İran'ın Körfez Stratejisi Ters Tepti, ABD Varlığını Meşrulaştırdı

Aiming at the Gulf, Iran shoots itself in the foot

For decades, Iran has sought to diminish America’s military presence and political influence in the Middle East. Yet some ambitions carry within them the seeds of their own undoing. The very policies intended to push out the United States have instead strengthened the rationale for Washington’s continued engagement. Before the erosion of its regional axis, Iran based its security doctrine on forward defense, projecting influence beyond its borders to keep threats at bay. However, what Tehran regarded as a defensive strategy, the Persian Gulf states perceived as an expansionist bid for regional primacy. As a result, they deepened their security ties with Washington, making the U.S. military presence more indispensable to Gulf security rather than less. Iran’s current approach suggests that it is repeating the same strategic mistake, both in its confrontation with the United States and in its vision for the regional order that will follow. Iran’s strategy of targeting Gulf states, which Tehran views as facilitating U.S. military operations, appears intended to demonstrate that the American presence is a liability rather than an asset. The objective is to persuade Gulf leaders that hosting U.S. bases brings greater insecurity and that accommodation with Iran is a safer alternative. Yet, given the history of Iranian coercion and the prevailing lack of trust, these states are more likely to conclude that accommodating Iran would invite further pressure rather than reduce it, much as Iran itself has come to believe that restraint toward the United States invites further attacks. Iran appears to overlook one of the most enduring patterns in international politics. States facing rising security threats rarely respond by distancing themselves from their security partners. More often, they reinforce existing alliances. The United Arab Emirates moved toward the Abraham Accords amid growing concerns about Iranian regional influence and again sought Israel’s help during Iranian attacks this year. Likewise, despite being attacked by multiple actors during the recent regional conflict, Qatar neither distanced itself from the United States nor moved closer to Iran. Instead, it sought stronger American security guarantees. At the same time, Iran seeks to convey that the United States can no longer protect its regional partners. Through its relatively successful targeted attacks across the Gulf, Tehran aims to show that the U.S. security umbrella can be penetrated. Yet this strategy also overlooks the Gulf’s limited strategic alternatives. Although some Gulf states have expanded their engagement with China, Beijing currently lacks both the capability and the intent to provide security guarantees comparable to those of the United States. Nor are Gulf states likely to seek protection from a country that is itself threatening them. Consequently, rather than diminishing America’s relevance, Iranian coercion has made Washington appear increasingly indispensable because no other external power can match its military infrastructure, intelligence capabilities, or ability to project force across the Gulf. Iran should also pay closer attention to the evolving U.S. National Security Strategy during President Donald Trump’s second term in office. Washington’s long-term priorities are gradually shifting away from the Middle East and toward theaters where sustained strategic competition is expected to define American grand strategy. Accordingly, the United States seeks to reduce its direct burden in the Middle East while allowing regional states greater responsibility for shaping a stable order. Yet, instead of positioning itself within that emerging order, Iran appears intent on constructing one centered on its own regional primacy. In doing so, it only increases the likelihood of continued American involvement or support for a competing regional order designed to balance against Iran. The same dynamic has undermined another key Iranian objective. Iran has long hoped that opposition to Israel would foster greater political convergence across the region. Yet it is precisely Tehran’s regional overreach that has hindered broader Arab convergence behind the Palestinian cause, which remains fundamentally an Arab issue. Indeed, had Iran not pursued an expansive regional project, the Palestinian cause might have attracted broader regional support. The reason is straightforward. As long as Gulf leaders continue to view Iran itself as a source of regional instability, they are unlikely to subordinate their security concerns to broader Arab solidarity. Ironically, a strategy intended to strengthen resistance against Israel has instead encouraged closer security coordination against Iran. Iran no longer needs to prove it has regional influence. It has already demonstrated its ability to survive a combined U.S.-Israeli onslaught and to project power across the Middle East. Its influence in neighboring states, including Lebanon and Yemen, and its ability to affect maritime security around the Strait of Hormuz are already well understood. Iran does not need to establish hegemony over the Strait of Hormuz to demonstrate that it retains the capability to threaten its closure. Continuing to emphasize these capabilities through repeated coercive signaling, therefore, offers diminishing strategic returns and yields the opposite outcomes. Power seldom commands enduring respect through its perpetual display; for what is ceaselessly wielded soon teaches others not submission, but preparation. The future of Pakistan-Iran relations also hinges on Iran’s approach to the Gulf. Islamabad has begun to play a larger role in Gulf security. Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia last year and is exploring deeper security ties with the other Middle Eastern states, including Kuwait. This evolving regional architecture presents Tehran with an important strategic choice. If Iran continues to rely on pressure against the Gulf monarchies, it risks placing Pakistan in an increasingly difficult position. Islamabad seeks constructive relations with Tehran. However, Pakistan wants not only to maintain but also to deepen strategic partnerships with Gulf states. Should Iranian pressure on the Gulf intensify, Pakistan may eventually be drawn more firmly into a regional security framework designed to reassure its Gulf partners. Continued Iranian pressure could also gradually shift Pakistani public opinion against Iran. Such an outcome would serve neither country’s long-term interests. Iran should, therefore, not assume that Pakistan’s defense commitments lack a firm basis, nor should it create circumstances that compel Islamabad to test those commitments. A more flexible approach would not require Iran to abandon its national interests or weaken its defensive posture. It would simply require recognizing that integration into regional economic and security infrastructure would serve its long-term interests. The Gulf states increasingly regard economic diversification, regional connectivity, and political stability as central to their national priorities. Iran also faces significant economic challenges after years of sanctions and the war. These shared interests provide a stronger foundation for regional order than coercion could ever offer. If Tehran genuinely seeks a Middle East that is less dependent on outside powers and more capable of managing its own affairs, it should seize the current diplomatic opening and map out a strategy built on reassurance and integration rather than coercive leverage. Such an approach would pay off not only for Gulf stability but also for Iran’s own strategic interests. Iran should move beyond seeking popular sympathy among Arab populations and instead forge lasting partnerships with regional states. It should set aside its ideological lens in favor of greater pragmatism and work toward ending its regional isolation. Rather than intimidating its neighbors, Iran should pursue cooperation based on a model of shared prosperity.