ABD-İran Nükleer Mutabakatı Olumlu, Şimdi Pratik Diplomasiye Odaklanma Zamanı

The U.S.-Iran MOU Is a Welcome Step; Now Negotiators Must Focus on Practical Nuclear Nonproliferation Diplomacy

The U.S.-Iran MOU Is a Welcome Step; Now Negotiators Must Focus on Practical Nuclear Nonproliferation Diplomacy PressRoom Libby Flatoff Mon, 06/15/2026 - 09:44 Statement by Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy For immediate release: June 15, 2026 Media Contacts: Kelsey Davenport (202-463-8270 ext 102); Daryl G. Kimball (202)-463-8270 ext. 107) Reports that the United States and Iran finalized a preliminary deal to halt the war is a welcome development that creates a pathway for resuming negotiations on Iran's nuclear program that were underway when the United States and Israel launched their illegal attack on Iran on February 28. Washington and Tehran must now capitalize on this diplomatic momentum to reach an effective, verifiable nuclear agreement that blocks Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons and reduces the risk of a return to war. According to reports on the preliminary deal, or memorandum of understanding, Iran reaffirmed that it will never seek to build or acquire nuclear weapons. The memorandum set a sixty-day timeline for negotiating the limits on Iran’s nuclear activities as part of a broader agreement. Reaching an effective agreement in that timeframe will be challenging, but it is not impossible. To increase the chances of success, the United States and Iran should be willing to engage in direct talks, empower expert negotiating teams, and refrain from maximalist demands and threats. One of the key nuclear issues will be how to verifiably neutralize the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), particularly the 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level just shy of weapons-grade. Most of that material is likely intact, but inaccessible in underground storage sites due to Israeli and U.S. strikes. Excavating the HEU under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision and then diluting it within Iran is a safe, effective option for neutralizing the risks posed by that material. Blending down the HEU to less than five percent, a level suitable for power reactors, under IAEA monitoring removes the near-term proliferation risk posed by the material. Tehran could agree to ship the down-blended enriched uranium to the international fuel bank in Kazakhstan, sell it, or store it above ground under continuous IAEA supervision to further reduce the risk that Iran would use the material for nuclear weapons in the future. Another key issue to resolve will be the future of Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities. A U.S. official suggested in a June 12 press call that the final deal will include a multi-year suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Trump’s decision to move away from demanding Iran forgo enrichment in perpetuity is a pragmatic step that improves the odds of a deal. Insisting on an enrichment ban is not necessary for an effective agreement and would only drive Iran from the negotiating table. A verifiable suspension on enrichment, combined with the dilution of the HEU stockpile, would provide much greater assurance that Tehran could not quickly dash to a bomb if the decision were made to weaponize. The United States could strengthen the enrichment suspension by pushing for additional limits, such as a freeze on centrifuge research and production, and eliminating or capping uranium mining and milling activities. Any future resumption of enrichment in Iran should be based on demonstrated practical need, capped to reactor-grade levels, and subject to more intrusive IAEA monitoring. The United States could also encourage Iran to use the duration of the suspension to explore other nuclear fuel cycle options that pose less proliferation risk, including a regional or multilateral approach to reactor fuel production. An essential element of any effective agreement must be the swift return of IAEA inspections and an intrusive, agency-led monitoring regime to verify compliance with the terms of any new deal. To date, Trump administration officials have said little about the U.S. demands on monitoring and verification, but it should be a primary focus in negotiations going forward. Iran has gained irreversible knowledge about the uranium fuel cycle since Trump pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal, knowledge that allows Tehran to quickly build back to the threshold of nuclear weapons, even if a deal requires complete dismantlement of its uranium enrichment infrastructure. Intrusive verification will provide greater assurance that Iran is implementing its nuclear obligations and not engaging in covert activities. The United States should prioritize a return of IAEA inspectors to all nuclear sites in Iran as soon as possible and Tehran’s adherence to the more intrusive inspections arrangement, known as the additional protocol. To further strengthen monitoring provisions, the United States could seek to include a clear timeframe for Iran to respond to IAEA requests for access to sites and information, as the agency seeks to assess what remains of Iran’s nuclear program and account for key materials and technologies. Clear timeframes reduce the risk of Tehran attempting to stonewall the agency, as it has done in the past, and are likely to be more acceptable for Iran than U.S. demands for "anywhere, anytime" inspections. No state, including Iran, is likely to grant the IAEA unfettered access, including to military sites, and it is not necessary to effectively detect prohibited nuclear activities. Any new U.S.-Iran agreement addressing Iran's nuclear program and sanctions relief should be put before the UN Security Council to ensure its terms are recognized by the international community and to enable the Council to reinforce the full implementation of its terms. The U.S. and Israeli decision to illegally strike Iran in 2025 and 2026 set back the country’s nuclear program, but military attacks cannot eliminate Tehran’s capability to build the bomb. Negotiating an effective, verifiable nuclear agreement that also provides clear benefits to Iran stands the best chance of disincentivizing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. The Trump administration cannot afford to squander—for the third time—this diplomatic opportunity. # # # The nonpartisan, nongovernmental Arms Control Association promotes effective arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation policies and supports international efforts to reduce and eliminate the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons.