İçeriğe atla
Hikayeler
US
Kapatıldı

Trump'ın Hürmüz Boğazı'ndaki Süveyş Anı: Masadaki Anlaşma ABD'nin Çıkarına

Özet · AI üretimi

Umman ve İran, Hürmüz Boğazı'nı yeniden trafiğe açmak üzere geçici bir düzenlemeye yakın görünüyor. Bu adım, mevcut çatışma sarmalından çıkış sağlarken daha kalıcı bir deniz düzeninin temelini atabilir. Washington'ın, İran'ın boğaz trafiğinde bir ölçüde yetki sahibi olmasını kabul etse bile böyle bir anlaşmayı memnuniyetle karşılaması gerektiği belirtiliyor; zira ABD'nin çıkarı, boğazın ayrım gözetmeksizin açık kalmasını zorunlu kılıyor. Bu durum, Trump yönetimi için Eisenhower'ın Süveyş Krizi'ndekine benzer bir diplomatik dönüm noktası anlamına gelebilir.

Başlangıç 05 Ağu 09:56 3 olay Güncellendi 07 Ağu
ABD dosyası →
Paylaş
Bağlam · AI üretimi

Bağlam, hikayenin etrafındaki ülke + lider + komşu hikaye ağına dayanılarak AI tarafından üretildi. Olgu içerikleri için her zaman üstteki kaynak linklerine başvurun.

Bu gündemi takip et

ABD gelişmelerini kaçırma — ücretsiz kaydol, günlük brifinginde gör.

Bu gündeme tepki ver:

Zaman çizelgesi

en güncel: 07 Ağu
  1. Diplomatik05 Ağu 09:56

    Will Trump meet his Suez moment & seize Hormuz deal on the table?

    Washington, ABD

    Oman and Iran appear close to a temporary arrangement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, potentially providing both an exit from the current round of fighting and the foundation for a more durable maritime order. Washington should welcome such an agreement—even if it acknowledges a degree of Iranian authority in administering traffic through the strait—because US interest dictates that open and non-discriminatory passage must be given priority over control. The emerging formula would reportedly divide responsibility for the shipping lanes. Vessels entering the Persian Gulf would travel through waters administered by Iran, while outbound traffic would pass through an Omani-administered route. Iran would be notified of departing vessels and, while this has not yet been discussed, Tehran appears open to also ensuring that Oman would be notified of incoming traffic. Tehran and Muscat may collect and share fees for specified security and environmental services, although this sensitive issue has not yet been settled. The negotiations remain fluid, and any agreement is reportedly linked to the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports. The arrangement would represent a slight climbdown by Tehran. Iran’s earlier position would have required traffic in both directions to pass through some portion of Iranian waters as well as Omani waters. That would have brought even ships already inside the Persian Gulf under an Iranian-administered transit system. The emerging division of lanes would give Oman primary responsibility for outbound shipping and limit the universe of vessels requiring Iranian approval or coordination. If successful—and if Washington accepts it—the agreement could help end the present fighting. It remains unclear whether that would restore the previous American-Iranian memorandum of understanding or require a new framework. Nor does it in and of itself move the needle on two other major stumbling blocks: Iran’s demand for a regional ceasefire and Washington’s demands on Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration will likely receive strong pushback from hawkish elements in Washington and Israel who will complain over the arrangement’s de facto acceptance and legitimization of Iran (and Oman’s) management of the Strait. But this critique is borne out of a confusion of what the US’s actual core interest in the Strait is: The free and predictable flow of commerce or preventing the ability of a hostile power to assert control. The Trump administration has increasingly framed the objective as preventing Iran from “controlling” the strait. Yet the central American interest in strategic waterways has historically been less about who administers them than about whether ships can pass through them freely, predictably and without discrimination. Preventing a hostile state from acquiring coercive leverage has generally been a means of preserving passage, not an end that supersedes passage itself. That hierarchy of interests matters. If reopening the strait requires acknowledging that Iran possesses some capacity to regulate traffic in waters along its coast, Washington should not reject an agreement merely because it fails to preserve the appearance of unqualified American dominance. The Suez crisis provides the clearest example. In 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company, displacing the British- and French-controlled corporation that had operated one of the world’s most important commercial arteries. Britain and France regarded nationalization not merely as an economic injury but as a strategic humiliation and, together with Israel, invaded Egypt. President Dwight Eisenhower refused to support them. After rejecting the Anglo-French invasion, Eisenhower’s administration did not make restoration of British or international ownership a condition for accepting Egypt’s continued administration of the canal. Instead, Washington opposed the invasion and pressed for a diplomatic arrangement that would preserve international access. The applicable legal regime emphasized the canal’s free use by ships of all countries on equal terms, while leaving Egypt responsible for administering and defending the waterway. Egyptian control was not the same as unrestricted Egyptian discretion. The distinction was crucial. Washington could accept Egyptian sovereignty over the canal while insisting that sovereignty be exercised within rules guaranteeing nondiscriminatory passage. The overriding American interest was not which flag flew over the canal authority, but whether the canal remained open under internationally accepted rules. A crucial detail that should not be overlooked: Egypt at the time was not an American ally, whereas France and the UK were. Indeed, Egypt was at the time closely aligned with the Soviet Union though not formally allied with Moscow. Washington nevertheless accepted continued Egyptian administration of the canal rather than seeking to reverse nationalization, provided freedom of navigation was preserved. The Turkish Straits offer another instructive precedent. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey recovered control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, including the right to remilitarize and defend them. Yet commercial vessels retained freedom of passage under an internationally recognized regime. The United States has lived for decades with a strategically important NATO ally exercising extensive authority over a waterway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean—even though Turkey can regulate warship access and, in wartime, exercise additional powers. The South China Sea makes the same point from another direction. The United States does not claim territory there and formally takes no position on sovereignty over most disputed features. It objects instead to excessive maritime claims, coercion and unlawful restrictions on navigation and overflight. American naval operations are designed to demonstrate that ships and aircraft may exercise rights recognized by international law regardless of which government claims nearby rocks, reefs or waters. Washington certainly cares about China’s growing regional power. Its legal position, however, is not that the United States must control the South China Sea. It is that no coastal power may transform contested waters into an exclusive domain or condition lawful passage on political obedience. Once again, the preservation of navigational rights lies at the heart of the U.S. legal position. Strategically, Washington’s concern about control extends beyond navigation alone, but it is precisely because control creates the capacity to restrict those rights—and to alter the regional balance of power—that it commands such attention. Iran, of course, is viewed in Washington as a hostile power. Few American officials would be comfortable with an arrangement that left Tehran able to close the Strait of Hormuz at will. Any agreement must therefore contain credible safeguards: passage should be nondiscriminatory; notification procedures should not become a discretionary licensing system; service charges should be limited to reasonable fees for services rendered rather than function as political tolls; and disputes should be subject to an agreed international mechanism. But Washington must also acknowledge the strategic reality the war has exposed. The conflict did not give Iran the capacity to close the strait. It revealed a capacity Iran already possessed—perhaps to a greater extent than either Washington or Tehran had fully appreciated. Crucially, a diplomatic agreement recognizing that reality would not expand Iran’s military power. Rather, it would seek to limit that ability through a legally and politically binding agreement that can be sustained for the simple reason that it meets the core interests of all relevant parties. The alternative is to insist that even the symbolism of Iranian control is intolerable. But unless the United States can reliably eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten shipping—a goal it has thus far failed to achieve and appears increasingly incapable of achieving—that position offers no practical path to reopening the waterway. Instead, it creates the conditions for an endless war: a militarily unattainable objective coupled with a political dynamic that makes pursuing it indefinitely more acceptable than abandoning it. If President Trump concludes that keeping the strait open is more important than denying Iran all visible administrative authority, an agreement appears possible. If he decides that American primacy requires rejecting any arrangement that acknowledges Iranian leverage, the likely result will be renewed military action—even though military action has so far failed to guarantee passage. Incidentally, the elevation of control over access is closely associated with the postwar American pursuit of global primacy - the very same grand strategy that has led to America almost always being at war. A settlement that subjects Iranian and Omani administration to predictable, nondiscriminatory international standards may not appear attractive, but would meet America’s core interest of free commerce in a region with fast diminishing strategic significance. Washington should judge it by whether ships can pass—not by whether the agreement preserves the illusion that Iran lacks leverage over waters along its own coast that we now know it always enjoyed. This was republished from Trita Parsi's Substack

    Responsible Statecraft
  2. Diplomatik07 Ağu 04:05

    DRC president claims Trump deal requires he seize another term

    Washington, ABD

    Last week, the Constitutional Court of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) opened the door for the country’s sitting president, Felix Tshisekedi, to seek a third term. In a widely expected but nonetheless dramatic decision, the court ruled that the country’s constitution — including its provision limiting presidents to two terms in office — can now be amended via a referendum in the event of “major dysfunction” of state institutions. The country’s 2006 constitution not only limits a president to two five-year terms, but Article 220 stipulates that “the number and length of the terms of office of the President of the Republic … may not form the object of a Constitutional amendment.” Tshisekedi already expressed interest in the idea of a referendum on term limits, saying in June, “I have not asked for a third term, but if the people want a third term, I will accept.” The next presidential election is scheduled for 2028. The court’s decision now threatens to set off a political crisis in the country — one in which the United States, which has actively tried to influence both political and economic issues in the DRC for years, has unintentionally become embroiled. In a press conference on May 6, Tshisekedi argued, without evidence, that amending his country’s constitution was among the conditions put in place by Washington in the minerals agreement the two countries signed last December, which gave American firms preferential access to the country’s resources. Members and supporters of the ruling coalition are now repeating this claim across the media, pointing to Article XII of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) as the condition requiring an amendment to the country’s constitution. The article in question says that the DRC must commit “to undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms within a maximum period of twelve (12) months in order to align its legal framework with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.” But the SPA does not require any specific changes to the Congolese constitution, let alone any that focus directly on presidential term limits. The only explicit requirement in the SPA is that the Congolese government agrees to amend a 2014 law focused on “the fiscal, customs, parafiscal, non-tax revenue and exchange regime” and to “undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms … to align its legal framework” with the SPA. In order to avoid the appearance of foreign interference, the Trump administration should clearly indicate that the SPA does not require the DRC to make any constitutional amendment relating to presidential powers or term limits. Another argument advanced by Tshisekedi and his supporters is that, since the constitution was largely written by foreigners, it never sufficiently accounted for domestic Congolese realities. The text therefore needs to be amended, if not completely overhauled, in order to be more responsive to local needs. U.S.-based organizations funded by the U.S. government were among those that sent experts to the DRC to help in the drafting and implementation of the constitution. A third major argument presented by Tshisekedi and his supporters has to do with the long-standing war ravaging the DRC’s east. The DRC has for years been fighting a proxy war against Rwanda, in which both countries are providing munitions to various armed groups in a conflict whose origins date back to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In early May, Tshisekedi said “If we cannot end this war, unfortunately we will not be able to organize elections in 2028.” “The resources are there, we can do it, but we cannot organize them without North Kivu and South Kivu,” he argued, referring to two of the country’s eastern provinces where much of the recent fighting has taken place. The United States is directly implicated in the conflict’s future. Washington brokered an agreement in June 2025 to end the war in exchange for preferential access to the region’s minerals — access which was codified in the December SPA. Despite Trump’s claims to have ended the war, fighting has continued sporadically in the year since. If peace continues to be elusive, and if Tshisekedi continues to cite the conflict to argue for deferring elections, Washington could find itself in a difficult position. In such a case, it would need to pressure Tshisekedi to live up to his end of the peace deal, including ceasing “any state support to non-state armed groups except as necessary to facilitate implementation of this Agreement.” Reporting suggests the DRC continues to provide support to several of the armed groups fighting in the country’s east. Ultimately, the United States’ primary objective in the DRC shouldn’t be to support Tshisekedi’s effort to cling to power, no matter how amenable he’s been to U.S. mining interests. The DRC has long struggled to support a liberal democracy where reliable elections happen as scheduled. The country was under a dictatorship until 1997, when long-time ruler Mobutu Sese Seko fled the country under threat. Laurent-Desire Kabila took over the next day, installing an autocratic government. After years of conflict and unstable governance, a constitution was approved in 2006, providing for two five-year term limits for the office of the president. In 2015, then-President Joseph Kabila — the son of Laurent-Desire — expressed his interest in seeking an unconstitutional third term in office. Tshisekedi, who was in the opposition at the time, spoke out against Kabila’s plans, claiming that they were a breach of democracy. Widespread protests and pressure from foreign governments ultimately forced Kabila to step down at the end of his second term, allowing for elections to be held, in which the Constitutional Court declared Tshisekedi the winner amid claims of electoral fraud by the opposition. The opposition has voiced disapproval over Tshisekedi’s apparent attempt to hold onto power. In a speech before the Conference of Catholic Bishops a couple weeks ago, Martin Fayulu, who officially came in second in the 2018 presidential election and third in 2023, said “Tshisekedi has betrayed the oath he took to respect and defend the constitution.” For the United States, the goal in the DRC shouldn’t be to advance or hinder the interests of any single domestic politician, no matter how powerful they might be. Getting embroiled in the domestic political affairs of the DRC risks pulling the U.S. into a crisis from which it has nothing to gain. Rather, Washington should remain focused on promoting its own interests by seeking access to the region’s economic opportunities and extending its investments across the Congo in an effort to integrate the region’s vital resources into global supply chains. The United States should also work to continuously hold each of the belligerent sides accountable for the peace accord signed last year in Washington. If peace takes hold, then the U.S. wins twice: first by securing a diplomatic victory, and second by lowering barriers to investment for American private sector firms.

    Responsible Statecraft
  3. Güvenlik07 Ağu 23:46

    US expects deal soon on Strait of Hormuz; Sunni powers unite in defense pact

    Washington, ABD

    By Steve Holland and Timour Azhari WASHINGTON/RIYADH, Aug 7 (Reuters) - A U.S. official on Fridayreported progress between Iran and Oman that could soon reopen the Strait of Hormuz, potentially restoring oil exports that have been disrupted by the five-month-old U.S. war with Iran. The U.S. official, who declined to be identified, said Washington soon anticipated an agreement between the two countries, which sit on either side of the strait, so that normal oil traffic could resume.

    Al-Monitor – The Pulse of the Middle EastThe Straits Times – WorldThe Hindu – International

Okumaya devam et

ilgili gelişmeler