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Washington ve Tahran, askeri çatışmalar sonrası yeni nükleer anlaşmanın çerçevesini çiziyor

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Washington ve Tahran, son askeri saldırılar ve ateşkesin ardından yeni bir nükleer anlaşmanın ana hatlarını araştırıyor. Ortaya çıkan çerçeve, eski Başkan Barack Obama'nın 2015'te müzakere ettiği anlaşmadan belirgin biçimde farklı görünüyor. Orijinal anlaşmanın hazırlanmasına katkıda bulunan uzmanlar, askeri gelişmelerden bağımsız olarak diplomasinin vazgeçilmez olduğunu savunuyor ve yeni anlaşmanın dikkatle ele alınması gerektiği konusunda uyarıyor.

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Started 15 Jun, 03:03 2 events Updated 16 Jun
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latest: 16 Jun
  1. Diplomatic15 Jun, 03:03

    How new deal may differ from Obama-era nuclear accord

    Washington, United States

    AS Washington and Tehran explore the contours of a possible new nuclear agreement following recent military strikes and a ceasefire, the emerging framework appears markedly different from the deal negotiated by former president Barack Obama in 2015. Yet experts who helped craft the original agreement argue that diplomacy remains indispensable, regardless of military developments, and caution that any lasting settlement will ultimately depend on verification, inspections and mutual compromise. According to an analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the expected agreement is likely to begin with a memorandum of understanding extending the ceasefire between the two countries for at least 60 days and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while leaving the most contentious issue — Iran’s nuclear programme — for follow-on negotiations. “Even if they do and an MoU is announced, negotiations on the outstanding issues, especially on Iran’s nuclear programme, will be long and difficult,” Steven Cook, senior fellow for Middle East studies at CFR, cautioned. President Donald Trump said this week that Washington and Tehran were nearing an agreement to end a conflict that has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and shaken global energy markets. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded by saying the two sides had “never been closer” to an understanding. But unlike the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which specified detailed nuclear restrictions before sanctions relief was granted, the proposed agreement appears to defer the most difficult technical issues. According to CFR, both sides would continue negotiating “the enrichment programme’s suspension and stockpile removal” during the next phase of talks. Iran would reportedly commit never to pursue a nuclear weapon, while discussions on dismantling nuclear facilities and handling enriched uranium stockpiles would continue. “The details matter here,” CFR senior fellow Elisa Ewers observed, particularly regarding inspections, verification measures and what dismantlement would actually mean after the extensive US-Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities. The contrast with the Obama agreement is striking. Jake Sullivan, who participated in the secret US-Iran negotiations that eventually produced the JCPOA and later served as national security adviser, says the Obama administration accepted limited Iranian enrichment under strict supervision. “Under the Iran nuclear deal that President Obama negotiated, Iran retained a limited nuclear capacity to be used for civilian purposes with intense long-term verification,” Sullivan said in an interview with Harvard Kennedy School. The JCPOA drastically reduced Iran’s uranium stockpile, capped enrichment levels, restricted centrifuge operations and established an extensive inspection regime under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The objective was not to eliminate Iran’s civilian nuclear programme but to ensure that any attempt to build a weapon would be detected well in advance. Trump sought something more ambitious. “President Trump was basically saying, Iran can have no nuclear capacity of any kind,” Sullivan said. “When it comes to the core activity of a nuclear programme — the enrichment of uranium — all enrichment of uranium would have to be done outside of Iran.” That demand has remained the principal obstacle in negotiations. According to Sullivan, Iran insists that it possesses a right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium under monitoring and verification arrangements. “Iran has resisted that position, has said it has rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium, and that it should be able to do so under constraints and under monitoring and verification,” he noted. The CFR analysis suggests that the same disagreement continues to shape the current negotiations. While reports indicate that Iran may agree to a 15- or 20-year halt on enrichment and eventual dismantlement of nuclear facilities, the Iranian state news agency IRNA has said that Tehran will negotiate the issue “solely within the framework of the Islamic Republic’s fundamental principles” and will not abandon its claim to enrichment rights. This leaves verification at the centre of any future agreement. Iran’s nuclear programme was one of the stated reasons for the conflict that erupted earlier this year. Its facilities were targeted in major US-Israeli strikes, while Washington argued that Iran’s enrichment activities had brought it dangerously close to weapons capability. Iran, however, continues to insist that its programme is peaceful. Sullivan argues that military action alone cannot resolve the issue. “Military action can set their nuclear program back, but not nearly as long as a deal can,” he said. He warned that important elements of Iran’s programme may still survive. “Iran seems to have retained some amount of enriched uranium stockpile, some centrifuges that it could assemble so that it could get back to the business of constructing a nuclear programme and go for a nuke,” he said. The former national security adviser also highlighted what he sees as the most urgent concern: the absence of international monitoring. “Critically, right now Iran is not allowing IAEA inspectors to look at its nuclear programme,” Sullivan said. That concern echoes warnings from CFR analysts. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the council, recently argued that Iran could potentially disperse parts of its programme into multiple small facilities. “By building many small workshops containing advanced centrifuges, Tehran can challenge the prying foreigners to find them all,” he wrote. “If any escape detection, the regime has a safer path to bomb production.” For both supporters and critics of diplomacy, the emerging negotiations therefore raise a familiar question. Can a verification regime be designed that is robust enough to prevent Iran from secretly rebuilding its nuclear capabilities while still allowing Tehran to preserve what it regards as its sovereign rights? “There’s unfinished business here regarding how to fully and sustainably verify that Iran’s nuclear programme is being monitored continuously,” Sullivan said. “In my view, the best way to do that is diplomacy.” More than a decade after secret US-Iran talks in Oman paved the way for the JCPOA, Washington and Tehran appear once again to be confronting the same fundamental dilemma: whether a negotiated compromise can reconcile America’s demand for lasting nuclear restrictions with Iran’s insistence on retaining at least some nuclear sovereignty. Published in Dawn, June 15th, 2026

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  2. Diplomatic16 Jun, 02:43

    A new deal

    Washington, United States

    AFTER three and a half months of war between US-Israel and Iran and an acrimonious temporary ceasefire, a genuine chance at peace seems to be at hand. Early on Monday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced what many around the world were waiting to hear: that an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations” on all fronts, including Lebanon, had been reached. US President Donald Trump followed up shortly, offering “congratulations to all”. Confirmation of the deal was also received from Tehran. Apart from pitting two competing visions for the Middle East against each other, the war affected regions far beyond the Gulf, as the Iranians blocked the critical Strait of Hormuz, while the Americans enforced a naval blockade of Iranian ports. These grave obstacles in the way of global commerce will now be removed as the US and Iran are scheduled to sign the deal in Geneva on Friday, under Pakistan’s aegis, as per Mr Sharif. This is a considerable diplomatic accomplishment for Pakistan. From hosting US-Iranian talks in April in Islamabad, to engaging in hectic diplomacy in order to ensure the earlier ceasefire did not collapse, Pakistan’s leadership went the extra mile to prevent a resumption of fully fledged hostilities. This critical role has been recognised by both the UN secretary general and nations around the world, who have lauded Pakistan’s efforts — as well as those of Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia etc — in securing US-Iran peace. The vast majority of nations are pleased with the outcome — considering the conflict’s impact on the global economy — yet there is great bitterness in Tel Aviv. The Zionist state, which had played a key role in convincing Mr Trump to attack Iran, is dissatisfied as the Islamic Republic has survived the joint Israeli-American onslaught, while the peace deal reportedly stipulates an end to Tel Aviv’s brutal attacks on Lebanon. This brings us to the question: while there may be relief that a deal has been reached, will it last? After all, this is no elaborate formula for enduring peace — merely an MoU which allows all belligerents to silence their guns, and work towards achieving a long-term arrangement. Moreover, the Obama-era JCPOA took around 20 months to negotiate, so no one should expect a quick resolution within days or even weeks of the signing in Geneva. What is important is that both sides talk, and cease all hostilities. Moreover, the US must give genuine sanctions relief to Tehran to gain the Iranians’ confidence, for after torpedoing the JCPOA and launching two attacks on Iran, there is considerable mistrust towards team Trump within the establishment in Iran. These obstacles can be overcome if the two sides approach each other with respect and sincerity, and if Israel is kept in check by Washington. Published in Dawn, June 16th, 2026

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