24. Kanada başbakanı (2025–görevde)
Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Kanada Başbakanı Carney ile telefonda görüştü
Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kanada Başbakanı Carney ile telefonda görüştü. Görüşmede, Türkiye-Kanada ilişkileri ile bölgesel ve küresel konular ele alındı. Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney ile telefon görüşmesi gerçekleştirdi. Görüşmede, Türkiye-Kanada ikili ilişkileri ile bölgesel ve küresel konuları ele alındı. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Türkiye ile Kanada arasındaki ticaret, güvenlik, savunma sanayii, enerji başta olmak üzere birçok alanda ilişkileri bir üst düzeye yükseltmek için çalıştıklarını, bu amaçla atılan adımları sürdüreceklerini ifade etti. Cumhurbaşkanı, Türkiye’de düzenlenecek NATO Liderler Zirvesi’nin müttefikler arasındaki iş birliğinin kuvvetlendirilmesine vesile olmasını temenni ettiğini de belirtti. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan görüşmede, Kanada Başbakanı’nın 1 Temmuz Kanada Günü’nü de tebrik etti.
Erdoğan ve Carney Görüşmesinde NATO Zirvesi İşbirliği VurgusuBaşkan Erdoğan, Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney ile görüştü! NATO Zirvesi mesajı: "Müttefikler arasındaki iş birliği kuvvetlendirilmeli"
Başkan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney ile bir telefon görüşmesi gerçekleştirdi. Liderler Türkiye-Kanada ikili ilişkileri ile bölgesel ve küresel konuları ele aldı. Başkan Erdoğan, Türkiye’de...Devamı için tıklayınız
Erdoğan ve Carney Görüşmesinde NATO Zirvesi İşbirliği VurgusuCarney Unveils Western Canada Mega-Projects to Boost Asia Trade
Multibillion dollar investments, including a new oil pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific Coast, and natural gas facilities, aim to diversify trade away from the United States.
Carney Unveils Western Canada Mega Projects to Boost Asia Trade
Multibillion dollar investments, including a new oil pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific Coast, and natural gas facilities, aim to diversify trade away from the United States.
Canada aims to announce 10 countries backing global defence bank at NATO summit
Canadian PM Mark Carney promotes DSRB, urging 'middle powers' alliance amid shifting US-led world order
Exclusive-Canada aims to announce 10 countries backing global defence bank at NATO summit
By Jonathan Spicer, Iain Withers and Marc Jones ANKARA/LONDON, July 2 (Reuters) - Canada is aiming to co-announce around 10 founding nations for a global defence bank at next week's NATO summit in Turkey, the lead Canadian negotiator told Reuters on Thursday. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is promoting the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) as part of his call this year for an alliance of "middle powers" to combat what he sees as the fracturing of the traditional U.S.-led world order.
Minister Sidhu advances trade, investment and economic cooperation during visit to South China
The Honourable Maninder Sidhu, Minister of International Trade concluded the first visit of a Canadian Minister to South China since 2018, where he built on Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to Beijing earlier this year, advanced trade diversification, and delivered tangible outcomes for Canadian businesses, workers and exporters.
Kanada'nın Avrupa'daki askeri varlığı son 30 yılın en yüksek seviyesinde
Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney, NATO Genel Sekreteri Mark Rutte ile görüşmesinde, ülkesinin Avrupa'daki "sürekli askeri varlığının" son 30 yılın en yüksek seviyesine ulaştığını belirtti.
Kanada'nın Avrupa'daki "sürekli askeri varlığı" son 30 yılın en yüksek seviyesine ulaştı
Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney, NATO Genel Sekreteri Mark Rutte ile görüşmesinde, ülkesinin Avrupa'daki "sürekli askeri varlığının" son 30 yılın en yüksek seviyesine ulaştığını belirtti.
Canada deploys largest Europe force in 30 years ahead of NATO summit
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Monday that Ottawa has deployed its largest sustained military presence in Europe in over three decades, highlighting that defense spending has hit the alliance's 2% GDP target for the first time since the Cold War ended.
Canada deployed 'largest' Europe military presence in 30 years amid NATO summit preparations
Prime Minister Carney discusses upcoming Ankara summit with NATO chief Rutte, reaffirms Canada's commitment to 2% and 5% GDP defense targets
The world adrift
THE world is at an inflection point, in the middle of geopolitical upheaval and turmoil. It is more unstable today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Rising geopolitical tensions and fierce geoeconomic competition are contributing to instability. The old order with its rules has gone. The international system is fragmenting. Multilateralism remains under unprecedented stress. Power shifts continue to reshape the international landscape, marking the advent of a multipolar era. The disregard for international law and norms by big and regional powers has left countries having to navigate a rule-less terrain at a time of uncertainty and volatility. Hard power is back, and with a vengeance. Not that it ever went away. But now it’s the first option, not the last for powerful countries to use to bend other states to their will. Diplomacy only happens after missiles fly. The US and Israel’s attack on Iran, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s war on Gaza, Lebanon and Syria and India’s military action against Pakistan all testify to the increasing use of force. All these actions flouted international law and the legal prohibition on the use of force. They were carried out with impunity, further fragmenting an already crumbling global order. The future outlook isn’t just troubled. It appears chaotic. What should we make of this state of disorder? A number of recent books deal with a world in transition, the present disarray and what might follow. They include The Triangle of Power: Rebalancing the New World Order by Alexander Stubb, The Return of the Great Powers by Brendan Simms, and Statecraft: The New Rules of Power in a Divided World by Jack Watling. These scholarly works offer insightful though varying perspectives on the current state of play and differ in how they see the future panning out. Stubb is the president and former prime minister and foreign minister of Finland. He draws on that experience for his analysis of the international system and how to address its weaknesses. The liberal world order is in tatters, he argues, and trust that has been the basis of the international system, is broken. What happens next will depend on the interplay between the triangle of the Global West (US and Western allies), Global East (Russia, China) and Global South (the global majority). The latter is underrepresented in the current global system and wants a redistribution of power. It does not want to take sides but seeks agency in the system. What kind of international order will emerge from a divided and unstable world? Stubb sees the Global South playing a key role in rebalancing and shaping the new order. He calls for cooperative multilateralism and choosing ‘Helsinki’ over ‘Yalta’. This means accommodating the views and interests of the Global South and economically empowered middle powers by more powerful states. Cambridge historian Brendan Simms’s compelling book is about the return of “traditional geopolitics and the “new great power world”. This is seen as a departure from the post-Cold War period when international law and economic cooperation were dominant. Globalisation was valued as delivering benefits for all. But the belief that great power conflict and rivalry had ended and cooperation would outrank raw power was belied in the past decade. The world was no longer flat as interdependence came to be weaponised. Globalisation began to be reversed as a reaction to its homogenising effects and the vulnerabilities it created. Now, Simms writes, military might is valued more than economic heft, law or morality. Decisions are driven by geopolitical logic and not economic logic. Hence, “geopolitics may kill us before climate change does”. Global governance is in retreat as major powers compete for primacy. But this doesn’t mean great powers can do what they want and succeed. There are constraining factors. Nevertheless, Simms sees great powers dominating the world in the foreseeable future and shaping the new order. But without a single hegemon. He points to the risks of war between the great powers and urges the need for a strategy that recognises that reality and seeks to deal with it. Statecraft’s focus is on how states compete in a dynamic contemporary milieu, how they can exercise leverage and influence and effectively pursue their interests even when they do not possess the majority of power in that environment. Watling is principally concerned with how countries can achieve better strategic outcomes through their statecraft at a time of chaos. States, he says, pursue strategies but it is humans that bear the consequences. In today’s fraught security landscape, the need for statecraft has never been greater. This is especially so because today the competition is multipolar not bipolar while the arena for competition has vastly expanded. In a divided world what matters is not a country’s size or economic resources. The states that thrive are those that practice statecraft across all domains, not just defence. A broader question is raised by today’s rule-less international environment where big and regional powers act unilaterally and wantonly resort to force to achieve their objectives. Does this mean might-makes-right? If recent developments are anything to go by, the answer is no. Stronger powers have been unable to prevail because modern warfare, with its drones, missiles and asymmetrical strategies, has levelled the ground between them and smaller/weaker countries The US/Israel-Iran war showed the failure of military force. Its use did not compel Iran to surrender. In today’s world, military superiority does not guarantee dominance or victory. This is testified by America’s Operation Epic Fury, Russia’s unwon war against Ukraine and India’s aggression against Pakistan last year. Then there is the middle powers question. Can they reshape geopolitics or is that just for great powers to do? The debate continues. Some say only great powers move the board. Others see middle power activism as the new normal, as an important aspect of the emerging global order. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told Davos which side he is on. Middle powers acting together could deal with bigger powers from a position of strength. He was acknowledging their power to reshape the world. Countries must adapt to a shifting global environment. But the problem isn’t just complexity. It’s a fractured and unmoored world that will remain volatile and unpredictable for the foreseeable future. The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. Published in Dawn, June 29th, 2026
Küresel Sistem Sürükleniyor: Soğuk Savaş'tan Bu Yana En Büyük İstikrarsızlıkDışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan: Ateşkesin Lübnan'ı kapsaması olumlu
Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan, Kanada Dışişleri Bakanı Anita Anand ile görüşmesinin ardından düzenlenen ortak basın toplantısında konuştu. Fidan, Venezuela'da meydana gelen depremlerde hayatını kaybedenler için taziye dileklerinde bulunarak, Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın bu konuda her türlü yardımın yapılması için gerekli talimatı verdiğini ve ilgili kurumların gerekli hazırlıklarını yapıp Venezuela'ya hareket ettiğini söyledi. Kanadalı mevkidaşının martta Türkiye'yi ziyaret ettiğini hatırlatan Fidan, verimli bir görüşme yaptıklarını aktardı. İlginizi Çekebilir Fidan, iki ülke arasında dinamik ilişkilerin olduğunu belirterek, "Türkiye'yle Kanada arasında gerçekleştirilemeyen uzun yıllardır çok büyük potansiyel işbirliği alanları var. İki büyük ülke, NATO üyesi olmasına rağmen belli alanlardaki potansiyellerini çok fazla ileri taşıyamamışlardı." diye konuştu İki büyük ülkenin bir araya gelerek kendi potansiyellerini işbirliğiyle daha da ileri taşımayı ele aldığına işaret eden Fidan, "Anand bunu çok iyi ifade etti, dört bacak üzerinde götürdüğümüz daha yapısal hale sokmaya başladığımız bir ilişki kümesine dönmeye başladı." dedi. Carney'i iki hafta sonra Anand ve Kanada Savunma Bakanı David McGuinty ile Ankara'da düzenlenecek NATO zirvesinde ağırlayacaklarını belirten Fidan, Carney'nin ilerleyen dönemde Türkiye'yi ziyaret etmesinin söz konusu olduğunu dile getirdi. Fidan, küresel gelişmelere bakıldığında Türkiye ve Kanada gibi ülkelerin çok daha yakın bir işbirliği sergilemeleri gerektiğini, bu anlayışla Türkiye-Kanada ilişkilerini stratejik bir seviyeye taşıma kararını aldıklarını ve bu çalışmaları yürüttüklerini söyledi. "Söz konusu hedef doğrultusunda Türkiye-Kanada Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması'na yönelik ön görüşmeler de ilgili birimlerimiz arasında başlatılmış durumda. En kısa sürede bunu daha da ileri taşımayı düşünüyoruz." diyen Fidan, iki ülke arasında serbest ticaret anlaşmasının hayata geçmesi halinde ikili ticaret hacminin daha da artacağını değerlendirdiklerini belirtti. Fidan, Kanada ile enerji alanındaki işbirliği imkanlarını da stratejik bir perspektifle değerlendirdiklerini, Anand ile Toronto kentinde bulunan Darlington Nükleer Tesisi'ni ziyaret ettiklerini aktardı. Ziyarette, Kanada'nın nükleer enerji üretimindeki yetenek ve kabiliyetlerini bir kez daha gördüklerini belirten Fidan, Türkiye'nin nükleer enerji arayışında olan bir ülke olduğunu ve nükleer enerji santrallerinin yapımı konusunda uluslararası ortaklarla çok yoğun temaslarının olduğunu kaydetti. Fidan, enerji santraline giderek Türkiye'nin, Kanada'nın teknolojisinden nasıl istifade edebileceğine ilişkin görüşmeler yaptıklarını ve ciddi bir potansiyelin olduğunu dile getirdi. "Burada Türkiye-Kanada işbirliğinin çok olumlu sonuçlar üreteceğine inanıyorum. Klasik nükleer reaktörlerin dışında küçük modüler reaktörlerin de biliyorsunuz son 10 yıldır hayata geçirilmesi konusunda uluslararası camiada büyük bir çaba var." ifadelerini kullanan Fidan, Kanada'nın bu konuda somut adım atmasının Türkiye olarak kendilerini etkilediğini söyledi. "SAVUNMA SANAYİ ALANINDAKİ İŞBİRLİĞİMİZİ DAHA DA GELİŞTİRMEYİ HEDEFLİYORUZ" Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın da bu konuda diğer ülkelerle işbirliği yapma konusunda büyük hassasiyet gösterdiğinin altını çizen Fidan, "Kanada'da somut bir adım atılması bizim olayı yerinde görmemiz açısından önemliydi. Darlington'da hem klasik nükleer elektrik santralinin olması hem de yeni inşaatı başlayan SMR'in (Darlington Küçük Modüler Reaktörü) bulunması dolayısıyla bizim ziyaretimizi daha pratik hale getirdi." ifadelerini kullandı. Fidan, diğer taraftan kritik mineraller ve sıvılaştırılmış doğal gaz alanlarında da büyük bir potansiyelin bulunduğuna dikkati çekerek, "Savunma sanayi alanındaki işbirliğimizi daha da geliştirmeyi ve derinleştirmeyi hedefliyoruz." dedi. Türkiye ve Kanada yararına olacak çok sayıda proje üzerinde çalıştıklarını dile getiren Fidan, bu projeleri hayata geçirmek için gerekli siyasi iradeye ve kararlılığa sahip olduklarını vurguladı. Fidan, başlıca küresel ve bölgesel meselelere giderek daha benzer bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşmalarının Türkiye ile Kanada'yı birbirine daha da yakınlaştırdığını belirterek, uluslararası meselelerin diplomasi ve diyalog yoluyla çözümü için çaba sarf ettiklerini söyledi. "İSRAİL'İN GÖRÜŞMELERİ SABOTE ETMESİNE İZİN VERİLMEMELİ" Bakan Fidan, "Amerika ile İran arasında ateşkesi temin eden mutabakat zaptının imzalanmasından büyük bir memnuniyet duyduk. Bu ateşkesin Lübnan'ı kapsayacak şekilde genişletilmiş olmasını da olumlu bir gelişme olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Tarafların yapıcı yaklaşımlarını sürdürerek kalan meseleler üzerinde de bir an evvel uzlaşmalarını ümit ediyoruz." ifadelerini kullandı. Gelinen aşama itibarıyla Hürmüz Boğazı'ndan kesintisiz ve serbest geçişin kalıcı olarak test edilmesinin elzem olduğunu vurgulayan Fidan, "Türkiye olarak Amerika ile İran arasında devam eden müzakere sürecine etkin katkı vermeyi sürdüreceğiz. Bu süreçte İsrail'in görüşmeleri sabote etmesine izin verilmemelidir. Dünya kamuoyu bu konuda son derece dikkatli olmalı. Tarafların bu konuda dikkatli ve sağduyulu davranması gerekmekte." değerlendirmesini yaptı. "DİKKATİMİZİ ORADAN (GAZZE'DEN) AYIRMIYORUZ" Fidan, Gazze'de halen son derece hassas ve kırılgan bir dönemden geçtiklerine işaret ederek, "Dikkatimizi oradan (Gazze'den) ayırmıyoruz. Uluslararası toplumun tüm çabalarına rağmen İsrail yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmemektedir. (İsrail Başbakanı Binyamin) Netanyahu hükümetinin insani yardımların Gazze'ye girişini engellemesi, durumun vahametini daha da, bildiğiniz gibi, arttırmaktadır. Bunu anbean takip etmekteyiz." diye konuştu. İsrail'in ateşkes hükümlerinin hilafına askeri mevcudiyetini ısrarla genişlettiğini ve sivil halkın yaşam alanını daha da daralttığını kaydeden Fidan, "Doğu Kudüs dahil Batı Şeria'da giderek artan yerleşimci terörün kalıcı barış zeminini ciddi şekilde sarstığını" dile getirdi. Bakan Fidan, Kanadalı mevkidaşıyla yaptığı görüşmelerde Filistin meselesinin iki devletli çözüm temelinde adil ve kalıcı şekilde neticelendirilmesi yönündeki tutumlarını yinelediklerini belirterek, bu konuda uluslararası toplumun sorumluluk sahibi üyeleriyle işbirliği yapmaya devam edeceklerini söyledi. TÜRKİYE, RUSYA-UKRAYNA HEYETLERİNİ MÜZAKERE MASASINDA BULUŞTURMAYA HAZIR Küresel güvenlik ve istikrarı tehdit eden diğer bir konunun da Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı olduğunu vurgulayan Fidan, Kanadalı mevkidaşı Anand ile bu konuyu da ele aldıklarını dile getirdi. Fidan, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'nın mümkün olan en kısa sürede, diyalog yoluyla ve uluslararası hukuk temelinde sona ermesini istediklerini belirterek, gelinen noktada diplomatik süreçte bir durgunluk yaşandığını, çatışmaların hız kazandığını ve tarafların askeri kazanım arayışına odaklandığını gördüklerini ifade etti. Diplomatik sürecin bir an önce canlandırılması gerektiğini vurgulayan Fidan, "Bu bağlamda Rusya ve Ukrayna heyetlerini yeniden ülkemizde müzakere masasında bir araya getirmeye hazır olduğumuzu da taraflara ilettiğim gibi buradan dünya kamuoyuna da iletmek istiyorum." dedi. Fidan, bugünkü görüşmelerin Türkiye ile Kanada arasındaki ilişkilerin müşterek sorumluluklar ve çıkarlar temelinde derinleşmekte olduğunu gösterdiğini belirterek, iki ülke liderlerinin liderliğinde işbirliğini güçlendirmeye devam edeceklerini aktardı. Ankara'da yapılacak NATO zirvesine ilişkin soru üzerine Fidan, zirve hazırlıklarının yoğun şekilde devam ettiğini belirterek, "Gerçekten bu zirve, tarihi bir zirve olacak. Çünkü uluslararası jeopolitik şartlar öyle bir noktaya geldi ki NATO üyesi ülkelerin alacağı kararlar bu dönemde daha da belirleyici olacak. Sadece İttifakın geleceği için değil aynı zamanda kendi coğrafyamızın geleceği açısından da önemli." ifadelerini kullandı. Fidan, bu noktada İttifak içerisinde son birkaç yıldır devam eden önemli konuların olduğunu, bunların başında savunma harcamalarının artırılmasının geldiğini aktararak, "Bu, tartışılan bir konu olmaktan çıkmış durumda. Biz, bu yeni yapacağımız zirvede de bunun altını çizeceğiz." değerlendirmesini yaptı. Bakan Fidan, bütün ülkelerin bunu siyasi olarak kabul ettiğini artık bundan sonra pratikte hangi adımların atıldığını, kabul edilen artışa ilişkin ne türden harcamaların yapıldığına ilişkin muhasebenin yapılacağını dile getirdi. NATO ZİRVESİNDE SAVUNMA SANAYİSİ ÖZEL GÜNDEMİ VURGUSU Özellikle Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı ve diğer savaşlarla birlikte NATO ülkelerinin savunma sanayisinde nerede olduklarını sorgulama noktasında siyasi ve stratejik düzeyde farkındalık geliştiğini kaydeden Fidan, "Bu noktada savunma sanayi, NATO planlamalarında, NATO toplantılarında artık detay bir konu olmaktan çıkıp en üst düzeyde stratejik anlam ifade eden bir konu." dedi. Fidan, "Dolayısıyla önümüzdeki ay Ankara'da yapılacak olan zirvede de savunma sanayiyle ilgili özel bir gündem olacak, özel etkinlikler olacak. Savunma Sanayi Başkanlığımız ve ilgili kurumlarımız, bu konuyla ilgili yoğun bir çalışma içerisinde." ifadelerini kullandı. Liderler arasında yapılacak üst düzey stratejik ve siyasi görüşmelerin önemine dikkati çeken Fidan, NATO'nun geleceğine ilişkin farklı perspektiflerin nasıl uyumlaştırılacağı, transatlantik farklılıkların nasıl uzlaştırılacağı, tehdit algılamaları ve İttifakın hazırlık düzeyi gibi konuların zirvede ele alınacağını söyledi. Fidan, bu tartışmaların yapıcı bir ortam içerisinde geçeceğinin altını çizerek, burada Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın kilit rol oynayacağına olan inançlarının tam olduğunu vurguladı. KANADA İLE NÜKLEER ENERJİDE ANLAYIŞ BİRLİĞİ "FEVKALADE ÖNEMLİ" VURGUSU Darlington Nükleer Tesisi'ni ziyaretine ilişkin soru üzerine Fidan, Türkiye'nin nükleer enerjiye her fırsatta ve her halükarda ihtiyacının olduğunu belirterek, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan liderliğinde Enerji Bakanlığının "muhteşem başarılar ortaya koyduğunu" vurguladı. Fidan, Türkiye'de alternatif yeşil enerji kullanımının büyük oranda ilerletildiğini ancak buna rağmen sanayide artan enerji ihtiyacını istenilen hızda ve fiyatta karşılamadığını belirterek, "Yıllar önce başlatılan nükleer enerji stratejisinde kaydettiğimiz ciddi mesafeler var. Şimdi ikinci santralin, üçüncü santralin yapılması için de arayışlar, çalışmalar devam ediyor. Bizim, Kanada'yla bu yönde geliştirdiğimiz anlayış birliği fevkalade önemli." ifadelerini kullandı. Dün, Darlington'a yaptığı ziyaret esnasında Kanada'nın özgün teknolojisini görme imkanı bulduklarını aktaran Fidan, "Orada bizi etkileyen noktalardan biri de şu; bir ağır su reaktörü, zenginleştirilmiş uranyum olmadan çalışıyor. Dizaynı ve konsepti 50'li yıllarda, 60'lı yıllarda yapılmış ama çok uzun yıllardır problemsiz şekilde güvenlik tedbirleri en üst düzeyde çalışan bir teknoloji." değerlendirmesini yaptı. Fidan, bu teknolojinin Kanada'nın özgün teknolojisi olması açısından önemli olduğunun altını çizdi. Öte yandan bu teknolojinin, Kanada dışında Romanya, Çin ve Arjantin'de de yaygın şekilde kullanılıyor olmasının kendilerinin dikkatini çektiğini söyleyen Fidan, bu konuda gösterdiği anlayış ve işbirliği için de mevkidaşına teşekkür etti. Fidan, Enerji Bakanlığının da bu konuyu gerçekten büyük bir ilgiyle yakından takip ettiğini ve görüşmeler yaptığını, dün de kendisinin bizzat ilgili şirket yöneticileriyle bir araya geldiğini ve teknik konularda izahatlarını dinlediğini aktardı. Bakan Fidan, bu konuda ciddi bir profesyonel işbirliği zemininin bulunduğuna işaret etti. Mevkidaşı Anand ile yaptığı görüşmelerde, Kahramanmaraş merkezli 6 Şubat 2023 depremlerinin ardından Kanada'nın, bu ülkede eğitim gören, ticari faaliyet yürüten veya aile bağı bulunan Türk vatandaşlarına yönelik başlattığı oturum ve çalışma izni uygulamasının uzatılması konusunun gündeme gelip gelmediğinin sorulması üzerine Fidan, Türkiye ile Kanada arasında vize, çalışma izinleri ve göç süreçlerine ilişkin konuların kapsamlı şekilde ele alındığını belirtti. Basın toplantısının ardından mevkidaşıyla bir görüşme daha gerçekleştireceklerini bildiren Fidan, "Basın toplantısından sonra bir oturumumuz daha var. Orada da daha detaylı ele alma imkanımız olacak." dedi. Son dakika... Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Reeskont kredilerinin yıllık limitini 5 milyar liraya çıkarıyoruz Kadir İnanır'ın ölümü sanat dünyasını yasa boğdu! Ünlü isimlerden taziye mesajları
Dışişleri Bakanı Fidan: Lübnan'ı kapsayan ateşkes olumluCarney Squeezes Germany and Korea as He Dangles Huge Submarine Deal
In late May, a South Korean attack submarine slipped into a harbor in Victoria, British Columbia — a floating sales pitch for one of the largest military contracts in Canadian history.
Macron’s Evian summit shows the limits Trump places on the G7
Macron’s Evian summit shows the limits Trump places on the G7 Expert comment jon.wallace 19 June 2026 France achieved as much as could have been expected at its G7 Summit, but this was well short of what the world needs. A new approach is needed. French President Emmanuel Macron appears to have had two goals for France’s Evian G7 summit which concluded on 17 June. First, to facilitate a constructive dialogue between President Donald Trump and the G7’s other members (or ‘G6’) on a limited number of issues. And second, to strengthen cooperation between the G7 as a whole and leading emerging economies. In the event, he achieved both these goals. In contrast to last year’s Kananaskis Summit, Trump did not leave early. There were no public spats of the kind that marred the 2018 Canadian G7 summit. And the guest countries attending – Brazil, Egypt, India, Kenya and the Republic of Korea – took part in at least half the sessions, explicitly endorsing some of the policy statements. But Evian also shows the limits of what can be achieved at the G7 with President Trump in the US chair. A new format is urgently needed to address pressing global challenges. Main outcomes Arguably France’s biggest success was that Trump joined the opening session with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump signed up to a statement which reaffirmed the G7’s ‘unwavering support’ for Ukraine, committed to increase the supply of air defence systems, and promised to strengthen sanctions against Russia, including on its oil and gas sector. The G6 supported Trump’s agreement to end its war with Iran, despite the memorandum of understanding’s vagueness and critical unresolved issues. And they avoided repeating their criticism of the decision to launch the war. In return the US gave a qualified endorsement of a UK–France naval initiative designed to assist a resumption of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The summit also produced statements on several French economic priorities, although these were often constrained by US ‘America first’ positions. A summit declaration recognized the risk from growing macroeconomic imbalances, a key factor underpinning the global financial crisis of 2007-9. However, no specific offer was made to try and persuade China, the other essential player, to help address these imbalances. Nor did G7 countries make their own domestic policy proposals to help address the problem – a particular issue for the US, with respect to its burgeoning fiscal deficit. There was only a bland statement that ‘countries with large and persistent external deficits should undertake policies that include supporting domestic savings and fiscal consolidation’ and a commitment to continue discussions in the G20. Since President Trump started his second term…many of the most important issues facing the world economy are excluded from the group’s agenda. Another declaration promoted collective approaches by the G7 and its allies in responding to China’s dominance of critical minerals supply. This contrasted with the strongly bilateral approach that characterized a US-hosted critical minerals ministerial in February. The G7 statement set out high level goals on industrial cooperation, market structure, transparency, stockpiling and recycling. It also announced a non-binding G7 Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance. A statement on creating a safe digital space for children and youth focused, for the most part, on calls for the digital technology industry to take (essentially voluntary) action to protect young people from online harms. G7 leaders also requested that finance ministers and central bank governors further ‘discuss’ emerging opportunities and potential risks arising from artificial intelligence, including in the financial sector. But the urgent need for stronger public guardrails on AI development generally – and the desire of many countries to establish sovereignty over the way digital products developed by the US and China are used in their jurisdictions – were not addressed. The apparent support of the CEOs of Open AI, Anthropic and Google DeepMind for enhanced G7 cooperation and equitable access to AI products would, however, have been welcome to the G6 and partner countries. A further statement reiterated the importance of development finance while calling for reform of the way it is delivered. How did France do it? To deliver these outcomes France refined the approach adopted by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney for the Kananaskis G7 Summit in 2025. To try and ensure President Trump’s attendance, President Macron moved the summit date – avoiding a clash with the president’s birthday celebrations on 14 June. The agenda was structured to avoid all subjects where the US would not engage or where its position was likely to be unacceptable to G6 countries – such as climate change, the future of the world trading system, maintaining monetary and financial stability and the need for broad-based digital technology governance. And France invited Kenya to the summit rather than South Africa, after Trump threatened to boycott the summit if South Africa attended. Related work Saving global economic governance from the ‘Trump shock’ France was also helped by the timing of the US ceasefire agreement with Iran. Trump’s poor domestic poll ratings, the approaching midterm elections, and the Supreme Court’s restrictions on his ability to deploy tariff hikes at will may also have contributed to the US president’s relatively constructive approach to the summit. Meanwhile France deepened the involvement of guest, or ‘partner’, countries. They were invited to send representatives to preparatory sherpa meetings. And the summit outcomes were structured around nine declarations, allowing partners to choose which to back. In the event, all partners endorsed the statement on creating a safe digital space for young people, while support for the other G7 statements varied. The limits of today’s G7 France achieved as much as might reasonably have been expected from this summit. But the flaws in the G7 format with President Trump representing the US were again highlighted in Evian. That weakness is not about the reduced size of the G7 economies relative to the world economy – the group is still large enough in economic terms and has the technological and financial capabilities to be highly influential. But it can only wield its influence if members share core values, trust each other sufficiently and there are no policy areas which are barred from discussion. None of these conditions have held since President Trump started his second term. As a result, many of the most important issues facing the world economy today are excluded from the group’s agenda.
Evian G7 Zirvesi, Trump'ın Küresel İşbirliğine Getirdiği Sınırlamaları Ortaya KoyduHegseth slams NATO and ‘middle powers’ talk, launches Europe troop review
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech appeared to take a veiled dig at recent remarks made by Prime Minister Mark Carney about middle powers needing to band together.
G7 zirvesinde neler konuşuldu?
Fransa'nın Evian-les-Bains kentinde düzenlenen G7 Liderler Zirvesi'nde, İran uzlaşısı, Ukrayna savaşı ve yaptırımlar ön plana çıktı. Fransa'nın Haute-Savoie bölgesindeki Evian-les-Bains kentinde düzenlenen G7 Liderler Zirvesi, üye ülkelerin liderlerini ve davetli devletlerin temsilcilerini bir araya getirdi. Zirve programı kapsamında liderler; jeopolitik sınamalar, Ukrayna ve Avrupa'da barış ve güvenlik, Ortadoğu'daki son durum, uluslararası işbirliği, küresel ekonomik büyüme perspektifleri ve yapay zeka teknolojilerindeki gelişmeleri ele aldı. ABD ile İran arasındaki savaşı sonlandırmaya yönelik varılan ön anlaşmanın ardından, İran konusu da zirvenin öncelikli gündem maddeleri arasındaydı. Evian'daki zirveye G7 üyesi ülkelerin yanı sıra küresel işbirliğini genişletmek amacıyla Hindistan, Brezilya, Kenya ve Güney Kore gibi ülkelerin temsilcileri de davet edildi. En son 2025 yılında Kanada'nın ev sahipliğinde toplanan G7, 2014 yılına kadar Rusya'nın katılımıyla G8 formatında düzenleniyordu. Rusya'nın Kırım'ı ilhak etmesi ve Ukrayna'ya yönelik askeri müdahalesinin ardından üyeliği askıya alınmış ve grup yeniden G7 formatına dönmüştü. Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Zelenski, zirve marjında liderlerle yoğun ikili temaslar gerçekleştirirken, ABD Başkanı Donald Trump ile de dört ay aradan sonra ilk kez yüz yüze bir görüşme gerçekleştirdi. Zirvede Ukrayna'daki savaş, hava savunma destekleri, Rusya'ya yönelik yaptırımlar ve küresel ekonomik güvenlik öncelikli başlıklar olarak öne çıktı. RUS PETROLÜNE YÖNELİK YAPTIRIMLAR GERİ GELECEK Zelenski ile yaptığı ikili görüşmenin ardından açıklamalarda bulunan ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İran ile yaşanan savaş döneminde askıya alınan Rus petrolüne yönelik yaptırımların yeniden uygulamaya konulabileceğini belirtti. Associated Press (AP) ajansının aktardığına göre Trump, Hürmüz Boğazı'nın açılmasına atıfta bulunarak, "Yakında bunu yapabileceğiz, çünkü artık petrol akıyor" ifadesini kullandı. Trump, bir gün önce yaptığı açıklamada boğazın kısmen açık olduğunu belirtmişti. Washington ve Tahran'ın, boğazın tamamen açılması konusunda henüz nihai bir anlaşmaya varmadığı basına sızan bilgiler arasında yer alıyor. ABD yönetimi, Hürmüz Boğazı'nın kapanmasının ardından petrol fiyatlarındaki yükselişi dizginlemek amacıyla, tankerlere yüklenmiş durumdaki Rus petrolüne yönelik yaptırımları geçici olarak askıya almıştı. Rusya'nın bir barış anlaşmasına varması gerektiğini yineleyen Trump, Ukrayna'daki savaşı "aptallık" olarak nitelendirdi. Trump, "Bakın, Rusya bir anlaşma yapmak zorunda! Rusya çok sayıda insan kaybetti, Ukrayna da öyle. Geçen ay ikisi toplamda 35 bin asker kaybetti. Orada yaşananlar tam bir çılgınlık" dedi. Trump, mayıs ayına ait bu toplam kayıp verisini hangi kaynağa dayandırdığını açıklamadı. Ukrayna tarafı ise sadece Rusya'nın mayıs ayındaki kaybının bu seviyede olduğunu savunuyor. UKRAYNA LİDERİNDEN PUTİN İLE ÜÇLÜ ZİRVE TEKLİFİ Öte yandan Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Zelenski, Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin ile G7 zirvesinin yapıldığı Evian'da bir araya gelmeyi önerdiklerini açıkladı. Reuters'ın haberine göre Zelenski, "Putin ile G7 zirvesi sırasında görüşmeye hazır olduğumuz mesajını ilettik. Çünkü orada Trump, Macron, yani Avrupalılar ve Amerika olacak. Hep birlikte bir araya gelmek için bunun çok iyi bir fırsat olduğunu düşünüyorum" dedi. Kremlin Sözcüsü Dmitri Peskov ise salı günü yaptığı açıklamada, Putin ile Zelenski arasında G7 marjında bir görüşme gerçekleştirilmesine yönelik kendilerine resmi bir teklif ulaşmadığını bildirdi. Zelenski ayrıca, Donald Trump'ın hem kendisiyle hem de Putin ile yaptığı telefon görüşmelerinde, ABD'de üçlü bir zirve düzenlenmesi ihtimalinin gündeme geldiğini belirtti. Ukrayna lideri, "Böyle bir görüşme ABD'de, Putin'in reddetmesinin çok daha zor olacağı bir formatta, en azından Başkan Trump vasıtasıyla organize edilebilir" dedi. Buna karşılık Putin'in dış politika danışmanı Yuri Uşakov, Putin ve Trump'ın 14 Haziran'daki telefon görüşmesinde bu konuyu ele almadıklarını ve Rusya'ya böyle bir teklif iletilmediğini açıkladı. LİDERLER UKRAYNA OTURUMUNDA BİR ARAYA GELDİ Zirve kapsamında Ukrayna delegasyonunun da katılımıyla savaş gündemli ortak bir oturum düzenlendi. Ukraynalı kamu yayın kurumu Suspilne'nin aktardığına göre Zelenski, oturumdaki tüm liderlerin "Rusya'nın bu savaşı kazanamayacağı" konusunda mutabık kaldığını belirtti. Zelenski, toplantıda Ukrayna'ya yönelik hava savunma yardımlarının da ele alındığını ifade ederek, "Hava savunması konusundaki ihtiyacı herkes kabul ediyor, herkes yardım edecek. Tüm G7 üyeleri savunmamızı güçlendirmek için çalışacak. Sistemler ve füzeler hakkında konuştuk ancak şu an için detay vermeyeceğim" dedi. AFP ajansının ismi belirtilmeyen bir Fransız diplomata dayandırdığı haberine göre, G7 liderleri Rusya üzerindeki baskıyı gaz ve petrol yaptırımlarıyla artırma konusunda uzlaştı. İngiltere Başbakanı Keir Starmer, oturumun ardından Times Radio'ya yaptığı açıklamada, G7 içinde durumun değişmekte olduğuna dair güçlü bir fikir birliği ve birlik duygusu hissettiğini söyledi. Starmer, "Ukrayna sadece kendisini savunmakla kalmayıp, topraklarını geri alabildiğini ve Rusya'ya ciddi kayıplar verdirebildiğini gösterdi" diye konuştu. Zirveye ev sahipliği yapan Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Emmanuel Macron'un, Zelenski'ye çarşamba günkü kapanışa kadar zirvede kalmasını ve diğer liderlerin yanı sıra Trump ile yeniden görüşmesini teklif ettiği bildirildi. Zelenski, salı günü Almanya Başbakanı Friedrich Merz, Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney ve İngiltere Başbakanı Keir Starmer ile ikili görüşmeler gerçekleştirdi. Merz ile görüşmesinde Ukrayna'nın hava savunmasının güçlendirilmesi ve Rusya topraklarının derinliklerine düzenlenen operasyonların sonuçları ele alındı. Mark Carney ile yapılan görüşmede ise Rusya'ya yönelik yaptırımlar, askeri işbirliği ve Kanada'nın Ukrayna insansız hava araçlarının üretimine sağlayacağı finansal destek konuşuldu. İNGİLTERE VE KANADA'DAN YENİ YAPTIRIM KARARLARI Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanı Ursula von der Leyen ve İngiltere Başbakanı Keir Starmer, görüşmelerin ardından Ukrayna'ya yönelik destek sürecinin yeni bir ivme kazanacağını belirterek iyimser mesajlar verdi. Von der Leyen, "Ukrayna için bir dönüm noktasına geliniyor. Ukrayna cesurca savunmasını sürdürürken, Rusya tükenmişlik belirtileri gösteriyor. 2026 yılındaki durum, 2025'tekinden oldukça farklı" dedi. Starmer ise Ukrayna'nın sahada ilerleme kaydettiği bir dönemde, uygulanan yaptırımların sonuç verdiğine dair G7 içinde gerçek bir fikir birliği oluştuğunu ifade etti. Bu doğrultuda İngiltere ve Kanada, Rusya'nın "gölge filosu" ile askeri sanayisine yönelik yeni yaptırımlar açıkladı. Londra yönetimi, G7 ülkeleri arasında bir ilke imza atarak, üçüncü ülkelere Rus sıvılaştırılmış doğalgazı (LNG) taşıyan gemileri yaptırım listesine aldı. Starmer, yeni önlemlerin Rusya'nın savaş ekonomisini destekleyen ve Avrupa'nın güvenliğini tehdit eden gemileri, fonları ve kişileri hedef aldığını vurguladı. ZİRVE ESNASINDA SİBER SALDIRI Bunun yanı sıra G7 liderler zirvesinin düzenlendiği Haute-Savoie departmanındaki bazı resmi kurumların internet siteleri siber saldırıya uğradı. Fransız Le Parisien gazetesinin haberine göre; zirvenin ilk gününde Evian-les-Bains, Annecy, Thonon-les-Bains kentleri ile Saint-Gingolph komünündeki çeşitli kurumsal siteleri hedef alan koordineli bir siber saldırı düzenlendi. Saldırının sorumluluğunu Rusya yanlısı siber korsan grubu NoName057(16) üstlendi. ABD merkezli siber güvenlik platformu FalconFeeds, grubun sosyal medya platformu X üzerinden yaptığı "Böyle bir etkinliği kaçıramazdık, Fransa'ya küçük bir hediye verdik" açıklamasını paylaştı. Annecy Gölü Turizm Ofisi Sözcüsü Louise-Adelaide Selles, sitelerinin bir süre normalden yavaş çalıştığını ancak bunun teknik bir aksaklığa ya da güvenlik açığına yol açmadığını bildirdi. Haute-Savoie Valiliği ise olayla ilgili bilgileri Paris Savcılığına iletti.
G7 Zirvesinde İran Uzlaşısı ve Ukrayna Savaşı Ön PlandaRusya'dan aralarında üst düzey isimlerin de bulunduğu 103 Kanadalı için şok karar! 'Kalıcı olarak yasaklandı'
Rusya yönetimi, Kanada'nın uyguladığı yaptırımlara tepki olarak Kanada Senatosu ve Avam Kamarası üyeleri, parlamento ve devlet sekreterleri, milletvekilleri ve diğer kamu görevlileri olmak üzere 103 Kanada vatandaşının ülkeye girişine yasak getirdi. 'KALICI OLARAK YASAKLANDI' Rusya Dışişleri Bakanlığından yapılan açıklamada, "Carney hükümetinin, selefi Justin Trudeau'nun Rus karşıtı politikalarını pervasızca benimsemesi ve Kiev'deki neo-Nazi yetkililere ahlaki, mali ve askeri-teknik destek sağlamaya devam etmesi nedeniyle başta Kanada parlamentosu olmak üzere faaliyetleri ülkemizin anayasal düzenini ve dış politikasını karalamayı amaçlayan ve aynı zamanda egemen Rus devlet varlıklarının yasa dışı bir şekilde ele geçirilmesi hedefine hizmet eden 103 Kanada vatandaşının Rusya'ya girişi kalıcı olarak yasaklanmıştır" ifadeleri kullanıldı. Rusya'nın Ottawa yönetiminin "kışkırtıcı eylemlerine" uygun şekilde karşılık vermeye devam edeceği belirtildi. Dünyanın en zengin 10 ismi belli oldu! Zirvede kim var? NE OLMUŞTU? Son aylarda Kanada, Özel Ekonomik Tedbirler (Rusya) Yönetmeliği kapsamında yaptırımlarını sıkılaştırmıştı. Kanada hükümeti, 12 Haziran'da Rusya'nın savunma sanayi üssü, enerji, nükleer hizmetler ve kripto para birimi de dahil olmak üzere finansal alanlarındaki üst düzey liderleri hedef alarak 7 kişi ve 34 kuruluşun yanı sıra Rusya'nın gizli filosundan 121 gemi daha yaptırım listesine eklemişti. Kanada, Mayıs ayında ise Ukraynalı çocuklarla ilgili insan hakları ihlallerine karışan kişi ve kuruluşlara yaptırım uygulamış, Şubat ve Mart ayında ise Rusya'nın petrol taşıyan gölge filosuna karşı yaptırımları genişletmişti. 1 milyon 800 bin TL'lik sağlık faturası! Tatile gitmeden önce yapmadı, kabusu oldu
Rusya, Kanada’dan 103 kamu görevlisine ülkeye giriş yasağı getirdiUS, Trump have changed to more realistic view of war in Ukraine, Canada's Carney says
EVIAN-LES-BAINS, France, June 17 (Reuters) - The United States and U.S. President Donald Trump have pivoted in its view of the war in Ukraine, taking what other G7 leaders thought was a more realistic position regarding the conflict, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said on Wednesday. Speaking during the G7 summit in Evians-les-Bains, France, Carney said he had seven or eight discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump in the past 36 hours on a wide range of subjects, including Canada's Chinese electric vehicle cap, the structure of which Trump liked.
ABD’de hastanede silahlı saldırı. 1 kişi öldü
ABD'nin Delaware eyaletindeki bir hastanede düzenlenen silahlı saldırıda 1 kişi hayatını kaybetti, 1 kişi yaralandı. ABD’nin Delaware eyaletinde silahlı saldırı paniği yaşandı. Kimliği belirsiz bir şüpheli, yerel saatle 15:30 sıralarında Wilmington şehrindeki "Christiana Care Wilmington Hastanesi"nde 2 kişiyi hedef aldı. Saldırıda 1 kişi hayatını kaybederken, 1 kişi ise yaralandı. Polis Şefi Wilfredo Campos olayla ilgili yaptığı açıklamada şüphelinin saldırının ardından kayıplara karıştığını söyledi. Saldırganı yakalamak için geniş çaplı operasyon başlatıldığını aktaran Campos, hedef alınan kişilerin kimlik bilgileri hakkında detay vermekten kaçındı. ABD basınının emniyet kaynaklarına dayandırdığı haberlere göre ise, bir hastane çalışanının diğer iki çalışanı silahla hedef aldığı öne sürüldü. HASTANEDEKİLER TAHLİYE EDİLDİ Hastaneyi işleten "Christiana Care" şirketinden yapılan açıklamada, saldırının ardından acil servis bölümünün geçici olarak kapatılarak hastaların başka merkezlere yönlendirildiği ve hastanedekilerin tahliye edildiği bildirildi. İçeride aktif bir saldırgan olma ihtimaline karşı her türlü güvenlik önleminin alındığı ve polisle işbirliği yapıldığı vurgulandı. Gerekli incelemelerin tamamlanmasının ardından hastanenin normal işleyişini sürdürdüğü ifade edildi. "ŞEHRİMİZ İÇİN KORKUNÇ BİR GÜN" Wilmington Belediye Başkanı John Carney de saldırının ardından kolluk kuvvetlerinin hastanedeki her katı tek tek aradığını söyledi. Bu sırada bazı hastane çalışanlarının odalarda barikat kurarak yataklı hastaları korumak için tedbir aldığını ifade eden Carney, "Bu, şehrimiz için korkunç bir gün" ifadelerini kullandı. Yardıma muhtaç insanlara kapılarını açan bir sağlık kuruluşunun böyle bir saldırıya sahne olmasına tepki gösteren Carney, "Bu hastane, böyle bir şiddet olayı karşısında sığınak olması gereken bir yerdir" dedi.
ABD-İran Mutabakatına Rağmen İsrail Güney Lübnan’da 4 Kişiyi ÖldürdüLee says ties with Canada advancing quickly in mutually beneficial manner
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held talks with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on Tuesday, saying bilateral ties are advancing briskly in a mutually beneficial manner. The meeting came on the sidelines of a Group of Seven summit in Evian-les-Bains, which Lee is attending for the second consecutive year as the head of an invited country. The two leaders met ahead of Canada's expected selection of a preferred bidder for its submarine acquisition project, worth 60 trillion-won ($39.8 bill
Carney caught on hot mic pitching Chinese EV import deal to Trump at G7
The deal with China has raised concern within the Trump administration, with Trump himself threatening new tariffs and saying he won't allow Canada to become a 'drop-off port.'
Canada imposes 162 sanctions targeting ‘Russian war machine’
Carney, Zelenskyy discuss drone production
G7'de Zelenskiy ile Görüşmede Kanada'dan Rusya'ya Yeni YaptırımlarCanada announces new Russia sanctions after Carney, Zelensky meeting at G7 Summit
The latest sanctions package will target 162 individuals, entitites, and vessels related to Russia's shadow fleet, its energy revenues, and its defense, industrial, and disinformation sectors.
Ottawa spreading false information about Kiev-Pechersk Lavra — Russian embassy
The embassy emphasized that the office of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is well aware that the buildings at the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra were struck by a US Patriot missile
Ukrayna: Rus İHA'sı Çernobil yakınındaki nükleer yakıt deposunu vurduHow to counter the Trump shock to free trade
How to counter the Trump shock to free trade The World Today iallan.drupal 8 June 2026 Interview: Creon Butler tells Sara Seth that rule-supporting economies can unite to form a third economic pole without the US or China. Your new research paper is ‘Saving global economic governance from the ‘Trump shock’’. What is the ‘Trump shock’? Up until recently, the United States and other advanced economies were largely in consensus on the benefit of international rules and had a long history of collaborating to tackle global problems. But since January 2025, President Trump’s approach on trade is no longer about achieving mutual benefits through a rules‑based system but rather extracting as much value as possible from other countries. At the same time, the US has withdrawn, more or less, from supporting a wide range of global public goods, including the pursuit of net zero, energy security and financial stability. The third pole should start with the European Union and 11 signatories of the CPTPP. Many hoped that this was just for the Trump presidency period, but in my view, this is a fundamental shift in US policy. Trump may be succeeded by another Republican and the Democrats are also highly sceptical about the benefits of free trade. It would be hard for them to roll back many of Trump’s policies even where they wanted to. What’s the solution? Some think that countries have no choice but to ally themselves with either the US or with China. Others, such as Mark Carney, the Canadian prime minister, argue that the so‑called ‘middle powers’ must work together in coalitions designed on an issue‑by‑issue basis. Instead, the argument this paper makes is that you need a new, permanent ‘third’ economic pole, without the US or China, built by countries in favour of a rules‑based approach to the global economy, the provision of global public goods and cooperation to achieve mutual benefit.
Trump şokuna karşı üçüncü ekonomik kutup arayışıThe Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world
The Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world The World Today iallan.drupal 8 June 2026 Europe must resist the temptation to become a fortress in a closed West. Instead, amid America and China’s gepolitical struggle, it has the history and values to be the place where the rest of the world finds common cause, writes Grégoire Roos. Introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’ The international order by which much of the world, for better or for worse, has lived for nearly eight decades is eroding. What might succeed it? To try to answer that question and the many others that come with it, we are introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’, a strand for fresh ideas about the direction of global order. To start, Grégoire Roos presents his vision of a new role for Europe – we hope you enjoy it and the occasional essays, interviews and conversations that will follow. Visitors to the recent exhibitions in Germany commemorating the 250th anniversary of the painter Caspar David Friedrich would have been struck by the peculiar, almost mystical, posture of his solitary figures on the edge of the void. So intent are they on the world dissolving into mist before them that they seem almost to overlook the first light gathering beyond it. Neither simply melancholic nor entirely despairful, those are figures of hesitation – poised between what is fading and what is beginning. Carney’s speech said what many European leaders hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Friedrich’s wanderers offer a fitting metaphor for Europe’s predicament today: a civilization pressed to decide whether it wishes merely to remember the world it once shaped, or to help mould the world now coming into view. That question is no longer aesthetic or philosophical alone. It has become brutally strategic for the whole continent. In this regard, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s speech at Davos earlier this year was striking not because it told us anything entirely new, but because it said plainly what many European leaders still hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Finnish president Alexander Stubb, for his part, has moved from describing a ‘triangle of power’, that is, a world order structured around three geopolitical blocs: the Global North, led by the United States and Europe, the Global East, led by China and the Global South, with no leading power. He now admits that it looks more like a ‘rectangle’, since the old transatlantic reflex can no longer be taken for granted given the accelerating split between the United States and Europe. And hovering over both is the bracing admonition of S. Jaishankar, India’s minister of external affairs, that Europe must outgrow the habit of thinking that ‘Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.’ Together, these interventions amount to a strategic summons. Europe can afford neither nostalgia nor delusion. The temptation is to respond to this moment in one of two familiar and equally sterile ways. The first is melancholy: to speak as if the answer lay in restoring the vanished certainties of the post‑1945 or post‑1989 order. The second is mimicry: to conclude that, since the age is one of hard power, Europe must simply become colder, harsher, more transactional. Both instincts miss the point. Europe’s opportunity to recover relevance and purpose lies elsewhere. A wider European grammar By Europe, what is meant here is not only the European Union but a wider civilizational basin encompassing all European societies that belong to the continent’s historical argument even when they do not sit within the same institutions. There are already faint signs of such a wider European grammar: the European Political Community, for all its looseness, convenes nearly the whole continent around a language of common stability and prosperity that reaches well beyond the EU’s formal borders. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. That opportunity is to become what one might call the centre that holds. The phrase matters. Europe has long been haunted by the fear that ‘the centre cannot hold’, W.B. Yeats’s 1919 description of post‑First World War Europe, where ‘mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’. Today’s fear is that pluralism dissolves into chaos, that compromise decays into weakness, and that openness ends in fragmentation. Yet, for the centre to hold, it cannot close itself against plurality. It must remain open. This is not civilization as enclosure, still less as the closed‑West idiom now favoured in Washington. It is civilization in a radically different sense: not walls, but, in the words of Pope Leo XIV, ‘bridges through dialogue and encounter’. A centre holds not by suppressing difference, but by giving it form – by accommodating plurality without surrendering coherence. Europe’s deepest historical achievement has never been domination as such. It has been the difficult art of giving form to plurality; of building institutions in which rival powers, rival classes, rival memories and rival truths can coexist without tearing the political fabric apart. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. — Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog. Photo: DeAgostini / Getty Images. This is not a claim of innocence. Europe knows too much of empire, hierarchy, hypocrisy and violence to indulge in moral self‑worship. It has preached universalism while practising exclusion; it has spoken in the language of law while often living by exceptions. Precisely for that reason, any serious European project for the 21st century must begin not in self‑congratulation but in humility. An ‘open centre’ is not a closed fortress with better manners. It is not a sanctimonious core issuing instructions to a wayward periphery. It is not the centre to which everyone must return, but the point at which differences can still be held in balance, and a common direction can still be forged. In that sense, it is not an exclusive point of reference, but it has the potential to act as a force for measure and equilibrium in a world of excess and instability. Jaishankar’s witty provocation should be heard in Europe not as an insult but as a moral reality check. Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America do not organize their priorities around Europe’s anxieties. Their concerns lie elsewhere: development, debt, technology, borders, food security, urbanization, energy access and sovereign room for manoeuvre. If Europe wishes to matter in such a world, it must first accept that it is no longer the measure of all things. And, paradoxically, that act of decentring is a moral necessity as well as a geopolitical one. Europe’s ‘fourth way’ French philosopher Paul Ricœur understood early that the true test of universality in a plural world is whether it can be translated without turning imperial. His idea of ‘linguistic hospitality’ offers a clue: Europe will recover credibility not by renouncing universality, but by learning to translate it. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. But accepting that the world is no longer Europe‑centric does not mean renouncing the European vocation altogether. It means redefining it. In the emerging configuration sketched by Carney and Stubb, Europe’s ‘fourth way’ would not be a nostalgic third way warmed over for a harsher age, but a path between American volatility, Chinese‑style authoritarian capitalism, and a wider world increasingly tempted by transactional hedging. Europe’s offer would be neither hegemonic nor passive, neither imperial nor merely procedural, but something rarer: a power of reconciliation. It would be the proposition that liberty can be married to protection, innovation to conscience, prosperity to social cohesion, sovereignty to cooperation, and identity to openness. Carney’s phrase – actually borrowed from Stubb – for this is ‘value‑based realism’. The term is useful precisely because it refuses both sentimental idealism and crude simplification. Yet, such a project cannot be proclaimed abroad before it is built at home. World order – or order abroad – rests on order at home. This is the point on which too much Brussels rhetoric and too much national politics across the continent still founders. Europe’s external incoherence is not only the result of institutional complexity. It is the outward symptom of an inward crisis: distrust in politics, social atomization, cultural pessimism, waning prosperity, exhausted public services, generational frustration and, perhaps worst of all, the growing sense that democratic governments are failing not only in action, but also in imagination. 58% of respondents across 10 countries in Europe were dissatisfied with how democracy was working, according to a Pew study. The malaise is measurable. In 2025, Pew found a median 58 per cent across 23 countries dissatisfied with how democracy was working, with satisfaction in Europe ranging from 75 per cent in Sweden to just 19 per cent in Greece. No society will sustain ambition abroad for long if its citizens experience only drift at home. Politics depends on the existence of what Hannah Arendt aptly called a ‘common world’ in which citizens still feel they have a stake, a voice and a future. Once that world frays, public life gives way to resentment, passivity or tribal retreat. Foreign policy follows the same rule. A society unsure of its own future cannot sustain ambition abroad for long. A Europe that doubts itself will oscillate between sermon and retreat, proclamation and paralysis. Arendt, writing in the aftermath of Europe’s totalitarian collapse, understood as much. Domestic renewal So, the first chapter of any credible European playbook for the new world order is domestic renewal. Not as a preface to geopolitics. But as geopolitics’ very condition of possibility. Europe needs a new civic and material bargain with its own citizens. It needs to prove, in visible ways, that democracy can still build, protect and inspire. That means affordable and reliable energy, yes, but also housing in which the least privileged can imagine living with a sense of pride and dignity; transport and digital infrastructures that reduce distance rather than reproduce fractures; universities and research ecosystems capable of attracting not only the best minds unsettled by America’s academic crackdown, but also talent from Africa, Latin America and Asia; culture and the arts made accessible to everyone; manufacturing strength in the sectors that will define technological sovereignty; public institutions that are competent enough to be trusted and simple enough to be legible. The World Today Related work The decline of the West and the rise of ‘the Rest’ will lead to a new world order Recent efforts to present Europe as a haven for research freedom suggest that some have begun to grasp the stakes, even if slogans still fall well short of strategy. Yet in this age, power requires more than capability. It requires promise. Europe’s greatest strategic deficit is not merely military or fiscal; it is narrative. It does not sufficiently know how to speak of itself except as a market, a rulebook or a risk‑averse peace project. None of that is irrelevant. But none of it is enough. Europe must relearn how to talk about greatness without drifting into a new form of megalomanic expansionism; about ambition without arrogance; about civilization without exclusion. It must once again sound like a place that knows where it wants to go. If it succeeds in doing so at home, then its external projection becomes clearer. The open centre would not present itself to the wider world as a tutor. It would act as a partner of choice in solving concrete problems: scaling research cooperation, widening access to education and training, financing infrastructure that is sustainable rather than extractive, designing AI and digital standards that protect human dignity and fair competition, building resilient supply chains without demanding ideological conformity or falling into moral lectures, and strengthening multilateral rules while accepting that those rules must better reflect non‑European realities. The open centre does not merely invite others into institutions Europe built yesterday; it is willing to reshape those institutions so that others can recognize themselves within them tomorrow. Inclusion is not charity That principle matters particularly in global governance. Europe cannot go on invoking the legitimacy of multilateralism while resisting any meaningful redistribution of voice within it. If the world’s demographic, economic and political gravity is shifting south and east, then institutional authority must begin to follow. That would start with Africa and greater Asia gaining a seat at the table of the permanent members of the UN Security Council – even if that alone would obviously not save the United Nations. A Europe serious about being an open centre would do the same more broadly: not out of self‑denial, but out of strategic intelligence. Inclusion is not charity. It is the condition under which legitimacy survives. Such openness also means taking science and risk seriously. A centre that holds in the 21st century cannot be merely juridical or diplomatic; it must be epistemic. It must be able to absorb uncertainty, marshal expertise and govern frontier technologies without either naivety or paralysis. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. Europe should not accept the false choice between hyper‑regulation and techno‑anarchy. It can be the place where innovation scales without shrinking the individual, and where technology remains bounded by dignity, judgment and purpose. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. The real point, then, is not that Europe should seek to become ‘No.1’. That would be to mistake yesterday’s grammar of power for tomorrow’s. Europe’s ambition should be more original than that. It should aim at becoming the indispensable organizer of cooperation among powers that do not fully trust one another but cannot flourish alone. It should become the arena in which compatibility is made possible: between markets and morals, states and societies, science and politics, plurality and cohesion. That is what an open centre is for. The virtue of steadiness This would also answer a deeper moral question. In a fragmented world, the highest political virtue is no longer purity; it is steadiness. For the centre to hold, it cannot impose uniformity as a citadel of self‑reference. It must remain open; what Édouard Glissant called a space of relation – an ‘initiation to totality without renouncing the particular’. It is to prevent disintegration. It is to create enough trust, enough credibility, enough competence and enough shared aspiration that differences do not become fatal. Having spent the past 12 centuries wrestling with plurality in a confined space, Europe is unusually equipped for that task. It has learned, often painfully, that coexistence is a political achievement, not a natural state. The world may yet find that capability useful. Viktor Orbán’s defeat may point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. None of this will happen through managerialism alone. The preliminary conclusion is therefore also an opening: Europe now needs political leadership driven by substance, steadiness and the audacity to dream. Substance, because rhetoric without delivery will deepen the contempt already stalking democratic politics. Steadiness, because the coming years will reward those who can sustain direction amid shocks. And audacity to dream, because no great political community has ever renewed itself by balance sheets alone. ‘Dream’ is not the opposite of ‘resolve’. In world politics, it is often its truest companion. Hungary’s recent turn after Viktor Orbán’s defeat may, in this respect, point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. Fear can mobilize; only a dream can awaken. That is why the next cycle of major European elections matters so much, beginning with France’s presidential contest in 2027. The question in those campaigns will not simply be who governs. It will be whether Europe continues to be narrated as a civilization in decline, oscillating between fear and nostalgia, or whether it rediscovers the ambition to shape the age in its own register. The continent does not need leaders who promise a return to the 19th century with better apps. It needs leaders willing to state, calmly and convincingly, that Europe can still be a maker of order because it is willing first to become a maker of confidence, possibility and purpose at home.
Chatham House: Avrupa, ABD-Çin Rekabetinde Açık Merkez Olmalı‘Happy vassal’ or ‘strategic hedging’? Europe’s hard choices as NATO crumbles
‘Happy vassal’ or ‘strategic hedging’? Europe’s hard choices as NATO crumbles The World Today iallan.drupal 8 June 2026 Europe has four long-term paths to security autonomy from America – which it takes will depend on electorates’ appetites for far greater political integration and financial sacrifice, says Glyn Morgan. The NATO summit in The Hague last year passed more smoothly than many had feared. Credit was due partly to Secretary General Mark Rutte’s now-notorious flattery of President Donald Trump, whom he referred to as ‘Daddy’, and partly to the allies bowing to US demands to spend more money on defence. Those fearing a repeat of the contentious Brussels summit of 2018 – where Trump reportedly threatened to pull the United States out of NATO – were pleasantly surprised. Unfortunately, the Ankara summit in July threatens a return to the fractious atmosphere of 2018. Trump’s most recent diplomatic manoeuvres certainly provide his NATO allies with cause for concern. Not only did he promise to march 5,000 or so troops out of Germany, but barely a few weeks later he promised to march 5,000 back into Poland. There was no obvious strategic reason behind this Grand Old Duke of York act other than the president’s negative feelings towards German chancellor Friedrich Merz, who had just criticized Trump’s Iran policy, and positive feelings towards the Polish president Karol Nawrocki. An asymmetrical military alliance like NATO exposes the weaker party to twin dangers: abandonment or entanglement. NATO as an institution will doubtless survive recent difficulties with the US. The organization has been around for nearly 80 years; it can call on the support of powerful vested interests; and perhaps most importantly, no one has come up with a viable alternative. The survival of NATO as a reliable security alliance is another matter. Disagreements over the Iran and Ukraine wars lay bare structural problems that even Rutte’s emollient rhetoric can’t conjure away. Sceptics might object that NATO has never been wholly reliable. It has always required a suspension of disbelief concerning American assurances, especially in the case of security threats that impose asymmetrical costs across the Atlantic. International relations scholars have long recognized that an asymmetrical military alliance such as NATO exposes the weaker party to twin dangers: abandonment or entanglement. Under the second Trump administration, these dangers are more than mere theoretical possibilities. Abandonment fears Abandonment is the Ukraine story. However erratically expressed on Truth Social, the US administration’s declaratory policy signals a willingness to trade Ukrainian territory – with troubling implications for the Baltics, where a revanchist Russia, having digested part of Ukraine, may feel emboldened to turn next. Entanglement is the Iran story. Having made initial noises about regime change, the Trump administration found that its European allies were reluctant to lend support to the US–Israel military campaign. The fear that a failed state in Iran would flood Europe with refugees was just one reason. While abandonment and entanglement are familiar fears in NATO’s history, Europe must now come to terms with two altogether more alarming prospects: appropriation – the US seeking to absorb Greenland, the territory of a NATO member state; and extortion – the US seeking to leverage its security guarantee for trade gains. The American Europe built between 1945 and 2025 is coming to an end. Europeans and Canadians are discovering that membership of NATO hardly matters to a US president who views the world in purely transactional terms. Even some traditional Atlanticists such as Germany’s Friedrich Merz and Poland’s Donald Tusk now question whether it makes sense for Europe to rely so heavily on the US for its security. Optimists still like to think that a return of the Democrats to power in 2029 would resolve all problems. Trump is an aberration; the allies retain shared strategic interests grounded on common western values; and now there’s an agreement to increase expenditure. There are, however, four problems with this optimistic response. First, it makes European security vulnerable to the whim of the American voter – a strategy of hope that President Emmanuel Macron of France has repeatedly warned against. Second, the US and Europe are far less congruent in their values than they once were – a point US Vice President JD Vance noted in his infamous Munich speech in 2025. Third, throwing more European money at the problem will hardly suffice, especially now that the current US administration has reminded European political leaders of their vulnerability to abandonment, entanglement, appropriation and extortion. And fourth, since ‘the pivot to Asia’ of the Obama presidency, Democratic and Republican leaders alike have recognized that China is the highest strategic and economic priority. Furthermore, an increase of defence spending within the current NATO framework merely reinforces dependency on a US-controlled command structure. This simply buys more vulnerability, more reliance on what the American political scientist Stephen Walt describes as a ‘predatory hegemon’ – one that prefers threats and humiliating insults to the traditional tools of diplomacy. Rather than a temporary aberration, the current NATO crisis is best understood not as an anomaly to be managed, but as a symptom of a deeper transformation. The American Europe built between 1945 and 2025 – an asymmetric order in which the US provided security, set the terms of trade, anchored the dollar system and shaped Europe’s political horizons – is coming to an end. NATO’s troubles are not the cause of this rupture but its most visible expression. After Greenland, European leaders must worry about a command structure where the Supreme Allied Commander is always an American. The task confronting European leaders is not to bow to American demands for more money but to consider European security in a world where the old transatlantic order is disintegrating. Here it is of critical importance to recognize that the concept of security has at least three different dimensions, each of which requires its own response. Security as territorial integrity involves the ability to resist armed attack on one’s territory and prevent a Ukraine-style loss of one’s border regions. Until recently, it would have been ludicrous to suggest that threats to Europe’s territorial integrity might come not merely from Russia but also from the United States. Following the US threat to appropriate Greenland, European political leaders must worry about a NATO command structure where the Supreme Allied Commander is always an American. Learning to say ‘No’ If a US president is going to treat European borders as negotiable, then the European allies – perhaps in conjunction with Canada – need to organize military forces capable of acting not merely independently of the US, but in extremis capable of adopting a defensive posture against US forces. Needless to say, the defensive forces available to Europe and Canada are likely to be no match for the United States. But it is still important to signal a willingness to resist. Independently deployable defensive forces are a necessary component of that signal. Security as autonomy requires the capability to say ‘No’ to entanglements like the Iran bombing campaign without having to fear the withdrawal of US military security support or extortion in the form of ruinous trade deals. While Europe remains so dependent on the US military, whether in the form of the nuclear shield or the sword of US conventional forces, it will always remain vulnerable to this form of coercion. Related work NATO chief Mark Rutte warns Russia could use military force against alliance in five years European officials faced precisely this dilemma when seeking to negotiate a trade deal with Washington in July 2025. Unfortunately for Europe, they remain dependent not only on the US military but also on US technology (including satellites) and – following the Ukraine and Iran wars – increasingly on US liquefied natural gas (LNG). European efforts to achieve security autonomy are, in short, insufficient without also achieving a measure of technological autonomy and energy self-sufficiency. Security as world-making involves the capacity to shape the rules of the international political and economic system. European leaders have long recognized the importance of a rules-based international system. And they have long hoped that the US was equally committed to this endeavour. The Canadian prime minister Mark Carney has gone further than most leaders in registering the threat the Trump administration poses to the rules-based order. Since his January 2026 speech at Davos, Carney’s fears about the fate of the rules-based order have only been confirmed by US actions in Venezuela, Iran and the Persian Gulf. In May 2026, Trump proudly announced that the US Navy was acting like ‘pirates’ in the way they were seizing foreign ships. If security requires the capacity to shape the rules of the international system, then Europe is less secure than at any time in the post-war era. Four paths to security The realization that the transatlantic order is disintegrating leaves European leaders with four primary strategic paths. None is entirely satisfactory and each involves a disconcerting sacrifice of either prosperity, security or identity. The first option is to embrace the status of America’s ‘happy vassals’. The hope of those who recommend that survival depends on submission is that by spending a little more on defence, the US will continue to provide its security umbrella, while leaving Europeans free to enjoy their longer vacations, more robust safety nets and comparatively idyllic lifestyles. If the Americans will only allow this option at the cost of greater technological and energy dependence, so be it. And should they insist that Greenland is theirs, then Europeans will still always have Paris. Military autonomy is a hollow shell without technological and energy autonomy. The second option is for each European state to pursue a modified Gaullist strategy and follow its own national interest. This will probably mean that Europe gives up the postwar effort to become a unified political and economic territory. Different European states will strike different security and trade deals with the global powers, whether the US, Russia or China. In some respects, this was the path that Viktor Orbán, the former Hungarian prime minister, was pursuing. If Orbán-like populists were to come to power in other European states, we might expect them too to pursue similar strategies. Not surprisingly, some evidence suggests that all three global powers would welcome this development. The US, China and Russia would rather deal with each European state on a transactional basis than with a unified Europe. The danger of a Gaullist strategy is it would allow the great powers to pursue a divide et impera strategy, which, as Machiavelli understood, is the natural strategy of the strong faced with many weaker powers. A possible ‘Euto’? The most ambitious response is the creation of a European-centred defensive alliance – a ‘Euto’ – that formalizes a European command structure independent of NATO. Such a structure would replace the American Supreme Allied Commander with a European general staff, integrate national forces under continental rather than Atlantic command, and develop doctrinal and logistical capabilities for autonomous action. However, military autonomy is a hollow shell without technological and energy autonomy. A European command structure that depends on US satellites for targeting, US semiconductors for its weapons systems and US LNG to keep its industries running would offer only the appearance of independence. This path therefore requires a wartime-scale investment in three interconnected pillars. The first is London, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw leading an ‘E3+Poland’ industrial base capable of producing at scale the munitions, drones, air defence systems and armoured vehicles that Europe currently sources from American suppliers. Security autonomy necessitates something approaching a European Hamiltonian moment. The second is a sovereign satellite constellation for communications, navigation and intelligence – removing the dependence on American GPS, Starlink and reconnaissance assets that the Ukraine war has so vividly exposed. The third is a final decoupling from American energy markets, including the diversification of LNG suppliers, the acceleration of European nuclear capacity and serious investment in renewable infrastructure that does not run through Washington’s regulatory permission. Some commentators have suggested that Trump’s excesses are beginning to shake Europe from its strategic torpor. They point to the new €150 billion defence financing programme as a sign that Europe is now serious about attaining strategic autonomy. They also emphasize the joint military plans put in place to thwart US attempts to grab Greenland. But to interpret these still rather modest steps as a sign that Europe is freeing itself from US dependency is far-fetched. Any genuine commitment to security autonomy requires a level of political integration, fiscal commitment and societal sacrifice that current European electorates have yet to understand, much less authorize. Security autonomy necessitates something approaching a European Hamiltonian moment – shared debt, shared command, shared strategic culture – at precisely the moment when nationalist forces across the continent are pushing in the opposite direction. Yet political integration – the prerequisite for full-spectrum European security – has no champion on the European horizon capable of driving it through. The end of American Europe Finally, Europe could adopt a posture of ‘strategic hedging’. In the current context, this strategy would require considerable guile, for it would require European leaders to sustain NATO as an organization while concurrently building independent military strength and diplomatic ties. By refusing to fully align with Washington’s ‘pirate’ tactics, Europe could – perhaps alongside Canada – attempt to act as a ‘third pole’. NATO may endure as a bureaucratic ghost, but as a reliable security alliance, it is beyond repair. This strategy foregoes any immediate efforts to achieve strategic autonomy – that’s a longer-term project – and aims only for ‘security as world-maker’ by preserving the rules-based order through a coalition of middle powers. Ultimately, the policy of strategic hedging constitutes not much more than a holding strategy, an effort to bide time while Europe develops the political unity to tackle its security, technological and energy dependencies.
NATO Çatırdarken Avrupa'nın Güvenlik Özerkliği İçin Dört Zorlu YolCanadian Prime Minister Carney visits grandparents' Irish village on eve of G7
AUGHAGOWER, Ireland, June 14 - Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on Sunday met distant cousins in his grandparents' home village in the west of Ireland on a visit to celebrate his Irish roots while urging closer cooperation in the wake of a global geopolitical \"rupture\".
From Davos to the G7: Mark Carney’s middle-power moment
Diplomats from Europe to Australia say Carney’s call for middle-power solidarity has captured the attention of countries looking for leverage in a harsher world.
‘A global rupture’: Carney calls for Canada-EU unity before G7 summit
Canada's prime minister has warned that the 'rules-based' global order is 'breaking down' amid superpower dominance.
Carney, G7 Zirvesi Öncesi Kanada-AB Birliği Çağrısı YaptıUK and Canada in talks on defense bank and fighter jet programs
Gordon Brown — the ex-PM who is now advising No. 10 Downing Street on global finance — spoke to Canadian PM Mark Carney about the scheme.
Fisa spy powers almost certain to expire after Congress fails to act – US politics live
Law due to expire at midnight tonight following unhappiness over Trump’s pick for intelligence chief A key provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Fisa) is due to expire on Friday night amid a backlash to Trump’s announcement that Bill Pulte, head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and a major Republican donor, would be acting DNI. While Trump has moved to contain the furor – announcing his nomination of another top official, Jay Carney, to take the role on a permanent basis – US Congress has so far failed to extend section 702 of Fisa in time for Friday’s deadline. Pulte has to go. He cannot be in the DNI role. It’s too important. Donald Trump declared “a great settlement” with Iran, which could be signed soon “maybe in Europe, over the weekend”. Trump’s hand-picked board at the Kennedy Center is mounting a last-minute effort to keep his name on the facade of the performing arts facility before a court-ordered deadline to remove it by Friday. The board voted on Thursday to seek a stay of US district judge Christopher Cooper’s 29 May ruling that said Trump’s name was illegally added to the Kennedy Center, according to a person familiar with the move who requested anonymity to discuss a private meeting. Congressman Robert Garcia, who is in line to chair the House oversight committee next year if Democrats win back the majority in November, called for testimony from vice-president JD Vance and other senior officials over what he called “the White House cover-up” of the Epstein files revealed by the New York Times. US federal authorities are investigating what appears to be a massive etching of “8647” into the grass of the National Mall. Live webcam footage from atop the Washington Monument as of Thursday afternoon shows the markings, with a highly visible “8,” along with less visible “6”, “4” and “7”. Continue reading...
FISA gözetim yetkisi Kongre tıkanıklığında gece yarısı sona eriyorCarney calls Türkiye 'incredibly important' ally
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described Türkiye as an "incredibly important strategic" NATO ally and major regional power spanning the Balkans to the Caucasus, confirming he will attend next month's Istanbul summit as Ottawa moves to deepen bilateral ties.
China-EU tensions, Xi in North Korea, flatlining retail sales
China called on major nations to “foster a free and facilitative trading environment” ahead of two summits next week that may herald a trade war with the European Union. Vice-Premier Zhang Guoqing said China was “steadfastly expanding high-standard opening up” in a videoconference hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attended along with representatives from Brazil, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea,...
Kanada Başbakanı Carney'den dikkat çeken Türkiye açıklaması! 'İnanılmaz derecede önemli'
Kanada Başbakanı Mark Carney, Toronto'da gazetecilere yaptığı açıklamada Türkiye ile ilişkilere dair değerlendirmelerde bulundu. 'İNANILMAZ DERECEDE ÖNEMLİ BİR MÜTTEFİK' "Türkiye, inanılmaz derecede önemli bir NATO müttefiki." ifadesini kullanan Carney, "Bölgesel olarak da ki bu bölge Balkanlar'dan Orta Doğu'ya Kafkaslara ve ilerisine uzanıyor, Türkiye bölgedeki en önemli stratejik partnerlerden ve güçlerden biri" yorumunu yaptı. 'DERİNLEŞEN BİR İLİŞKİMİZ VAR' Carney, "(Türkiye ile) derinleşen bir ilişkimiz var" diyerek, Ankara'da 7-8 Temmuz'da yapılacak NATO Liderler Zirvesi'ne katılacağını ve yıl sonuna doğru Türkiye'yi tekrar ziyaret edeceğini belirtti. ABD-İran hattında son viraj! Dört uçak yola çıktı: Mutabakat zaptı sızdı Gazetecinin yolunu kesip kurşun yağdırdılar! Detaylar ortaya çıktı
Carney’s Middle Powers Race to Thwart US-China Dominance of AI
A survey of government AI strategies in three continents shows a determination not to allow Washington and Beijing to dictate the future alone.
Will North America try to revive USMCA—or finally bury it?
It is virtually certain that the trade agreement between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (USMCA) negotiated in President Donald Trump’s first term will not be renewed by the deadline of June 30. And indeed, just this morning, Trump confirmed that he would not be reauthorizing the agreement before the July 1 deadline. Such slippage might not be catastrophic:the relevant proviso of USMCA states that a failure to renew only triggers a series of annual joint reviews for the next 10 years unless one of the parties formally announces its withdrawal. Nevertheless, the tenor of discussions heading into the deadline points to bubbling trade and geopolitical stresses in North America. These discussions also suggest the U.S. intends to reshape the agreement substantially in ways that would be relatively favorable for Mexico and quite unfavorable for Canada. One of the more surprising outcomes of Trump’s second term has been the extent of the deterioration in U.S.-Canada relations, even as relations with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum have been (at least until recently) relatively stable. Trump has interfered to some extent in Mexican politics, most recently through a CIA operation in an opposition-led state and the indictment of a governor from Sheinbaum’s party. But this falls well short of the level of interference in a neighbor’s sovereignty suggested by the American ambassador in Ottawa retweeting his president’s reference to Canada as the 51st state, or Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent implicitly backing separatism by referring to an independent Alberta as a “natural partner” for the U.S. The atmospherics at the highest level are indeed terrible, reflecting geopolitical differences of opinion across the Rio Grande and (to a much greater degree) across the 49th parallel. There are some signs that trade bureaucracies are experiencing something of a thaw. Still, significant political divergences over the economic outcomes desired in each capital loom large. What Washington wants from the USMCA review is not just a strengthened regional trading bloc that reduces imports from the rest of the world (and, above all, from China) but rather one in which more high-value economic activities are located within the United States rather than in its trading partners. In a recent conversation at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer expressed his concern that while the administration’s trade actions had lowered the trade deficit with China, the trade deficit with Mexico had increased. He also made it very clear that the U.S. is “going to be talking about rules of origin in a way that enhances U.S. content in these goods.” This would mark a significant departure from USMCA as it currently stands, where there is nothing in the rules of origin that explicitly favors the U.S. Instead, the current agreement only calls for a minimum of 75% of all automotive content to be sourced within the USMCA and for 40-45% of automotive content to be produced by workers making at least $16 an hour. With average hourly wages for autoworkers in both the U.S. and Canada above that level at around $30, the measure is essentially just a ceiling on Mexico’s content. However, recent reports suggest that the Trump administration is going to push in the review for measures that would raise the minimum required level of North American content that qualifies for USMCA preferential access to 82%, and the minimum level of specifically U.S.-produced content to 50%. It is also possible that the U.S. could ask for formal rules of origin to be extended beyond the automotive sector to other industries (a recommendation made in a recent Quincy Institute brief) given concerns that Mexico is serving largely as a final assembly point for Asian exporters, particularly for electronics. This would be in accordance with low levels of USMCA content in industries like Information Technology and Electronics, as suggested by some OECD research. If the U.S. does want to increase minimum content requirements on two axes – more U.S. content in automotive (and perhaps other) industries, as well as higher USMCA content across all industries – the impact would likely differ across the three members. U.S. auto workers would benefit from the requirement for increased U.S.-only content and Mexican workers would benefit if foreign exporters were to respond to minimum USMCA content requirements by investing in Mexico. But the impact of such a combination could end up being a net negative for Canada, a country with wage levels that are close to those of the U.S. The paired incentives could mean that firms decide to put new plants servicing U.S. markets in either the U.S. or Mexico, but not in Canada (and conversely, choose Canada when it comes to deciding which plants to shut down). There are other irritants. Unlike the multiple administration officials who delight in trolling the very idea that Canada is an independent nation-state, Greer has not taken the low road but has nevertheless suggested that Canada’s decision to retaliate against Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs was an affront. It might be possible to compartmentalize trade issues, but stresses in the relationship are likely to linger as long as the U.S. is dismissive of Canadian sovereignty even as it pushes a USMCA review that is overtly unfavorable to Canada. Mexico’s calculations may be somewhat different. Mexico’s export mix to the U.S. is weighted heavily towards manufactured goods (which makes it different from the rest of Latin America), and the country has benefited from the industrialization occasioned by the process of closer regional integration that took off with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. And for all of Washington's desires to reshore industry to the U.S., there may be a limit to such a process because of the American private sector’s need for a lower-wage production base to maintain profits (as well as the administration’s political interest in holding down prices). Canada does not answer those same needs. Compounding matters is a deep disagreement within USMCA on the future of automotive technology as the White House has signaled its doubts over Electric Vehicles (EVs) by cutting subsidies and halting the buildout of charging infrastructure, while both Sheinbaum (a climate scientist) and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney seem to have more faith in an EV future. Trump himself has blown hot and cold on whether he would allow Chinese inbound investment (including in EV technologies) into the U.S., but the reaction in much of Congress to any such prospect has been overwhelmingly negative. Meanwhile, Carney sparked a huge row earlier this year with the U.S. when he announced a partial retreat from Canada’s earlier mirroring of America’s 100% automotive tariffs on China by allowing low-tariff entry of up to 49,000 EVs from that country. Despite Sheinbaum’s own views, Mexico seems to have decided that it is important for reasons of USMCA diplomacy to hew closer to the U.S. line, imposing a 50% tariff on auto imports from all countries with which it has no free trade agreement, effectively targeting China more than any other country. One irony in this divergence is that it is likely that consumer automotive preferences in Canada look more like those in America (bigger and powered by internal combustion) than those of Mexican consumers looking for cheaper EVs. There are thus so many different points of contention that it could be hard to see a full trilateral agreement any time soon, particularly given increasing reservations in Canada about the future of Ottawa’s relationship with Washington. The question is whether the signatories follow the path of least resistance and allow USMCA to limp on as the zombie it has been since last January, when the U.S. imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico, or whether they formally decide to bury it.
USMCA'da Kritik Tarih: Trump Yenilemeyecek, Anlaşma AskıdaCarney heads to Europe for G7 summit as U.S. and Israel-Iran war escalates
One year after hosting the G7 summit in Alberta, Prime Minister Mark Carney is set to rejoin world leaders — including U.S. President Donald Trump — for their first meeting since the start of the U.S.-Israeli offensive in Iran.
Carney heading for Ireland, France to deepen ties and attend G7 summit
The summit is running from June 15 to June 17 in Evian-les-Bains and France says the focus will be on reducing global inequalities.
Can Mark Carney’s US-China juggling act keep Canada’s ‘primary relationship’ intact?
When China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in Canada late last month to consolidate a new economic partnership, Prime Minister Mark Carney was in New York pitching for more than US$1 trillion in investment. “The timing was almost certainly deliberate,” said Alejandro Reyes, a professor of politics and a senior fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World at the University of Hong Kong. “It signals to Washington that engagement with Beijing does not come at the expense of the...
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act now
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act now Expert comment LToremark 11 May 2026 The World Health Assembly in Geneva presents a narrow window of opportunity for action to save multilateral cooperation on global health. Three things need to happen. The 79th World Health Assembly (WHA) – the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO) – will take place in Geneva on 18–23 May amid major challenges to global health cooperation. The United States has withdrawn from WHO, leaving a $600 million funding gap and forcing WHO to cut its budget for 2026-27 by 20 per cent. Bilateral health deals under the America First Global Health Strategy are being signed across Africa and Asia, bypassing multilateral frameworks and transferring costs onto the partner countries without commensurate power. In February, WHO Director General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus described 2025 as potentially the most difficult in the organization’s history. Two recent speeches provide the clearest political diagnosis of the current international moment. On 5 March, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney told the Australian parliament that the rules-based order is not in transition – it is in rupture. That same day – and building on Carney’s speech – Finland’s President Alexander Stubb opened the Raisina Dialogue by arguing that the Global South will decide what the next world order looks like, and that the West has one last chance to prove it is capable of dialogue rather than monologue. Although neither mentioned global health explicitly, both were talking about it. Related work The good, the bad, and the possible: What the America First Global Health Strategy means for Africa – and the world As global health diplomats head to Geneva, the question WHA79 must answer is not whether WHO needs reforming, but who will drive that reform, in whose interests and on what political basis. Although Carney and Stubb approach the issue from very different angles, they converge on a clear answer: middle powers must act with urgency – and Western middle powers must act in genuine partnership with the Global South. Carney’s argument is strategic: great powers can compel; middle powers can convene. But not every country can convene because convening power flows from trust, which is earned through consistency between stated values and demonstrated actions. In the global health context, this matters enormously. WHO has never had enforcement powers; its authority has always rested on the legitimacy conferred by member states who believe it acts in their collective interest. That legitimacy is now under structural pressure. A WHO seen as a residual institution – one that the powerful use when convenient and abandon when not – cannot perform its core functions of surveillance, standard-setting and emergency coordination. The middle powers who remain committed to it must therefore act not merely as supporters but as active co-architects of its renewal. Carney’s concept of ‘variable geometry’ is equally important for global health. Rather than waiting for a comprehensive multilateral settlement that may take years, middle powers should build different coalitions for different issues, based on shared values and common interests. This is not a retreat from multilateralism, Carney argues, but its evolution. For global health, the implication is direct. Issues such as pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, digital health governance and climate-health linkages each require a different coalition, moving at different speeds. The WHO reform process is necessary but slow. Variable-geometry coalitions can build the normative and financial infrastructure that a reformed global health architecture will eventually need to incorporate. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control showed what is possible. Similar courageous steps must now be taken in other areas, such as negotiations on a pandemic agreement or possibly in relation to digital health. Stubb’s argument adds a political dimension to Carney’s intervention: the Global South cannot be a passive recipient of whatever order emerges – it is the decisive actor. The triangular contest he describes between a Global West, Global East and Global South is directly visible in WHO’s governing bodies. How Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa engage at WHA79 – whether they drive the reform process or treat it as a Northern preoccupation – will shape the outcome far more than any European position paper. Stubb’s challenge to the West is blunt: stop treating engagement with the Global South as a communications exercise and start treating it as a power-sharing negotiation. The global health corollary is equally blunt: a reformed WHO governance structure that still reflects 1948 power distributions, rather than today’s distribution of disease burden and health capacity, will not be legitimate in the world that is now emerging. In his speech, Stubb called for concrete structural reform of global multilateral institutions: new permanent representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America in global institutions, not as a rhetorical concession but as a condition of legitimacy. Passivity is not a strategy, he said – a charge directed at Europe as much as anywhere. For the European and other Western middle powers who dominate WHO’s financing and governing bodies, this is uncomfortable but necessary. Being present is not the same as exercising leadership and showing willingness to cede structural power. Professing commitment to multilateralism while resisting the governance reforms that would make multilateral institutions genuinely representative is precisely the double standard that Stubb warns will cost the West its last chance.
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act nowTrump’s treatment of US allies has weakened his negotiating position with Xi
Trump’s treatment of US allies has weakened his negotiating position with Xi Expert comment jon.wallace 12 May 2026 The president has alienated partners that once acted as force multipliers. But there are still opportunities to create a united front on common points of tension with Beijing. President Donald Trump travels to Beijing this week with the US’s alliance structure under enormous strain. Washington has fewer partners at its side, and a weaker hand to play. It doesn’t have to be this way. Alone, the US has leverage against Beijing, through controlling access to its advanced chips, sanctions on Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, and a consumer market Beijing can’t ignore. But Washington’s allies and partners provided strength that China has struggled to compete with – acting as force multipliers, aligning with the US on shared vulnerabilities. The Trump administration’s dismissal of such countries has created justified resentment. Many of America’s closest partners, buffeted by threats to NATO and tariffs, have concluded that US commitment may be a relic of the past. That is leading them to forge independent approaches to China, beginning with commercial ties. Beijing today benefits from greater economic connectivity with US partners and allies, fewer multilateral structures to bind its behaviour, and little political will on either side of the Atlantic to advance common projects. Yes, allied cohesion on China has always been aspirational, limited by different risk perceptions and economic pressures. But US and allied approaches have increasingly diverged since January 2025. And the current situation weakens the US negotiating position, even on President Trump’s ‘America First’ terms. Greater alignment by the US with its traditional partners on China policy – covering issues like critical minerals, semiconductors, synthetic drugs and beyond – is still possible and of benefit to both Washington and allied capitals. It shouldn’t be cast aside. Beijing cashes in Today, the floor has fallen out of the US alliance structure, as relations with partners and allies has deteriorated. While the US spent the winter focused on Venezuela, Greenland and Iran, Beijing focused on commercial diplomacy. The US has retreated from multilateral organizations, questioned the role of NATO, divided the G7 over tariffs, further hollowed out the WTO, launched UN-alternative structures like the Board of Peace, and gone to war with Iran. This has pushed allies to chart independent paths, leaving China to take advantage. While the US spent the winter focused on Venezuela, Greenland and Iran, Beijing focused on commercial diplomacy. In January, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced a ‘full scale restoration of ties’ between Seoul and Beijing, backed by new agreements on economic and trade cooperation, science and technology and the digital economy. Two weeks later, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a comprehensive ‘strategic partnership’ with Beijing covering energy, agriculture, and Chinese electric vehicles, amounting to CAD$3 billion in new export orders for Canada. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s subsequent visit netted £2.2 billion in export deals and around £2.3 billion in market access. In February, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, though citing ‘difficult issues’ in trade relations, agreed to strengthen Germany’s ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with Beijing through 17 bilateral cooperation agreements. Trump will also seek bilateral deals – on products like American soybeans and Boeing aircraft, on top of the NVIDIA chips he recently approved for sale to China, despite national security concerns. Benefits are therefore rapidly accruing to Beijing. If the US and its traditional allies cannot develop a collective bargaining strategy, grouping their economies along similar red lines, China will only extend its run. DC’s demolition derby lays a few floorboards The floor of the US alliance structure cannot be rebuilt overnight, and its foundations were always imperfect. But two significant agreements indicate the Trump administration has realized that – in discrete instances – Trump’s ‘I alone can fix it’ instincts don’t work. Pax Silica, launched by the US in December 2025, aims to shore up silicon supply chains for semiconductor manufacturing and AI development. With 14 partners and counting, the initiative sees ‘allies and trusted partners’ like Australia, Finland, Greece, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the UK align to reduce dependency on critical technology from China. Its viability will take time to evaluate, but this novel grouping addresses a common concern, and will only become more effective as it expands. Meanwhile, to break dependencies on China’s critical minerals, the US launched the new Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE), alongside co-chair Japan. They and 52 other partners now belong to a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, guaranteeing price floors. Like Pax Silica, it’s still early days. And shifting White House attention risks limiting full implementation. But both are encouraging datapoints that the Trump administration is slowly realizing that American unilateralism undercuts American power in certain instances. New constructions, with or without a foreman Washington, European capitals, and Indo-Pacific allies should build on such initiatives, identifying areas where working with allies is clearly to the advantage of all. This can take a few forms. First, groupings like Pax Silica and FORGE should be bolstered by renewed efforts to bring in new country signatories and investments. Strengthening these groups will both improve members’ hands with Xi and promise material benefits to all its participants. — Laurel Rapp and Max Yoeli discuss the coming summit from the US perspective. Establishing or reviving other groupings, for instance on synthetic drug interdiction, is another obvious area for close US cooperation with allies. Fentanyl is a continuing source of American overdose deaths, with the US claiming that many of the chemicals used in its production originate in China. But the Trump administration chose not to extend US leadership of a nearly 160 country coalition to counter production and distribution of illicit substances. Revitalizing this network should be a priority. Both Biden and Trump hammered Xi on fentanyl, and US overdose deaths have fallen since 2023, possibly due in part to US diplomacy. But without a wider grouping of concerned partners, success may be limited or short-lived. It is also crucial that trade talks by the US, Canada and Mexico starting in July are a success and deliver real constraints on China’s investments in North American manufacturing. Allowing internal divisions to prevent a protective arrangement would be an own goal and play into China’s strategy. Rebuilding without Washington Finally, US allies and partners must identify shared red lines for bilateral cooperation with China that will be upheld independent of Washington. Most countries have national China strategies, and all have identified red lines for bilateral cooperation. But internal limits are not the same as a shared approach. The logic of greater allied alignment remains sound even where US commitment is uncertain. If allies can establish common approaches on China policy in other areas, it may manage Washington’s frustration with their hedging. And finding agreement may also prove useful for the future: the US may become more cooperative on some issues after President Trump leaves office. And the US’s structural rivalry with China looks likely to endure through successive administrations for some time to come.
Trump’s treatment of US allies has weakened his negotiating position with Xi