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Ongoing insecurity and livelihood disruptions sustain widespread Crisis outcomes

Ongoing insecurity and livelihood disruptions sustain widespread Crisis outcomes Key Messages Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January across South, El-Nabatieh, Beirut, Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa, Akkar, and parts of North and Mount Lebanon. Ongoing insecurity, large-scale displacement, reduced income-earning opportunities, and high food prices continue to erode household purchasing power and constrain access to food amid declining humanitarian food assistance. Despite a June ceasefire agreement, hostilities continue at elevated levels, particularly in southern Lebanon. Persistent airstrikes, evacuation orders, movement restrictions, and damage to infrastructure, agricultural assets, and markets are disrupting livelihoods and limiting access to food despite broadly stable national food supply. More than 844,000 people remain internally displaced, with most households unable to safely return to their homes or reestablish typical income sources. In areas not directly affected by insecurity, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through January. Many poor Lebanese households, Syrian refugees, and displaced populations face constrained economic access to food due to high prices, elevated fuel costs, and limited income-earning opportunities, resulting in weak purchasing power despite markets remaining broadly functional. The collapse of the June–September tourism season, below-average labor demand, and continued disruption to agricultural livelihoods are expected to further restrict household incomes, leaving many households unable to meet their needs. FEWS NET assess that 1.0-1.49 million people will require humanitarian food assistance through January, with the highest assistance needs expected between July and September, particularly in insecurity-affected areas of southern Lebanon. Despite the scale up of emergency assistance following the escalation’s onset, coverage is declining due to funding shortfalls and humanitarian access constraints and remains insufficient to meet elevated needs. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 22, 2026. Food security context Food insecurity in Lebanon is primarily shaped by prolonged economic fragility, a heavy reliance on imported food, and the impacts of regional instability. In 2022, an estimated one-third of the Lebanese population lived in poverty, nearly triple from a decade earlier. Many poor and refugee households rely on a combination of humanitarian food assistance, informal support networks, and coping strategies to meet their basic food and non-food needs. Lebanon has experienced poor macroeconomic conditions since 2019; during this time, the LBP has lost around 95 percent of its value against the USD, driving increased imported food costs and eroding household savings value. In the wake of the financial crisis, emigration pressures increased: nearly 200,000 Lebanese emigrated between 2018 and 2021 alone. However, the Lebanese diaspora continues to support the economy through remittances, which account for more than one-third of GDP and remain a key source of household income. While relative exchange rate stabilization in 2023 moderated inflation following its peak that same year, food prices remain elevated, and costs of living outpace wage rates. Poor households spend nearly 40 percent of their income on food and often cope with shortfalls by reducing dietary diversity and prioritizing cheaper staple foods. Roughly 80 percent of the food consumed in Lebanon is imported. Agriculture contributes only modestly to the national food supply – with only 25 percent of farms producing primarily for subsistence – but remains an important income source for poor rural households. The Bekaa Valley accounts for roughly 40 percent of Lebanon’s total cultivated land, while the North hosts around 40 percent of the country’s olive production. Lebanon’s climate is characterized by a winter wet season ranging from December to March that supports cereal and vegetable production, followed by a long dry season (April to November). Rainfed cereal production, particularly wheat in the Bekaa Valley and Akkar plains, is highly sensitive to rainfall timing and distribution, while irrigated horticulture depends on surface and groundwater availability. Chronic water scarcity, degraded irrigation infrastructure, and rising input costs often constrain agricultural productivity and limit agricultural labor demand. Across both urban and rural areas, households face limited and irregular income-earning opportunities amid weak labor demand and constrained livelihood options. Approximately nine in 10 people live in urban and peri-urban areas, where most poor urban households rely on informal and casual employment in construction, transport, services, petty trade, and small businesses. These earnings are unstable and rarely cover high urban living costs, and the continued presence of a large refugee population has increased labor supply in low-skill sectors, placing downward pressure on wages. The tourism sector also remains an important livelihood source for poor households, providing casual labor opportunities in services, hospitality, and transport. In rural areas, poor households primarily derive income from seasonal agricultural labor, small-scale crop production, and limited livestock ownership. Recurrent regional insecurity continues to impact food insecurity. Since the 2006 war, tensions between Lebanon and Israel have periodically escalated. On March 2, 2026, fighting between Hezbollah and Israel sharply intensified following a period of persistent low-intensity hostilities after the 2006 war and the September-October 2024 escalation. Israeli airstrikes, evacuation orders, and ground operations across southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and parts of Beirut triggered widespread displacement, infrastructure destruction, and livelihood disruptions, particularly in the south. Although a ceasefire was announced in April 2026, repeated violations, airstrikes, and continued displacement orders underscore the fragility of the truce and the risk of further escalation. Lebanon hosts the highest refugee population per capita globally, including approximately 1.3 million Syrian refugees and an estimated 222,000 Palestinian refugees. Syrian refugees primarily reside in informal settlements, agricultural zones, and urban peripheries and rely on informal labor; as of 2025, 73 percent are unable to afford basic necessities. Palestinian refugees predominantly reside in long-established camps that function as dense urban enclaves. Refugee households face acute food access constraints due to limited income-earning opportunities and dependence on assistance. High refugee concentrations increase competition for employment and affordable housing, indirectly constraining food access for both refugee and poor Lebanese households through reduced wages and higher living costs. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Lebanon Food Security Outlook: February 2026 to September 2026 Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Lebanon: April 2026 to September 2026 Latest Lebanon Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Source: Reuters The escalation of hostilities since early March continues to disrupt livelihoods, market systems, and food access across Lebanon. Despite the June 19 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel continues to launch ground operations concentrated in South and El-Nabatieh, particularly Nabatieh, Marjayoun, Bent Jbeil, and Tyre districts, while air and drone strikes extend to parts of Bekaa and Beirut’s southern suburbs. As of June 22, Israeli military operations had resulted in 4,175 civilian deaths and more than 12,100 injuries, and airstrikes have destroyed critical transport infrastructure, including bridges, roads, and key supply routes. Airstrikes also continue to damage health facilities and water systems. Israel’s April establishment of the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon — extended by 20 square kilometers, including areas north of the Litani River, in mid-June — has prompted widespread evacuation orders (Figure 1). Population movements remain fluid, with continued large-scale displacement driven by repeated evacuation orders — including the expansion of evacuation zones south of the Zahrani River — and ongoing hostilities. Following the June ceasefire announcement, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) declined by 12 percent June 11-17, as some households undertook precautionary, short-term return movements to assess conditions and reclaim property; however, more than 844,000 people remain displaced. Most displaced households reside outside formal shelters: an estimated 104,400 people are residing in 612 overcrowded collective shelters. Returns to Syria continue, with 441,453 cross-border movements from Lebanon recorded March 2-June 15. Market functionality remains highly uneven and severely degraded in southern areas. While national supply chains remain partially functional, market efficiency is reduced, with pronounced disparities in access and availability, particularly along insecurity-affected supply corridors. In South and El-Nabatieh, more than 80 percent of markets are no longer functional due to the destruction of critical infrastructure that has further disrupted supply chains. In contrast, markets in central, northern, and coastal areas remain largely functional but are under increasing strain due to elevated demand from large-scale displacement and rising transport costs. Localized shortages, reduced trader activity, and delays in restocking are reported in areas hosting high concentrations of IDPs. Staple food prices remain above average, driven by Lebanon's structural reliance on food imports and compounded by escalation-related supply chain disruptions and elevated transport costs. Since early March, bread and vegetable prices have risen by approximately 15 and 20 percent, respectively. Compared to the same time last year, cereal and pulse prices are approximately 20 percent higher, while vegetable prices are around 45 percent higher. While food is largely available at the national level, it is becoming increasingly unaffordable due to elevated fuel costs, persistent import dependence, and localized market disruptions. Fuel prices have risen since early March, increasing transportation, production, and distribution costs. Gasoline increased 34 percent between early March and early June, peaking at approximately 130,000 LBP/liter in late May due to domestic price adjustments, elevated regional energy prices, and escalation-related supply disruptions. Although prices declined by about 14 percent from May 19 to June 29, fuel costs remain well above pre-escalation levels. Labor opportunities in construction, services, and transport remain below average due to weak investment, high operating costs, and insecurity-related disruptions. The collapse of the June-September tourism season is removing a key source of seasonal income. The escalation of hostilities has reversed the modest economic gains seen in 2025, further weakening labor demand across most sectors. The surge of displaced workers into urban labor markets is intensifying competition for an already reduced pool of casual employment. Macroeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate. The GDP was previously projected to grow by around 4 percent in 2026 but is now projected to contract by at least 7 percent, reflecting the impact of the renewed escalation. Widespread airstrike damage to infrastructure, productive assets, and key economic sectors is further constraining economic activity. Agricultural production and livelihoods have sustained extensive damage following the escalation of hostilities, with more than 56,000 hectares — over one-fifth of cultivated area — affected. Impacts are concentrated in southern Lebanon, where 40 percent of the population relies on agricultural livelihoods and where airstrikes and ground operations have damaged farmland, irrigation systems, and agricultural infrastructure. Nearly 80 percent of farmers in the south have been displaced and are unable to access their land, disrupting main season planting and harvesting. Israel’s use of white phosphorous along border areas has burned thousands of crops and orchards and is likely causing lasting soil and water contamination, constraining future production. Israeli military operations have also resulted in the loss of more than 2.8 million poultry and livestock. Above-average temperatures across Lebanon are accelerating the seasonal depletion of soil moisture and surface water resources and increasing heat stress on rainfed crops and pasture, particularly in the Bekaa Valley and Akkar. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian food assistance scaled up rapidly following the escalation in early March; however, coverage is declining due to funding shortfalls and access constraints. As of June 22, WFP had reached approximately 721,000 people affected by the escalation with emergency food assistance, providing 70 percent with cash support and 30 percent with hot meals, ready-to-eat rations, and food parcels. In-kind assistance has reached more than 142,300 newly displaced people across 492 shelters countrywide, as well as approximately 83,500 people in host communities since March 2. Since the start of the escalation, 28 WFP-led convoys have delivered food parcels and bread to nearly 115,700 people in hard-to-reach areas; however, insecurity along delivery routes has forced the delay or cancellation of more than 50 percent of convoys deployed to the most-affected southern areas. Meanwhile, a revised extension of the Lebanon Flash Appeal targeting 1.4 million people from June to August remains substantially underfunded. Overall, WFP reached approximately 850,000 people with food and cash assistance in May. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Southern areas (South and El-Nabatieh governorates) Across South and El-Nabatieh, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread as of June following renewed escalation since early March. Ongoing military operations, widespread destruction of productive assets, restricted population movement, and extensive infrastructure damage continue to disrupt livelihoods and limit both market functionality and physical access to food, particularly in southern border districts such as Sour, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and El-Nabatieh. Income access remains severely constrained. Poor Lebanese households and Syrian refugees face near-total loss of agricultural livelihoods due to damaged orchards, inaccessible farmland, destruction of irrigation systems, and sharply reduced demand for seasonal labor. Physical access constraints are also limiting households’ ability to reach functional markets, with approximately 80 percent of southern farmers forced to abandon their lands due to active hostilities, compounding economic access barriers even where food remains available. As a result, many households are experiencing food consumption gaps, while others are only marginally meeting food needs through increased reliance on livelihood coping strategies. Households are increasingly borrowing, relying on humanitarian assistance, engaging in informal or irregular labor opportunities, selling productive assets, and reducing essential non-food expenditures to access sufficient food. Among the worst-affected households, more severe coping strategies are evident, including engagement in high-risk or illegal work and child labor. Consumption-based coping strategies are also widespread, including reducing meal frequency and portion sizes Northern areas (Akkar and North governorates) In Akkar and El-Minieh-Denie, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes emerged in June, while Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in other northern districts. Poor Lebanese households and Syrian refugees face below-average income due to high unemployment and reduced labor opportunities. Combined with elevated food prices, these income constraints are eroding purchasing power and limiting households’ ability to access sufficient food. In addition, the continued presence of displaced populations is further increasing competition for limited labor opportunities. In Akkar and El-Minieh-Dennie, a substantial share of households are experiencing food consumption gaps or are only minimally meeting food needs by engaging in negative coping strategies, including accumulating debt and reducing essential non-food expenditures such as health and education. Households are also relying on consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing meal frequency and portion sizes, shifting to less preferred foods, and purchasing food on credit. Eastern agricultural areas (Bekaa and Baalbek–El Hermel) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing and increasingly widespread across Baalbek–El Hermel, West Bekaa, and Zahle as of June, driven by reduced income from insecurity-related disruptions, high production costs, and weak demand for agricultural labor following over five consecutive seasons affected by water shortages. In Baalbek-El Hermel, where half the population are refugees, households are increasingly relying on remittances, humanitarian assistance, and low-paying informal labor to meet food needs. Meanwhile, livelihood coping strategies are becoming more prevalent, including the sale of productive and household assets, borrowing, reductions in essential non-food expenditures, and among the worst-off households, engagement in child labor and begging. In West Bekaa and Zahle, similar constraints on agricultural and casual labor are limiting households’ purchasing power. While humanitarian assistance continues to play a stabilizing role for some households, it remains insufficient to prevent food consumption gaps among poorer households. In addition, poor dietary diversity, overcrowding, and limited access to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health services continue to interact with food consumption gaps, increasing malnutrition risks, particularly among those residing in informal settlements. Beirut and Mount Lebanon Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s Baabda, Aley, and Chouf districts as of June, despite broadly functioning markets. The deterioration is driven primarily by reduced economic access to food amid large-scale displacement, high living costs, and weakened purchasing power following the escalation. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s southern districts, where households are highly market-dependent, food availability remains adequate; however, poor Lebanese households, Syrian refugees, and displaced populations face some of the highest living costs countrywide and limited income-earning opportunities. Labor demand in construction and services remains below average, while the disruption of the June–September tourism season has reduced seasonal employment opportunities in hospitality, transport, and retail, further constraining household incomes. Meanwhile, the influx of displaced populations has intensified competition for limited employment opportunities and placed additional strain on housing and local services. As a result, many poor households rely on irregular informal labor, borrowing, and remittances to meet basic needs, while increasingly resorting to consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing meal size and frequency. Elsewhere in Mount Lebanon, including Kesrwan-Jbeil and El-Meten, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) persist as most households maintain minimally adequate food consumption. Compared to Beirut and southern Mount Lebanon, these districts have experienced relatively lower levels of displacement and less direct impact from hostilities, resulting in comparatively lower pressure on housing, labor markets, and services. Households benefit from relatively better access to income, including salaried employment, remittances, and more stable service-sector activity, which help sustain basic food access despite high prices. However, elevated living costs continue to strain household budgets, requiring many households to reduce expenditures on health care, education, utilities, and other essential non-food items. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Source: FEWS NET, using Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International data The escalation between Israel and Hezbollah is expected to persist through at least September despite the nominal ceasefire framework. Hostilities will likely remain concentrated in South and El-Nabatieh, with periodic Israeli air and drone strikes likely increasing in Bekaa Valley. Insecurity is expected to remain above typical levels through January, including targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure. The June ceasefire agreement will likely reduce attacks on Beirut and other urban centers but is unlikely to improve conditions in southern Lebanon. Displacement is expected to gradually decline through January with some limited return movements to southern areas; however, overall displacement is likely to remain elevated compared to pre-escalation levels. Most displaced households will continue to reside outside organized shelter settings. Full-scale returns to South and El-Nabatieh are unlikely to occur amid ongoing insecurity and widespread destruction of housing, infrastructure, and productive assets. Access to essential services is expected to remain severely constrained through January due to ongoing hostilities, infrastructure damage, and pressure on systems in host areas, with most acute disruptions expected in southern areas. Above-average temperatures through January are expected to increase moisture stress and water scarcity. Fuel and agricultural input prices are expected to gradually decline through September and stabilize above pre-escalation levels through January (Figure 2). Summer agricultural production in northern and eastern areas is expected to be below average for the second consecutive year due to high input costs and constrained access to quality inputs. In South and El-Nabatieh, production is expected to remain well below pre-escalation levels, as insecurity, displacement, and damage to land and assets limit cultivation. Winter cereal production, particularly rainfed wheat, is also expected to remain below average due to delayed planting, below-average soil moisture, and localized flood damage in Akkar. National food markets are expected to remain broadly supplied through January due to continued commercial imports and trader stocks; however, localized supply disruptions and reduced market functionality are likely in insecurity-affected southern areas. Market functionality is expected to remain severely degraded in the south through January, driven by ongoing insecurity, displacement, and road inaccessibility, with markets south of the Litani River expected to remain largely non-functional. Elsewhere, markets will likely remain operational but face increased strain from displaced populations. Staple food prices, including imported wheat, are expected to remain elevated but relatively stable due to exchange rate stability and adequate imports. Prices are expected to decline slightly during the harvest and post-harvest period from June to September before stabilizing through the remainder of the projection period, while remaining highest in insecurity-affected areas. Income-earning opportunities in construction, services, and transport are expected to remain far below pre-escalation levels and the five-year average through the projection period, particularly for poor and displaced households in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Saida, and Zahle. Increased labor supply from displaced populations is expected to intensify competition for informal and low-wage work in host-area urban markets. Income from agricultural labor during the summer harvest and winter planting periods is similarly expected to remain well below average. Tourism-related labor opportunities are expected to remain substantially below average during the June-September peak and winter seasons, particularly in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and northern coastal areas. Remittance inflows are expected to remain below average and decline through January due to weakened expatriate earnings and ongoing regional disruptions. The LBP is expected to remain relatively stable through January, supported by continued Central Bank intervention and foreign currency reserves. Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain severely depressed and fragile through January, deteriorating beyond already low pre-escalation levels. Persistent hostilities, high import dependence, elevated fuel and transport costs, and insecurity-related market disruptions are expected to sustain inflationary pressures and constrain economic activity, while high national debt (38-46 billion USD), limited fiscal space, and the weak banking sector are expected to constrain any meaningful economic recovery. Social and community tensions are expected to remain elevated and intensify through January, driven by continued hostilities, repeated displacement, and host communities exceeding absorption capacity. Rising anti-IDP sentiment, particularly in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, is expected to increasingly constrain access to shelter, labor, and assistance for recent arrivals. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue through January, but at levels insufficient to meet rapidly rising needs. Coverage is expected to steadily decline starting in June due to funding constraints and access limitations. Implementation of the Lebanon Flash appeal from June to August will remain highly dependent on securing additional funding, and substantial funding gaps will likely continue to limit partners’ ability to sustain assistance delivery at scale. Assistance is expected to continue through a combination of cash-based transfers, food parcels, hot meals, and ready-to-eat food distributions. However, in insecurity-affected areas, particularly in South and El-Nabatieh, in-kind assistance is expected to remain largely inaccessible due to infrastructure destruction, road closures, active hostilities, and convoy limitations, all of which constrain humanitarian access and restrict timely delivery. Similarly, households’ ability to fully utilize cash-based assistance in insecurity-affected areas is constrained by ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions, infrastructure damage, and localized market disruptions. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Southern areas (South and El-Nabatieh governorates) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across South and El-Nabatieh through January 2027, with the most severe outcomes anticipated in frontline districts, including Sour, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, Hasbaya, and El-Nabatieh. Persisting insecurity, displacement, movement restrictions, and damage to productive assets and infrastructure are expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and limiting household access to food, despite intermittent ceasefire agreements. Many households are likely to remain separated from agricultural land, fishing assets, livestock, and typical sources of seasonal labor, constraining income-earning opportunities throughout the projection period. Although food is expected to remain generally available, poor and displaced households, farmers, agricultural laborers, and fishermen will likely face increasing difficulty accessing sufficient food due to limited purchasing power and reduced livelihood opportunities. Households are expected to rely on humanitarian assistance where accessible. Many households will likely continue to engage in livelihood strategies, such as reducing expenditures on health and education, selling productive assets, and accumulating debt, as well as consumption-based coping strategies, including reducing meal frequency and portion sizes. Newly displaced households, those residing near active hostilities, and those who have lost access to primary livelihoods are expected to face the most severe outcomes. Northern areas (Akkar and North governorates) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across Akkar and parts of North through January, driven by limited livelihood opportunities and high food prices, weaking purchasing power. Poor Lebanese households, Syrian refugees, and displaced households are expected to continue to rely primarily on market purchases financed through irregular casual labor, remittances, borrowing from informal support networks, and humanitarian assistance. Summer harvesting activities are expected to provide some seasonal income-earning opportunities through September; however, labor demand will likely be constrained due to high production costs and increased competition for employment opportunities. Northern Lebanon is expected to emerge as a primary receiving area for newly displaced populations as shelters in other governorates surpass maximum capacity, placing additional pressure on labor markets and basic services amid persistently high poverty levels. As incomes remain below average and assistance declines, households will likely continue purchasing food on credit, accumulating debt, and reducing non-food expenditures, as well as engaging in consumption-based coping strategies, such as consuming less preferred foods and reducing meal size and frequency. Elsewhere in North, poor households are expected to face similar economic constraints but retain relatively better access to income sources and markets, supporting Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. Despite some seasonal improvements associated with summer agricultural activities and the start of the 2026/27 rainy season in October, food insecurity is expected to worsen gradually through September and remain elevated through January, with refugees, displaced populations, and households dependent on casual labor likely to face the largest food consumption gaps. Eastern agricultural areas (Bekaa and Baalbek–El Hermel governorates) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel through January 2027. Although summer harvesting activities are expected to provide modest seasonal income and food access for farming households through September despite expected below-average production, sustained airstrikes, evacuation orders, restricted access to agricultural land, and high production costs are expected to constrain cultivation and harvesting activities and limit typical seasonal gains, particularly for poor households dependent on agricultural wage labor. As a result, many poor households will likely experience food consumption gaps or remain only marginally able to meet food needs. To access food, households will likely continue relying on food purchases on credit, borrowing, reducing essential non-food expenditures, and selling productive assets. The worst-affected households are likely to increase reliance on more severe strategies, such as child labor and begging, particularly as humanitarian assistance coverage continues to decline and seasonal income gains fail to materialize. Beirut and Mount Lebanon In Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s Baabda, Aley, and Chouf districts, which host approximately 64 percent of all IDPs, Crisis (IPC 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027, while Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected elsewhere in Mount Lebanon. Although markets are expected to remain largely functional and generally well supplied through the projection period, poor Lebanese households, Syrian refugees, and displaced populations will likely continue to face difficulty accessing sufficient food due to high living and food costs and limited income-earning activities, reducing household purchasing power. While the June ceasefire is expected to reduce attacks on Beirut’s southern suburbs and adjacent areas of Mount Lebanon, intermittent airstrikes, economic contraction, and the disruption of the typical tourism season will likely substantially reduce income from construction, services, and tourism-related activities, particularly among low-skilled workers and households dependent on informal employment. In Beirut and Baabda, Aley, and Chouf, the continued presence of large numbers of displaced households is expected to maintain pressure on labor markets, housing, and basic services, further increasing competition for low-wage employment. Urban households are expected to rely almost entirely on market purchases financed through irregular labor, remittances, and borrowing. As assistance declines, poor households are expected to face food consumption gaps or meet minimum food needs by depleting essential livelihood assets and borrowing. Households are also expected to engage in consumption-based coping strategies, including shifting to less nutrient-dense foods and reducing meal size and frequency. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Market Functionality Index WFP Lebanon (RAM)QuantitativeMarket functionality, food availability, supply chain disruptions, and access issues SMEB and MEB cost dataWFP LebanonQuantitativeCost of basic needs, food access, and economic vulnerability IPC Acute Food Insecurity Updated Projection Analysis IPC Technical Working Group (TWG)MixedBaseline food security outcomes, convergence of evidence, IPC classification mVAM and household surveysWFPQuantitativeFood consumption, coping strategies, and household-level food access Seasonal calendars FEWS NET / Regional analoguesQualitativeTiming of agricultural activities, labor demand, income flows, and seasonal food access patterns Agroclimatology and remote sensing products (CHIRPS, NDVI, WRSI)FEWS NET (NASA, NOAA, USGS, UCSB)Quantitative (geospatial, time series)Rainfall performance, drought severity, vegetation conditions, crop production prospects Conflict and displacement monitoringIOM (DTM), UNHCRQuantitativePopulation displacement, returns, mobility constraints affecting livelihoods and food access Market prices and trends (weekly and monthly)WFP, Ministry of EconomyQuantitativeStaple food prices, inflation trends, purchasing power, and market-based food access IPC Acute Food Insecurity AnalysisIPC/CH TWGConvergence of evidence (mixed)Classification of acute food insecurity severity and population in need (IPC Phases) Refugee Food Security AssessmentsUNHCR (VaSyr), UNRWAQuantitativePopulation and assistance for Syrian and Palestinian refugees Household Economy Analysis Save the ChildrenQuantitative & qualitativeBaseline livelihood information Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. Intensified Israeli military operations Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation of military activity above current levels would likely result in increased airstrikes, ground operations, and attacks on infrastructure would likely occur in South and El-Nabatieh, with expanded targeting of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and Baalbek-El-Hermel. Renewed hostilities would likely trigger additional displacement, prevent returns to southern areas, and further destroy housing, productive assets, and markets. Increased displacement would heighten social tensions in host communities beyond current levels and contribute to localized security incidents. Agricultural production, labor opportunities, and market activity would likely decline further as insecurity restricts movement and access to farmland and employment. Additional disruption to transport routes and commercial infrastructure would constrain supply chains and increase food prices, as well as further limit the delivery of assistance to affected populations, particularly in southern areas. As a result, food access would deteriorate among displaced households, poor households, Syrian refugees, and insecurity-affected farming communities. Under this scenario, Crisis IPC (Phase 3) outcomes would become more widespread across Lebanon. In the most heavily insecurity-affected areas of South and El-Nabatieh, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely emerge among newly displaced households and households isolated by insecurity and market access constraints; however, those households would not likely reach 20 percent of the population. Sustained de-escalation and expanded Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If the ceasefire framework results in a sustained reduction in hostilities and meaningful Israeli withdrawals from areas of southern Lebanon, humanitarian access would likely improve and facilitate some population returns to less affected parts of South and El-Nabatieh, including areas of Sour, El-Nabatieh, and Saida districts. Improved security conditions would also support the gradual reopening of key transport routes and commercial supply chains, easing some constraints on market access and food availability. However, the extent and pace of recovery would likely remain constrained by extensive damage to housing, infrastructure, productive assets, and transportation networks, as well as prolonged disruption to agricultural livelihoods and market systems. Even with improved security conditions, market functionality and supply chains would likely require an extended period to stabilize, while elevated food prices and reduced purchasing power would continue to constrain food access for many households. Income-earning opportunities would gradually recover as displaced households regain access to agricultural land, livestock, fishing assets, and seasonal labor opportunities. However, widespread displacement, accumulated debt, asset depletion, and substantial damage to productive infrastructure would continue to limit livelihood recovery through much of the projection period. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would likely persist across much of South and El-Nabatieh and among many displaced and refugee households, even under a de-escalation scenario; however, improved access to livelihoods, markets, and humanitarian assistance would likely reduce the proportion of households facing food consumption gaps, resulting in a shift of some households from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. The greatest improvements would likely occur in areas less severely affected areas of South and El-Nabatieh and in areas hosting large displaced populations, including parts of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and northern governorates. While de-escalation would reduce the risk of further deterioration and support gradual recovery, meaningful improvements in acute food insecurity outcomes would likely extend beyond the projection period. csiegel@fews.net Wed, 07/01/2026 - 16:14 Download the report 5