İran Avrupa hedeflerini gündeme aldı; Hürmüz trafiği dibe vurdu
Temmuz sonunda ABD'nin hava saldırılarına ara vermesi ve İran'ın aynı şekilde karşılık vermesiyle başlayan görece sükunet, Hürmüz Boğazı'ndaki anlaşmazlık nedeniyle kalıcı olmadı. İran Dışişleri Bakanı Abbas Araghchi, Washington'ın mutabakat zaptını ihlal ederek alternatif koridor açtığını öne sürdü; Umman ile yeni seyir hatlarına ilişkin görüşmelerin son aşamada olduğunu ancak boğazın yeniden açılması için ABD'nin koşulları kabul etmesi gerektiğini söyledi. 11 Ağustos'ta ABD ve Husiler gemilere yönelik yeni saldırılar bildirdi; 12 Ağustos'ta Hürmüz'den geçen gemi sayısı 8'e düşerek bir haftanın en düşük seviyesini gördü. Petrol fiyatları yükselirken küresel hisse senetleri geriledi. Savaşın askeri ve bölgesel yansımaları da derinleşiyor. Washington Post, ABD'nin beş ayda 45 MQ-9 Reaper İHA kaybettiğini ve maliyetin 1,3 milyar doları bulduğunu aktardı. New York Times, Pentagon'un önleyici füze stoklarının azaldığını, İran'ın ise ABD savunma sistemlerini aşabilen yeni taktikler geliştirdiğini yazdı; Trump mühimmat sıkıntısı iddialarını reddetti. İran'ın Bulgaristan'daki Bezmer Hava Üssü ve Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz Akrotiri Üssü dahil Avrupa'daki ABD askeri hedeflerini vurmayı değerlendirdiği belirtiliyor. Pakistan ordusu da Çin üzerinden İran'a füze sevkiyatı yapıldığı haberlerini yalanladı.
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en güncel: 20 Ağu- Güvenlik24 Tem 14:39
DPM Dar stresses need to build on Islamabad MoU commitments in meeting with Iran’s Araghchi
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on Friday stressed the need to build upon the commitments enshrined in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Their meeting came after Washington and Tehran exchanged strikes over the past several days, with the former targeting Iranian military facilities along its southern coast and the latter targeting US bases in Gulf countries. In a statement, the Foreign Office (FO) said the two top diplomats met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan. During the meeting, they reviewed the ongoing regional situation and bilateral ties. “DPM/FM expressed deep concern over recent regional tensions and underscored the importance of dialogue, restraint, de-escalation by all sides, and sustained diplomatic engagement to achieve lasting peace and stability,” the FO said in a post on X. “He emphasised the need to build on the understandings reached under the Islamabad MoU of June 2026.” According to the FO, Araghchi expressed appreciation for Pakistan’s continued diplomatic support and efforts in promoting regional peace and security, thanking Islamabad for facilitating the safe return and repatriation of Iranian fishermen and sailors, including those from vessels interdicted by the US. “The two sides agreed to maintain close coordination and regular consultations on issues of mutual interest and reaffirmed their commitment to working together for regional peace, stability and shared prosperity,” the statement concluded. The renewed fighting between the two sides since July 8 has cast further doubt on the future of the MoU, signed on June 18, that aimed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and end the war after a further 60 days of negotiations. Two weeks since the effective collapse of an interim truce meant to end the war, the US military launched air strikes on Iran late on Thursday and early on Friday, for a 13th consecutive night of attacks. US Central Command (Centcom) said the latest strikes lasted more than two hours. “Centcom targeted Iranian military command centres, drone storage facilities, communication networks, coastal surveillance sites and maritime capabilities to further diminish the threat Iran poses to civilian mariners and commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz,” it said in a statement. On both Thursday and Friday, Iranian state media said missiles struck Qeshm Island on the Strait of Hormuz, the virtually closed waterway that is the focus of a war well into its fifth month that has killed thousands and fanned fears of a global economic downturn.
- Güvenlik26 Tem 05:48
Iran says US violated Hormuz deal to undermine Tehran's authority
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Washington violated the post-war memorandum of understanding by opening an alternative shipping corridor before the agreed deadline, insisting that Article 5 clearly assigns Tehran sole responsibility for restoring navigation through the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
- Güvenlik26 Tem 13:35
Trump is giving Iran talks 'a little bit of room,' US ambassador to UN says
WASHINGTON, July 26 - U.S. President Donald Trump has paused attacks on Iran to allow more room for diplomacy, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations told Fox News.
- Güvenlik26 Tem 14:50
Iran will halt attacks as long as US maintains pause, Iranian source says after Trump calls off strikes
DUBAI/WASHINGTON, July 26 - Iran will halt its own attacks as long as the United States maintains its latest pause on air strikes, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Sunday, after President Donald Trump abruptly called off his two-week-old bombing campaign.
- Güvenlik26 Tem 15:46
After Trump calls off bombing, Iran signals it will halt strikes as long as US does
By Parisa Hafezi and Raphael Satter DUBAI/WASHINGTON, July 26 (Reuters) - Iran will halt its own attacks as long as the United States maintains its latest pause on airstrikes, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Sunday, after President Donald Trump abruptly called off his two-week-old bombing campaign. After 13 nights of intensifying U.S. airstrikes on Iran, the Pentagon abruptly suspended the campaign late on Friday, with no U.S. attacks reported on either Saturday or Sunday.
- Güvenlik26 Tem 15:46
Iran says it will halt strikes as long as US bombing pause holds
By Parisa Hafezi, Phil Stewart and Raphael Satter DUBAI/WASHINGTON, July 26 (Reuters) - Iran will halt its own attacks as long as the United States does the same, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Sunday. The development comes as the United States pressed pause on its bombing campaign after President Donald Trump's advisers told him they were running out of targets and expressed worries about depleting the U.S. arsenal.
- Ekonomik27 Tem 19:17
Trump says U.S. has sold more than $13 billion of Venezuela oil
President Donald Trump said Monday the U.S. has sold more than $13 billion of Venezuelan oil since taking control of the South American nation's energy exports.
- Güvenlik30 Tem 06:20
Is Pakistan facilitating Chinese missile shipments to Iran? Islamabad responds
Pakistan's military has strongly denied reports of facilitating Chinese weapons transit to Iran. These claims emerged amid ongoing tensions between Iran and the United States. The Pakistani army dismissed all such speculations as baseless and untrue. This situation highlights Pakistan's careful balancing act between China and Washington. The denial comes after reports suggested Iran would receive air defense systems soon.
- Ekonomik31 Tem 14:38
USA Crude Oil Stocks Drop More Than 7MM Barrels WoW
Crude oil stocks, not including the SPR, stood at 404.5 million barrels on July 24, the EIA's latest weekly petroleum status report showed.
- Güvenlik02 Ağu 03:43
Trump says US 'locked and loaded' but will hold off on fresh Iran attack in hope of quick deal
United States President Donald Trump said late on Saturday he would hold off on a fresh attack on Iran as long as a deal could be reached quickly to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iran and “other Middle Eastern Countries” asked for a time to complete a deal that would lead to “the Immediate, Complete and Total” reopening of the Strait and “an end to Iran’s nuclear threat,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. “Based on this request, I have agreed, for the future benefit of the WORLD and, likewise, the survival of a successful and prosperous Iran, to cancel the attack, subject to being able to rapidly make a DEAL.” Israel “joins me in this commitment,” Trump wrote. Israel did not immediately make a public statement on the issue. Iran warned the US this weekend against any adventurous action and said it would retaliate decisively if American forces followed through on Trump’s threats of fresh attacks on Iranian targets. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchis comments in separate phone calls on Saturday with senior Turkish, Pakistani and Saudi officials came just hours after Kuwait’s army said it destroyed hostile drones launched by Iran against several vital facilities. Speaking to Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Araqchi said Iran would respond decisively to any “aggression” and discussed the consequences of destabilising actions” by the US, as well as prospects for heightened regional insecurity, according to Araqchi’s Telegram account. Araqchi later told Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan that any attacks by the US and Israel or participation by regional countries in such actions would be met with a proportionate response. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke to Trump on Saturday and “expressed concern and asked for clarity” about Us plans for Iran, a US official told Axios. The Saudi crown prince spoke to Trump, a White House official told Reuters, but did not provide details. Nournews, a media outlet affiliated with Iran’s top security body, said on Saturday that US attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure would prompt Iranian strikes on oil fields in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the gas fields of Qatar and Israel, saying, “all will be burned to ashes”. At a cabinet meeting on Friday at the Camp David retreat, Trump said he believed US negotiators, including his son-in-law Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, could still reach a deal with Iran. But Trump also said he was losing faith in the Iranians, saying, “They break their word so often” a claim Tehran has frequently levelled at Washington and said he would be “hitting them”. Strait of Hormuz Oil prices have stayed high since US and Israeli forces started the war with strikes on Iran on February 28. Trump has argued that his stated goal of keeping Iran from gaining nuclear weapons justifies higher fuel costs in the near term, but the economic pain has put political pressure on him to find a way to end the war. Benchmark Brent crude futures rose 24 per cent in July, and analysts polled by Reuters expect prices to rise further this year. The risk of Iranian attacks has deterred most shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, an important conduit for global energy supplies, since the start of the conflict, sending shockwaves through the world economy. A government facility in northern Kuwait and civilian property belonging to a company on Bubiyan Island were hit on Saturday, with falling shrapnel causing material damage but no casualties, the Kuwaiti army said. Adding to the energy industry’s concerns, the Houthis in Yemen recently began threatening the Bab el-Mandeb, the strait at the other end of the Red Sea from the Suez Canal, another export route for Saudi crude. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said on Saturday it had received reports of two maritime incidents off Oman, including one in which a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile that damaged the engine room. In the other incident, the master of a tanker reported seeing a large splash and an explosion close to the vessel, though no damage was reported.
- Güvenlik03 Ağu 19:36
Fresh US-Iran talks are ‘last chance’ for Tehran to avoid war escalating, Trump says
US president expects negotiations to begin in next day or two but Iran says it is not reviving talks with Washington Middle East crisis live – latest updates New talks between Washington and Tehran are the “last chance” for Iran to forge a deal and avoid an escalation of US strikes on the country, Donald Trump said on Monday. Trump said he expected negotiations to begin in the next day or two to reopen the strait of Hormuz and create a pathway for Iran to address the US’s concerns about its nuclear programme. Continue reading...
- Ekonomik04 Ağu 20:44
US Crude Oil Inventories Build As Washington Talks Up Potential Peace Deal
The American Petroleum Institute (API) estimated that crude oil inventories in the United States rose by 2.69 million barrels in the week ending July 30, despite analyst expectations for a 2 million barrel draw. In the week prior, US crude oil inventories fell by 3.3 million barrels. Commercial crude oil inventories excluding the SPR have lost just over 58 million barrels over the last sixteen weeks, with US crude inventories down just 7.2 million for the year, according to API data, kept in check by draws from the SPR. For the week ending July…
- Diplomatik06 Ağu 04:05
Surprise strikes signal Iran is digging in for a long war
In recent weeks, Iran has gone on the offensive, striking commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and launching a surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan. From a distance, these moves look like self-defeating escalation. Why should a badly damaged state, under severe economic pressure, lash out at the U.S. instead of pushing for a ceasefire? The answer, simply put, is that Iran is digging in for a long war. Whatever Washington's intentions, Tehran increasingly interprets sanctions, negotiations, temporary ceasefires and military strikes as different instruments aimed at a single objective: regime change. As long as this primary objective remains, Iran expects no sanctions relief or meaningful de-escalation. My conversations with Iranian foreign policy analysts suggest that Tehran now believes the war will continue in different forms until the end of Donald Trump's presidency. There is no doubt that the war has punished Iran’s economy. Over 23,000 U.S. and Israeli strikes heavily damaged the country's energy, industrial, transportation, and civil infrastructure, which had kept the country functioning despite decades of onerous sanctions. The country is experiencing the largest contraction in its labor market, along with the highest inflation rate, in its modern history. Beyond economic costs, the war has profoundly changed Iran’s perception of costs and its decision-making logic. The February 28 decapitation strike did not replace old, conservative political leaders and military commanders with more hard-line ones dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as mainstream U.S. media has suggested. Instead, it formed a shadow decision-making system that is more confident, less patient, less predictable, and guided by a different calculation of risk. Iran's experience of failed negotiations with the U.S. before the two major airstrikes in 2025 and 2026 intensified this new perception. In Tehran's view, a comprehensive agreement with the Trump administration is virtually unachievable. Trump either cannot deliver a durable settlement because he cannot afford its domestic political cost, or he does not want to. Even if the administration wants to change course, Israel, which clearly maintains substantial influence within Trump’s inner circle despite the recent rhetoric of Vice President JD Vance, will do what it can to disrupt it. The debate over the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is illustrative. Under the MoU, bombing stopped, and the blockade was lifted despite some violations of the Lebanon ceasefire. But the promised economic incentives were never realized. Tehran exported $6 billion in oil but did not receive the $12 billion in foreign assets it had expected. This limited implementation of the deal hurt Iran’s negotiating team at home. Sources told me that Iranians were also deeply dissatisfied with the Qatari-administered mechanism for allocating Iran’s frozen assets to import essential foods and medicine, and blamed Doha for misleading them. Altogether, these deepened the suspicion that the United States had paused its attacks in order to rebuild its defenses, update its military targets, bring oil prices down, and manage domestic grievances before returning to war. Ironically, hawks in the U.S. complained that the MoU had allowed the Iranians to rebuild their military capabilities in the interim. In Iran, a fragile MoU with no clear economic benefit was seen as a one-sided pause that exposed the Islamic Republic to societal and political pressures that had eased during wartime. While inflation, unemployment, poverty, and mismanagement fueled public anger, power struggles among political and security factions intensified. On one hand, Tehran could wait, ignoring some of Washington’s violations of the MoU while taking advantage of its limited economic benefits, and retaliating if the U.S. resumed the war. A factor weighing on the minds of leaders was that a renewed full-scale war would target Iran’s remaining energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, on which the state still depends. However, the leadership in Tehran came to believe that the relative benefits of waiting flowed overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and Israel. In particular, as long as Washington controlled the tempo of the war and decided when the war began, paused, and resumed, Tehran would lack agency. Seeking to break the deadlock, Tehran has thus adopted a strategy of managed confrontation, a form of active deterrence to raise the cost for the United States. Such a confrontation is limited enough to avoid full-scale war but would still increase political pressure on the Trump administration. Even limited attacks can disrupt the U.S. military’s focus, spread out its forces, engage its defensive systems, and force it to spend more on defensive operations than on preparing for a resumption of the war. At the same time, Tehran could keep negotiation channels open and demonstrate its desire for diplomatic solutions. Iran’s economic experience reinforces a confidence that Iran can win this gamble. Iran has absorbed enormous damage without collapsing. As the government allows inflation and currency depreciation to rise, goods keep moving; shelves are not empty, although fewer people can afford what is on them. Iran’s diverse geography helps to bypass the blockade and meet its essential needs. Its privileged welfare system has protected public employees on whom the effective functioning of the state relies, but much of the burden falls on informal workers and small firms. In contrast, a fragile MoU without economic benefits, combined with high uncertainty, will not ease the war’s economic burdens but will lower the cost of a new U.S. attack. As such, a controlled confrontation is more worthwhile. Iran's military and geographic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz helps the country raise the costs of war in a way that could exhaust Trump, perhaps forcing him to abandon the confrontation and change his Iran policy. The pressure is growing: as public support in the U.S. has declined, Trump’s popular approval has fallen to an unprecedented low. Of course, Tehran may underestimate Trump’s tolerance for a prolonged conflict. Another risk is that, while Tehran might be able to calibrate the targets and scale of its own attacks, it cannot control how Washington responds. In addition, Iran's neighbors may lose patience with Iran’s retaliatory attacks on them and join the U.S. in the attack. Finally, domestic discontent over the destruction wrought by the war (on top of a collapsing economy and increased repression) remains a persistent possibility that would fracture wartime solidarity. Still, Iranian leaders appear determined to continue down a path of extended, low-grade war. For Washington, the upshot of this change in Iranian thinking is straightforward. If the U.S. is truly interested in ending the war rather than engaging in endless military confrontation, it must recognize the limits of military pressure. The military campaign might be effective in damaging Iran’s military and economic infrastructure, but, until now, it has been politically counterproductive. It has heightened Iran’s economic crisis and increased poverty, but failed to force Iran's capitulation. More military strikes are most unlikely to alter this seeming paradox. What may yet change this state of affairs is a U.S. effort to incentivize de-escalation. If even part of the $12 billion promised by the MoU had actually reached Iran, its leadership would have been much less likely to take the military initiative. That is the lesson of the broken memorandum: Washington has put enormous effort into making escalation costly, but far too little into making restraint worthwhile. Until that changes, more pressure is unlikely to end Iran's resistance; instead, it may reinforce the lesson Tehran least wants to hear: that resistance is still the only option that pays.
- Güvenlik06 Ağu 07:44
Trump dismisses reports of munitions shortages, says US has 'massive amounts'
WASHINGTON: President Donald Trump said on Thursday the United States has a vast supply of munitions and threatened those who suggested otherwise with jail terms as his frustration with the Iran war boiled over.
- Güvenlik06 Ağu 11:54
UNDERSTANDING IRAN’S WAR STRATEGY
“And worse I may be yet. The worst is not So long as we can say, ‘This is the worst.’” — William Shakespeare, *King Lear* PROLOGUE The United States’ on-again, off-again war against Iran continues. While we are witnessing another lull at the time of writing, after a brief escalation following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the structural logic of the conflict remains unchanged. If anything, Ukraine’s sinking of Iran’s merchant ship in the Caspian Sea threatens to imbricate the European and Asian theatres, especially if Kyiv attacks more Iranian ships and Iran retaliates. The war imposed on Iran by the US and its Zionist partner already involves 12 active state actors, a number that makes untangling the entanglement into a nightmare. Notwithstanding, many people in Pakistan have raised a number of questions regarding Iran’s policy and continue to fuss over why Iran can’t just cut a deal with the United States, get sanctions relief and get on with life. This article is an attempt to explain what guides Iran’s politico-strategic approach and how that affects Tehran’s operational strategy and its tactical responses, the three distinct but overlapping levels of war. The critics’ frustration is understandable. Pakistan is contiguous to Iran. Any internal and external shocks in that country affect it. Oil and gas and the entire ecosystem that impacts petrochemical industries and agriculture is Pakistan’s lifeline. Given Pakistan’s fragile economy, energy scarcity and price shocks have a direct and negative impact on the country. Pakistan also has friendly ties with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. These states are in Iran’s crosshairs. That adds to Islamabad’s diplomatic and economic woes. It desperately wants an early end to the war, which is what informs its mediation efforts. Problem: the war is much bigger than Pakistan’s interests. With the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East and their escalation, many concerns have understandably been expressed in Pakistan about where the war is headed. Some have questioned Iran’s strategy and its steadfast refusal to come to a compromise with the United States on conditions dictated by the latter. What is Tehran’s endgame, they wonder. Ejaz Haider attempts to unpack the strategic logic that underpins Iran’s decisions… By now, Iran has been subjected to US perfidy four times: US President Donald Trump unilaterally scuppering a multilateral deal — the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — with Iran in 2018; the 2025 attacks, even as Iran was negotiating with the US; the repeat in 2026; and the US violation of clauses 1 and 5 of the MoU, which resulted in the latest round of fighting and escalation. Flagging this is important because the current line of questioning runs the risk of shifting the burden of war termination and making a deal from the aggressor (US) to the victim (Iran). That framing is problematic by all metrics and renders the methodology flawed a priori. An Iranian missile system is displayed in Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, on July 30, 2026. — WANA via Reuters/File WHY IS IRAN NOT MAKING A DEAL? A counter question could be, is Iran playing solitaire? Expecting Tehran to make a deal without any reference to actions by the US, which imposed this war on Iran, is to either falsify all known facts or insinuate that Iran must accept the terms set by the aggressor — ie seek a deal without reference to why the US-Zionist duo started this war, what were/are their objectives, and what it means for Iran if they were to achieve those objectives. And for Iran to make such a deal for what? To avoid pain? Get rich? In an ideal world, avoiding pain is the best course of action. There is nothing bad about getting rich, either. Iran definitely wants to avoid pain and get rich if it means exploiting its full potential as a state and society with a very high literacy rate and impressive STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) achievements. But there’s a context here, of perpetual threat, and it requires that Iran, after having taken and absorbed much pain, must ensure that no external power can attack it in the future, whenever it so desires. Not ensuring that would mean squandering its current thin advantage, taking pain without any gains. That’s stupidity, not strategy. The central lesson of Iran’s history with the US, and more specifically with Trump, is simple: never make concessions on the basis of future promises. The operating principle, after being stung by Trump consistently, is zero trust and verifiable implementation. Those who say that Iran shouldn’t play hardball would do well to listen to what Oman’s foreign minister, Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi, told CBS News on February 27 about the concessions Iran had made. He stated that a nuclear deal with Iran was “within our reach”, ensuring that Iran would not accumulate nuclear material (zero stockpiling) and accept full verification. He said that Iran had gone beyond the 2015 JCPOA and stressed that there was no alternative to diplomacy. The interview took place in Washington, DC, shortly after Albusaidi had met with US Vice President J.D. Vance to conduct high-stakes diplomatic negotiations. By the early morning hours of February 28, the US-Zionist decapitation and degradation strikes had begun. So, yes, critics must forgive Iran if it is not entirely convinced of US-Zionist intentions and understands that talks have been a treacherous shield in preparation for war. Iran has no option but to take the hard path, a path not of its choosing but thrust on it by circumstances. While the US and the Zionist entity overlap quite a lot on Iran, it’s important to make a distinction: US wants Iran to surrender and be a subject state; Zionists want Iran destroyed as it stands today. The choice for Iran is not even about getting rich and losing sovereignty. It is about losing itself as a state. It has no choice but to stand up for its sovereignty and force the imperial power’s hand by raising the cost-exchange ratio for it. WON’T A COMPROMISE BE BETTER FOR IRAN’S ECONOMY? On that point about getting rich… Conflicts do not just happen one day. They have a structural-historical dynamic. They are also dictated by the interests of state parties, whether one is defending against an aggressor or has chosen to be the aggressor. The sense of history also defines how states and societies perceive themselves and their place in the world. This is not mere theoretical assumption. Take China. As a superpower today, its grand strategy merges historical pride with past trauma to drive its modern global ambitions. For millennia, China viewed itself as the Middle Kingdom, Zhngguó, centre of the world. The term reflected China’s ancient worldview, cultural pride, and geopolitical strategy. This status was shattered by the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839–1949), an era of Western and Japanese colonial exploitation, unequal treaties, and deep national subjugation. That century, as Sinologists agree, deeply informs China’s modern approaches. Iran too is a civilisational state. Much like China, its civilisational trajectory was violently disrupted and it was subjugated by foreign intervention — the humiliation and concessions of the 19th century; the CIA-MI6 coup of 1953; and the Iraq aggression of 1980 that lasted for eight years, with Baghdad being supported by Arab-Gulf states, the US and its European allies. Just as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses historical trauma to validate its rule, the Islamic Republic of Iran utilises this legacy as a core pillar of state ideology. The 1979 Islamic Revolution is officially framed as the moment Iran broke free from a century of colonial humiliation. There are multiple internal negatives of this policy in both states but that is outside the scope of this article. Realism, in both its classical and structural incarnations, offers empirical evidence that when security is scarce, a state cannot afford to care about perceived absolute gains in the future for two existential reasons: the peril of future intentions and the vulnerability of interdependence. With respect to the first, no state can ever truly know another state’s future intentions, a lesson Canada and European allies of the US are learning, forcing Canadian PM Mark Carney to talk about “the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality.” With respect to the second, chasing absolute gains usually requires deep economic or strategic cooperation. In a secure world, this liberal-internationalist approach — cooperation will make me wealthier and more secure than I was yesterday — is easier to answer and can also be hugely profitable. In a scarce-security environment, however, interdependence can create strategic vulnerabilities. If you rely on another state for your energy, technology or supply chains to achieve future gains, you have handed them a weapon. Realism demands strategic autonomy and self-reliance over future prosperity. This too is on full display through small-yard, high-fence strategies to kneecap adversaries by denying them access to tech, re-shoring, friend-shoring and domestic redundancies! Moreover, for Iran, Lockean cooperation has never been on offer; the demand is to surrender. The 2015 JCPOA, if it were allowed to continue, might have changed the dynamic, but Trump put paid to it. There’s another variable too when it comes to Iran: the Zionist serpent. While the US and the Zionist entity overlap quite a lot on Iran, it’s important to make a distinction: US wants Iran to surrender and be a subject state; Zionists want Iran destroyed as it stands today. There’s enough evidence of this emerging from Western sources and statements for me to belabour the point. The choice for Iran is not even about getting rich and losing sovereignty. It is about losing itself as a state. It has no choice but to stand up for its sovereignty and force the imperial power’s hand by raising the cost-exchange ratio for it. Before I put this point to rest, an example is in order: Gulf states are very rich; they attract a lot of global capital. And yet, not one is really sovereign; all are dependencies bowing to the very imperial power that’s waging war on Iran. At least two of them sleep happily in the Zionist bed despite the murderous, genocidal policies of the Zionists. A bulk carrier and an oil tanker sit anchored in Muscat, Oman, as the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed off: Iran understands that talks have been a treacherous shield in preparation for war by the US-Israel duo, which is why Iran is leveraging its control over the Strait of Hormuz | Reuters WHY DID IRAN ATTACK SHIPS AFTER SIGNING THE MOU? Many analysts in Pakistan blame Iran for this round of fighting. They argue that Iran should have looked at sanctions relief rather than insisting on controlling the Strait. Others have spoken about the illegality of collecting fees. Still others blame hardline elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who presumably wanted to upstage the moderates and were not happy with the MoU. A few point to the four working groups and the High-Level Committee set up by the MoU and argue that Iran should have taken up the issue there. The issue of fees is controversial. But so far, Iran has not charged any fees, as per the MoU. The working groups had not begun functioning because Iran was involved in the state funeral of Syed Ali Khamanei. The US found the opportunity to push ships through the southern route. Missing the point leads to a flawed causal chain. The analyses adopt a geopolitical frame that views the US navy as a default, passive guarantor of global commons. That’s just not true and blinds them to how that action will act as a catalyst in regional escalation in this case. By starting the timeline only at the moment Iran fired at the ships, they exclude the compounding variable (the US naval escort deployment). With this boundary setting, they choose to analyse the “action” (the attack) while systematically omitting the “antecedent” (the escort policy). A proper methodology would require mapping all structural inputs that led to Iran’s action. The US escorting of ships is not a neutral act. It signals a provocative, forward military posture in Iran’s backyard. A robust analysis requires a dialectical approach to recognise the security dilemma, where US projection of power and Iran’s encirclement anxieties constantly feed into each other. The real question to ask is this: why does Iran want to control the Strait and why does the US want to deny Iran that control? The MoU’s clause five is clear in its wording (by the way, talk about the MoU being loosely-worded is just that, post-facto talk): “Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.” There are three points here, two in bold letters and the third in italics. 1. Iran will make arrangements, with no charge for 60 days from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. 2. Iran will conduct dialogue with Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait. 3. Any such arrangement will be in line with applicable International Law and the sovereign rights of coastal states. The first clearly states that Iran will make arrangements (not the US); the first 60 days will be free. This links up with the second point: “to define the future administration and maritime services” in consultation with Oman. Implication: beyond 60 days, Iran and Oman will figure out the administration and maritime services. Corollary: after 60 days, there may be a fee and the routes will be coordinated with Oman and Iran. (Oman is already in consultation with Iran and has forwarded its proposal to Iran. What will become of it remains to be seen.) The after-thought that the clause does not refer to any particular route and, therefore, the US navy can escort ships through the southern route is shystering. The US was/is clearly attempting to dilute Iran’s control, in violation of what MoU’s relevant clause states. When an express power or duty is given, the law implies the concurrent assignment of the necessary powers to execute it. The post-facto interpretation by the US contravenes the principle of good faith. WHY HASN’T IRAN ATTACKED THE ZIONIST ENTITY? Iran has not attacked the Zionists in this round because the Zionists have stayed away, embroiled as Benjamin Netanyahu is in the upcoming October polls and on the northern front against Hezbollah. Iran does not have unlimited resources. Any sensible planning requires that it husband its war-fighting capability. Hezbollah is keeping the Zionist entity busy at this stage. Internally, Netanyahu is being challenged effectively. As for targeting the Gulf states and Jordan, it’s somewhat amazing that this point is raised, given how deeply these states are interlocked with US interests. But there’s another reason too, as noted by some former US military officers, including Lt Gen Mark Hertling. Hertling identified Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base as the largest concentration of advanced US airpower in the Middle East, housing F-35s, F-15Es, A-10s, and critical air defence networks like THAAD. He explained that the base is vital for projecting power against Iran while enabling “strategic plausible deniability” for Jordan. That hasn’t worked, as is clear from Iran’s strikes targeting early warning and radars. Jordan has been critical in shielding the Zionist entity from incoming Iranian missiles and drones. This is why Iran targeted and destroyed a $300 million AN/TPY-2 Forward Based X-band Transportable Radar operated by the US Army at the base, rendering the THAAD battery effectively blind. Iran has done this to US electronic warfare and radar systems elsewhere too. This makes the space for it to target the Zionists more effectively when it needs to do so. IS IRAN OVERPLAYING ITS HAND? This is an interesting question and subtly contains in it other questions! It is also grounded in some nuance. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz spoke of the “culminating point of victory”, the point that denotes the critical threshold where military gains peak and begin to reverse into a disadvantage if pushed further. History offers many examples of this overreach. But this point is not on a metered scale; the buzzer doesn’t go off for the commander when gains reach that point. It is a judgement call. A commander has to work through and analyse multiple variables to figure out where and when to stop. I believe that while Iran must remain cognisant of this, the situation needs to be contextualised. The war has led to pain on both sides and a stalemate. Neither side has been defeated or has won in the classical sense. And while Iran has so far denied the US its strategic objective of bending Tehran to its will and fracturing it, the contest is on and Iran simply cannot let its guard down until the US realises that gambling for resurrection is resulting in increasingly diminishing returns. I have already discussed the structural logic of Hormuz above so I don’t need to repeat it. The essential point is that, in this contest, Iran is defending and reacting. Its victory lies in denial strategies. But yes, it has to be careful about figuring out the balance. The Strait is central to its strategy, sure. But what kind of balance can be struck, and as early as possible, is a vital question. Iran also has to signal to the Gulf states that its attacks have a context and, outside of that context, it seeks cooperation with them, not just because of geographic contiguity but also historical, cultural and trade ties. The most notable example is the backchannel between the UAE and Iran. It’s going to be a frosty peace; the UAE will use this as part of a suite of strategies. But pragmatism could work for both sides. This is also applicable to other Gulf states. American President Donald Trump signs the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) at the Palace of Versailles in France on June 17, 2026: Trump reneged on the MoU by violating its clauses regarding Lebanon and Strait of Hormuz | White House WON’T IRAN BRINGING ANSAR ALLAH INTO THE FIGHT BRING KSA AND UAE TOGETHER? This question takes it for granted that Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis is the wrong shorthand for the movement’s name) operates purely at the behest of Iran. As multiple analyses suggest, Ansar Allah, while a strong ally of Iran, primarily operates within the Yemeni context. Recent analytical and investigative reports present a nuanced picture that goes beyond the narrative of Ansar Allah being an Iranian puppet. The current escalation was sparked on July 13, when Yemen’s Aden-based Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) bombed the runway at Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian plane from landing. The plane carried an Ansar Allah delegation that had traveled to Iran for Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral. The strike shattered a fragile, unwritten four-year truce between the Saudi-led coalition and Ansar Allah. Regional reports underscore that Ansar Allah operates primarily on its own local calculations rather than acting purely on Iranian command. In fact, it is far more independent than the IRG, which is an extension of Riyadh. The group’s decision to transition from targeting global shipping to a direct, localised “siege-for-siege” blockade on Saudi Arabia is driven by local dynamics, including economic stress. The group is facing domestic strain over a longstanding financial stalemate with the Aden government. Framing their actions as a defence of Yemeni sovereignty against external blockades, Ansar Allah uses the escalation to rally mass public support domestically. Their military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, explicitly framed the missile strikes on Saudi oil hubs such as Yanbu as local retaliation for airspace violations. While Ansar Allah has its own domestic drivers, there’s no gainsaying that the crisis serves Iran’s broader geopolitical goals. The blockade on Saudi shipping allows Tehran to project power and threaten global energy corridors without engaging in a direct state-on-state conventional war. Within the Yemeni context, neither the IRG nor Ansar Allah is looking for a return to full-scale war. In the broader context, Iran’s offer to mediate between Ansar Allah and Riyadh is a signal that Tehran does not want it to escalate. The essential point is that, given the complexity of the actors involved and their varied interests, all sides are attempting to create a balance between the pressures of the immediate and the long-term reconfiguration of the Gulf and the Middle East. As for bringing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi together, they will come together on certain issues while remaining apart on others because of structural reasons. EPILOGUE There are three sets of actors in this war: the United States and the Zionist entity (the latter operates with and also independent of the US); the Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt; and Iran and its regional allies (the ‘Axis of Resistance’). There are also differences within the Gulf set but we will not press that point here. Each set has its objectives. The US has been the primary force in the Greater Middle East since World War II; the Zionists act as its outpost. Jordan and Egypt are US dependencies and have peace treaties with the Zionist entity. The Gulf set, excluding Saudi Arabia, comprises tiny states with oil wealth in varying degrees. These states, most notably the UAE, have tried to compensate for their geographic and demographic weaknesses by allying with the US and modernising their militaries within a capital/tech-intensive model. They are also, with varying degrees of success, trying to diversify their economies, investing abroad and attracting investments at home. The model requires peace and security. Iran is under sanctions since 1979. Its attempts to break out of isolation have repeatedly failed. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf states, the US and its European partners fully backed Iraq. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was birthed for the very purpose of containing Iran. Iran’s allies, non-state actors, are labelled “terrorist”. Its state ally, Syria, is now controlled by a former ‘Islamic State’/Al Qaeda leader, newly-minted and koshered by the West because he serves a purpose. Iran wants to secure itself. The US/Israel want to destroy it. The Gulf states want the US to defang Iran. These objectives create their respective incentive structures. They also impact Iran’s tactical, operational and political-strategic approaches. This is a very sketchy overview, of course. But the point is that analyses have to bring in multiple factors to figure out the dynamics at play. The situation is far too complex for linear causalities. In the end, however, the world remains anarchic. The US is waning but it still remains the strongest power. It never allowed itself to be subjected by laws and norms but Trump has expressed his disdain for norms and laws openly, even bragged about it. In the wolf world, one is reminded of King Lear’s eldest daughter Goneril’s cynical question in Shakespeare’s play, after her villainy is exposed: “Say, if I do, the laws are mine, not thine. Who can arraign me for’t?” The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider Published in Dawn, EOS, August 2nd, 2026 Header image: A man walks past a mural depicting late Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran on July 24, 2026.— AFP/File
- Güvenlik06 Ağu 16:52
Trump dismisses reports of munitions shortages, says U.S. has ‘massive amounts’
Donald Trump lashed out on his Truth Social platform at media reports about the dwindling weapons stockpile, saying that the United States has “massive amounts of ‘munitions’ especially of certain types”
- Ekonomik09 Ağu 11:46
Iran says Oman deal is in 'final stages' but US must act to open Hormuz
By Nayera Abdallah, Steve Holland and Enas Alashray DUBAI/WASHINGTON/CAIRO Aug 9 (Reuters) - Iran said on Sunday that a deal with Oman defining new shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz was in its final stages but reiterated that the strait would only reopen once the United States met other conditions. A U.S. official told Reuters on Friday that an agreement between Iran and Oman was close and could soon reopen the waterway, which carried a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments before Iran blocked it in response to U.S. and Israeli attacks.
- Ekonomik11 Ağu 20:47
US Crude Oil Inventories See Surprise Build: API
The American Petroleum Institute (API) estimated that crude oil inventories in the United States rose by 9.072 million barrels in the week ending August 7, compared to analyst expectations for a 500,000-barrel draw. In the week prior, U.S. crude oil inventories rose by 2.69 million barrels. The larger-than-expected build was driven in part by higher crude imports relative to exports during the week. Commercial crude oil inventories excluding the SPR have lost just over 49 million barrels over the last seventeen weeks, with US crude inventories…
- Güvenlik11 Ağu 15:46
New attacks on shipping as Iran war talks hit fresh impasse
By Elwely Elwelly and Parisa Hafezi DUBAI, Aug 11 (Reuters) - The United States and Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis reported separate attacks on shipping on Tuesday as prospects for ending the five-month-old Iran war appeared to dim, with Tehran saying the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless Washington accepts its conditions. Oil prices gained and global shares retreated amid renewed pessimism about a quick end to the conflict. Brent crude futures climbed 1.4% to settle at $88.91 per barrel and U.S. crude rose 1.3% to $83.20.
- Güvenlik12 Ağu 05:46
Hormuz shipping traffic falls to one-week low amid hostilities
SINGAPORE, Aug 12 (Reuters) - The tally of vessels tracked in the Strait of Hormuz fell to a one-week low of eight on Tuesday, shipping data showed, as owners avoided the key waterway amid continued hostilities in the Middle East. The United States and Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis reported separate attacks as prospects appeared to dim for an end to the Iran war, with Tehran saying the strait would stay closed unless Washington accepted its conditions.
- Güvenlik13 Ağu 03:00
Çarpıcı analiz. "İran savaş taktiğini geliştirdi"
New York Times'ın analizinde ABD'nin savaş mühimmatı azalırken İran'ın yeni savaş taktikleri geliştirdiği belirtildi. İran'ın son saldırılarında ABD'nin savunma sistemlerini aşmayı başardığına dikkat çekildi. İran savaşıyla ilgili Amerikan New York Times gazetesinde dikkat çeken bir analiz yayınlandı. Buna göre ABD Savunma Bakanlığı Pentagon'un elindeki önleyici füzeler azaldı. İran ise savaş becerilerini hızlı şekilde geliştiriyor. İran'ın 5 gün süren yoğun saldırılarında Ürdün'deki ABD üslerini hedef aldığı hatırlatan New York Times, İran'ın bu saldırıda havada aniden yön değiştirebilen gelişmiş füzeler kullandığını yazdı. İran'ın Ürdün'deki üs saldırısında 3 ABD askeri ölürken 100 asker yaralandı. Bazı uçaklar da hasar aldı. Analizde İran'ın çatışma alanını Ortadoğu'nun büyük bir kısmını kapsayacak şekilde genişleterek Yemen'deki Husiler ve Irak'taki milisler gibi vekil güçleri dahil ettiği vurgulandı. "İRAN, ABD SAVUNMASINI AŞMAYI ÖĞRENDİ" İran'ın ABD hava savunma sistemlerini nasıl atlatacağını öğrendiği de belirtildi. Buna karşın ABD'nin önleyici füze stoklarının hızla azaldığına dikkat çekildi. New York Times'a göre Pentagon savaş sırasında bin 500'den fazla Patriot önleyici füze kullandı ve elinde yaklaşık bin 700 önleyici füze kaldı. Hatta geçen ay tek bir günde 50 Patriot füzesi harcamak zorunda kaldı. Analizde İran'ın ise Rusya'nın Ukrayna'da kullandığı taktiklere başvurduğu belirtildi. İran'ın balistik ve seyir füzeleriyle savunma sistemlerini oyalarken aynı anda drone saldırıları da düzenlediği hatırlatıldı. Dronların savunma sistemlerinin bu şekilde aştığına dikkat çekildi.
- Güvenlik15 Ağu 06:54
Herkes ne olduğunu merak ediyordu! Trump'tan ABD'nin 'dev gücüne' dair ilk açıklama
New York Times'ın (NYT) haberine göre ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Washington'dan bir etkinlik için ayrıldığı esnada basın mensuplarına USS Abraham Lincoln uçak gemisiyle ilgili konuştu. 'ENDİŞELİ DEĞİLLER' Gemideki mürettebatın zorlu yaşam koşullarına ilişkin basına yansıyan haberlerin sorulması ve mürettebatın ailelerinin endişeli olduğu aktarılması üzerine Trump, "Hayır, endişeli değiller" ifadesini kullandı. Trump, geminin görevlendirmesinin çok uzun sürüp sürmediği sorulduğunda ise bu durumu reddederek yeterince uzun olmadığını belirtti. 'BENZER GEMİYLE DEĞİŞTİRİLECEK' ABD Başkanı ayrıca ABD Donanması'nın gemiyi yakın bir zamanda çok benzer bir gemiyle değiştireceğini aktardı. Öte yandan ismini açıklamak istemeyen ABD'li bir yetkili de NYT'ye yaptığı açıklamada, USS Abraham Lincoln gemisinin yerini alması için George Washington uçak gemisinin gönderildiğini öne sürdü. ABD basınında, İran ile yaşanan çatışmalar kapsamında görev sürelerinin defalarca uzatılması ve aylardır denizde bulunmaları nedeniyle ABD askerleri üzerindeki baskının arttığına dair haberler yansımıştı. NE OLMUŞTU? ABD basınındaki haberlerde, gemideki en az iki denizcinin denize atlama girişiminin engellendiği, denize düşen bir başka denizcinin ise kurtarıldığı öne sürülmüştü. Uzatılan görev süresi boyunca mürettebatın temel malzeme eksikliği, hijyen sorunları, posta dağıtımında aksamalar ve ciddi gıda kısıtlamalarıyla karşı karşıya kaldığı iddia edilmişti. Savunma Bakanı Hegseth ise iddiaları reddederek, uçak gemisindeki koşullara ilişkin aktarılanların "tamamen çarpıtıldığını" savunmuştu.
Milliyet - Diplomatik17 Ağu 20:55
The Iran war flushed $1.3 billion of Reaper drones down the drain
The U.S. has lost 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones, worth at least $1.3 billion, since the start of its war on Iran, the Washington Post reported Friday. The drones can cost between $30 and $50 million each, depending on their sensor and weapons payload. The U.S. military has lost roughly 25% of its pre-war fleet in the past five months. A defense official told the Washington Post that some of the drones were not shot down by Iranian forces, but instead were lost after their communications link to their operators failed. They did not say how many were lost this way. Observers say the MQ-9 losses are par for the course amid a costly war with Iran. “The drip, drip, drip of this news shows how much the Trump administration is drawing down U.S. arsenals to support the war in Iran,” Justin Logan, the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, told RS. “First it was interceptors, then it was naval deployments, now it is drones, and tomorrow it will be something new.” “U.S. allies in the region know better, which is why, with the exception of Israel and partly the UAE, they are all pressing for deescalation, not a full-on renewal of the war,” Logan said. To Logan’s point, the U.S. has suffered numerous high-profile and expensive weapons systems losses since the start of the conflict in late February. An MQ-4 Triton drone, worth $238 million, crashed in an accident over the Persian Gulf in April. An Iranian missile and drone attack on a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia damaged a E-3 Sentry AWACS plane, worth about $300 million, in late March. The U.S. has also burnt through many of its critical munitions since the war began, including “virtually all” its long-range precision strike missiles, according to sources who spoke to Reuters. The Pentagon has repeatedly floated requests for Congress to replenish these munitions — which can cost millions of dollars each, and can take years to make — with possible supplemental funding packages worth tens of billions of dollars. The MQ-9 has proven vulnerable beyond the war against Iran. Yemen’s Houthi Rebels shot down 7 reaper drones during Operation Rough Rider, the U.S. campaign against the group last spring, which aimed to stop Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. Three of those were shot down in one week in April of last year. As losses mount, the Pentagon has begun to seek out cheaper alternatives for the costly drone. A Defense Innovation Unit notice posted in July solicited designs for alternatives that can be produced in high numbers at low costs within five years. The notice said a “reliance on low-density, high-value” aircraft is “unsustainable” against advanced air defense systems.
- Ekonomik18 Ağu 20:56
Distillate Stocks Sink Further as U.S. Crude Inventories Barely Budge
The American Petroleum Institute (API) estimated that crude oil inventories in the United States fell by 328,000 barrels in the week ending August 14. In the week prior, US crude oil inventories rose by 9.072 million barrels on the back of increased imports, decreased exports, and a sizeable injection from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Commercial crude oil inventories excluding the SPR have lost just over 49 million barrels over the last eighteen weeks, with US crude inventories up 1.88 million for the year, according to API data, kept…
- Güvenlik19 Ağu 09:34
Savaş Avrupa'ya mı sıçrayacak? İran'ın yeni hedef listesi
ABD ile İran arasındaki gerilimin dozu yükselirken çatışmanın Ortadoğu sınırlarını aşabileceği belirtiliyor. Tahran, ABD'nin Avrupa'daki askeri hedeflerini vurmayı bir seçenek olarak değerlendiriyor. ABD gerilimi tırmandırırsa İran Avrupa'daki Amerikan hedeflerini vurmayı değerlendiriyor. İran'ın potansiyel hedefleri arasında Bulgaristan'daki Bezmer Hava Üssü ve Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz Akrotiri Hava Üssü'nün de bulunduğu belirtiliyor. İngiliz Financial Times gazetesine göre, Bulgaristan geçen ay ABD'ye ait yakıt ikmal uçaklarının Bezmer Hava Üssü'nü kullanmasına izin verdiği için İran'ın hedefi olabilir. Ayrıca İran'ın, çatışmanın tırmanması durumunda Hürmüz Boğazı’ndaki denizaltı fiber optik kablolarına saldırmayı da masadaki seçeneklerden biri olarak değerlendirdiği ifade ediliyor. İran'ın Orta Doğu dışındaki hedefleri vurabileceğinin sinyali daha önce verilmişti. DEVRİM MUHAFIZLARI UYARMIŞTI İran Devrim Muhafızları geçen ay ABD'nin İngiliz Askeri üslerini kullanması nedeniyle İngiltere'yi tehdit etmiş ve “İran topraklarına yönelik saldırı başlatmak için kullanılan her üssün meşru hedef olarak kabul edileceği" konusunda uyarmıştı. Uzmanlar, İran'ın Avrupa ve diğer bölgelerdeki hedeflere yönelik füze tehdidini “gerçek ancak sınırlı” olarak niteliyor. İran'ın, Şahab serisi gibi orta menzilli balistik füzeleriyle Güney ve Güneydoğu Avrupa’daki ABD unsurlarını hedef alabileceği, ancak daha uzak mesafelerdeki noktalara etkili hasar verme konusunda zorlanacağı belirtiliyor. DIEGO GARCIA ÜSSÜ HEDEF ALINMIŞTI Washington yönetimi, savaşın başladığı Şubat ayında İran'ın yaklaşık 4 bin kilometre mesafedeki, ABD ve İngiltere'nin ortak kullandığı Diego Garcia üssüne birden fazla füze fırlattığını açıklamıştı. Ancak füzelerin hiçbiri hedefe ulaşmadı. Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü uzmanlarından Douglas Barry bu saldırının İran'ın elinde 2 bin kilometreden daha uzun menzilli füzelerin olduğunu göstermesi açısından önemli olduğunu söylüyor. Barry, İran'ın elinde bu kadar uzun menzile sahip kaç füzenin olduğunun ise kesin olarak bilinmediğine işaret ediyor. İran’ın ABD'ye vereceği karşılığın Washington’ın atacağı adımlara bağlı olacağı vurgulanıyor.
- Güvenlik19 Ağu 22:33
İran rotayı Avrupa’ya çeviriyor
ABD’nin aylar boyunca düzenlediği saldırılara Körfez’deki ABD üslerini hedef alarak karşılık veren İran’ın, gözünü Avrupa’ya çevirdiği öne sürüldü.
- Ekonomik20 Ağu 14:50
USA Crude Oil Stocks See Another Build
Crude oil stocks, not including the SPR, stood at 428.8 million barrels on August 14, the EIA's latest weekly petroleum status report showed.
- Güvenlik20 Ağu 17:17
U.S. targets Hezbollah with fresh sanctions, emphasizes ties to Iranian government
WASHINGTON, Aug 20 - The United States will on Thursday issue fresh sanctions targeting Lebanon's Hezbollah, including re-designating it under a terrorism authority, according to a statement seen by Reuters, in a move aimed at emphasizing its links to the Iranian government.
Okumaya devam et
ilgili gelişmeler- Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
İran, Hürmüz'de Umman'la yeni koridor anlaşması imzalayacak
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ABD1 olay18 sa önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
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ABD2 olay1 gün önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
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ABD1 olay8 sa önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
ABD-İran Savaşında Düğün Vuruldu: İnsan Bedeli Göz Ardı Ediliyor
1 Eylül'de Washington ile Tahran arasında çatışmalar yeniden alevlenirken, İran'ın Hürmüzgan eyaletine bağlı Kuhestak kasabasında bir düğün törenine mermi isabet etti. Neşe dolu gece, can kayıplarına yol açan bir trajediye dönüştü. Dünya kamuoyunun odağı büyük ölçüde ABD-İran savaşının jeopolitik boyutları ve küresel ekonomi üzerindeki etkilerine çevrildiği için, bu tür olaylardaki insani bedel çoğu zaman göz ardı ediliyor. ABD ile İran arasındaki düşmanlıkların tırmanması, bölgesel istikrar ve enerji piyasaları başta olmak üzere geniş bir alanda sonuç doğuruyor. Ancak Kuhestak'taki düğün vurulması, çatışmanın sivil yaşamlar üzerindeki doğrudan etkisini ortaya koyuyor. Savaşın jeopolitik ve ekonomik sonuçları tartışılırken, savaş alanı dışında kalan yerleşim yerlerindeki halkın güvenliği de kritik bir mesele olarak öne çıkıyor.
ABD1 olay15 sa önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
Trump: İran'ın nükleer silahına izin yok, Körfez'e yayılan gerilim şaşırttı
ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İran ile yaşanan gerilimin Körfez ülkelerine yayılmasından duyduğu şaşkınlığı dile getirdi. Trump, bu gelişmeyi kendisi dahil kimsenin beklemediğini söyledi. Aynı açıklamada İran'ın nükleer silah edinmesine izin vermeyeceklerini vurguladı. Trump, İran'ın nükleer silaha sahip olması durumunda İsrail'i vuracağını, Avrupa ve ABD'ye saldıracağını öne sürdü. Bu ifadeler, ABD yönetiminin Tahran'a yönelik tutumunun ve bölgede tırmanan gerilimin genişlemesine ilişkin değerlendirmesinin bir parçası olarak kayda geçti.
ABD7 olay1 gün önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
Guterres'ten ABD-İran Geriliminde 'Son Derece Endişe' Açıklaması
Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Genel Sekreteri Antonio Guterres, ABD ile İran arasında yeniden başlayan saldırılar nedeniyle "son derece endişe" duyduğunu bildirdi. Açıklama, Anadolu Ajansı tarafından duyuruldu. Guterres'in bu değerlendirmesi, iki ülke arasındaki tırmanan gerilime ilişkin BM'nin resmi kaygısını yansıtıyor. Ancak açıklamada saldırıların tarihi, yeri veya tarafların eylemlerine dair ayrıntı paylaşılmadı.
ABD4 olay2 gün önce