Trump'ın yaz tarifeleri ticaret belirsizliğini kalıcı kılıyor

Trump’s summer of tariffs means trade uncertainty is here to stay

Trump’s summer of tariffs means trade uncertainty is here to stay Expert comment thilton.drupal 7 August 2026 The Trump administration has pushed through another round of tariffs. While they are being challenged in the courts, unpredictable and costly US trade policy is here to stay. The Trump administration spent the waning days of July upending – again – the structure of US trade policy. Various issues have been used to justify a new wave of tariffs, investigations and threats – including forced labour, EU digital policy, Canadian commodities and Brazilian politics. But amid these specific dramas, a broader reality has become clear: that rapidly changing, often political tariffs are the new normal for US trade policy. Congress also bestirred itself on trade last month, but in contradictory directions that may ultimately serve instead to further embolden the White House. Indeed, the more aggressive this administration’s use of tariffs becomes, the more difficult subsequent administrations are likely to find it to move away from them. From ‘Liberation Day’ to Section 301 July was a big month for US trade policy as time ran out on the temporary ‘section 122’ tariffs that the Trump administration put in place in February 2026. Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the president to impose tariffs of up to 15 per cent on all imports for up to 150 days ‘to address fundamental international payments problems.’ This was the administration’s move to keep a form of global tariffs in place after the US Supreme Court had overturned US president Donald Trump’s original approach. The court struck down his use of an emergency powers act to declare wide-ranging tariffs via an executive order on ‘Liberation Day’ in April 2025. Following this setback, in March 2026 the administration initiated a series of investigations under ‘section 301’ of the Trade Act of 1974, which permits it to document and levy tariffs on countries that burden or unfairly restrict US exports. The first section 301 investigation to be completed was also the largest: the claim that US commerce was being harmed by imports of goods produced with forced labour. The investigation did not, crucially, focus on firms using forced labour. Instead, it accused 59 countries and the European Union of permitting the import of goods allegedly produced with forced labour elsewhere. On 24 July, the administration implemented tariffs on the 60 economies. While the new rates are significantly lower than the original ‘Liberation Day’ rates for many countries, they reinstituted a 10-12 per cent minimum tariff on the 60 economies, which together provide the US with 99 per cent of its imports. This applied even to the countries (and the EU) that had moved to enact or beef up enforcement of forced labour bans. Canada, Brazil, EU, China These forced labour tariffs also stack on top of some previous ones. As a result, while estimates put the overall US effective tariff rate at 10.8 per cent, some countries face much higher tariffs. In July, the administration cited a previously unused legal authority (section 338 of the notorious 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff act) to declare 50 per cent levies on various Canadian goods – some longstanding trade irritants, others related to Canadian public boycotts and retaliation over prior tariffs. The White House also put a 25 per cent tariff on some Brazilian goods, in a move that was viewed by many in Brazil as politically motivated ahead of the country’s upcoming elections. More is on the way. An ‘excess capacity’ section 301 investigation targeting 16 economies including China, India, Japan and the EU is still in process, with potentially high tariff outcomes. The administration has said it would restart its 2019 section 301 investigation against countries that engage in so-called ‘digital protectionism,’ which would chiefly target EU members and Canada. President Trump’s response to EU fines on Google in July was also to suggest additional tariffs. President Trump gets a new version of the across-the-board tariff wall he desires, while importers get chaos. Pharmaceuticals have also been targeted. On 31 July, tariffs on pharmaceuticals from certain companies – justified under a different law focused on national security concerns – began to take effect. Some are as high as 100 per cent. The administration also has an ongoing section 301 investigation targeting German pharmaceuticals, in response to German efforts to lower drug spending. Meanwhile, Washington and Beijing nibbled at the edges of their trade truce; in addition to putting 12.5 per cent forced labour tariffs on Chinese goods, the US banned Chinese-made humanoid robots. For its part, the Chinese government has continued to build out its ability to restrict critical minerals flows, while meetings between senior US and Chinese officials have not marked progress on agricultural trade or Washington’s planned Board of Trade to manage relations with China. It appears, to quote former US negotiator Ambassador Wendy Cutler, that ‘just holding the truce together has become the main objective.’ Exemptions and challenges The new tariffs – like the ones they replaced – cover about half of all goods imported into the US, with significant exemptions. The exemptions process may help manage inflationary pressures at home, but it also makes implementation complex and has prompted questions about which industries are given exemptions and why. An audit of the first Trump administration’s tariff exclusion practices in 2018 and 2019 by the Commerce Department’s Office of Inspector General warned of the ‘appearance of improper influence in decision-making for tariff exclusion requests.’ A recent New York Times report raised questions about the basis of the exemptions from last month’s tariffs over forced labour, including commodities like diamonds. The report quoted White House spokesperson Kush Desai in response: ‘The only special interest guiding the Trump administration’s decision-making is the best interest of the American people.’ Overall, President Trump gets a new version of the across-the-board tariff wall he desires, while importers get chaos. The new tariffs are already being challenged in court, including by 25 US states. Experts disagree on which challenges might succeed, but it appears that the administration aims to maintain elevated tariff levels by imposing new tariffs faster than courts can overturn old ones. Contradictory Congress A majority of the American public, including independents and non-MAGA Republicans, dislike tariffs. Democratic Senator Ron Wyden, a longtime critic of tariff initiatives from both parties, introduced comprehensive legislation that would wrest trade policy power back to Congress. But the bill has no clear path forward. At the same time, a bill giving the president even more tariff authority to target Russia, including to put 100 per cent tariffs on top importers of Russian oil, began to move through the Senate with strong bipartisan support. Wyden was one of only ten Democrats to oppose it. Related work Trump’s tariffs: Are they here to stay? Independent Thinking podcast This reflects the politics of tariffs: the pain they impose is diffuse, while the benefits are highly specific and thus easier to organize around. A majority of US public opinion supports free trade in the abstract but opposes specific trade liberalization deals with their real and imagined costs. As a result, Congress remains unwilling to engage in affirmatively setting trade policy, handing more power to the executive branch. Meanwhile, more corners of US industry are getting used to building in uncertainty and negotiating with the administration for exemptions from tariffs. This means it’s going to get harder, rather than easier, for future leaders of any political stripe to swear off trade policy as a cheap political tool. As with climate change, the risk for US trade policy is that the world is left with heat and unpredictability all year round.