Kolombiya devlet başkanı
Ukrayna’dan Rusya’nın kalbine İHA saldırısı
Rusya, Ukrayna’ya ait insansız hava araçlarının St. Petersburg’da bir petrol terminalini hedef aldığını açıkladı. Moskova yönetimi, gece boyunca Ukrayna’ya ait yaklaşık 500 İHA ile 10 Flamingo füzesinin düşürüldüğünü öne sürdü. Saldırıların, Rusya’nın ikinci büyük kenti St. Petersburg’un yanı sıra Finlandiya sınırına yakın Vysotsk Limanı çevresinde de etkili olduğu bildirildi. PETROL TERMİNALİ HEDEF ALINDI St. Petersburg Valisi Alexander Beglov, İHA’ların kentin Kirovsk bölgesindeki bir petrol terminali çevresini hedef aldığını duyurdu. Beglov, hava savunma sistemlerinin 72 İHA’yı düşürdüğünü, bunlardan birinin tarihi Peterhof bölgesine düştüğünü ancak can kaybı ya da hasar meydana gelmediğini açıkladı. Peterhof Sarayı, 18. yüzyılda Rus Çarı I. Petro döneminde inşa edilen geniş bahçeleri ve sarayıyla ülkenin en önemli tarihi kompleksleri arasında yer alıyor. FİNLANDİYA SINIRINDAKİ LİMAN DA VURULDU Leningrad Bölgesi Valisi Alexander Drozdenko da NATO üyesi Finlandiya sınırına yakın Vysotsk Limanı çevresinde İHA parçaları bulunduğunu bildirdi. Drozdenko, saldırının püskürtülmeye devam ettiğini belirtti. Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Volodimir Zelenski ise Kiev’in St. Petersburg’daki Kronstadt deniz üssünü de hedef aldığını savundu. MOSKOVA’DAN MİSİLLEME MESAJI Rusya, saldırılara yanıt verileceğini duyurdu. Moskova Belediye Başkanı Sergey Sobyanin, başkente yönelen 62 İHA’nın hava savunma sistemleri tarafından düşürüldüğünü açıkladı. Rus yetkililer, Bryansk bölgesinde ve ilhak edilen Kırım’da saldırılar sonucu birer kişinin hayatını kaybettiğini bildirdi. Belgorod bölgesinde ise altyapı tesislerinin zarar gördüğü, elektrik ve su kesintileri yaşandığı belirtildi. KİEV SALDIRISININ ARDINDAN GELDİ Ukrayna’nın St. Petersburg’a yönelik saldırısı, Rusya’nın bu hafta Kiev’e düzenlediği ve 30 kişinin ölümüne yol açan saldırının ardından geldi. Kiev yönetimi son aylarda Rusya topraklarına yönelik İHA saldırılarını artırdı. Ukrayna, cephe hattından uzaktaki petrol, yakıt ve askeri altyapı tesislerini hedef alarak Moskova’nın savaş maliyetini artırmayı amaçlıyor. Bu saldırılar aynı zamanda Rusya’yı müzakere masasına çekme çabasının bir parçası olarak değerlendiriliyor. KOSTYANTYNIVKA İÇİN KARŞILIKLI AÇIKLAMALAR Saldırıların yaşandığı gün, Donetsk bölgesindeki stratejik Kostyantynivka kenti için de Moskova ve Kiev’den çelişkili açıklamalar geldi. Rusya, kenti ele geçirdiğini duyururken Ukrayna bu açıklamayı yalanladı. Ukrayna ordu sözcüsü Andriy Kovalyov, kentte durumun zor olduğunu ancak Kostyantynivka’nın Ukrayna Savunma Kuvvetleri’nin kontrolünde bulunduğunu söyledi. Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Zelenski de Moskova’nın açıklamasını “bir Rus yalanı daha” sözleriyle reddetti. DONBAS’TA KRİTİK HAT Kostyantynivka, Ukrayna’nın kontrolündeki Kramatorsk ve Slovyansk kentlerine giden hatta kritik noktalardan biri olarak görülüyor. Bu iki kentin ele geçirilmesi, Kremlin’in Donbas’taki temel askeri hedefleri arasında yer alıyor. Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin, cuma günü askeri üniformayla yaptığı açıklamada Kostyantynivka’nın ele geçirilmesi nedeniyle Rus askerlerine teşekkür etmişti. Ukrayna tarafı ise Rus birliklerinin küçük gruplar halinde kente sızmaya çalıştığını, ancak çatışmaların sürdüğünü belirtiyor.
Çernobil’de nükleer yakıt tesisine Rus drone saldırısı: Ukrayna ‘kasıtlı’ diyorFund created to mitigate oil price shocks
ISLAMABAD: The government on Monday notified a new head of account to establish a price stabilisation fund for petroleum products, following a June 5 decision by the federal cabinet. “All proceeds received in the name of the Petroleum Prices Stabilisation Fund will be credited to the Public Account of the Federation under the major head ‘Special Deposit Fund’,” stated a notification issued by the Ministry of Finance. The notification explained that the modalities, including the operating procedures for governing the Fund, would be finalised by the finance division, the petroleum division and the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) in accordance with legal and financial requirements. Necessary approvals will be sought separately. The need for the Fund arose following historic price hikes in recent months due to the US-Israel war on Iran. While a few cargos were previously secured directly by the government through special diplomatic efforts, yielding substantial price savings compared to normal industry practices, this was handled on an ad hoc basis using administrative powers rather than a formal legal framework. Informed sources stated that while the Fund does not currently hold any deposits, the decision was made to capitalize on future unforeseen opportunities. They added that funds already accrued over the past few months, or those made available through future austerity measures, could be credited to the Fund. These resources would be used for weekly adjustments in petroleum prices to minimise price shocks for consumers. Sources also noted that the government may tap new funding sources in the upcoming fiscal year, given the financial maneuvering restrictions imposed under the IMF program. However, a limited amount from special provincial grants to the federal government could still be set aside for POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) price stability. In certain cases, oil imports from unconventional sources such as the US, Russia and Iran, or specialised storage at warehouses can provide discounts compared to standard imports from the Middle East. The Fund will allow these windfalls to be channeled fully or partially into price stabilisation, rather than letting the benefits flow exclusively to oil-importing companies and refineries. Published in Dawn, June 30th, 2026
President-elect gives Colombian guerillas one month to surrender
BOGOTA: Colombia’s hard-right president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella on Thursday gave the country’s guerrilla groups one month to surrender, taking a tough stand on an issue that helped propel him to victory. De la Espriella won Sunday’s tightly-fought presidential election by less than a percentage point as Colombia endures its highest levels of violence in a decade. “To all those acting outside the law, you have one month to arrange your submission,” the millionaire lawyer said in his first speech since official results confirmed his electoral win. “In my administration, there will be no generous offers or unacceptable concessions.” During the campaign, he said he wanted to conduct bombing campaigns against guerrillas and construct “mega-prisons” like those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. The 47-year-old’s victory marks the end of Colombia’s first-ever leftist government led by President Gustavo Petro. The president-elect once called for the left to be “gutted” but later toned down his words. Defeated leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda has warned that the left will resort to “peaceful civil disobedience” if necessary, while distancing himself from post-election violence following Sunday’s results. De la Espriella also plans to forge a military alliance with the United States and Israel to achieve his aims. In an X post on Wednesday, he said Colombia and Israel would share a relationship “like never before” after speaking with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar. He called his win at the polls an “epic triumph” during Thursday’s speech. “It came from the people, against the parties, against political scheming, and against the establishment,” he said, adding: “I will not let you down.” In a report published Thursday, the United Nations said drug crops in Colombia, the world’s largest cocaine producer, increased by 3.5 percent in 2024 as compared to the previous year. Published in Dawn, June 26, 2026
Kolombiya'nın yeni lideri gerillalara bir ayda teslim ol çağrısı yaptıMeet Ilya Novikov, the Russian-born lawyer and sharp Zelensky critic helping to defend the Ukrainian man accused of bombing the Nord Stream pipeline
Defense attorney Ilya Novikov moved from Russia to Ukraine in 2019. Back home, he has been sentenced in absentia to eight and a half years in prison for spreading ”fake news,” labeled a “foreign agent,” added to the registry of “terrorists and extremists,” and put on a wanted list in a separate criminal case — on treason charges for fighting on Ukraine’s side. Now, as a Ukrainian lawyer, Novikov is defending Serhii Kuznetsov, a Ukrainian citizen who was detained in connection with the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines and later extradited to Germany. Novikov is also handling several cases for former President Petro Poroshenko, and he is a critic of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s policies. (Zelensky and Poroshenko have a long-running feud.) Meduza asked Novikov about his criticisms of Zelensky and his administration, and why he thinks Ukraine’s government imposed sanctions on Poroshenko.
Kolombiya'da, Espriella devlet başkanı ilan edildi
Kolombiya'da Ulusal Seçim Konseyi (CNE), 21 Haziran'da yapılan cumhurbaşkanı seçimini önde tamamlayan Donald Trump destekli Abelardo de la Espriella'yı devlet başkanı ilan etti. Kolombiya'da seçiminin ikinci turunda oyların çoğunluğunu alan sağcı Abelardo de la Espriella'nın zaferi resmen tescil edildi. Seçimlerden Sorumlu Sicil Memuru Vekili Jaime Hernando Suarez, Abelardo de la Espriella'nın 2026-2030 dönemi için Kolombiya Cumhurbaşkanı, Jose Manuel Restrepo'nun ise Cumhurbaşkanı Yardımcısı seçildiğini resmi olarak duyurdu. CNE Başkanı Cristian Quiroz, ilan töreninde şu ifadeleri kullandı: "Bugün CNE, demokrasimizin en önemli ve tarihi adımlarından birini tamamlamış bulunuyor: Cumhurbaşkanı seçiminin ikinci turuna ait ulusal oy sayım süreci nihayete erdirilmiştir. Belirtmek isterim ki gerçekleştirilen bu genel sayım sadece bürokratik bir işlem değil, halkın iradesinin en titiz şekilde doğrulanmasıdır." İkinci tur cumhurbaşkanı seçiminde, Vatan Savunucuları Hareketi adayı sağcı Espriella oyların yüzde 49.66'sını, iktidar partisi Tarihsel Pakt İttifakı'nın sol görüşlü adayı Ivan Cepeda yüzde 48.70'ini aldı. CNE tarafından resmen seçilmiş cumhurbaşkanı ilan edilen Espriella, 7 Ağustos'ta görevi mevcut Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro'dan devralacak. DE LA ESPİRELLA: TRUMP DESTEKLİ MİLYONER Seçim kampanyası süresince "Kaplan" lakabını kullanan Espriella, ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'a yakınlığıyla bilinen 47 yaşındaki bir avukat ve milyoner iş insanı. Espriella, Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro liderliğindeki solun ve onun halefi olarak görülen Senatör Cepeda'nın iktidarını sürdürmesini engellemek için Temmuz 2025'te kendi siyasi hareketini kurarak cumhurbaşkanlığı yarışına katıldı. Espriella, yaklaşık 20 yıl önce eski Cumhurbaşkanı Alvaro Uribe hükümeti ile paramiliter grup Kolombiya Birleşik Özsavunma Kuvvetleri (AUC) arasındaki barış görüşmelerinde yer aldı. Sağcı Espriella'nın müvekkilleri arasında, Venezuela Devlet Başkanı Nicolas Maduro’nun yakın çevresinde yer aldığı belirtilen ve kısa süre önce hakkındaki "kara para aklama ve yaptırım ihlali" suçlamaları nedeniyle ABD’ye iade edilen Venezuelalı iş insanı Alex Saab da yer alıyor. Rakibi sol görüşlü Ivan Cepeda, seçim kampanyası sırasında bu geçmişi nedeniyle De la Espriella'yı paramiliter gruplarla bağlantılı olmakla da suçladı. Espriella’nın öne çıkan vaatleri arasında 10 "mega hapishane" inşa etmek, Petro hükümetinin "Topyekun Barış" (Paz Total) politikasını bitirmek, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı ve silahlı gruplarla mücadelede daha sert ve askeri odaklı bir güvenlik stratejisi uygulamak yer alıyor.
Zelensky threatens Belarus as NATO hovers at edges of war
On June 19, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko a one-week ultimatum: remove all equipment assisting Russia with drone targeting or Ukraine would strike Belarus. “If he doesn’t do it, we will,” he said, adding that “a week is enough for him to do that.” From the first days of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine and its Western partners including the U.S. and NATO, have warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions would not be contained to the borders of Ukraine. They claimed that if not dealt with, Russia would attack other European and NATO countries. The UK, relying on its own intelligence and echoing other European leaders, said Russia would be prepared to strike by 2020. But the real risk of a widening war at the moment comes from Ukraine, and on two fronts — the Baltic states and Belarus. On May 19, a Romanian F-16 fighter jet based in Lithuania shot down a Ukrainian drone in Estonian airspace after it had flown through Latvian airspace. It was not the first Ukrainian drone flying through the airspace of a Baltic country. Russia has accused the Baltic countries of permitting the Ukrainian armed forces to use “air corridors” that reduce flight times to targets deep inside Russia and increase their effectiveness. In response, the Baltic countries say Russia is “lying,” and Kiev insists that “Ukraine has never requested such a use.” Even more serious is Russia’s accusation that Ukraine is coordinating with Latvia to allow Kyiv to launch drones from its territory. Latvia's envoy to the Security Council called the Russian claim “pure fiction.” Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže said this was part of a disinformation campaign against her country. The Baltic nations — Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia — are NATO members. Putin has warned that “Russia would treat all Ukrainian drone launch sites as legitimate targets, even if they operate from the Baltic states.” This risks drawing NATO — and the U.S. — into a direct war with Russia. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has warned that “the coordinates of decision-making centers on Latvian territory are well known” and that “NATO membership will not protect terrorist accomplices from just retribution.” This war of words, including Zelensky’s most recent threats, is getting dangerous. In his charges last week, Zelensky accused Belarus of installing four signal relay stations on communications towers on its territory to assist Russia in directing drones targeting Ukraine. He said Minsk has been warned through intelligence and military channels to “stop helping the Russians.” He added that “Russia will keep pushing [Lukashenko] further into this war,” but that the Belarusian president now “understands that Ukraine will respond.” When the Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said that they have identified 500 targets on Belarusian territory and that “we know where Lukashenko is,” Lukaschenko responded that Ukraine may have identified 500 targets, but “we have one very serious target, with precise coordinates.” Lukashenko later apologized for his role in the escalation of words, adding that “no military action should be expected from Belarus.” Belarus and Russia are strategic partners and members of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Belarus hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons that are fully under Russia’s control, and Russia used Belarus territory to launch its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, Belarusian troops have not entered the war. People with expertise on Belarus and familiarity with the situation told Responsible Statecraft that Lukashenko has used every means at his disposal to avoid being drawn deeper into Russia's conflict with Ukraine. While the Ukrainian complaint has a basis, it is being blown out of proportion, say experts. While there is intelligence sharing between Russia and Belarus, some of which is being used to help Russian forces with drone targeting, the scope and impact are not as strategically important as Ukraine is suggesting. Ukraine has other issues. Despite an increasing series of spectacular drone strikes deep inside Russia, the war on the battlefield isn’t going as well as the mainstream would like us to believe. Russian advances have increased again recently, and the key strategic city of Kostyantynivka is now in real danger of falling to Russian forces. If it falls, Russia’s goal of taking all of Donbas will be within reach. Zelensky wants the “hot phase” of the war to end by winter, and has suggested certain parts of contested Ukraine could come under the NATO security umbrella to achieve that. Nicolai Petro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, suggested to RS that Zelensky’s threat against Belarus “may make sense in the context of his overall strategy of trying to provoke an escalation from Russia or Belarus that would necessitate NATO's direct military intervention.” Petro, however, questions whether European leaders would intervene under such circumstances. Alexander Hill, Professor in Military History at the University of Calgary, agrees, telling RS that he suspects Zelensky’s threat is another part of his “attempts to widen the war and ultimately drag NATO into a more active role.” Experts say that Kiev could be signaling to Belarus and Europe that it will not tolerate constructive engagement between Minsk and the EU during the war. Ukraine is anxious to see a European security architecture that emerges from the war confront, not include, Russia. Keeping Belarus out is part of that strategy. If so, that would represent a tragic failure to learn from past mistakes. The tensions over how and whether Baltic airspace is being used and the threat delivered to Belarus show how dangerous the risk of escalation beyond Russia and Ukraine is becoming. Zelensky may not be posturing or issuing idle threats. Experts believe Zelensky could be seeing how far he can go and that, if there are no existential objections from key European players, there is a good chance he'll keep pushing.
Zelensky'den Belarus'a Bir Haftalık Ültimatom: Rus Dron Teçhizatını Kaldırın ya da VurunDe la Espriella says Colombia will join the US-led 'Shield of the Americas' on August 7
Colombia's president-elect, Abelardo de la Espriella, said on Tuesday that the country will join the "Shield of the Americas," the US initiative against drug cartels, on August 7, when he takes office in place of Gustavo Petro. "From August 7, Colombia will be part of the Shield of the Americas. Colombia will no longer be governed by a government complacent toward narcoterrorism; we will move to combat it as it deserves," he wrote on the social network X, in response to a congratulation from US War Secretary Pete Hegseth.
Kolombiya'da seçimi Trump destekli sağcı aday kazandı
Kolombiya'da cumhurbaşkanı seçimini, resmi olmayan ilk sonuçlara göre Trump'ın desteklediği sağcı aday Abelardo de la Espriella yüzde 0.30'luk farkla kazandı. Kolombiya halkı, ülkenin tıkanan barış sürecinin ve Washington ile gerilen ilişkilerinin geleceğini belirleyecek olan devlet başkanlığı seçiminin ikinci turu için sandık başına gitti. ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın sağcı avukat Abelardo de la Espriella ile solcu senatör Ivan Cepeda'nın yarıştığı seçimin sonuçları da netleşmeye başladı. Ulusal Sivil Sicil Kayıt Başkanlığı'nın resmi olmayan sonuçlarına göre sandıkların yüzde 99.91'i açıldı, Trump'ın "tam ve koşulsuz" destek verdiği Espriella seçimi kazandı. Kesin olmayan bu sonuçlara göre Vatan Savunucuları Hareketi adayı sağcı Espriella yüzde 49.65, iktidar partisi Tarihsel Pakt İttifakı'nın solcu adayı Ivan Cepeda yüzde 48.70 oy aldı. Resmi olmayan sonuçlara göre iki aday arasındaki fark yüzde 0.30 seviyesinde gerçekleşirken, oy farkı 246 bin 355 olarak kaydedildi. Seçime katılımın yüzde 61.5 olduğu bilgisi paylaşıldı. Seçim sonuçlarını Karayip kenti Barranquilla'da takip eden Abelardo de la Espriella, sosyal medya hesabından yaptığı açıklamada, zaferini ilan etti. Espriella, "Silahların gölgesindeki baskılara, oy satın alma girişimlerine, geleneksel partilere, yolsuzluğa ve gerillaya karşı kazandık. Kazanan Kolombiya oldu." ifadesini kullandı. CUMHURBAŞKANI PETRO SONUCU TANIMADI Kolombiya Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro ise sosyal medyadan yaptığı açıklamada, oy sayımında bazı düzensizlikler olduğunu vurgulayarak, şunları söyledi: "Hiçbir aday kendini cumhurbaşkanı ilan edemez. Cumhurbaşkanının kim olduğunu belirleyecek olan, resmi hukuki sayım sürecidir. Ben yargıçların kararına itaat ederim. Vatandaşlarımızdan lütfen sakin olmalarını rica ediyorum. Karşımızdaki gerçeklik, bize tam ortadan ikiye bölünmüş bir ülke ve özgürlüğümüzü elimizden alan yabancı müdahaleleri gösteriyor. Önümüzdeki yıllarda vatanı ve barışı korumak istiyorsak, bir 'Ulusal Mutabakat' kaçınılmazdır." İLK TURU DA KAZANMIŞTI Kendisine "Kaplan" lakabını takan ve hem ABD hem Kolombiya vatandaşlığı bulunan De la Espriella, mayıs ayındaki ilk turda oyların yüzde 43,7'sini (bazı kaynaklarda yüzde 44) alarak birinci sıraya yerleşmişti. De la Espriella, 2016 barış anlaşmasını imzalamayı reddeden uyuşturucu kaçakçısı gerilla gruplarına savaş açma vaadiyle öne çıkıyordu. Seçimi resmi olarak kazanan aday, 7 Ağustos'ta görevi Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro'dan devralacak.
Kolombiya cumhurbaşkanını seçti! Trump'ın desteklediği Abelardo de la Espriella kazandı
Ulusal Sivil Sicil Kayıt Başkanlığının resmi olmayan sonuçlarına göre, sandıkların yüzde 99,91'i açıldı. Cumhurbaşkanı ikinci tur seçiminde Vatan Savunucuları Hareketi adayı sağcı Espriella yüzde 49,65, iktidar partisi Tarihsel Pakt İttifakının sol görüşlü adayı Ivan Cepeda yüzde 48,70 oy aldı. Resmi olmayan sonuçlara göre iki aday arasındaki fark yüzde 0,30 seviyesinde gerçekleşirken, oy farkı 246 bin 355 olarak kaydedildi. Trump'ın "tam ve koşulsuz" destek verdiği Espriella, Ulusal Sivil Sicil Kayıt Başkanlığının sonuçlarına göre seçimi kazandı. Seçim sonuçlarını Kolombiya'nın Karayip kenti Barranquilla'da takip eden Abelardo de la Espriella, ABD merkezli X şirketinin sosyal medya platformundaki hesabından yaptığı açıklamada, seçimden zaferle çıktıklarını duyurdu. Espriella, "Silahların gölgesindeki baskılara, oy satın alma girişimlerine, geleneksel partilere, yolsuzluğa ve gerillaya karşı kazandık. Kazanan Kolombiya oldu." ifadesini kullandı. CUMHURBAŞKANI PETRO SONUÇLARI TANIMADI Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro ise X'teki açıklamasında, oy sayımında bazı düzensizlikler olduğunu vurgulayarak, şunları kaydetti: "Hiçbir aday kendisini cumhurbaşkanı ilan edemez. Cumhurbaşkanının kim olduğunu belirleyecek olan, resmi hukuki sayım sürecidir. Ben yargıçların kararına itaat ederim. Vatandaşlarımızdan lütfen sakin olmalarını rica ediyorum. Karşımızdaki gerçeklik, bize tam ortadan ikiye bölünmüş bir ülke ve özgürlüğümüzü elimizden alan yabancı müdahaleleri gösteriyor. Önümüzdeki yıllarda vatanı ve barışı korumak istiyorsak, bir 'Ulusal Mutabakat' kaçınılmazdır." Sandığa katılımın yüzde 61,5 olduğu bilgisi paylaşıldı. Ülkenin siyasi ve ekonomik geleceği açısından kritik önem taşıyan seçim, son yılların en çekişmeli yarışlarından biri olarak görülüyor. Seçimi resmi olarak kazanan aday, 7 Ağustos'ta görevi Cumhurbaşkanı Gustavo Petro'dan devralacak.
Colombia votes in high-stakes presidential runoff to define nation’s future
Over 41M eligible voters head to polls to choose successor to President Gustavo Petro, as hardline conservative, progressive senator face off in dead heat
Colombia’s runoff election expected to trigger shift in decades-long armed conflict
Frontrunner Abelardo de la Espriella has vowed to return to full-scale military confrontation with armed groups Colombians go to the polls on Sunday in a presidential runoff expected to trigger to a dramatic shift in the country’s decades-long armed conflict, now at its most violent point since the landmark 2016 peace agreement between the government and most of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc). Polls show the frontrunner is the Trump-admiring far-right lawyer and millionaire businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, who has vowed to abandon President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” plan of negotiating the disarmament of all criminal organisations and instead return to full-scale military confrontation with armed groups. Continue reading...
İkinci Tur Seçimleri Kolombiya'nın Silahlı Çatışmasında Dönüm Noktası OlabilirBUDGET 2026-27 : NA panel questions climate levy
Naveed Qamar says climate funds must not be consumed without projects • Panel seeks stricter recovery of petroleum levies from OMCs • Islamabad token tax hike approved despite middle-class concerns ISLAMABAD: A parliamentary committee on Saturday raised concerns over the proposed carbon levy amid growing climate challenges, warned that reduced duties on scrap could create environmental risks and approved an increase in Islamabad’s token tax that is likely to affect middle-class vehicle owners. The National Assembly Standing Committee on Finance and Revenue reviewed the National Tariff Policy 2025-30 in detail, focusing on the phased reduction in import duties. Lawmakers asked tax authorities to redraft the proposed climate levy, stressing that it must be backed by a clear and defined objective. Commerce Secretary Jawad Paul briefed the committee, while Commerce Minister Jam Kamal remained absent. Since last year, the committee, chaired by MNA Naveed Qamar, has undertaken a clause-by-clause review of the Finance Bill. Last year, it held 12 meetings to review the legislation. The committee took up the petroleum levy and the newly introduced climate support levy amid concerns over Pakistan’s commitments under the IMF’s climate resilience framework. Members debated collection of the carbon support levy from citizens while criticising the absence of concrete climate projects. Finance Secretary Imdad Ullah Bosal informed the committee that an agreement had been signed with the IMF on climate resilience. Committee chairman Mr Qamar, however, criticised the government for collecting levies without initiating any concrete projects, warning that such practices would damage Pakistan’s image. “You take money from the IMF, impose levies, but start no projects,” he remarked. Officials briefed the committee on measures taken under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility programme. Mr Qamar countered that the government’s approach amounted to “lip service” on climate, with policies running contrary to stated commitments. “It is not acceptable that money comes from the IMF and is simply consumed without projects. This is a complete failure,” he said, pressing officials to present at least one climate-related initiative. PPP lawmaker Hina Rabbani Khar recalled that Pakistan was once recognised globally as a leader in climate support but had gradually lost that position. She urged the government to reclaim that standing, stressing that Pakistan remained among the countries most vulnerable to environmental impacts. The committee further scrutinised the proposed amendments to the Petroleum Products (Petroleum Levy) Ordinance, 1961, with particular focus on strengthening enforcement against defaulting oil marketing companies. Mr Qamar observed that oil marketing companies merely acted as collection agents for government levies and, therefore, could not be permitted to retain public funds. Expressing serious concern over delays in the recovery of petroleum levies, he directed the government to introduce a strict inbuilt enforcement mechanism providing for suspension of product supplies to any defaulting oil marketing company after 30 days of non-payment, while eliminating discretionary extensions or instalment facilities that weakened compliance. The chairman directed the Petroleum Division to redraft the proposed legislative amendments to explicitly eliminate instalment powers for defaulting oil marketing companies and institute immediate supply suspensions. Duty on scrap, waste The committee rejected a proposal to reduce customs duty on scrap and waste imports to 10pc. The duty will remain at 20pc. Commerce Secretary Jawad Paul told the committee that certain industries imported waste to produce fuel, but PPP lawmaker Nafisa Shah questioned why Pakistan, already burdened with domestic waste, could not generate fuel locally. MNA Arshad Abdullah Vohra noted that Karachi alone produced 25,000 tonnes of waste daily. The secretary responded that Pakistan lacked the machinery to convert waste into fuel, adding that most imported waste was used in furnaces. The committee also strongly opposed tariff concessions on environmentally hazardous imports such as shredded tyres, observing that such measures contradicted Pakistan’s climate commitments and undermined domestic recycling efforts. Islamabad token tax After detailed deliberations, the committee approved an increase in token tax on vehicles registered in Islamabad. Islamabad Deputy Commissioner Irfan Nawaz Memon briefed the committee that token tax had not been revised since 2019, while all provinces had already raised rates. He said a one-time fixed tax of Rs10,000 applied to cars up to 1,000cc, while for models manufactured before 2010 the rate would now be Rs20,000. For vehicles between 1,000cc and 1,300cc, token tax is currently 0.3pc of the invoice value, which will be adjusted to 0.25pc. This translates into Rs2,500 for pre-2010 models and Rs6,200 for post-2010 models, compared to Rs1,500 previously. For a car worth Rs2m, the tax will amount to Rs6,200. Committee members raised concerns over the burden on the middle class. MNA Sharmila Faruqi opposed the increase, arguing that most vehicle owners belonged to the middle class. Published in Dawn, June 21st, 2026
Pakistan'da iklim bütçesi kesintisi: Şok edici düşüşe Rehman'dan sert tepkiPetro'dan Trump'a 'İsrail'in Lübnan'a saldırılarını durdurun' çağrısı
Kolombiya Cumhurbaşkanı Petro, ateşkese rağmen Lübnan'a yönelik saldırılarını sürdüren İsrail'in durdurulması için ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'a çağrıda bulundu.
ABD-İran Mutabakatına Doğru: İsrail ‘Geçici Çözüm’den RahatsızHyper-militarized 'war on narco-terror' is not stopping drug flows
For the past year, the Trump administration has undertaken a lethal campaign of strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, killing at least 200 people. It could soon gain a major new ally in this fight in Colombia, where the leading candidate in Sunday's presidential elections has promised to break with his dovish predecessor and wage an all-out war on drug trafficking. As a regional war on drugs takes shape, there is no better time to ask the question: is a military campaign really the most effective way to stop the flow of narcotics from Latin America? My new Quincy Institute brief addresses this question head-on, finding that the White House’s militarized “war on narco-terror” across the hemisphere is unlikely to produce durable results. In its place, I recommend a concrete road map for sustainably reducing Colombian coca production and cocaine trafficking to the U.S. An analysis of 25 years of evidence since the the passage of the multi-billion dollar Plan Colombia aid package reveals that a winning strategy for fighting drug trafficking must bolster state presence, rural development, and the rule of law in drug-producing areas; sequence manual eradication campaigns alongside legally enforceable negotiations with some armed groups; and tackle more profitable nodes of drug supply chains while countering illicit financial flows. Colombia — where over two-thirds of the world’s cocaine, and 90% of cocaine that enters the U.S., is produced — forms the nucleus of the Andean drug trade and is by far Washington’s’ most important counternarcotics partner in the Western Hemisphere. Yet nearly $15 billion in U.S. security, counternarcotics and development assistance over the past quarter century has largely failed to curtail Colombia’s cocaine economy, which is now witnessing all-time highs in hectares under cultivation and potential production. Past strategies, such as aerial fumigation with glyphosate, which was banned in Colombia in 2015, significantly reduced coca crop coverage in the early 2000s but failed to halt production. As farmers became more productive and adaptive, cultivation shifted to Peru, and the chemicals sprayed left indelible harm on the environment and public health. Surges in U.S. military aid, particularly under the aegis of Plan Patriota, led to the professionalization of Colombian security forces, improved their aerial and intelligence capabilities, and brought the FARC guerillas to the negotiating table. But this approach also fueled instability near military bases — as extrajudicial killings by security forces and paramilitary violence rose to unprecedented levels — and failed to meet its counternarcotics objectives. The “kingpin strategy,” meanwhile, focused on extraditions of drug bosses. This tactic, which soared under President Alvaro Uribe as he sought to demobilize Colombia’s largest paramilitary organization and has continued to this day, has produced the fragmentation, expansion and specialization of newer criminal outfits, contributing to increased cocaine production as groups devised new trafficking routes and illicit rents to exploit, from gold mining to extortion, kidnapping, wildlife trafficking, and human smuggling. Other approaches, however, have proved more successful and are correlated with modest declines in coca cultivation, potential cocaine production, and trafficking to the U.S., particularly in the late 2000s and following the signing of the 2016 peace accords between the government and the FARC. The strongest recipe for slowing the drug trade has focused on incentivizing viable economic alternatives to coca and reducing the power and influence of illicit armed actors. Under initiatives like the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena, Familias Guardabosques, and Colombia Transforma, Colombian authorities have boosted state presence, invested in rural development, and bolstered rule of law in drug-producing areas, all while maintaining a credible security posture focused on improving public safety. A complementary approach involves manual coca eradication campaigns. While time consuming and sometimes risky for communities and security forces alike, these efforts have proven effective when sequenced by first establishing police presence and investing in productive infrastructure and services before forcibly — or, ideally, voluntarily — uprooting coca plants. When combined with strategically designed and legally binding, enforceable negotiations with some armed actors in localized settings — as the administration of President Gustavo Petro has pursued more recently as its Total Peace plan flounders — this approach can incentivize armed groups to pursue industrial-scale eradication themselves. They do this by tying non-compliance to credible threats of targeted offensives. Lastly, later-stage drug interdictions, increased inspections of larger vessels, and enhanced regulatory integration and coordination against money laundering and other illicit financial flows are essential for stemming cocaine trafficking to the U.S. and disrupting the global networks underpinning it. Fortunately, this approach continues to occur alongside the expensive, legally questionable, and likely ineffective boat strike campaign, which could explain why even top administration officials admit it’s “not the answer … [or] the most effective tool." These lessons have clear implications for Colombia’s next president and U.S. drug policy moving forward. A balanced strategy is bound to yield more favorable outcomes for both left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who seeks to follow Petro’s negotiations with armed actors and voluntary illicit crop substitution programs, and right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who seeks to accelerate low-level arrests and increase the military’s role in targeting drug production and trafficking. To date, neither the left’s hesitation to implement a credible supply-side counternarcotics agenda nor the right’s militarized approach to curbing coca cultivation has led to durable results. In fact, the lack of a viable, well-articulated strategy strengthens the hand of irregular armed actors, exacerbates a deteriorating security landscape across the country, and gives the Trump administration greater leverage to dictate its preferred approaches, regardless of their empirically poor outcomes. Despite the U.S. administration’s insistence on applying “systemic friction” to designated foreign terrorist organizations across the hemisphere, this overly militarized strategy is already leading groups to adapt to new illicit industries, divert trafficking routes, diversify economic portfolios, and expand operations to new subregions, resorting to more covert and asymmetrical forms of violence against states and competitors, as a recent surge in drone activity in Colombia has shown. Aside from proving woefully ineffective at reducing drug production and trafficking, Washington’s militarized campaign, carried out in conjunction with regional governments, also risks increasing extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, fueling insurrectionary and anti-U.S. sentiment, undermining the rule of law across the hemisphere, and reversing years of progress in Latin America’s fraught civil-military relations. Ultimately, without credible government presence, viable economic opportunities, and even rudimentary judicial institutions in drug-producing subregions throughout Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, illicit economies and the irregular armed actors feeding off them will persist, regardless of military pressure. Raiding artisanal drug labs, fumigating small-scale farmers or extraditing kingpins have not proved particularly significant in advancing durable policy outcomes. And there’s little evidence to show that bombing alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific will work either, despite some Trump administration officials’ claims. Assisting our Colombian partners in formulating a credible security posture against armed non-state actors is crucial to U.S. counternarcotics goals. But in tandem with this approach, we must seek to safeguard development assistance for coca-growing communities; sequence manual eradication campaigns with prior investment in infrastructure; boost interdictions of more valuable drug supply; and counter impunity and corruption by political and business elites. Colombia’s high-stakes presidential elections could well accelerate a remilitarization of the regional drug war. It is therefore urgent that analysts and officials evaluate the effectiveness of diverse counternarcotics strategies in Colombia over the past quarter century. If reducing the flow of drugs to the U.S. is truly the Trump administration’s objective, then U.S. officials must learn from decades of failure and chart a new course.
ABD'nin narko-terör operasyonları uyuşturucu akışını durdurmuyorArap medyası paylaştı. 14 maddelik ABD-İran anlaşması ortaya çıktı
İran ve ABD arasındaki anlaşmanın maddeleriyle ilgili özellikle İran ve Arap medyasında ortaya atılan iddialar var. Suudi medya kuruluşu El Arabiya, 14 maddelik anlaşma metninin sızdığını iddia etti ve o maddeleri yayımladı. İran ile ABD arasında sağlanan mutabakatın resmi imza töreninin, 19 Haziran'da İsviçre'nin Bürgenstock kasabasında düzenlenmesinin planlandığı bildirildi. Henüz mutabakat zaptının maddeleriyle ilgili resmi açıklama yok ama her gün yeni iddialar ortaya atılıyor. SUUDİ BASINI 14 MADDEYİ YAYIMLADI Son alarak Suudi Arabistan merkezli El Arabiya, "anlaşmanın maddeleri" dediği bir metin yayımladı. Buna göre mutabakat 14 maddeden oluşuyor. İlk olarak, Lübnan dahil tüm cephelerde savaşın sona erdiği teyit ediliyor. İsrail Başbakanı Benyamin Netanyahu bu iddiayı yalanlamış, Hizbullah ile savaşının süreceğini duyurmuştu. Bir diğer maddede ise İran ve ABD'nin birbirlerine müdahale etmeyeceklerini teyit ediyor. Mutabakat zaptında 60 gün içerisinde müzakerelerin tamamlanacağı da yer alıyor. HÜRMÜZ BOĞAZI'NA İLİŞKİN 3 MADDE Hürmüz Boğazı'na ilişkin ise 3 madde yer alıyor. Bunlar, ABD'nin deniz ablukasını kaldırması, Hürmüz Boğazı'nın tam kapasiteyle 30 gün içinde açılması, İran'ın tüm mayınları temizlemesini içeriyor. Al Arabiya'nın iddiasına göre, İran'ın ekonomik talepleri de yerine getiriliyor. İran'ın yeniden inşası için 300 milyar dolar ödenmesi, tüm yaptırımların kaldırılması, İran'ın petrol ve petro kimya ürünleri satışının kolaylaştırılması ve donmuş varlıkların serbest bırakılması mutabakat metninde yer alıyor. Diğer maddeler ise İran asla nükleer silah üretmeyecek, iki ülke anlaşma nihai sonuca varana kadar mevcut pozisyonlarını koruyacak bir uygulama mekanizması kurulacak. Bu maddelerin uygulandığı teyit edilirse geri kalan maddelere ilişkin bir nihai anlaşma için müzakerelere başlanacak. Nihai anlaşma, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin bağlayıcı bir kararıyla onaylanacak. Anlaşma maddelerine dair iddialara henüz resmi bir yanıt gelmedi. Ancak ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, sosyal medyadan paylaştığı mesajında İran'a 300 milyar dolarlık yardımın verilmeyeceğini yazdı. Bu nedenle anlaşma maddeleri belirsizliğini koruyor.
ABD-İran Anlaşması Sızdı: 14 Madde ve Bürgenstock İmza PlanıHandler with ties to Russia appears to have directed arson attacks on Starmer-linked property
Roman Lavrynovych and Stanislav Carpiuc appear to have operated under instruction of online handler ‘El Money’ Two men found guilty of conspiring to carry out arson attacks on property connected to Keir Starmer appear to have operated under the instruction of an online handler with links to Russia. Roman Lavrynovych, 22, from Ukraine, and Stanislav Carpiuc, 27, from Romania, were found guilty at the Old Bailey on Monday. Another Ukrainian man, Petro Pochynok, 35, was cleared of the same charge. Continue reading...
Iran and the new Persian Gulf equilibrium
Iran and the new Persian Gulf equilibrium Expert comment jon.wallace 11 June 2026 The Axis of Resistance failed to deter Israel and the US. Whatever deal ends the war, Tehran will seek to rebuild its deterrence around the threat it poses to the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf states. The fragile ceasefire between Iran and the United States, in place for two months, has been punctuated by several episodes of violence. That includes the latest exchange of strikes following the shooting down of a US helicopter, and President Donald Trump’s threats on 11 June to seize Iran’s Kharg Island. However, both Washington and Tehran have generally expressed a reluctance to return to open warfare. And according to media reports the US has signaled to Iran, through Qatar, that recent attacks were not meant as a resumption of all-out war. At the same time, negotiations to prolong the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz have failed to make progress. A deal on the Strait will eventually emerge, but whatever the details, dynamics in the Persian Gulf have changed – and will not return to the pre-28 February 2026 status quo. A new deterrence strategy Since the ceasefire in early April, Iran and the US have floated in a volatile state of no war and no peace. The two sides are far from reaching an agreement that would set bilateral relations on a more stable and predictable footing, let alone resolve the deep divergences that have divided them for 47 years. Each perceives that it has the upper hand, and expects the other to make compromises. In this fragile context, limited escalations are virtually guaranteed to happen again. But the events of early June reinforce the view that Iran and the US will continue to try to avoid uncontrolled escalation. The World Today Related work How Iran’s ‘forward defence’ became a strategic boomerang However the war ends, a new equilibrium is steadily emerging in the Persian Gulf based on an equation that features both new and pre-existing but modified variables. First, the Axis of Resistance – the network of non-state armed groups supported by Iran – has failed. Israel has not been able, as much as it has tried since October 2023, to decisively defeat Hamas and Hezbollah. But the two Iran-backed groups have undoubtedly been weakened. More importantly, they could not deliver what was one of the original rationales behind Iran’s support for the Axis: deterrence. When Tehran developed its forward defence strategy, one of its goals was to signal to the US and Israel that an attack on Iran would be met with a costly retaliation from Axis members. In this sense, the Axis did not fulfil its mandate: the threat of reprisals failed to deter multiple American and Israeli attacks on the Iranian homeland. As a result, Iran’s focus is shifting to the Gulf. Analysts, in and out of government, have long known that in the event of a war that threatened its survival, the Islamic Republic would likely try to close the Strait of Hormuz. Countless wargames and simulations demonstrated exactly that. What was known in theory has now been demonstrated in practice, and there will be no turning back. This profoundly and sustainably transforms the geopolitics of the Gulf region. There is little doubt that the Strait of Hormuz will eventually re-open to maritime traffic. It will probably not be a sudden re-opening. Instead, it will be gradual, for both security reasons and because it will take time for supply chains to re-organize themselves. Rebuilding its missile and drone production facilities…will be [Iran’s] top priority, as will be the consolidation and diversification of its global supply networks. But the Islamic Republic will not forget the tremendous leverage it gained by closing it. Neither will it agree to permanently forego the option of resorting to this tactic again. Rather, it will integrate it into its strategy. And it will not hesitate to consider closing the Strait again if it perceives it to be necessary. The war, in other words, has broken a psychological barrier that will not be rebuilt. Iran will, as such, restock and reconstitute its damaged military infrastructure with Hormuz in mind. Rebuilding its missile and drone production facilities, heavily damaged by American and Israeli strikes, will be its top priority, as will be the consolidation and diversification of its global supply networks. This will take precedence, for example, over rebuilding its shattered nuclear infrastructure and conventional navy. This will ensure that the threat of the closure of the Strait remains a black cloud permanently hanging over maritime shipping in the Gulf and, therefore, the global economy. The Houthis The fear of that scenario will be compounded by the possibility that the Houthis, the group that controls the northwestern quadrant of Yemen, could join the fray and close the Bab al-Mandab at the southern tip of the Red Sea – another crucial maritime chokepoint. This week, the Houthis explicitly threatened to close the route to Israeli shipping. The Houthis are not Iranian puppets and do not merely execute orders from Tehran. That said, they caused severe disruption to Red Sea shipping throughout 2023-25, motivated, they said, by solidarity with Palestinians. In a hypothetical future conflict in which the Islamic Republic is seriously threatened, it is conceivable that they would renew their attacks. In combination with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the impact on the global economy would be significant. The other feature of the new equilibrium is the threat of Iranian attacks on the Gulf Arab states. As with Hormuz, analysts have long understood that if pushed into a corner, the Islamic Republic would likely target the six petro-monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. And, as in the case of Hormuz, the war has created a precedent that provides Iran with important leverage moving forward. For GCC states, whose brand is partly premised on their reputation as havens of stability, this is another permanent threat that will further damage their security and prosperity.
İran, Hürmüz Boğazı Tehdidiyle Yeni Körfez Dengesi PeşindeSunday's election could put Colombia back on team Trump
On Sunday, Colombians will go to the polls for the first round of their presidential elections, a race that could radically reshape Colombia’s relations with the United States at a moment of political turmoil and polarization in Latin America. The key contenders include the ruling party’s candidate, Iván Cepeda; conservative outsider Abelardo De la Espriella; and Paloma Valencia of former President Álvaro Uribe’s center-right party, Centro Democrático. Currently, no candidate is polling over 50%, so a runoff between the top two candidates is projected for June 21, 2026. This election comes within the context of heightened concerns over political violence, with the civil society Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) reporting 565 acts of political violence since January 2025. This has included the assassination of a presidential hopeful, kidnappings, attacks targeting candidates and campaign staff, vandalism of campaign offices, and death threats. Apart from rising violence in the country, campaign issues include great economic discontent, the deeply polarized legacy of President Gustavo Petro, and tense diplomatic relations with the U.S. over anti-narcotics efforts and security policy. The leading candidates present three distinct visions for Colombia’s future. Iván Cepeda, senator for the Historic Pact party, is the former leader of the Movement for Victims of State Crimes and a former peace negotiator involved in the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerilla peace dialogues. He plans to advance peace and negotiations with illegal armed groups and focuses on truth and reconciliation. Cepeda proposes advancing Petro’s agrarian reforms, pursuing an energy transition to curb climate change and investing in education. His security proposal goes beyond an exclusively military response, focusing on improving human rights and dismantling the financial infrastructure of criminal groups. He proposes an autonomous, peace-oriented foreign policy that emphasizes Latin American integration, migrant protection, global anti-militarism, and strict adherence to international law. Aberlardo de la Espriella, the candidate for Defensores de la Patria, is a conservative outsider and criminal lawyer with a controversial past who describes himself as not being a politician. His security proposal mirrors that of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, and his economic model that of Argentina’s Javier Milei. He would end peace negotiations and tackle narcotrafficking and organized crime with military force. De la Espriella supports fracking, new oil contracts, and cutting taxes for the private sector. He’d advance a Plan Colombia 2.0 that is aligned with the Trump administration’s anti-narcotics strategy and would resume aerial fumigation of coca crops that was halted by the Petro administration. Paloma Valencia, a senator and prominent member of the center-right opposition party, proposes a Plan 30-30 for security, which would recruit 30,000 new members each to the military and police and increase the defense budget to 4% of Colombia’s GDP. Valencia would end the peace dialogues, militarize insecure areas, and resume aerial fumigation. She proposed opening a 22,000-capacity penitentiary and prison with 19,000 spots and restricting social protests. She further proposes that Colombia participate in the U.S. plan to reconstruct Venezuela, and she wants to request a $50 billion loan from the U.S. to refinance Colombia’s external debt. Similar to de la Espriella, Valencia wants a Plan Colombia 2.0 to combat narco-trafficking. Both Valencia and de la Espriella propose including Colombia in the Shield of the Americas, created by the Trump administration, and have engaged with administration officials and Republican members of Congress. The results of Colombia’s 2026 presidential race will have a significant impact on U.S.-Colombia relations and the Trump administration’s strategic goals in Latin America. Since Petro took office in 2022, the long-standing bipartisan strategic relationship between the two countries has faced growing strains, driven in part by tensions between Petro and a group of Republican lawmakers, particularly from Florida, who have used anti-Petro rhetoric to appeal to conservative Latino voters. Since January 2025, Trump and Petro have repeatedly clashed on X, resulting in the temporary recall of ambassadors and threats of tariffs. Petro also strongly criticized U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific that have killed at least 196 people to date. The Petro administration’s decision in May 2025 to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative further widened the rift with Washington. In response, the Treasury Department sanctioned Petro and others, and the U.S. decertified Colombia for failing to meet its counternarcotics commitments. (Decertification can lead to U.S. foreign assistance suspension, the U.S. blocking Colombia from obtaining international loans, and visa cancellations.) Things came to a head last December, when Trump warned that Petro “could be next” after the U.S. overthrow of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro. Tensions cooled off after the two men met at the White House on February 7. But no sanctions were lifted, Colombia remains decertified, and no new aid for Colombia has been announced. (Colombia saw a massive reduction in U.S. assistance as part of the elimination of USAID and overall foreign aid cuts in 2025.) The Trump administration and Republicans in Congress are looking to the Colombian elections in hopes that the next president in Bogota will restore the strong strategic relationship with the U.S. that existed before Petro. This includes creating alliances of like-minded conservative leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean, as was reflected in the Shield of the Americas Summit held in Doral, Florida, in March. While framed as a way to build a multinational military partnership against drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations, the summit excluded leftist governments in the region, including Colombia — where most of the world’s cocaine is produced. The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy advances a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine aimed at restoring U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere through an “enlist and expand” approach focused on curbing irregular migration, weakening cartels, and nearshoring manufacturing. The strategy also reorients the region toward competition with extra-hemispheric powers such as China and Russia, using economic pressure, tariffs, and expanded military engagement to secure supply chains and strengthen regional partnerships. Similarly, the 2026 National Defense Strategy places greater emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, prioritizing efforts to combat drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations, limit China’s influence, and deepen regional defense cooperation. Given Colombia’s regional importance to the United States, the Trump administration may try to shape Colombia’s elections, as it has in Argentina and Honduras. So far, the administration has presented its role as one of monitoring and promoting transparency. At the U.S. Embassy's request, the National Electoral Council authorized a U.S. election observation mission of 86 government officials, who will be deployed across 15 areas to assess transparency, security, and voting in high-risk locations during both presidential rounds. Regardless of the results this coming Sunday, and in the likely second round in June, the next president should support peace and inclusion policies in the country, while maintaining a respectful diplomatic relationship with the U.S. For Cepeda, that may be easier said than done. A victory for Petro’s successor will most likely mean continued U.S.-Colombia tensions, particularly as Trump threatens regime change in Cuba and strives to push Latin American politics to the right. Meanwhile, if either of Cepeda’s challengers wins, Trump could gain a major new ally in Latin America — and a willing partner for implementing his “Donroe Doctrine.”
Kolombiya seçimleri ABD ile ilişkileri yeniden Trump eksenine çekebilirNo clear winner: Colombia's hard right and left will battle out in runoff
Right-wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella and left-wing senator Ivan Cepeda have emerged victorious in Colombia’s high-stakes, first-round presidential election Sunday, setting the stage for a tight runoff on June 21 that could reshape the country’s relationship with the Trump administration and political dynamics across Latin America. De la Espriella, 47, a criminal lawyer and businessman with the Defenders of the Homeland movement, won 10.3 million votes, or 43.7% of the total—shy of the 50% required to clinch victory in the first round—while Cepeda, 63, a human rights activist and former peace negotiator with President Gustavo Petro’s Historic Pact party, won 9.65 million votes, or 41% of the total. Trailing far behind were center-right senator Paloma Valencia of former president Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Center party, with 1.6 million votes, or 7% of the total, and Sergio Fajardo, of the centrist Dignity and Commitment party, with 1 million votes, or 4% of the total. The preliminary vote tallies came in within less than two hours of polls closing at 4 p.m. local time. De la Espriella easily took the country’s central highlands and eastern plains, where Colombia’s largely conservative, majority-white urban centers are located, while Cepeda won the regions on the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts and Amazon rainforest, where Colombia’s Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations are the majority. According to Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), nearly 24 million Colombians voted at 118,346 polling tables across 13,489 voting stations nationwide, as well as 2,181 polling tables across 253 voting stations in 67 other countries, for a participation rate of around 57.5%. This was somewhat higher than in the 2022 first-round elections, which Petro, who is limited to a single term, won with 40% of the vote. Sunday’s elections unfolded across the South American country of 54 million people (41 million of whom are eligible to vote) without major incidents or violent episodes, although the country’s non-governmental Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) registered hundreds of presumed anomalies and electoral violations, including armed actors restricting voter mobility, political campaigning at polling stations, attempts at vote-buying and imitation of electoral authorities, and widespread online disinformation campaigns, among others. Petro and Cepeda have urged electoral authorities to scrutinize potential irregularities and ratify the count before accepting the final tally. Election monitors said that nearly a quarter of Colombia’s 1,110 municipalities faced risk of violence from Colombia’s myriad irregular armed groups on election day, while Colombia’s defense ministry deployed over 400,000 soldiers and police to safeguard the vote. The pro-Trump De la Espriella, who calls himself “The Tiger” and promises to convert the violence-afflicted nation into a “Miracle Country,” jumped ahead in most major polls — which for months had him trailing behind both Cepeda and Valencia — in recent weeks, bolstered by his aggressive use of social media, support from charismatic Evangelical pastors, and backing from key conservative figures across Latin America. His efforts to win in the first round, however, fell short despite last minute attempts to shift voter intention even after campaigning had formally closed the weekend before. On Friday night before the election, President Daniel Noboa of neighboring Ecuador joined a live stream with De la Espriella where he announced that 75% tariffs he had enacted on Colombian imports would be lifted the day after Sunday’s vote, a move denounced by Colombia’s foreign ministry as a form of electoral interference. In a similar vein, U.S. senator Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio) — who joined an 86-member State Department electoral observation mission on Sunday after visiting President Noboa in Ecuador last week — along with Reps. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.) and Carlos Gimenez (R-Fla.), have made several statements in the days leading up to the vote implicitly encouraging voters to vote for De la Espriella and reject Cepeda. The June 21 runoff pits diametrically opposed visions for Latin America’s third largest country and economy against one another. De la Espriella has promised to end Petro’s “Total Peace” negotiations with the country’s guerilla, paramilitary, and criminal groups; unleash lethal military force to fight drug trafficking, and construct ten maximum-security prisons for low-level criminals just has President Nayib Bukele has in El Salvador. He also wants to cut taxes for the private sector, resume aerial fumigation of coca crops, join the Trump administration’s “Shield of the Americas” consortium, and issue new concessions for fracking and oil exploration. Cepeda, on the other hand, intends to double-down on the demobilization of armed actors through peace negotiations and intensify the country’s clean energy transition. He promises to center human rights and combat illicit finance as the cornerstone of his counternarcotics strategy, and seeks to deepen Colombia’s leadership role in Latin America, invest in public education, and prioritize anti-militarism and international law in the country’s foreign affairs. The second round runoff will likely come down to whether the roughly 12% who voted for Valencia and Fajardo will opt for De la Espriella or Cepeda. It’s likely that Fajardo’s 4% will mostly swing in favor of Cepeda and Valencia’s 7% will go for De La Espriella — putting him above the 50% needed — though many of Valencia’s more centrist voters attracted to her openly-gay, liberal running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo, may be put off by De La Espriella’s conservative family values and outwardly misogynistic behavior, and instead vote for Cepeda. It’s also expected that voter turnout will be considerably higher in the second round — as it typically has been in past votes — with many Cepeda supporters opting to stay at home in the first round given most polling had put him squarely in the lead, yet not hitting the 50% mark required to win outright. This dynamic could work to Cepeda’s favor, as it did in Colombia’s 2022 presidential elections, when the two right-wing and center-right candidates won a combined 52% to Petro’s 40% in the first round, but a surge in last-minute support and voter turnout for Petro’s movement catapulted him to over 50% for a victory in the runoff. Even if De la Espriella wins the June 21 vote, he will likely face an uphill battle getting some of his more radical proposals passed into law. Petro’s Historic Pact party won a plurality of Colombia’s Senate and House of Representatives seats in the country’s March 8 legislative elections, while De la Espriella’s party has just one congressman and four senators in the legislature, making it likely he would have to form coalitions with centrist parties and moderate some of his proposals for them to have a chance at becoming law. If Cepeda wins the June runoff, he is likely to face similar governance challenges as well as an uphill battle with the Trump administration — as Petro has — though his cooler demeanor and more pragmatic work-style may facilitate the country’s long-standing institutional and operational relationships with its U.S. counterparts despite possible tensions between the executives. Meanwhile, with a De la Espriella victory, the Trump administration would gain a major new ally in Latin America’s epicenter — and a partner more than willing to accelerate the spread of the “Donroe Doctrine” at a key inflection point in the regional balance of power.
Kolombiya'da İlk Turdan Net Kazanan Çıkmadı: De la Espriella ve Cepeda İkinci Turda YarışacakColombian president links Mideast wars to oil greed, Nazi ideology
Gustavo Petro tells UN Security Council that global racism, hydrocarbon consumption drive violence
Kolombiya Devlet Başkanı Petro: Orta Doğu Savaşları Petrol Açgözlülüğü ve Nazi İdeolojisinden BesleniyorPro-Trump candidate takes lead in Colombia's presidential race with promise of crime crackdown
Bombastic pro-Trump lawyer Aberaldo de la Espriella pulled ahead as a leader in Colombia’s race for the presidency in the first round of elections over the weekend, capitalizing on a growing appetite for heavy-handed crackdowns on criminal groups across Latin America. But the second-place finisher, progressive senator Ivan Cepeda, and his ally President Gustavo Petro questioned the results of the election Sunday night without providing evidence. De la Espriella rapidly gained traction in the lea