Kuzey Mozambik'te Çatışma ve Kuraklık Gıda Krizini Derinleştiriyor
Kuzey Mozambik'in Cabo Delgado ve Nampula bölgelerinde, devam eden hasada rağmen, çatışmalar, sellerin yavaş iyileşmesi ve kurak koşullar gıdaya erişimi kısıtlıyor. FEWS NET'in raporuna göre, devlet dışı silahlı grupların faaliyetleri, iç göçler ve geçim kaynaklarının bozulması nedeniyle en az Ocak 2027'ye kadar IPC 3. Aşama (Kriz) gıda güvencesizliği bekleniyor. Bölgede sellerin etkilerinin yavaş atlatılması ve kurak dönemler tarımsal üretimi olumsuz etkilerken, çatışmalar yerinden edilmeye ve ekonomik faaliyetlerin aksamasına yol açıyor. Bu faktörler, hane halklarının gıdaya erişimini sürekli olarak zayıflatıyor. En az 2027 başına kadar sürmesi öngörülen bu kriz, bölgedeki insani durumun ciddiyetini koruduğunu ve gıda güvenliğinin kırılganlığını ortaya koyuyor.
Bağlam, hikayenin etrafındaki ülke + lider + komşu hikaye ağına dayanılarak AI tarafından üretildi. Olgu içerikleri için her zaman üstteki kaynak linklerine başvurun.
Bu gündemi takip et
Filistin gelişmelerini kaçırma — ücretsiz kaydol, günlük brifinginde gör.
Zaman çizelgesi
en güncel: 2 sa önce- İnsani08 Tem 19:21
Conflict, slow recovery from floods, and dry conditions constrain food access
Conflict, slow recovery from floods, and dry conditions constrain food access Key Messages Key Messages In northern Mozambique, despite the ongoing harvest, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in conflict-affected parts of Cabo Delgado and northern Nampula through at least January 2027 due to ongoing non-state armed groups (NSAG) activity, internal displacement, and disrupted livelihoods, as households have food consumption gaps. Poor households will continue to have below-average food and income, relying on assistance, petty trade, and family support while resorting to negative coping strategies such as skipping meals and reducing meal sizes. Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected in areas receiving food assistance, while less affected parts of Cabo Delgado will likely remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In southern and central Mozambique, an improvement is anticipated from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes staring in July. Most households started accessing fresh vegetables and income from sales. This improvement is supported by post-flood vegetable seed assistance, seasonal income, and favorable second season harvest and good residual moisture. However, by October, household food stocks will decline, increasing market dependence amid high food prices and weak purchasing power, with some districts expected to revert to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) until January 2027. El Niño event is now ongoing and is likely to persist through at least January 2027, with possible strong events. A below-average start to the 2026/27 rainy season is most likely, leading to a late start, and above-average temperatures are likely in southern and central Mozambique. As a result, labor opportunities will be below-average for poor households. FEWS NET estimates that 1.5-1.99 million people are expected to be in need of food assistance from December to January. Food insecurity is driven by below-average food stocks following a poor 2026 harvest, as well as by ongoing conflict-related disruptions to livelihoods in parts of Cabo Delgado and Nampula. Southern and northern areas remain the areas of greatest concern. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 26, 2026. Food security context Mozambique continues to face persistent food insecurity despite its considerable untapped agricultural potential. The country is highly vulnerable to extreme weather events – such as cyclones, floods, droughts, and dry spells – that disrupt food production, income, and employment. In the past three years, cyclones Filipo, Chido, Dikeledi, Jude, and Gezani, along with the 2024 El Niño-induced drought, have significantly impacted livelihoods, particularly among poor households, hindering recovery and maintaining high vulnerability to weather shocks. In January 2026, prolonged heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in southern and central regions, affecting over 700,000 people, damaging 440,000 hectares of farmland, killing livestock, and disrupting livelihoods in Maputo, Gaza, and Sofala. Between February and March 2026, extended dry spells and heavy rains caused further damage to the remaining crops and livestock. Most poor households face an increased risk of acute food insecurity during shocks – including food consumption gaps, limited primary healthcare, restricted access to clean water, and recurrent disease outbreaks – which further undermine food security outcomes. Agriculture is Mozambique’s main economic sector, mainly consisting of subsistence and small-scale rainfed farming (typically 1-2 hectares). More than 70 percent of the population depends on farming as a main source of food and income. Smallholder farmers have limited purchasing power to access improved inputs and technology, resulting in low crop productivity and high susceptibility to extreme weather events. Post-harvest losses are around 30 percent of production, mainly due to poor storage and drying infrastructure. Mozambique’s main harvest typically occurs from April to June. The second season, primarily for vegetables, happens in low-lying areas of central and southern Mozambique and depends on residual moisture or irrigation, with planting starting around March-April and harvests from June to October. Key farming activities include land preparation and planting during October-December and weeding from February to March. The period from October to March is the lean season, characterized by depleted food stocks, fewer income-earning opportunities, and higher food prices. Households often cope by reducing meal sizes, skipping meals, eating less preferred foods, or relying on wild foods. The lean season is also associated with a seasonal increase in acute malnutrition. Urban poverty in Mozambique is rising due to rapid rural-to-urban migration, limited formal job creation, and the expansion of informal settlements that lack adequate services and infrastructure. Cities like Maputo, Beira, and Nampula are expanding quickly, yet economic growth has not generated sufficient stable employment, leaving many households to rely on low-paying informal work. Additionally, the high cost of living in urban areas – particularly for food, rent, and transport – reduces purchasing power. Since 2017, conflict has affected parts of Cabo Delgado Province in the north, driven by a non-state armed group (NSAG): an Islamist militant group often referred to as Al-Shabaab locally. During the peak of the insurgency in 2021/22, over a million people were displaced, infrastructure was destroyed, and local economies contracted. Agricultural activities were severely disrupted, with a sharp decline in the area under cultivation. Many farmers still lack access to farmland, markets, or income sources, limiting their ability to produce food or earn income. In late 2025, an escalation in retaliatory attacks by the NSAG and localized armed responses by vigilante groups (Naparamas) triggered new waves of displacement, increasing the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, while the number of people assisted by partner organizations is decreasing. The conflict persists in 2026, causing displacement in Cabo Delgado and Nampula and disrupting livelihoods, though its intensity is lower compared to previous years. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Mozambique Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 Latest Mozambique Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Conflict remains a key driver of food insecurity in northern Mozambique, particularly in Cabo Delgado and parts of Nampula provinces. Reports indicate that from early April through June, NSAGs launched renewed and intensified attacks in the Nangade and Macomia districts, followed by a southward expansion of the conflict affecting Chiúre, Ancuabe, and the northeastern parts of Montepuez. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), NSAG attacks displaced more than 23,000 people by mid-June 2026 in Ancuabe, Montepuez, and Chiúre, disrupting livelihood activities and limiting access to markets in the affected areas. The main harvest in the southern areas was below average due to flooding in January and March, combined with a prolonged dry spell in February and early March. These shocks occurred during critical stages of crop development, particularly during flowering and grain filling, resulting in below-average crop yields. Maize prices in southern Mozambique remain atypically high due to below-average local food availability and increased reliance on supplies from surplus-producing areas (Figure 1). Contrary to typical seasonal trends, maize grain prices rose by up to 10 percent from April to May. In May, maize grain prices were 25-60 percent above the five-year average across southern markets, while rice prices remained 20-40 percent above average. Reduced local market supplies have increased dependence on external inflows, raising transportation and transaction costs and contributing to elevated food prices. Source: FEWS NET, Ministry of Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries (MAAP)/Agricultural Market Information System (SIMA) Households in the southern areas have below-average incomes from agricultural labor due to the constrained hiring capacity of better-off households following poor main-season production. Consequently, seasonal agricultural labor opportunities remain below average. In Cabo Delgado, restricted access to farmland, markets, and income-generating activities has further reduced earnings from agricultural labor, trade, and other livelihood activities. Soil degradation, prolonged waterlogging, and limited access to seeds delayed post-flood and second-season cultivation and harvests by more than a month. Recovery from floods and prolonged dry spells in southern and parts of central Mozambique has remained slow, with late floodwater recession delaying land preparation and planting, while siltation and salinization further constrained agricultural activities. Limited access to seeds and delayed input distribution shortened the planting window, postponing harvests from June to late July and delaying food availability and income for affected households. Annual headline inflation increased sharply in May 2026, from 4.4 percent in April to 7.2 percent, the highest year-on-year rate recorded since May 2023. Monthly inflation accelerated to 2.3 percent in May, up from 0.63 percent in April, marking the highest monthly rate since 2019. Transport fares increased by 26 percent, while diesel prices rose by 45 percent in April, contributing to much of this increase. Higher fuel prices due to global supply disruptions are raising distribution costs for essential goods, putting upward pressure on the prices of basic food items and other necessities. Humanitarian food assistance In May 2026, Food Security Cluster partners provided humanitarian food assistance to approximately 180,000 people, primarily in Cabo Delgado and Gaza. Under the Joint Response Plan (JRP), support for new internally displaced people (IDPs) in Ancuabe, northern Mozambique, was completed in June, assisting 7,665 people, with a second round planned for later in the month. By mid-June 2026, flood response operations had reached approximately 300,000 people across Maputo, Gaza, and Sofala, and an additional 11,400 people affected by heavy rains received assistance in Zambézia, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado. Beneficiaries received one-month food rations, return kits, and agricultural inputs to support the resumption of livelihoods. For conflict-affected populations, food assistance covered nearly 40 percent of monthly caloric needs. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Northern region Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in localized conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado, particularly in Mocímboa da Praia, Meluco, Palma, Quissanga, and parts of Chiúre. The renewed NSAG activities have led to further displacement of households, disrupted agricultural activities, and restricted access to farmland, even during the post-harvest period. As a result, households have below-average food stocks and increasingly reliant on market purchases for food. They also depend on humanitarian food assistance, support from relatives, and informal small-scale income sources. Many households are also adopting coping strategies, such as reducing meal size and frequency to two meals per day and sometimes skipping meals. Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes persist in parts of Muidumbe, Nangade, and Macomia, where ongoing humanitarian food assistance is mitigating food consumption gaps among displaced and conflict-affected households. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist across less conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado, including the Ancuabe, Mecúfi, Montepuez, and Pemba districts. These areas have access to their own food stocks, and are benefiting from seasonal improvements in food availability following the 2026 main harvest. As a result, household food consumption has improved, and reliance on markets has decreased, leading to an improvement in purchasing power. However, in certain areas, ongoing insecurity has restricted access to agricultural land and disrupted typical livelihood activities in several districts. Most households can meet their basic food needs after the harvest period but cannot afford certain essential non-food items. Southern and central regions Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in the areas most affected by flooding and followed by prolonged dry spells, particularly in the Chibuto, Chókwe, Limpopo, and Magude districts. Many poor households face food consumption gaps due to limited food stocks and weak purchasing power. As a result, they are resorting to coping strategies such as reducing meal size and frequency, prioritizing children’s feeding, and sending household members — particularly youths — to urban centers to seek income-generating opportunities. Household purchasing power remains weak due to limited income-earning opportunities and above-average staple food prices. Most households affected by flooding continue to depend on market purchases as post-flood crops were planted atypically late in April/May and are not yet ready for harvest. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes prevail in the remaining less-flood-affected areas, where households have experienced less severe production losses and below-average income from agricultural labor. Most households can generally meet their minimum food needs but struggle to cover essential non-food expenditures. Urban areas In urban areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist among most poor households due to limited income-earning opportunities, fixed wages, and declining purchasing power. Urban households are highly dependent on market purchases for both food and non-food needs and are therefore particularly affected by recent increases in the cost of living. The purchasing power of poor urban households has continued to deteriorate as incomes have generally failed to keep pace with rising living costs. However, many households can still meet their basic food needs but are unable to cover non-food expenses such as transportation, education, healthcare, utilities, and housing. To cope, households are reducing spending on non-food items and relying more heavily on informal income-generating activities such as petty trade, casual labor, and the sale of small quantities of goods and services. Some households are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), reducing meal size and frequency, particularly poor households with limited purchasing capacity or social support, including child-headed, elderly-headed, and widowed households. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Insecurity is expected to continue in parts of Cabo Delgado and neighboring provinces through at least January 2027. This situation will likely result in ongoing displacement and disruptions to livelihoods and market access. Incidents of violence are anticipated to increase during the dry season from June to September before decreasing slightly with the arrival of the rain. Strong El Niño conditions is mostly likely through at least January 2027. Rainfall is expected to be below average and delayed in southern and central Mozambique (Figure 2). Above-average temperatures are expected between October and January, particularly in southern and central areas, which will increase moisture stress on crops, pasture, and water resources. High fuel prices are expected to keep transportation and marketing costs elevated through January 2027, contributing to above-average prices of staple foods and other essential commodities. Annual headline inflation is expected to remain in single digits but to be higher than earlier estimates due to economic challenges, domestic supply constraints, weather shocks, and external factors. Imports of maize grain and fresh produce from South Africa are expected to remain above average through January 2027, which will help to offset the below-average production in southern Mozambique. Maize harvest was below average in south and northern regions due to extreme weather events and conflict disrupting livelihoods, respectively. Maize grain prices in southern Mozambique are expected to remain above average due to reduced production levels. In contrast, prices in central and northern regions are likely to remain below average through January due to improved market supply. Source: University of Botswana RAMP Lab, CHIRPSv3, UCSB CHC Household food availability in parts of southern and central Mozambique is expected to remain below average until January 2027 due to reduced main-season cereal production. However, harvests of vegetables and limited quantities of short-cycle maize from post-flood and second season production are expected to temporarily improve food supplies between July and October. Agricultural labor opportunities and wages are expected to remain below average from October 2026 to January 2027 across much of southern, central, and conflict-affected northern Mozambique, driven by reduced labor demand and insecurity. In southern areas, income will be constrained by the impacts of the 2025/26 floods and dry spells, despite temporary gains from the second season. In Cabo Delgado, restrictions on movement due to ongoing insecurity will continue to reduce household income. Second-season/post-flood harvests are expected to be below average in central and southern Mozambique from July through October. In addition, the lingering effects of soil degradation, prolonged waterlogging, and constrained access to agricultural inputs are expected to reduce planted area and crop yields. Non-agricultural income-generating activities in southern Mozambique are expected to increase between June and September, as households seek to offset reduced agricultural production. However, earnings are likely to remain below average due to weak demand and increased competition. In the northern region, income is expected to be below-average, as insecurity will constrain participation in income-generating opportunities. Humanitarian food assistance The number of people reached with food assistance in Cabo Delgado is expected to be between 265,000 and 425,000 by January 2027. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Northern areas From June to September 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in conflict-affected districts of Cabo Delgado, including Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Meluco, and parts of Muidumbe, Nangade, and Chiúre, as well as in northern Nampula (Eráti and Memba), due to ongoing disruptions to livelihoods and market access. Household food access is expected to be below average due to limited purchasing power, leading to food consumption gaps. In areas receiving humanitarian food assistance, such as Macomia, Quissanga, Nangade, and Muidumbe, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected as assistance mitigates food consumption deficits among IDPs. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Ancuabe, Mecúfi, Montepuez, Namuno, Mueda, Balama, and urban Pemba, supported by post-harvest food availability. Between October 2026 and January 2027, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in conflict-affected districts of Cabo Delgado (Chiúre, Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Quissanga, Meluco, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Macomia) and in northern Nampula (Erati and Memba), where many households are unable to meet their minimum food needs. Food consumption gaps are expected to persist among the poorest households due to limited access to food, weak purchasing power, continued reliance on irregular income sources, and constrained market access. As a result, households are expected to continue employing coping strategies such as reducing meal size and frequency, temporarily relocating to areas perceived as safer with better food availability, increasing reliance on support from other households, and intensifying the collection of wild foods. South and central regions From June to September 2026, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected across southern and central Mozambique, as improvements are gradually expected from July. The improvement from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to be driven by increased food consumption from post-flood and second season harvests, as well as seasonal income from agricultural labor and the sale of surplus produce, which will support the purchase of staple foods. However, second season production consists mainly of vegetables, which are perishable and provide only short-term access to food, limiting their contribution to longer-term household food access. Some households will also continue to earn income from typical non-agricultural activities, including charcoal production and livestock sales, where feasible. Overall, households are expected to gradually meet their minimum food needs from July through September but will remain unable to fully cover essential non-food and livelihood expenses due to below-average incomes and limited purchasing power. From October 2026 to January 2027, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected during the lean season across parts of southern and central Mozambique, following a poor 2025/26 harvest, diminished food stocks, and high food prices, leading to food consumption gaps. During this period, household food stocks from the second season production will be largely depleted, and reliance on market purchases will increase. At the same time, staple food prices, particularly for maize grain and rice, are likely to remain above average, while household incomes are expected to be below average, further eroding purchasing power. Poor households are likely to adopt a range of coping strategies, including increasing reliance on wild foods, migrating to larger urban centers in search of employment and income-generating opportunities, sending household members to stay with relatives, and withdrawing children from school where school feeding programs are not available. Some households may also reduce meal size and frequency as food access deteriorates. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are anticipated in areas less affected by flooding and dry spells, where households will likely meet their minimum food needs but remain unable to cover essential non-food expenditures. Urban areas In urban areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist among most poor households from June to September 2026, driven by continued reliance on markets, limited income sources, and constrained purchasing power. Temporary improvements in food access are expected through September, supported by increased availability of fresh produce (primarily vegetables) and relatively lower food prices, which help stabilize food consumption for many households. From October 2026 through at least January 2027, food access is expected to deteriorate as staple food prices rise and incomes decline, eroding purchasing power. As a result, poor households are expected to face increasing difficulty in maintaining adequate food consumption, with a small proportion likely to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Most poor households are expected to meet minimum food needs but remain unable to cover essential non-food expenditures. Coping strategies include reducing non-food spending and increasing reliance on informal income sources such as petty trade and casual labor. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Mozambique livelihood zones and profilesFEWS NETQualitative/Quantitative Typical sources of food and income by livelihood zone Weather and flood forecastNOAA’s Climate Prediction Center, USGS, the Climate Hazards Center at the University of California Santa Barbara, and NASAQualitative/QuantitativeForecast on the agroclimatic situation in Mozambique during the scenario period NOAA's June 2026 ENSO outlookNOAA/Climate Prediction CenterQualitative/QuantitativeAll food security elements are affected, with particular relevance to food access Impacts of El Niño Brief: MozambiqueFEWS NETQualitative/QuantitativeAgrometeorological monitoring Geospatial data, satellite image products, and derived data productsGeospatial data, satellite image products, and derived data productsQualitative/QuantitativePermanent monitoring of the agroclimatic situation based on satellite images Conflict analysis and forecastsACLED, Control Risks Seerist, Signal Room, ACAPS; 360MozambiqueQuantitativeAnalysis and information on the conflict in Cabo Delgado Humanitarian food assistance distribution plans Mozambique Food Security Cluster (FSC), WFP QuantitativeLevels of humanitarian food assistance in September and plans for the scenario period of this Outlook Fundamentals and integrated technical analysis for the projection of maize grain prices in the southern, central, and northern areasFEWS NETQualitative/QuantitativeCurrent behavior of maize grain prices and projections for the next eight months across three reference markets: Maputo and Chókwe (South), Mutarara (Center), and Montepuez (North) Field information on food security conditions in selected areas of the countryKey informant interviews with local extension officers, humanitarian implementing partners, and community leaders Qualitative/QuantitativeFood security issues, focusing on access to food, income generation, production levels, food reserves, and coping strategies February 2026 FEWS NET Seasonal Forecast ReviewNOAAQualitative/QuantitativeForecast on the agroclimatic situation in Mozambique during the scenario period Displacement Tracking Matrix reports IOMInternational Organization for Migration (IOM)Qualitative/QuantitativeAnalysis and information on the conflict-related displacement in Cabo Delgado Inflation trends in MozambiqueTrading EconomicsQuantitativeFood access Fuel price increaseClub of MozambiqueQuantitativeFood access Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. National Tropical cyclones impact high-production areas Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Depending on the scale and frequency, tropical cyclones could severely disrupt agricultural production by damaging standing crops and livestock, disrupting livelihood activities, and destroying infrastructure. The impact would be particularly severe if the weather shock occurs between the reproductive and maturation stages of crop development, when the potential for recovery or replanting is limited. The main concern is for poor households that have experienced two to three consecutive below-average harvests. These households would likely face another poor harvest, further limiting access to own-produced food, labor opportunities, and income-earning capacity. Households could have difficulties recovering and are likely to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or experience only a short-lived improvement before potentially returning to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) well ahead of the lean season beyond the projection period. Southern region Slower-than-expected recovery from post-flood harvest or a below-average performance of the second agricultural season Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The expected improvement in food security from July onward is unlikely to materialize as projected, prolonging Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes across most of the southern zone and parts of the central zone affected by floods and dry spells between January and March 2026. Below-average main season harvest and limited livelihood recovery will continue to constrain food and income access, increasing reliance on market purchases. However, above-average staple food prices and persistently low incomes will severely limit food access. While households may expand natural resource-based activities, weak purchasing power will prevent them from meeting their food needs. Households could start applying coping strategies, such as reducing meal sizes and skipping meals, thereby sustaining elevated acute food insecurity. Southern and central regions Start of the 2026/27 rainy season worse than currently anticipated Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A significantly more delayed and erratic onset of the 2026/27 rainy season than currently anticipated, or more prolonged dry conditions at the start of the season, would delay land preparation and planting activities, reducing the availability of seasonal agricultural labor and postponing income generation for poor households that rely on farm work. The delayed rains would also slow the regeneration of pasture and surface water sources, negatively affecting livestock body conditions, reproduction, and milk production, thereby reducing both access to livestock products and income from livestock-related activities. In addition, the availability of wild foods—an important seasonal food source for many poor and very poor households—would remain below normal for longer than expected, further constraining food access. Although major dams and reservoirs are currently at relatively favorable levels following the previous rainy season, delayed rainfall would postpone the replenishment of smaller community water sources, reducing water availability for both households and livestock in some areas. As a result, poor households would remain dependent on market purchases for food for longer than currently anticipated. However, staple food prices are expected to remain above average and rise seasonally from November onward, while below-average income from agricultural labor would further constrain households' purchasing power. Consequently, increased number of districts, particularly in the southern and central semi-arid areas, could experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes than currently projected. Food consumption deficits would likely deepen among the poorest households, leading to a deterioration in acute malnutrition as access to adequate and diverse diets declines. Although area-level acute malnutrition is likely to remain within the Acceptable GAM classification and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) would remain the highest area-level acute food insecurity classification, the proportion of households facing larger food consumption gaps or engaging in more severe coping strategies would increase, resulting in a higher number of households experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Annex 5: Projected acute food insecurity outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian food assistance mtesfasilassie… Wed, 07/08/2026 - 19:21 Download the report 5
Okumaya devam et
ilgili gelişmeler- Ortak aktörcanlı
NATO Zirvesi Öncesi Ankara'da Görüntü Temizliği: Yoksul Mahalleler Billboardlarla Kapatıldı
Türkiye'nin başkenti Ankara, Salı günü başlayacak ve aralarında ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın da bulunduğu 32 devlet başkanının katılacağı kritik NATO zirvesi öncesinde kapsamlı bir estetik makyajdan geçiyor. Belediye ekipleri, havalimanından şehir merkezine uzanan güzergâh boyunca çiçekler dikiyor ve harap evler ile yoksul mahalleleri gizlemek için dev billboardlar yerleştiriyor. Bu çalışmalar, Türkiye'nin uluslararası arenadaki imajını güçlendirmek ve başkenti zirve için daha modern bir görünüme kavuşturmak amacıyla yürütülüyor.
Türkiye2 olay4 gün önce - Ortak aktör
İran Savaşı İslam Cumhuriyeti'ni Çökertemedi, Muhalefeti Dağıttı
ABD'nin 28 Şubat'ta başlattığı İran'a yönelik askerî harekât, İslam cumhuriyeti rejiminin çöküşünü hızlandırma beklentisiyle kurgulanmıştı. Ancak aylar süren çatışmalar, yönetimin yerinden edilmesini sağlayamadı ve rejim ayakta kaldı. Harekât, Tahran üzerinde beklenen siyasi etkiyi yaratmadı. Başkan Trump, ocak ayında zirveye ulaşan ve rejime yönelik en ciddi meydan okuma olarak değerlendirilen hükümet karşıtı protestolara destek sözü vermişti. Savaşın İranlıları ayaklanmaya teşvik edeceği öngörülüyordu. Buna karşın, harekât muhalefetin güçlenmesine katkıda bulunmadı; aksine, protesto dalgası söndü ve muhalif gruplar arasındaki bölünmeler derinleşti. Savaşın diplomatik ve siyasi bağlamı, rejim değişikliği hedefi etrafında şekillenmişti. Ancak çatışmaların uzaması, İslami yönetimin beklenenden dayanıklı çıkmasına yol açtı. Muhalefet ise uluslararası desteğini kaybederek siyasi arenada marjinalleşti. Bu sonuç, harekâtın temel siyasi amacının gerçekleşmediğini ortaya koyuyor.
Fransa1 olay19 Haz - Ortak aktör
DSÖ, Bundibugyo Ebola Salgınına Karşı Uluslararası Acil Durum İlan Etti
Dünya Sağlık Örgütü (DSÖ), Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti'nde (DRC) Bundibugyo virüsünün yol açtığı Ebola salgınını uluslararası halk sağlığı acil durumu olarak ilan etti. Nadir görülen bu varyanta karşı onaylı bir aşı veya tedavi bulunmuyor. Şimdiye kadar 500'den fazla şüpheli vaka tespit edildi, en az 130 kişi yaşamını yitirdi ve DSÖ risk seviyesini 'çok yüksek' olarak güncelledi. Salgının komşu ülkelere sıçrama ihtimali endişe yaratıyor. Uluslararası alanda Hong Kong, Afrika'dan gelen yolcular için sağlık taramalarını sıkılaştırdı ve karantina tesisi hazırladı. ABD, DRC ve Uganda'da 50 tedavi merkezi için 13 milyon dolarlık başlangıç fonu sağlarken, USAID'in kapatılması ve halk sağlığı kesintileri nedeniyle müdahalenin yetersiz kaldığı eleştirileri yükseldi. Sınır Tanımayan Doktorlar gibi kuruluşlar sahada çalışmalarını sürdürüyor, DSÖ ise aday aşı ve tedavileri değerlendiriyor. Çatışma, yerel halkta güvensizlik ve geç tespit gibi etkenler salgınla mücadeleyi zorlaştırıyor. DSÖ, salgının en az iki ay daha kontrol altına alınamayabileceği uyarısında bulundu. Uzmanlar, dış yardımlardaki kesintilerin küresel sağlık krizlerine yanıt kapasitesini zayıflattığını vurguluyor.
Birleşmiş Milletler14 olay22 May - Ortak aktör
Tahran'da savaş ve belirsizlik arasında tükenen İran halkı
1 Haziran 2026'da Tahran'da, İranlılar savaşın geri dönme korkusu ile sona erme umudu arasında bocalıyor. Middle East Eye'ın haberine göre, başkentte yaşayanlar uzun süredir devam eden ekonomik zorluklar ve jeopolitik gerilimlerden bitkin düşmüş durumda. Özellikle Trump yönetimine duyulan güvensizlik, nükleer müzakereler ve yaptırımlar konusundaki belirsizliği körüklüyor. Sokaklardaki ABD karşıtı duvar resimleri, halkın içinde bulunduğu ikilemi ve köklü güvensizliği yansıtıyor. Habere yansıyan görüşler, İran toplumunun büyük bir kesiminin savaş tehditlerine karşı duyarsızlaştığını, ancak aynı zamanda kalıcı bir çözüme duyulan özlemi de ortaya koyuyor. Bölgedeki istikrarsızlık ve uluslararası baskılar, gündelik yaşamı derinden etkilerken Tahran'da savaşın gölgesi, gerçek çatışma kadar yıpratıcı bir atmosfer yaratıyor.
ABD1 olay01 Haz - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
İsrail'in Gazze Saldırısında İki Filistinli Hayatını Kaybetti
Gazze'deki sağlık yetkilileri, İsrail'in Pazar günü Gazze şehrine düzenlediği hava saldırısında en az iki Filistinlinin öldüğünü açıkladı. The Straits Times'ın Kahire merkezli haberinde, olaya ilişkin ayrıntıya yer verilmedi. Saldırının hedefi ve koşulları hakkında resmi bir açıklama yapılmadı. Bu olay, bölgede aylardır süren şiddet sarmalının son örneği olarak kayıtlara geçti.
Filistin17 olay40 dk önce - Aynı ülke gündemicanlı
Gazze'de soykırım savaşının bininci günü: Ateşkese rağmen can kaybı sürüyor
Gazze'de İsrail'in başlattığı ve 'soykırım savaşı' olarak nitelendirilen askerî harekâtın üzerinden bin gün geçti. Al Jazeera'nin haberine göre, Ekim ayında varılan ateşkes anlaşmasına rağmen bölgede şiddet olayları tamamen durmadı; ateşkes sonrası dönemde en az 1,072 kişi yaşamını yitirdi. Bu süreç, bölgede kalıcı bir istikrar sağlanamadığını ve sivil kayıpların devam ettiğini gösteriyor. Savaşın başlangıcından bu yana yaşanan yıkım, uluslararası toplumda derin bir endişe yaratırken, diplomatik çabaların yetersiz kaldığı eleştirileri de beraberinde getiriyor. Gazze'deki insani durumun düzelmemesi ve ateşkes ihlallerinin sürmesi, hem bölgesel aktörler hem de küresel güçler için yeni krizleri tetikleyebilecek bir istikrarsızlık kaynağı oluşturuyor. Ekonomik açıdan, yeniden inşa maliyetlerinin milyarlarca dolara ulaştığı tahmin edilirken, siyasi olarak barış sürecine dair umutlar giderek azalıyor. Uzmanlar, mevcut durumun çözümsüz kalmaya devam etmesinin Ortadoğu'da daha geniş çaplı bir çatışma riskini artırabileceği uyarısında bulunuyor.
Filistin1 olay1 gün önce