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Philip Davis

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  1. Güvenlik02 EkiFilistin

    Senior UN figure sacked for criticising Israel

    ROME: A senior official at the UN’s agriculture agency said on Wed­­­nesday he had lost his job for cri­t­­icising Israeli policies in Gaza, as the body’s head condemned staff who “play the game of human rig­hts”. Food and Agriculture Organis­ation (FAO) director Ben Davis said he had been informed in July that his contract would not be renewed after 26 years because he had allegedly breached impartiality rules. “They accused me of organising these moments of silence on the situation of starvation and famine in Gaza,” he said, referring to weekly silent protests by some employees at the Rome-based organisation. Davis was also criticised for a report he worked on about food availability in Gaza and humanitarian law, published in May. “We were told to take it down,” he said. “We weren’t allowed to make any references to humanitarian law.” FAO director-general Qu Dongyu appeared to warn FAO staff Tuesday that “we don’t allow you to play the game here of human rights”. He was speaking in public comments made at the start of a filmed session on forestry. “Of course, human rights is very important but we have the human rights agency in Geneva,” he added. “If you want to take care, go there. “That’s why some senior members play the political game here, I fire him…You should follow the FAO constitution… You are against staff regulations…But I’m a very soft person, I didn’t fire that many,” he said. “I will fire more people if they are against the law,” he added. FAO did not respond to a request for comment. Asked if he thought the director general’s comments were about him, Davis said “absolutely”. “He has already scolded me in public in the past for being too political.” Davis also said he was “concerned” about the director general’s comments on firing more people. Hundreds of people attended the moments of silence at their height and there are now only 30-40 people coming on a weekly basis, he said. Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has killed over 74,000 people since October 2023, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry, whose figures the United Nations deems reliable. Published in Dawn, October 2nd, 2026

    Hamas leader says Israel to campaign off Gaza's 'blood' in election
  2. Güvenlik01 Eki

    Army meets Reserve, Special Forces recruiting goals for first time in a decade, general confirms

    Meeting recruiting goals allows the service to "firm up many of our operational units with the right talent," said USAREC Commander Lt. Gen. Johnny Davis.

  3. Diplomatik24 Eyl· WashingtonABD

    ‘The Dragon’ defined: How three capitals reimagined China

    Few things better illustrate how charged the American debate over China has become than the reaction to Jennifer Kavanagh’s recent proposal for a radically different U.S. military posture in Asia. Kavanagh, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities, has argued that Washington should pull most of its forces back from the “first island chain,” which includes Taiwan and the Philippines, toward the more defensible “second island chain,” while narrowing its defense commitments to regional allies and eschewing any commitment to defend Taiwan. The proposal prompted a sharp backlash from analysts and commentators, with some flinging accusations that Kavanagh and her colleagues are “fifth columnists.” The episode raises a larger question: how did the American debate over China become so intensely focused on strategic competition – and so resistant to arguments for restraint? David M. McCourt’s "The Dragon Defined: How Washington, Canberra, and London Reimagined China" is an unusually illuminating account of how China came to be understood as a strategic competitor in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. A professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, McCourt draws on more than 250 interviews with diplomats, strategists, academics, and other participants in the foreign-policy communities of the three countries to provide a rich, transnational account of great help to those seeking to understand the debate surrounding the rise of China. As McCourt puts it in the preface, “There is no single, real China, only numerous aspects – some inviting, others threatening. What leaders and elites see is largely a reflection of themselves: their hopes and fears for their countries domestically and on the world stage.” It is an apt summary of a sociologist’s perspective – and an especially useful one given the book’s subject: the production and circulation of elite knowledge. China, in McCourt’s telling, is both an empirical object and a kind of mirror. Its actual behavior matters, but so too do the institutions, professional incentives, domestic political struggles, and national self-conceptions through which that behavior is interpreted. This helps explain the striking transformation McCourt documents. In the 1990s, Washington approached China with considerable confidence that American power and engagement could shape the direction of its rise. By the mid-2010s, that confidence had given way to what McCourt describes as “an insecure, anxious, even fearful US hegemon facing a risen China that has become a near-peer challenger.” The shift from engagement to strategic competition was consequently not simply a response to an objective change in China. It was also a change in the way American elites understood the United States and its place in the world. ⁠ McCourt focuses on the institutions where foreign-policy knowledge is made – government agencies, think tanks, universities, journalism, and the business community – and, crucially, the individuals who inhabit them. American readers will recognize many of the names: AEI, CSIS, government agencies, prominent China scholars, journalists, and the revolving door connecting all of them. But McCourt’s comparative approach makes the equivalent institutions in Britain and Australia equally familiar and their relationships intelligible, including Chatham House, the Lowy Institute, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the SOAS China Institute, and the Australian Institute of International Affairs. For an American reader, the most revealing story is what happened inside Washington. The shift away from engagement did not begin with a single administration, nor did it happen because everyone suddenly reached the same conclusion about China. For decades, American policy had rested in part on an expectation that economic development, integration into international institutions, and the growth of a Chinese middle class would produce some degree of political liberalization and convergence. McCourt shows that this expectation was never universally shared. The U.S. military, in particular, had long maintained a more skeptical view of China. As one military analyst told McCourt, his organization had “stayed in the same place” while the rest of the China field had “recently ‘come to us.’” The rise of strategic competition was therefore not simply the triumph of a new idea; in important respects, it was the movement of one longstanding interpretation of China from the margins of the policy community toward its center. A look at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration illustrates the point nicely. Before September 11, 2001, Bush described China as a “strategic competitor.” Of course, the terrorist attacks and the wars that followed redirected American strategic attention elsewhere for years. China did not disappear as a concern, but the question of how to manage its rise drew less attention. When great-power competition returned to the center of U.S. strategy, some of this skepticism reemerged. The assumptions underpinning engagement became increasingly difficult to sustain. Economic growth had produced a much more powerful China, but not the political transformation many American policymakers had anticipated. President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, Beijing’s more assertive foreign policy, concerns about technology and economic dependence, human-rights abuses, and fears about the balance of power in East Asia all contributed to a growing sense that the old approach had failed. McCourt is especially interested in what happened to the people whose professional identities had been built around the older paradigm. One former Engager describes the pressure bluntly: in Washington, “You’re here because you want to influence policy,” which means asking, “how do I stay credible?” The choice, as he put it, was whether to “adjust myself to the metanarrative” or become “a voice in the wilderness.” McCourt’s interviews suggest careerism was not incidental to the production of China knowledge. Scholars, analysts, journalists, and think-tank experts had to connect their work to the concerns of policymakers – and the definition of what counted as relevant policy expertise was itself changing. At the same time, institutions with reasons to oppose engagement were becoming more influential. The military was hardly alone: hawkish think tanks and national-security officials had long challenged the assumptions of engagement, while parts of the business community became disillusioned with the expectation of an endlessly expanding “China market.” Politicians and strategists from across the political spectrum increasingly emphasized different aspects of the same emerging problem: China’s challenge to American power, its political system, its economic practices, or the security of the U.S.-led order in Asia. Figures such as Kurt Campbell, Ely Ratner, Robert Blackwill, Robert Work, Matthew Pottinger, and Elbridge Colby occupied different positions in this evolving debate, but the larger shift was institutional. By the early 2020s, the proposition that engagement had failed had hardened into a premise of Washington discourse, even as scholars and former Engagers, such as Michael Swaine and J. Stapleton Roy, continued to dispute the historical record. This is where McCourt’s comparative cases become particularly instructive. Australia, for example, complicates the assumption that ideas about China simply flow from Washington outward. McCourt shows how Australian analysts and officials helped strengthen arguments that subsequently gained traction among American skeptics of engagement, while initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific concept and AUKUS demonstrate that allies can also shape American strategic thinking. The point is not that any one of these actors “caused” America to become hawkish on China. It is that the American understanding of China emerged from a field of institutions and individuals whose interests, experiences, and assumptions were changing at the same time. McCourt’s field theory provides a useful way of understanding these developments without requiring either conspiracy or simplistic material determinism. Individuals occupying similar institutional positions, exposed to similar incentives and professional networks, can come to remarkably similar conclusions. Conversely, individuals situated differently can interpret the same Chinese actions in radically different ways. That is perhaps the greatest contribution of "The Dragon Defined." It does not require the reader to accept any particular interpretation of China in order to appreciate the importance of understanding how interpretations of China are made. For anyone interested in the origins of the contemporary turn from engagement toward strategic competition, McCourt has produced an exceptionally rich account. Its many individual case studies and interviews resist easy summary, and the comparative perspective makes the book considerably more illuminating than a study focused exclusively on Washington. Whatever position one takes on China, American grand strategy, or the wisdom of strategic competition, "The Dragon Defined" offers an important reminder: before asking what China is, it is worth asking who is doing the defining – and why.

    ‘The Dragon’ defined: How three capitals reimagined China
  4. Güvenlik21 Eyl

    CISO Conversations: Noopur Davis – The Accidental Global CISO at Comcast

    Noopur Davis never planned a career in cybersecurity. She was a developer at Intergraph, and for many years that was all she wanted to be. The post CISO Conversations: Noopur Davis – The Accidental Global CISO at Comcast appeared first on SecurityWeek.

  5. Güvenlik08 Eyl· ParisFransa

    'Be kind with yourself': US expat Robin Allison Davis on surviving cancer in Paris

    An American woman who moved to Paris and soon afterwards was twice diagnosed with breast cancer has spoken to FRANCE 24 about how she managed to get through the trauma. The paperback version of Robin Allison Davis's book "Surviving Paris: A Memoir of Healing in the City of Light" has just come out. The reviews say it's full of sorrow, laughter and some unforgettable cringeworthy moments. Davis told us the only way to survive in her situation was to be kind of herself, admitting that she did a lot of writing and crying at the same time. She spoke to us in Perspective.

  6. Güvenlik07 Eyl· BeirutLübnan

    Two children among dead in Israeli strikes on Lebanon

    Israeli airstrikes overnight killed 11 people in a south Lebanon village, including two infants, Lebanese state media said Monday, a day after separate raids left seven dead. France 24's Renée Davis in Beirut has the latest.

    ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail'den Lübnan'a Kanlı Saldırı: 4 Ölü
  7. Ekonomik07 EylPakistan

    Clean air is an economic choice Pakistan can no longer postpone

    The seventh International Day of Clean Air for blue skies, observed on September 7, 2026, places the economic case for integrated clean-air and climate action at the centre of the global conversation. For Pakistan, that message could not be more timely. Air pollution is no longer a seasonal inconvenience confined to winter smog. It is a year-round public-health emergency, a constraint on human capital and productivity, and a material risk to public finance, business continuity and financial-sector resilience. Pakistan’s policy architecture has advanced. The federal government adopted the National Clean Air Policy (NCAP) in 2023, and Punjab approved its Clean Air Policy and phased action plan the same year. Yet the decisive question is no longer whether Pakistan has policies. It is whether those policies can be converted into legally anchored responsibilities, credible data, investable sectoral measures and measurable reductions in exposure. Pakistan’s domestic financial institutions must now become part of the implementation architecture. When banks provide loans, refinancing or dedicated financing windows to industry, their risk assessments should consider material exposure to air pollution, regulatory non-compliance, inefficient technologies and transition risk. Lending structures can then reward verified emissions reductions, cleaner production and credible transition plans. This would improve environmental and financial outcomes while helping industrial sectors move progressively towards net-zero pathways without denying viable firms the capital needed to modernise. The evidence is already strong enough to act The scale of the damage is difficult to overstate. The World Bank’s Pakistan Country Climate and Development Report estimates that air pollution could impose economic losses equivalent to 6.5 per cent of GDP each year. A later World Bank appraisal for Punjab reports average annual PM2.5 exposure of about 52 micrograms per cubic metre across the province—more than ten times the WHO annual guideline of 5 micrograms—with measured annual averages of 110–130 micrograms in central Lahore. The same appraisal estimates that exposure to ambient and household PM2.5 in Pakistan was associated with a vast burden of premature mortality and illness in 2019, with health costs equivalent to about 9 percent of GDP. These estimates use different economic concepts and should not be added together; they nevertheless point in the same direction: polluted air is imposing economy-wide losses that conventional budgeting and credit decisions largely fail to recognise. Pakistan ranked as the world’s third most polluted country in IQAir’s 2024 assessment, underscoring the severity of population exposure. The burden is also deeply gendered. World Bank modelling attributes about 23pc of Punjab’s PM2.5 concentrations—and 28pc in Greater Lahore—to residential sources, predominantly the burning of solid fuels for cooking. Women and girls often experience greater direct exposure because of cooking roles and time spent near household combustion, while infants and young children breathe the same polluted indoor and neighbourhood air. Older people, persons with disabilities, outdoor workers, low-income households and communities living close to roads, kilns, industrial sites and power infrastructure also face elevated exposure and have fewer resources to protect themselves. Cleaner household energy must therefore be treated as a clean-air, public-health, gender-equality and affordability priority. Thick smog blankets Khayabaan-e-Jinnah, Lahore at 8am on December 14, 2023. Twelve major cities across Pakistan face similar hazardous conditions for three months on average each year which severely disrupts visibility andw impacts health and daily life. — Fair Finance Pakistan What the policy review finds Fair Finance Pakistan’s policy brief, “Air Pollution: A Solvable Problem,” developed with the University of California, Davis Air Quality Research Center, assesses the NCAP and Punjab’s 2023 policy against the 2021 WHO Air Quality Guidelines and relevant international governance practice. It identifies nine structural gaps in the national framework and five in Punjab’s framework. Four findings demand particular attention: Establish the national evidence baseline first. Pakistan has produced a national air-pollutant emissions inventory, but it still needs a nationally consistent, quality-assured ambient PM2.5 baseline that captures population exposure across provinces, cities and priority airsheds. Comparable source-apportionment studies are also required to determine how much pollution comes from transport, industry, households, agriculture, waste, dust and sources outside each jurisdiction. This baseline should be the first implementation priority because targets, sector selection, financing decisions and progress measurement cannot be credible without it. Targets need delivery architecture. The NCAP projects PM2.5-emission reductions of 38pc by 2030 and 81pc by 2040 against its baseline scenario. These ambitions need regularly updated inventories, sector-specific milestones, responsible institutions, funded action plans, compliance triggers and public reporting. Airsheds must shape governance. Pollution crosses city, provincial and national borders. World Bank modelling for Punjab indicates that 53pc of its PM2.5 pollution in 2021 originated within the province, 9pc came from other Pakistani provinces and 13pc from other countries. Local action and regional cooperation are therefore complementary, not competing, responsibilities. Short-lived climate pollutants require clearer accountability. The NCAP was informed by Pakistan’s 2022 inventory of short-lived climate pollutants and recognises important measures across households, waste, agriculture, industry and transport. The implementation gap is the absence of sufficiently clear, enforceable and routinely reported pollutant- and sector-level pathways, including for black carbon, methane and ozone precursors. Finance remains weakly connected to air-quality outcomes. Banks, investors and development-finance institutions influence the technology choices that determine future emissions. Clean-air eligibility criteria, verified performance indicators and pollution-risk due diligence should therefore inform credit, guarantees, concessional facilities and transition finance. From critique to a Pakistani implementation platform. The policy brief is part of a wider body of work, not a stand-alone publication. Through the ASIC Pakistan Mitigation Series 2025, Fair Finance Pakistan and UC Davis AQRC brought regulators, scientists, parliamentarians, development partners, financial institutions, industry and civil society into a shared implementation conversation. The Series launched the policy brief and issued a 2025–2030 National Clean Air Transition Statement calling for stronger sector-specific standards, financial due diligence and industrial transition pathways. Fair Finance Pakistan is now advancing the Pakistan Clean Air Finance Framework (PCAFF) to translate pollution evidence into financial governance. The goal is to connect credible emissions and exposure data with bankable interventions across priority sectors—including cleaner transport, industrial retrofits, crop-residue value chains, municipal waste, brick kilns and other high-emitting activities—while protecting workers, small enterprises and vulnerable communities during transition. A practical sequence: measure, govern, finance The brief proposes a Sensor–Governance–Finance Triad. It is not a slogan; it is a sequencing discipline to Measure: expand quality-assured ambient monitoring, source apportionment and regularly updated emissions inventories so that authorities and communities can see where pollution comes from and whether interventions work. Govern: convert evidence into enforceable standards, named responsibilities, compliance chains, airshed coordination and transparent progress reviews. Finance: use verified baselines and performance results to direct concessional credit, guarantees, transition finance and pollution-linked pricing toward interventions that deliver measurable exposure reductions. International experience—from California’s monitoring and regulatory system to European emissions regulation and urban low-emission zones—shows that durable progress comes when measurement, law, institutions and finance reinforce one another. Pakistan should adapt those principles to its federal structure, industrial base and distributional realities rather than copy any single model. Five priorities for the next phase Adopt a time-bound NCAP implementation plan with annual milestones, named federal and provincial responsibilities, budget lines and public progress reporting. Establish a lean, technically credible national coordination mechanism—such as the proposed Clean Air Secretariat—that supports rather than displaces provincial authority after the 18th Amendment. Establish a nationally consistent, quality-assured ambient PM2.5 baseline covering population exposure across provinces, cities and priority airsheds; support it with comparable source-apportionment studies and a nationally interoperable monitoring and emissions-inventory system that is updated regularly and reported transparently. Embed air-pollution risk and measurable clean-air outcomes in the Pakistan Green Taxonomy, bank due diligence, transition plans and blended-finance facilities. Align climate reporting with IFRS S1 and IFRS S2—including relevant Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3 GHG emissions—while requiring separate pollutant-specific metrics so that carbon disclosure is not treated as a substitute for air-quality reporting. Build an investable pipeline for high-impact measures, prioritising exposure reduction, health benefits, financing additionality and a just transition for SMEs, workers, farmers and low-income households. Industrial units near urban centers are major sources of toxic emissions. This photo shows an iron rod factory at the Eastern Bypass near Ravi, Lahore, on November 19, 2024, where fuel derived from burning tyres is routinely used, releasing hazardous emissions that intensify Punjab’s air pollution crisis. — Fair Finance Pakistan Clean air is achievable—and finance must help deliver it Pakistan does not need to choose between economic development and breathable air. Poor air quality already weakens growth by raising health costs, reducing labour productivity, disrupting education, damaging crops and increasing operational risk. The more relevant choice is whether the country will continue paying for pollution after the damage occurs, or finance prevention and transition before those losses deepen. On this International Day of Clean Air for blue skies, Pakistan has an opportunity to turn a policy review into an implementation compact: science defines the problem, governance assigns responsibility, finance enables transition, and communities help judge whether cleaner air is actually being delivered. Air pollution is solvable—but only when clean air becomes a measurable public duty and an investable national priority. Header image: Student rides a bicycle to school amid dense smog in Lahore, Pakistan, on November 24, 2021. — Reuters

    Temiz Hava Pakistan İçin Artık Ertelenemez Bir Ekonomik Tercih