ABD Ayrıldı, Çin Afganistan'da Konumunu Güçlendiriyor

When US left Afghanistan, China moved in. So How's it going?

When the Taliban reclaimed power five years ago, China appeared poised to capitalize on Afghanistan’s new realities. Beijing quickly took important steps to establish de facto relations with the Islamic Emirate, such as keeping its embassy open in Kabul, maintaining direct ties with Taliban leaders, and expanding political and security cooperation. In January 2024, Xi Jinping became the first head of state to accept credentials from a Taliban-appointed ambassador. Many analysts latched onto these moves as evidence that China would quickly assert great influence in Afghanistan after the hasty U.S. withdrawal in August 2021. Yet Beijing has pursued a far more cautious course, stopping short of formal recognition, which China sees as a bargaining chip for possible future use. Beijing’s clear message is that recognition will depend on how the Taliban addresses China’s interests and concerns. A security first approach Above all, Beijing wants assurances that Afghan territory will not become a launchpad for attacks on China or a base for militant groups hostile to Chinese interests. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan, Beijing alleged that armed Uyghur militants received training and material support there and that some later returned to China to carry out attacks. Since 2021, the Taliban 2.0 has delivered enough on the security front to keep Beijing engaged, but not enough to eliminate China’s concerns. Taliban authorities have restricted the activities of Uyghur militants and relocated fighters associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) — sometimes referred to as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) — away from the Afghan-Chinese border. There have been no confirmed attacks inside China that were launched from Afghan territory under the Taliban 2.0. Nonetheless, the Taliban has stopped short of expelling or handing over Uyghur militants who fought alongside them for years, and United Nations monitors continue to report on TIP’s presence in Afghanistan. “To a large extent,” the Taliban has satisfied Beijing by limiting the militants’ ability to act against Chinese interests, even while allowing them to remain in Afghanistan, according to a former Afghan diplomat, who spoke to RS on condition he not be identified. For China, that imperfect arrangement may be acceptable so long as the threat remains contained. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) has complicated matters. On one hand, Beijing views the Taliban as a necessary counter-terrorism partner against ISIS-K. On the other, ISIS-K has exposed the limits of the Taliban’s ability to protect Chinese interests and citizens. Having repeatedly targeted Chinese nationals and Chinese-linked businesses in Afghanistan, ISIS-K has also sought to recruit Uyghur militants, including TIP-associated fighters, by presenting the fight against China as part of its broader jihadist agenda. “ISIS-K has made the Taliban more valuable to Beijing and less credible at the same time,” according to Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, an associate professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Paradoxically, for Beijing, the Taliban remains an indispensable security partner precisely because the threat the Islamic Emirate promised to contain continues growing. “The Taliban is struggling to maintain security and prevent threats to Chinese interests in Afghanistan, and the two biggest threats are ISIS-K and [ETIM],” Morgan Tadych, senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, told RS. “Although [ISIS-K and ETIM] are not aligned with each other, they share a common goal of threatening Chinese interests in Afghanistan, such as mines, hotels, restaurants, and places where Chinese workers gather,” Tadych added. “Both groups perceive attacks against these locations as demonstrating their support for oppressed Uyghurs in China, and the Taliban has proven itself incapable of deterring or stopping these attacks.” The economic dimensions Although security cooperation has brought China and the Taliban closer, economic ties have been far less consequential than many had expected in 2021–22. China has long been interested in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, and Chinese companies have announced deals involving copper, oil, and gas, but few have translated into functioning projects. The Mes Aynak copper concession, signed in 2008 and repeatedly revived since the Taliban takeover, still has not reached commercial production. The Taliban terminated the Amu Darya oil project in 2025 following disputes with its Chinese operator. These episodes illustrate the difficulties of doing business in today’s Afghanistan. Contracts are difficult to enforce, the banking system remains isolated from the global economy, and political and economic decision-making is highly concentrated within the Taliban leadership. Sanctions and the challenges of transporting heavy minerals out of landlocked Afghanistan add to costs of doing business, noted Murtazashvili. Chinese companies may see opportunities in Afghanistan, but they have little reason to assume the enormous risks required to turn those opportunities into large-scale investments. Afghanistan’s limited economic importance to Beijing is also reflected in its place within China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite years of discussion about incorporating Afghanistan into China’s infrastructure network, there has been little tangible progress. Beijing’s major regional corridors run through Pakistan and Central Asia, while Afghanistan has yet to receive a flagship Chinese-backed BRI project. Pakistan as a major factor This limited economic engagement is closely tied to Afghanistan’s broader place in China’s regional strategy. For decades, Beijing largely viewed Afghanistan through a Pakistani lens, relying on Islamabad to help manage relations with Kabul. China previously supported extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, but the proposal has yet to be funded. The closure of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border amid the current conflict between the Afghan Taliban and Islamabad poses another major obstacle. “Afghanistan has marginal importance in BRI,” noted Murtazashvili. For now, China appears more interested in insulating its existing regional corridors from Afghanistan’s instability than in making the country a central node of its connectivity strategy. Militants operating in the Afghan-Pakistani border region have also attacked Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan, including projects associated with the CPEC. More recently, China has sought to mediate between Pakistan and the Taliban, underscoring how difficult it has become for Beijing to separate its Afghanistan policy from hostilities between Kabul and Islamabad. At the same time, these growing challenges have strengthened Beijing’s incentive to cultivate a direct relationship with Kabul rather than rely solely on Islamabad. China sees closer ties with the Taliban as a way to hedge at a time when Pakistan’s increasingly close ties with the West concerns Beijing. “Beijing also values the Taliban’s authoritarian rule and the resulting enforced stability, as Beijing finds Pakistan’s internal political instability as a major hindrance to their expansion in the region,” the former Afghan diplomat told RS. According to the same source, some within Pakistan’s establishment have also considered annexing the narrow Wakhan Corridor. This move would make Tajikistan Pakistan’s direct neighbor, giving Islamabad direct access to Central Asia without traversing Afghanistan. But such a move would also deny China a border with Afghanistan, which would likely not be well-received by Beijing. Five years after the Taliban’s return, China’s approach to Afghanistan looks less like a grand strategic expansion than an exercise in controlled exposure. Beijing has enjoyed direct diplomatic access to the Taliban, established limited security cooperation, and kept open the possibility of deeper economic and political ties — all while avoiding the costs of formally recognizing the Islamic Emirate or making major financial commitments. China has neither replaced the United States in Afghanistan nor appears intent on doing so. Instead, Beijing seeks to contain the security risks Afghanistan poses while preserving whatever leverage and opportunities it offers. As Murtazashvili put it, the goal is “insulation at the lowest possible price.”