Macar hukukçu ve siyasetçi
Ukraine's drone forces have ramped up attacks deep inside Russia 12.5-fold since start of 2026
Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) of Ukraine, has said USF has increased strikes deep inside Russia by 1,150% since the beginning of the year.
Hungary to pass anti-graft measures, eyeing EU funds
BUDAPEST: Hungarian lawmakers are expected to approve anti-corruption measures on Tuesday, part of new Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s sweeping reform drive and aimed at helping the country get billions of euros in withheld European Union funds.
Hungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence
Hungary’s reset with Ukraine is good news for European deterrence Expert comment jon.wallace 17 June 2026 Ending a dispute on minority rights would do more than progress Ukraine’s EU accession talks: it could strengthen the continent’s posture towards Moscow. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Hungary has created the most visible fissure in European Union (EU) support for Kyiv. Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán dissented early on from the European consensus. And he progressively turned this dissent into political leverage. Budapest slowed sanctions on Russia, contested assistance to Ukraine, obstructed parts of Kyiv’s European path and blurred the moral and strategic line between aggressor and victim. For Moscow, this mattered. Russia did not need Hungary to become an ally in any formal sense. It only needed an EU and NATO member state to make European unity appear conditional, reversible and transactional. Hungary’s role was therefore never only about Hungarian foreign policy. It was about the credibility of Europe’s collective resolve. That is why Budapest’s emerging reset with Kyiv under newly elected Péter Magyar is important. Hungary and Ukraine have reached an understanding on a festering dispute over the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. The agreement removes one of the main obstacles to opening EU accession talks with Ukraine – allowing Kyiv to take the first step on a long road to EU membership. Magyar has also signalled his readiness to meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy, presenting the issue as the beginning of a ‘new chapter’. The phrase may sound diplomatic, but the stakes are more strategic than they sound. Ukraine’s EU objectives For Zelenskyy, the benefits are immediate. Ukraine needs air defences, ammunition, financial support and heightened sanctions pressure on Russia – especially since the US–Israel war with Iran boosted oil prices, and Moscow’s energy revenues. But Kyiv also needs momentum in Brussels. In Zelenskyy’s view, Russia’s wager is not only that it can outgun Ukraine, but that it can wait out its partners. Every EU delay in accession talks, financial support or sanctions enforcement therefore helps Moscow to turn time into strategic advantage. Related work Hungary election: Orbán has been defeated – but will Orbánism survive? For Magyar, the issue is more delicate. His rise has been built on a promise to end the corruption, isolation and ideological theatre of the Orbán era. But he cannot simply reverse Hungarian policy by decree and expect domestic politics to follow. His government will still not send arms or troops to Ukraine. The ‘reset’ is not a strategic conversion. It is a shift from obstruction to conditional cooperation. That is why the Transcarpathia issue matters: by conditioning support for Ukraine’s European track on Hungarian language, education and cultural rights, Magyar can tell voters that he is defending national interests more effectively than Orbán did. That distinction is important. A reset with Kyiv will only be politically sustainable if it is framed as a somewhat elaborate form of Hungarian statecraft. It cannot appear to be capitulation to Brussels. Magyar’s task is to agree a settlement and come out as a statesman Europe can trust. That would be a meaningful change: a careful shift from obstruction to negotiation. Kyiv has an interest in cooperating. Ukraine’s future in the EU will depend on more than its resistance to Russia. It will also need to demonstrate institutional maturity, even under extreme pressure. Restoring trust with Budapest over minority rights will strengthen the argument that Ukraine can manage difficult questions with regard to the law, and with the application of compromise and political discipline. Repositioning the enlargement question Yet the larger question is European. Since 2022, Europe’s support for Ukraine has often been impressive in substance but fragile in method. It has produced sanctions packages, financial facilities, military assistance and enlargement commitments. But too often it has done so through last-minute bargaining, veto threats and leader-level firefighting. Orbán exploited that weakness. He understood that in a Union built around consensus, a single government can turn obstruction into currency and political gains at home. A Magyar-led reset will not abolish that structural problem. But it could reduce its most corrosive effects. Ukraine’s accession process would still be long, technical and politically demanding. And Magyar has made clear that Hungary does not support a shortcut to membership. But the question would no longer be how far Hungary operates as Russia’s wedge inside Europe. Instead, it will be whether Hungary can be reincorporated into a more coherent European posture towards Moscow. Why this is bad news for Moscow Russia watches Europe’s internal politics very closely. It knows the best and cheapest way to weaken the continent is to convince Europeans that their unity is too expensive, their publics too divided, their institutions too slow and their commitments too tiring. The Kremlin welcomes all European division over money, sanctions, EU enlargement or military aid to Ukraine. Each dispute supports the Russian strategy that Europe will tire first, divide and settle for less than Ukraine’s survival requires. In that respect EU resolve is as strategically important as ammunition production or air defence. The danger is that Europe mistakes one diplomatic breakthrough for durable alignment. The Ukraine–Hungary reset should therefore be understood as part of Europe’s wider deterrence posture. A continent that cannot maintain political cohesion around Ukraine invites Russian escalation. But a continent that can resolve internal disputes, and still sustain pressure on Moscow is harder to intimidate. The point here is fundamental: Europe does not need unanimity without argument – it needs argument without strategic paralysis. There are risks, of course. Magyar may yet be tempted to use Ukraine policy as leverage in his own negotiations with Brussels over frozen funds, rule-of-law conditions and Hungary’s wider rehabilitation inside the EU. Kyiv may find that implementation of minority commitments becomes a moving target. And European governments may be too eager to declare the Hungarian problem solved. The danger is that Europe mistakes one diplomatic breakthrough for durable alignment. But the opportunity is real. A serious reset could give Ukraine a clearer path through the next stages of accession talks. It could reduce Moscow’s room for political manipulation and help restore the credibility of Europe’s enlargement promise. It could also show that the post-Orbán transition, if consolidated, is not only a Hungarian domestic story but a strategic moment for European coherence.
Macaristan'ın Ukrayna ile ilişkileri düzeltmesi Avrupa'nın caydırıcılığı için olumluUkrainian commander predicts full control over Azov coastal route and isolation of Crimea
Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, has stated that systematic strikes on the so-called Novorossiya road along the Azov Sea have forced Russian forces to reduce traffic on it by more than two thirds over the past month.
Can Viktor Orbán lose Hungary’s high-stakes election?
Can Viktor Orbán lose Hungary’s high-stakes election? Expert comment jon.wallace 8 April 2026 Perhaps, but change will not mean transformation. Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April has implications reaching well beyond Budapest. After 16 years in power, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is facing a sustained, credible challenge from Péter Magyar, whose Tisza Party is ahead in most independent polling (though it is not beyond reach). The outcome of the contest will shape Hungary’s internal trajectory, the European Union (EU)’s ability to act cohesively, and the balance of influence between Russia and the West in Central Europe. It will also stress test President Donald Trump’s emerging network of like-minded political allies in Europe. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to Hungary this week, in open support of Orbán, marks an unusually direct form of US political engagement in a European election – and deepening division between Washington and its traditional transatlantic allies. Much more than a government: a system From a purely domestic perspective, this election is less a simple choice between continuity and change than a test of how deeply a political system has been embedded. Over the past decade, Hungary has developed a model characterized by strong centralization and an active role for the state in the economy. This has translated into concrete policies: caps on energy prices, direct support schemes for households, and a state-led approach to strategic sectors. At the same time, economic pressures have become more visible. Inflation has eroded purchasing power, and public finances are tighter than in previous electoral cycles. Another crucial aspect of Hungary’s model is a political narrative centred on sovereignty and resistance to external constraints. Órban’s relationship with the EU has been one of continuous, deepening dispute: over issues ranging from the rule of law and migration to the war in Ukraine. Nearly €20 billion in EU funds remain frozen as a result. Delays or conditions attached to EU funding are now visible in Hungary: infrastructure projects have been postponed. Fewer development grants are being issued to businesses. And there is more limited room for public spending. Having made confrontation with the EU a central point of its project, the Orbán system now sees that strategy turning back on itself – manifesting in delayed funds, tighter budgets, and fewer policy options. The political price could be deadly. Hungary and the EU: towards greater friction or more alignment? The election matters for the EU’s internal dynamics. Hungary has repeatedly used its position to delay or reshape collective decisions, particularly on financial support for Ukraine. This has created friction within the EU, where unanimity remains necessary on key foreign policy issues. Election victory for Orbán would likely intensify calls by Germany and others to introduce qualified majority voting in the EU – to minimize Budapest’s spoiling power. A change in leadership could reduce Hungarian blockages. However, it would not automatically align Hungary with all mainstream EU positions. On migration, for example, popular opinion within the country would likely remain cautious. On Ukraine and Russia, Hungary has maintained a distinctive position within the EU, combining formal alignment with sanctions and NATO commitments with a more cautious – at times opportunistically pragmatic – approach towards Moscow. This has included continued energy cooperation with Russia, and a more restrained stance on military support for Ukraine. The World Today Related work Hungary’s election looms – so does the far right challenge to Europe’s unity Recent unverified reports that Orbán told Vladimir Putin, during a 2025 telephone conversation, that ‘I am at your service’, will reinforce concerns in European capitals about Hungary’s relationship with Russia, and its implications for EU cohesion. So too will a Politico report of government efforts to deepen ties with Moscow through a 12 point plan. A government led by Péter Magyar might recalibrate this balance. But the underlying constraints any Hungarian government will face – geographic, economic, and political – would not disappear overnight. An inevitable part of continuity The prospect of change needs to be framed with caution here. Péter Magyar is not an outsider seeking to dismantle the system from the ground up, but a political insider who understands how it operates. His campaign has deliberately avoided presenting the election as a clash between two irreconcilable ‘Hungarys’. That positioning matters. It points to a scenario in which any change is likely to be selective and progressive rather than systemic and outright. Some areas could shift relatively quickly. Relations with Brussels may stabilize, unlocking parts of EU funding. And the tone of foreign policy may adjust, not least towards Kyiv and Moscow. But other elements are more deeply embedded: the central role of the state in the economy, or more importantly, the significance of large-scale energy projects. On energy policy: change at the margins The war in the Gulf brought energy security back to the forefront of the campaign. Energy policy choices are often presented as purely political, but they are also shaped by structural constraints. Hungary’s Paks nuclear power plant generates around half of the country’s electricity. The construction of new reactors relies on Russian technology and financing through Rosatom, the Russian state energy company. And Hungary’s gas infrastructure has historically been oriented towards Russian supply routes. Under a Magyar government the likely trajectory is not a clean break with Russia, but a gradual rebalancing. Recent events have underlined the vulnerability of this infrastructure. At the weekend, explosives were discovered in Serbia near a pipeline that supplies Russian gas to Hungary. Ukraine claims the incident may amount to a Russian false-flag operation. Although not improbable, that remains unproven. But the episode illustrates that energy dependence is not only an economic issue, but a strategic one. Diversifying away from dependence on Russian energy is possible. But it requires years of investment in alternative pipelines, grid upgrades, and regional coordination – limiting any government’s room for manoeuvre in the short term. EU expectations should be calibrated accordingly. Under a Magyar government the likely trajectory is not a clean break with Russia, but a gradual rebalancing shaped as much by practical constraints as by political intent. A campaign turning rogue? The conduct of the election campaign itself has also attracted attention. Journalists and NGOs have alleged practices that blur the line between policy and political mobilization – particularly in economically vulnerable areas. The government is accused of distributing material benefits and public employment schemes to secure the votes of key voters, and organizing transport to polling stations to facilitate their support. This is often described in political debate as ‘vote buying’. But the more substantiated pattern points to localized patronage networks and forms of dependency, rather than systematic cash-for-votes schemes at scale. This might not be enough to invalidate the electoral outcome. However, it does indicate that competition is taking place on an increasingly uneven playing field, shaped in part by clientelist practices – in which Orbán is likely to mobilize all available resources until the very end The moon may rise, but will not simply replace the sun… What emerges from all this is a picture of constrained choice rather than clear alternatives. Hungary’s economic policy is shaped by limited fiscal space and conditional external funding. Energy strategy is influenced by long-term infrastructure and existing dependencies. Foreign policy sits at the intersection of EU membership, NATO commitments, and pragmatic considerations.
Can Viktor Orbán lose Hungary’s high-stakes election?