSWERED”. Iran’s foreign ministry also said the attack caused the ship “to explode, killing one sailor and injuring several others”. The Islamic republic “has never intervened in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine”, the ministry said in a statement. Russia helping Iran? Zelensky’s accusations of Russia helping Iran target US troops are not the first. Multiple sources, including a senior US official, had told CBS News six days into the war that Russia was providing intelligence to Iran regarding US positions in the Middle East. The allegation has lingered in media reports over the last few months, often with China possibly being involved as well. During a hearing on Capitol Hill earlier this week, Defence Secre­tary Pete Hegseth was directly asked whether Russia and China were helping Iran. His answer was somewhat unclear, but he did say they were helping Iran. “There’s definitely adversary alignment, attempts to do so, and there are many ways that we deter that. And the depth and extent of it ought to remain classified, and it should,” Hegseth said. “But there are ways in which both of those countries are limiting, at different levels, enabling some of the things Iran is doing, yes.” However, just days later, President Trump contradicted his secretary of defence, saying on Truth Social he did not believe they were assisting Iran. He mentioned both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin and said they had assured him they were not involved. But on Saturday, Zelensky pointed to specific instances of Russia assisting Iran with targeting bases with US troops. “On July 19 and 20 alone, four air bases fell within the area of interest of Russian satellites — two in Bahrain, one in Jordan, and one in Kuwait,” Zelensky wrote. Published in Dawn, July 27th, 2026

    ABD Buşehr Nükleer Santrali Çevresini Vurdu, İran Hürmüz’ü Kontrol Etmek İstiyor
  40. Güvenlik24 TemÇin

    Trump'tan büyük saldırı açıklaması: Henüz bir karar vermedim

    Trump, Beyaz Saray'da düzenlediği basın toplantısında gazetecilerin ABD ile İran arasında yaşanan çatışmalar ve olası bir anlaşma konusundaki sorularını cevaplandırdı. İlginizi Çekebilir İran'a yönelik saldırıların devam edip etmeyeceğine ilişkin soruya Trump, "İran'a yönelik büyük çaplı saldırılar konusunda henüz bir karar vermedim. İran, gün geçtikçe görüşmelerde daha ciddi bir tavır sergiliyor." yanıtını verdi. Trump, İran konusunda "acelesi olmadığını" vurgularken, Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ve Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in İran'la ilgili kendisine verdiği sözlere "güvendiğini" belirtti. ABD Başkanı, "Rusya ve Çin'in İran'a olanak sağlayıp sağlamadığını bilmiyorum. Rusya'nın ya da Çin'in hayal kırıklığına uğramamı istediğini sanmıyorum." dedi. SUUDİ ARABİSTAN'LA NÜKLEER ANLAŞMA İÇİN ABRAHAM ANLAŞMASI ŞARTINI YİNELEDİ ABD Başkanı Trump, soru üzerine Suudi Arabistan'la nihayete erdirilecek bir nükleer enerji anlaşmasının ön şartı olarak İsrail'in taraf olduğu Abraham Anlaşması'na katılmaları gereğini tekrar vurguladı. Trump, "Bunu yapabilmeleri için son derece başarılı olan Abraham Anlaşması'na taraf olmaları gerekiyor." ifadesini kullandı. Suudi yönetiminin artık bu anlaşmaya imza atma zamanının geldiğini söyleyen Trump, "Onlar ve diğerleri, İran'la yaşadıkları sorun nedeniyle buna yanaşmıyordu. Ancak artık ortada öyle bir sorun kalmadı." değerlendirmesinde bulundu. ABD basınından çarpıcı iddia! Bahreyn ve Kuveyt İran'ı vurdu Son dakika... Bakan Gürlek'ten Ahbap soruşturması açıklaması: Haluk Levent kaçma girişimindeydi

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  41. Güvenlik24 TemÇin

    Trump: "İran'a yönelik büyük çaplı saldırılar konusunda henüz bir karar vermedim"

    ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İran'a yönelik "büyük çaplı bir saldırı" başlatıp başlatmama konusunda henüz karar vermediğini, İran'ın görüşmelerde "daha ciddi" tavır sergilediğini belirtti. Trump, Beyaz Saray'da düzenlediği basın toplantısında gazetecilerin ABD ile İran arasında yaşanan çatışmalar ve olası bir anlaşma konusundaki sorularını cevaplandırdı. İran'a yönelik saldırıların devam edip etmeyeceğine ilişkin soruya Trump, "İran'a yönelik büyük çaplı saldırılar konusunda henüz bir karar vermedim. İran, gün geçtikçe görüşmelerde daha ciddi bir tavır sergiliyor." yanıtını verdi. Trump, İran konusunda "acelesi olmadığını" vurgularken, Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ve Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in İran'la ilgili kendisine verdiği sözlere "güvendiğini" belirtti. ABD Başkanı, "Rusya ve Çin'in İran'a olanak sağlayıp sağlamadığını bilmiyorum. Rusya'nın ya da Çin'in hayal kırıklığına uğramamı istediğini sanmıyorum." dedi. SUUDİ ARABİSTAN'LA ANLAŞMA ABD Başkanı Trump, soru üzerine Suudi Arabistan'la nihayete erdirilecek bir nükleer enerji anlaşmasının ön şartı olarak İsrail'in taraf olduğu Abraham Anlaşması'na katılmaları gereğini tekrar vurguladı. Trump, "Bunu yapabilmeleri için son derece başarılı olan Abraham Anlaşması'na taraf olmaları gerekiyor." ifadesini kullandı. Suudi yönetiminin artık bu anlaşmaya imza atma zamanının geldiğini söyleyen Trump, "Onlar ve diğerleri, İran'la yaşadıkları sorun nedeniyle buna yanaşmıyordu. Ancak artık ortada öyle bir sorun kalmadı." değerlendirmesinde bulundu.

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  42. Güvenlik24 Tem· PekinÇin

    Trump, Çin ve Rusya'nın İran'a yönelik silah satışına 'dahil olmadığını' belirtti

    Trump, sosyal medya hesabından, Çin ile Rusya hakkında açıklamalarda bulundu. Çin Devlet Başkanı Şi Cinping ile Pekin'de yaptığı görüşmede, Çin liderinin kendisine İran'a hiçbir koşulda silah vermeyeceğini veya satmayacağını söylediğini ve bunun Çinli şirketler için de geçerli olduğunu aktaran Trump, "İlişkilerimizi göz önünde bulundurarak sözüne güveniyorum. Üstelik ben de ona çok büyük iyilikler yapıyorum." ifadesini kullandı. Aynı şekilde Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in de "Ukrayna'da devam eden korkunç savaşa rağmen" kendisine İran'a silah satmayacağını söylediğini kaydeden Trump, "(Putin) Ukrayna'ya değil, NATO ülkelerine silah sattığımı biliyor." değerlendirmesinde bulundu. Donald Trump, NATO ülkelerinin tam fiyat ödediğini ve bu silahların nasıl dağıtıldığı konusunda "hiçbir fikri olmadığını" belirterek, "Sıkça dile getirilse de iki büyük ülkenin (İran'a silah satışı) bu işe dahil olmadığını düşünüyorum. Eğer olsalardı, bu onlar için çok kötü olurdu. Kesinlikle çıkarlarına olmazdı." ifadelerine yer verdi. Son dakika... Ayasofya'nın ibadete açılmasının 6. yıl dönümü! Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Bizler gerçekten gururluyuz, mutluyuz Son dakika... Meteoroloji'den Cumartesi alarmı: Afete dönüşme ihtimali var, işiniz yoksa dışarı çıkmayın

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  43. Güvenlik24 Tem· WashingtonABD

    Trump warns Russia and China against arms sales to Iran

    WASHINGTON: US President Donald Trump warned China and Russia on Friday against selling weapons to Iran – while saying he believed assurances from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin that they were not yet doing so.

    Trump: Her ABD Askerinin Ölümü İran'a Kat Kat Ödetilecek
  44. Güvenlik24 Tem· WashingtonABD

    Will Donald Trump’s China squeeze for summit leverage actually work?

    Washington’s recent wave of trade, tech and visa restrictions on China appears to be a deliberate push to build leverage ahead of the presidential summit in September, according to Chinese analysts. However, they warn that such aggressive pressure tactics risk souring the political atmosphere ahead of the high-stakes meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. The assessment comes as the two powers seek to establish a new framework of “constructive strategic stability”, in line with the...

  45. Diplomatik24 Tem· WashingtonABD

    What the UK should learn from Kimi K3, WAICO and the Hugging Face incident

    What the UK should learn from Kimi K3, WAICO and the Hugging Face incident Expert comment jon.wallace 24 July 2026 Washington and Beijing spent the week arguing about whose models we should use. But the week’s most important news was about what a model did. On 17 July, Chinese President Xi Jinping told an audience in Shanghai that artificial intelligence should be ‘a symphony of international cooperation’, not ‘a solo performance by a single country’. Xi promised cooperation across Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia through a new World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (‘WAICO’) – viewed as a rival to United States-led efforts. And he warned against any country stretching the concept of national security to place its own interests above everyone else’s – a clear dig at the US. But it was not China’s latest moves on global AI governance that caught most attention this month. It was its AI capabilities – specifically a powerful new AI model called Kimi K3. At the end of 2024, the release of the Chinese DeepSeek AI knocked billions off American technology stocks, as it revealed that China was closer to US AI capabilities than previously thought. Related work What the UK government should do on AI and tech policy Kimi K3, a huge new Chinese model, adds fuel to those fears. It can compete with the latest offers from leading US laboratories, and is promised to be released as ‘open weights’ – the term for AI you can run yourself provided you have the hardware. The news predictably hit stock prices again, as it appears to narrow the gap on the US’s technological lead still further. From Beijing to DC, in discussions of sovereignty and dependence, IP theft, export controls and licensing, the focus is squarely on who is winning the AI race and by what margin. But there is a more pressing question: not whether the US or China is producing the most advanced models – but what those models are capable of. A myopic focus on competition risks leaving the toolbox of AI governance empty when it is needed most. A warning Leading US AI news this week was a more worrying development: during an internal evaluation, OpenAI models reportedly found a previously unknown flaw in third-party software, escaped the sealed environment they were being tested in, and moved through OpenAI’s research network until they reached a machine with an internet connection. Using that connection, they broke into the servers of another AI company – Hugging Face – and stole the answers to the exam they were sitting. A handful of cynics have accused OpenAI of crying wolf, arguing that this is a scare story aimed at convincing the world of the immense power of its technology. But AI experts have warned for decades that a machine set a task without sufficient guardrails may pursue its goals in unexpected or dangerous ways. Nick Bostrom’s famous thought experiment argued that a machine with superhuman competence innocently tasked with creating paperclips, given no other values, might well turn us all into paperclips. The hacking of Hugging Face by the OpenAI models looks to be an example of precisely this kind of misalignment – though both companies have offered few details beyond their initial blog posts. While its significance is disputed, the incident casts a long shadow over a technology debate conducted almost entirely in the language of competition. Few of the instruments that debate has produced would be useful in dealing with the risks the event highlights. Deciding who may have what AI – not what the AI does Banning Chinese models in America, as is reportedly being considered by the US administration, is an obvious example. The OpenAI model that allegedly broke containment was run on American chips, in an American data centre, for an American company. The rising popularity of Chinese AI models for American startups means that the main achievement of any ban would not be to improve safety, but to cut the legs out from under such US firms. Threats to sanction Chinese AI firms on the grounds of intellectual property theft – besides continuing to underplay Chinese innovation – also do nothing to limit the capabilities of AI models in the wild. And recently introduced approval windows for new AI models remain voluntary. Besides – the OpenAI incident took place behind closed doors, inside a private research environment, before the window for audit. While some of these measures may help US AI firms – particularly its two biggest, OpenAI and Anthropic – jockey for position, they do precious little to govern the capabilities of the technology itself. Should the US tighten its restrictions on Chinese AI, the UK should not follow suit. It is notable that President Xi used his address in Shanghai to call for AI systems to remain under human control to manage AI risk. But China’s play is similarly competitive. Its vision for WAICO is to counterbalance the US in shaping global AI norms. China is pushing open weight models. That is a clear contrast to the US, whose larger AI firms generally choose not to release their model weights and charge higher fees for access. However, for the moment, Beijing’s AI pitch comes from the same angle as Washington: a focus on who may have AI models, not on what the models do. What the UK can do Should the US tighten its restrictions on Chinese AI, the UK should not follow suit. A ban on Chinese open weight models would fall hardest on British firms that cannot afford the fees charged by the largest American labs. Maintaining the ability of UK startups to use cheap, open weight AI will be essential for them to compete with established players. An A16Z blog estimates some 80 per cent of startups using open models depend on Chinese ones. But more fundamentally, the UK should bring focus to a conversation that is drifting away from the urgent task to ensure artificial intelligence is developed safely. In the past fortnight, both US and Chinese technology companies have released extremely powerful AI systems. Governing these frontier systems will not come about through competition, but through technical institutional credibility: the exact kind of world-leading credibility that the UK’s AI Security Institute (AISI) has. In the same week as the OpenAI incident, AISI published research showing that every model they tested would at times cheat to achieve an objective. Where those models were built, or who by, tells us little about how they must be governed. It is the capacity to evaluate these systems that matters, and it is here that the UK can play a vital role. The challenge is to be heard over the sabre rattling.

    Xi'nin yapay zeka çağrısı İngiltere için ders niteliğinde
  46. Siyasi24 Tem· BeijingÇin

    China says US 'not a party' to South China Sea dispute after Trump-Marcos call

    Beijing says involvement of 'non-regional countries' only fuels tensions after Trump pledges to raise Manila's concerns with Chinese President Xi Jinping

  47. Diplomatik24 Tem· ManilaFilipinler

    Trump to Marcos: Will raise PH concerns with Xi

    MANILA, Philippines — President Marcos spoke on the phone late Thursday with United States President Donald Trump where the US leader said he would “take up concerns of the Philippines” with China in his next meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Presidential Communications Office said. The call was confirmed by US Ambassador to the

  48. Diplomatik23 TemÇin

    China's Xi to visit U.S. in September for talks, Trump says

    ‌U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday he will discuss artificial ​intelligence with Chinese President Xi ​Jinping when he visits the United States on Sept. ​24.

  49. Diplomatik23 Tem· ManilaFilipinler

    Phone a friend: Trump tells Marcos he’ll raise PH concerns with Xi

    MANILA, Philippines — United States President Donald Trump told President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. he will raise the Philippine leader’s latest issues, especially those involving the latest confrontations in the South China Sea, directly to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump made the commitment during a phone call with Marcos on Thursday evening (Philippine time), according to Malacañang.

  50. Güvenlik23 TemÇin

    Xi Jinping warns of ‘new historical injustice’ in AI. What does he mean - and can it be prevented?

    The warning by China’s president draws on a long-standing domestic narrative about the costs of falling behind in previous technological revolutions, say analysts.