Confusion over UK sanctions on Russia undermines a Western response that was already too slow and half-hearted

Confusion over UK sanctions on Russia undermines a Western response that was already too slow and half-hearted

Confusion over UK sanctions on Russia undermines a Western response that was already too slow and half-hearted Expert comment sfarrell.drupa… 22 May 2026 In trying to limit the pain on itself, the West has pulled its punches in hurting Russia. Nearly four and a half years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the West has still not found the knock-out punch which derails the Russian economy. Numerous Western sanctions packages – twenty now from the EU – have not decisively turned the course of the war. Part of the problem is that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely long planned this war and built up buffers accordingly – probably as far back as the first imposition of Western sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea in April 2014. Related work China and Russia’s strategic duo endures – but its limits are clear Russia deleveraged to reduce its vulnerabilities to Western sanctions and built up its foreign exchange reserves to record levels. It also used its leverage over energy supplies to Europe to manipulate energy markets and earn windfall profits in the months leading up to and after the invasion, further bolstering the buffers. This gave Russia resilience. The other problem is that the West has been too slow and has telegraphed its sanctions response. Slowing the response has been the desire to present Putin with a unified Western front. That required fair burden-sharing, but the result has been sanctions by the lowest common denominator – which has been quite low, actually. There has been an effort to ensure that no one country unduly bears the cost, but the reality is that no one really has been willing to bear much of a cost at all. And sanctions are never cost-free – they hurt the target, but also the initiator. The skill is ensuring the target is hurt more. But in trying to limit the pain on itself, the West has pulled its punches in hurting Russia. I would argue here that the West has continuously failed to properly recognize the existential nature of the threat from Russia. Because if it took the threat seriously it would understand that countering the Russian risk entailed costs. For example, the backdraft from sanctions is that they cause shortages and higher prices on products where Russia is key to the supply chains. But then the West would also be honest with their own electorates in terms of ‘This is the threat, and these are the costs we all need to bear to counter that threat’. UK’s PR disaster The West’s reluctance to bear the cost of sanctions in support of Ukraine was revealed again this week with the latest sanctions effort by the UK, which has turned into a PR disaster for the UK government but also damaged the broader effort to maintain unity in support of Ukraine. The UK was eager to build upon US sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft rolled out in the middle of 2025, and which were finally having some effect. The UK had signalled in October that it would tighten the noose further around Russia by banning the purchase of diesel and fuel from third countries if the feedstock was Russian crude. This gave the perception that the UK had gone soft on Russia All well and good. But then the Iran war kicked off and the US eased sanctions on the Russian oil majors to head off the resultant rising global energy prices. And with fears over shortages of jet fuel and diesel, the UK this week issued general licences to delay the imposition of the sanctions on jet fuel and diesel fed by Russian crude. This gave the perception that the UK had gone soft on Russia, pulling its punches again and putting the interests of its own consumer ahead of those of Europe, and the brave defenders of Ukraine. The reality is that this was not the lifting of sanctions already in place, rather delaying or watering down an already agreed tightening. The UK government tried to counter the perception of weakness on the decisions on jet fuel and diesel by announcing the rollout of sanctions on shipping moving LNG, and with a raft of new sanctions designations on individuals and corporates. But sanctioning another wave of individuals and corporates hardly moves the dial when set against the thousands already sanctioned. And the problem with the restrictions on shipping of LNG is that the UK itself hardly buys any Russian LNG. In Europe the biggest culprits there are Spain, Belgium and France. Do as I say, not as I do These allies are unlikely to be enamoured by the UK’s efforts to restrict their purchases of LNG while allowing the UK to still use Russian crude-fed diesel and jet fuel. It appears then to be a case of ‘do as I say, not as I do’, and whereas the hope was that the UK would lead Europe in its action on sanctions, the latest efforts perhaps do more to undermine European unity on sanctions. Perhaps this all shows the weakening of the NATO alliance and, post-Brexit, the UK’s inability to draw on EU support The obvious question here is: where was the coordination with Europe and Ukraine? Indeed, one might also ask why, if the UK is facing such difficulties with the supply of diesel and jet fuel, it did not request assistance from its allies first? Perhaps this all shows the weakening of the NATO alliance and, post-Brexit, the UK’s inability to draw on EU support.