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ABD ve İran Pakistan Arabuluculuğunda Barış Görüşmeleri Çerçevesinde Anlaştı

Özet · AI üretimi

ABD ve İran, aylar süren yoğun arka kanal diplomasisinin ardından barış görüşmeleri için bir çerçeve üzerinde anlaşmaya vardı. Pakistan'ın arabuluculuğunda ve bölge ülkelerinin desteğiyle gerçekleşen müzakereler sonucunda ortaya çıkan geçici anlaşmanın ayrıntıları henüz kamuoyuna açıklanmadı. Anlaşmanın 60 günlük bir süreyi kapsadığı belirtiliyor. Bu gelişme, uzun süredir devam eden ve ABD'nin kaybettiği bir savaş olarak nitelendirilen çatışmaların sona erdirilmesi yönündeki beklentileri artırdı. Taraflar arasında güven tesis edilmesi ve kalıcı bir barışın sağlanması için önümüzdeki dönem kritik önem taşıyor. Pakistan'ın öncülük ettiği arabuluculuk çabaları ve bölgesel iş birliği, çatışmanın diplomatik yollarla çözümüne yönelik uluslararası bir iradenin varlığına işaret ediyor. 60 günlük sürecin nasıl işleyeceği ve müzakerelerin hangi aşamalardan geçeceği ise ilerleyen günlerde netlik kazanacak.

Başlangıç 17 Haz 03:01 3 olay Güncellendi 1 gün önce
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  1. Diplomatik17 Haz 03:01

    A tentative peace

    IN a dramatic turn of events, the US and Iran have agreed on a framework for peace talks. While the details of the deal, reached after months of intense backchannel negotiations mediated by Pakistan and supported by other regional countries, have yet to be made public, this development has raised hopes of ending an irrational war that the US has lost. The tentative pact provides a space of 60 days to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement that remains a significant challenge. There’s still a long way to go before such an agreement is reached. There has been a noticeable shift in President Donald Trump’s previously aggressive tone; however, several complex issues need to be addressed during this period. These include deferred nuclear talks, the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz, the release of frozen Iranian assets and the lifting of the sanctions on Iran. Meanwhile, Israel’s refusal to participate in the process and its ongoing invasion of Lebanon could undermine peace negotiations. Bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table has been a challenging diplomatic task for Pakistan. Support from regional countries has significantly helped Pakistan in this painstaking process. Although no breakthrough occurred during the first round of peace talks, known as the Islamabad Talks, held in April, the meeting helped diplomatic channels remain open. Pressure was also placed on the Trump administration by the Gulf countries to end the war, which has profoundly impacted the region. Building trust between the two sides remains a significant challenge. Regardless of the outcome of the peace talks, it is clear that the US has lost yet another war of its choosing. Operation Epic Fury, jointly launched by the Trump administration and Israel against Iran on Feb 28, failed to achieve any of its shifting objectives. Despite relentless bombings that wiped out much of Iran’s military infrastructure and eliminated key civil and military leaders, the operation failed to force Iran to capitulate. The US blockade of Iranian ports, intended to strangle the country economically, also proved ineffective. It is clear that the US has lost yet another war of its choosing. Trump miscalculated Iran’s resilience; it was not to be the easy victory he expected, similar to Venezuela. As a result, he had no choice but to agree to a framework for peace talks that were not on his terms, seemingly conceding many of Iran’s demands. Even the nuclear issue, which was presented as the justification for the attack on Iran, has been deferred to upcoming negotiations, effectively aiming to restore the pre-war status quo. Despite its losses, Iran has emerged much stronger from the conflict, and has become a symbol of defiance. A weakened Trump is now left to fight a political battle at home. The highly unpopular and irrational war has divided his support base between anti-interventionists and hawks, who feel disappointed by the peace negotiations. The economic costs of the conflict, evidenced by rising inflation, have further driven down his approval ratings to a historical low. Meanwhile, the war has alienated Washington’s Western allies, who have refused to support what they describe as an illegal conflict. The economies of these countries have been severely impacted, and recovery will take a long time, even with the potential end of hostilities. However, the most significant challenge for the Trump administration is how to prevent Israel, which initially pushed the US into this war, from undermining the peace negotiations. On the day the US-Iran deal was announced, Israel escalated its bombing campaign in Lebanon, claiming that the provisions of the agreement did not apply to it. The cessation of hostilities in Lebanon is reportedly a crucial part of the MoU; however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the country would continue to occupy parts of Lebanon. Several Israeli government ministers have publicly denounced the agreement. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir argued that Israel should not accept it and called for the military to continue demolishing houses in southern Lebanon and push back the residents. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that the deal was detrimental to the world. Some media reports indicated that Trump exchanged harsh words during his conversation with Netanyahu. However, given Israel’s influence over America’s power structure, a rupture in relations between the two allies seems unlikely. Israel continues to pose the biggest threat to peace in the Middle East. The war has dramatically altered regional geopolitics, straining US relations with its Arab and Gulf allies, who have borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliatory strikes on American military bases in their countries. These nations were entirely dependent on Washington for security but found themselves unprotected as Israel’s security was America’s main priority. While some of these countries initially supported the US-Israel war on Iran, their perspective shifted due to the security and economic costs they incurred. Trump’s recent statement that the US would, if necessary, act as a paid police force for the Middle East, reflects his typical business and transactional mindset. In an interview with the New York Times, he suggested making the US “the guardian of the Middle East” in exchange for 20 per cent of the region’s revenues, effectively proposing a mercenary role for America. The Gulf countries have already been paying billions of dollars to Washington for security, but this approach has not been effective. Trump’s latest proposal may prompt these countries to explore alternative regional security arrangements. There are already signs of rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf countries in the post-war regional landscape, which could be a positive development for regional peace and for preventing future conflicts. The latest US-Iran deal has opened channels for meaningful dialogue starting in Geneva this week and is aimed at resolving a conflict that has serious global implications. It is indeed a victory for diplomacy. The Strait of Hormuz has now been opened for shipping, and the lifting of the US naval blockade has begun to ease restrictions on sea traffic from Iran. The pressure on the global economy has eased, yet the process remains tentative, with many obstacles still in the way. The writer is an author and journalist. zhussain100@yahoo.com X: @hidhussain Published in Dawn, June 17th, 2026

  2. Diplomatik18 Haz 13:16

    What the US-Iran deal means for West Asian security and Pakistan

    The US and Iran have agreed to a basic framework. Whether this formal consensus translates into a concrete agreement is an open question. While Iran has officially declared the end of the war, Israel insists “our struggle has not yet ended”. Between these two statements lies all the space the spoilers need. The ceasefire was made possible by pragmatists. It will be threatened by apocalypticists. In Washington and Jerusalem, there are people at the helm of affairs who do not read this war as a security crisis to be resolved but a scheduled event — one that a ceasefire can delay but not, in their theology, prevent. For them, a deal is not a solution. It is an obstacle. And obstacles, in the eschatological imagination, are not negotiated around. They are removed. A changed world Whether the framework holds or collapses, one thing is clear: the West Asian security structure that existed on the morning of Feb 28, 2026, has ceased to exist. Firstly, South Asian and West Asian security complexes are no longer analytically separable, as once theorised by British political scientist Barry Buzan. Secondly, the war subjected regional alliances and client-patron relations to a stress test, and, to the surprise of many capitals, the old security arrangements proved to be holding nothing at all. Many in the Gulf relied on American security guarantees. And it was not for the first time that the American security umbrella failed to protect them against Israeli belligerence and Iranian retaliation. This shared sense of being treated as collateral rather than partners will continue to haunt the GCC-US relations for years to come. The GCC, meanwhile, did not respond to the recent war in unison. Instead, the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran deepened some older fault-lines among the Arab states of the Gulf region. In the Pakistani imagination, Saudi-UAE relations are often assumed to be a tight axis. This is no longer the case. These countries have experienced rifts and complete ruptures in the recent past, and the war has only consolidated them. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are proposing two distinct security mechanisms that carry significant implications for Pakistan. Where does Pakistan fit in? Saudi Arabia desires to see an extended role for Pakistan and Turkey while normalising its relations with Iran. The starting point was the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement Saudi Arabia signed with Pakistan on September 17, 2025 — just days after the Israeli strike on Doha. That particular act of aggression by Israel clearly demonstrated that Qatar’s status as a major non-NATO ally and host of the largest US base in the region could not shield it from external aggression. It has also nudged Doha to diversify its security arrangements, bringing it closer to the Saudi-Pakistan framework. There was also subsequent talk of widening this framework — reports suggested Pakistan signalled Turkey and Qatar may join the Saudi defence pact, which would essentially formalise a Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad-Doha (RAID) mechanism. Abu Dhabi chooses a different route Abu Dhabi took the worst of Iran’s retaliation and answered with what American analysts termed a “defiant and forceful posture”, welcoming Israeli military assistance. Abu Dhabi’s response during the war has clearly illustrated that it is keen to integrate Israel and India into the Gulf security structure. There are apprehensions that Emirati-Israeli-Indian intelligence and security cooperation could facilitate covert activities elsewhere in the Gulf, with destabilising consequences for the GCC as a whole. A case in point is the arrest of eight former Indian naval officers caught spying for Israel in Qatar in 2022. All of the accused were sentenced to death in late 2023. It was only after personal intervention by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that the Qatari government released seven of the eight men in February 2024. At a time when the Gulf’s two most consequential powers are pulling regional security in opposite directions, the question of where Pakistan plants its flag is not an academic one. Millions of Pakistani livelihoods, billions in remittances, energy imports on deferred payments and the credibility of Islamabad’s emerging mediatory role all ride on the answer. What next for Pakistan? Recent history offers the clearest insights. Pakistan has avoided camp politics. The recalibration of its relationship with the United States and China over the past decade is the most instructive example: Islamabad has learned to navigate the US-China rivalry without taking sides. Pakistan’s insistence on strategic autonomy has been acknowledged at the highest level as something real, not rhetorical. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently dismissed the claim that Pakistan is a Chinese colony. In response to an Indian journalist, he emphasised that Pakistan is an independent, sovereign nation that maintains multi-faceted and diverse diplomatic ties across the globe rather than being solely aligned with or controlled by Beijing. Pakistan then walked the tightrope between Iran and the Gulf states during the most serious regional war in a generation — maintaining open channels to Tehran while standing publicly with Riyadh, mediating where others were merely spectating. The Saudi-UAE divergence over regional security presents a similar test. Pakistan’s historic ties with both countries run very deep — not merely at the level of diplomacy, but at the human level, where ties are hardest to sever. Nearly three million Pakistanis live and work across the two countries, sending home remittances that form a major pillar for Pakistan’s fragile economy. Pakistan will not choose between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — not because it lacks the courage to choose, but because it has learned, at some cost, that preserving both relationships is itself the strategy. This is exactly why Pakistan has prevented a public outcry over the UAE’s demand to return a USD3.5 billion loan, terming it a routine transaction with a brotherly nation. The no-camps policy has doctrinal backing. Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-26, the first ever publicly released by any Pakistani government, is explicit on this point — articulating a vision of “geo-economics over geopolitics,” of engagement with all major powers without subordination to any. In the fractured Gulf of 2026, that may be the most sophisticated position available. The old Gulf, predictable and broadly aligned, is not coming back. However, Islamabad has learned the hard way: choosing sides among friends is not a strategy.

  3. Güvenlik19 Haz 07:01

    US-Iran peace talks in Geneva postponed

    Switzerland said talks between the United States and Iran on a pact to end the Middle East conflict would not take place on Friday, as US Vice President JD Vance dropped plans to travel to Geneva. The talks were set to take place under the ‘Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding’ signed between the US and Iran a day ago, after the two sides agreed on a 14-point accord on Monday. Under the deal, Washington and Tehran have agreed on a framework to end the war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate on key issues within 60 days. The talks, set for the mountaintop resort of Burgenstock, would not take place, Switzerland’s foreign ministry confirmed, but gave no details. “The planned talks between the US, Iran, Qatar and Pakistan have been postponed,” the Swiss foreign ministry said in a message to AFP. “Switzerland remains ready to facilitate these talks. The relevant preparatory work at Burgenstock is continuing,” it added, without providing a new date for the talks. In Washington, a White House spokesperson said, “The logistics of these negotiations have never been simple or predictable. As of now, the vice president is not departing tonight.” However, the official added, “We look forward to beginning technical talks as soon as possible.” There was no immediate response from Iran, which had earlier said it was ready to begin technical talks after Thursday’s 14-point accord extended a tenuous ceasefire by at least 60 days. Iran’s negotiators first needed to see signs of the US implementing the interim deal, and there was no confirmation its delegation would travel to Geneva, the semi-official Tasnim news agency said before Vance’s Thursday announcement. Vance and the US delegation had been ready to depart as soon as plans were finalised. On Thursday, the US vice president had hinted at plans being unconfirmed, saying: “We think these technical negotiations are going to start sometime this weekend. That’s still the plan, but that could change.” US and Iran, along with mediators Pakistan and Qatar and other involved countries, were set to meet at “Buergenstock for initial negotiations about implementing the agreement”, according to the Swiss foreign ministry. An official signing ceremony of the Islamabad MoU had also been in the works previously, with Geneva as the planned venue. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who signed the Islamabad MoU as the mediator, had said earlier this week that the ceremony would be held in Geneva and be hosted by Pakistan. However, the premier’s plans to travel to Geneva were cancelled on Thursday, with Deputy PM Ishaq Dar giving the reason that the signing had been “completed remotely”. US officials had also said they would hold a formal signing ceremony in Switzerland, but Iran’s foreign ministry had cast doubt on the plan, calling it unnecessary after both countries’ presidents signed the pact. The war, which began on February 28 with US and Israeli air attacks on Iran, has killed at least 7,000 people, sent energy prices soaring and shaken global markets. Throughout the conflict, Pakistan has remained actively involved in mediating for peace. It brokered a ceasefire between the US and Iran on April 8 and also hosted historic direct talks between the two in Islamabad that month. Israel continues Lebanon attacks Israel, left out of the peace talks, has distanced itself from the US-Iran accord and kept up its attacks on Lebanon that it insists are targeted at Hezbollah, also raising questions about whether the agreement would hold. Fresh Israeli strikes on Friday in Lebanon, where more than a million people have been displaced by the fighting, killed at least 15, the state news agency NNA said. That raised doubt about how far Trump will go to force his wartime ally to halt an offensive he has now pledged to end. The deal calls for “permanent termination” of the war in Lebanon, but Israel has said it has no intention of withdrawing, instead depicting an expanded occupation zone in a new map. Trump has become openly critical of Israel’s operations in Lebanon, opening one of the biggest rifts between the two countries in decades. On Friday, Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that Tehran would give a “decisive” response if the agreement was breached. Prospects of further talks In Washington, some of US President Donald Trump’s Republican allies in Congress questioned whether he had conceded too much in order to end the conflict, unpopular with most Americans in the run-up to mid-term elections in November. Trump had sworn to end the war only with Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER”. But the memorandum signed with Iran instead provides relief from economic sanctions, unfreezes assets worth tens of billions of dollars and immediate US waivers for its exports of oil. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei said Trump had signed the deal “out of desperation” and signalled that approaching talks over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, among Trump’s stated reasons for starting the war, would not be easy. “If the American side wants to be too demanding, we will not accept it,” he said in a message. The deal gives negotiators 60 days to agree on the status of Iran’s nuclear programme, unless an extension is agreed, and set up a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran and other financial incentives. Vance said Washington would also seek to limit Iran’s long-range missiles. The growing cost of the war also drew the spotlight, as the US defence department told lawmakers it needed $80 billion to cover the costs and some unrelated bills, the Wall Street Journal said. When the US and Israel launched the war nearly four months ago, Trump said he aimed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities to ensure it could never develop such weapons. Tehran has repeatedly denied that it aims to develop nuclear weapons, stating that its nuclear programme is only for civilian purposes. Trump also sought to end Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbours and prevent it from backing anti-Israel groups in the region, and at times called for regime change in Iran. None of those objectives had been met when Trump signed the agreement, in which Iran restated its decades-long assertion not to get or develop nuclear weapons. It also agreed to the onsite “down blending” of its highly enriched uranium stockpile and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member, rejecting Trump’s wish to remove the material from the country. US officials say the negotiations could still yield a strong agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, aiming to better one dating from 2015 between Iran, the US and other countries that Trump tore up in his first term. But critics say Iran is in a stronger position now, having withstood a superpower attack, demonstrated its control of the Strait of Hormuz and gained valuable waivers to financial sanctions. Iran has said it will still exert control over Hormuz in partnership with Oman, its neighbour across the critical waterway, and intends to charge ships service fees that did not exist before the war, although not during the 60-day talks. Oil prices dipped on Friday as prospects brightened for more supply after tankers began moving through the reopening Strait, which had carried nearly a fifth of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas supplies before the war. Additional input from AFP

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