13. Finlandiya cumhurbaşkanı
Financial Times, Türkiye'nin '10 milyar dolarlık başarısını' yazdı! 'Hedefte Avrupa var, hazırlıklılar'
MİLLİYET.COM.TR / İngiliz basınından Financial Times (FT) gazetesi, Avrupa'nın değişen güvenlik dengeleriyle birlikte Türkiye'nin stratejik öneminin her geçen gün arttığını yazdı. ‘HEDEFTE AVRUPA VAR’ Gazete “Türkiye’nin savunma sanayisi hızla gelişiyor: Hedefinde Avrupa var” başlıklı haberinde Ukrayna'daki savaş, Orta Doğu'da yükselen gerilim ve ABD'nin Avrupa'daki askeri varlığını azaltabileceğine ilişkin beklentilerin Avrupa başkentlerini Ankara'yla ilişkilerini yeniden değerlendirmeye yönelttiğini belirtti. ‘GELECEĞİN VAZGEÇİLMEZİ’ Haberde, Türkiye'nin artık yalnızca NATO'nun önemli bir üyesi olarak değil, Avrupa'nın gelecekteki güvenlik mimarisinin vazgeçilmez parçalarından biri olarak değerlendirildiği ifade edildi. ‘TÜRKİYE KRİTİK STRATEJİK ORTAK’ Financial Times, Avrupa'da Türkiye'ye bakışın son yıllarda önemli ölçüde değiştiğine dikkat çekti. Gazete, Brüksel'deki NATO karargahında Türkiye'nin ittifakın en önemli ortaklarından biri olarak görüldüğünü aktarırken, Ankara'nın NATO'nun güneydoğu kanadındaki rolü, Karadeniz'deki etkinliği ve güçlü askeri kapasitesi nedeniyle Avrupa güvenliğinde kritik bir konuma yükseldiğini yazdı. Haberde, Türkiye'nin yalnızca jeopolitik konumuyla değil, hızla gelişen savunma sanayisi sayesinde de Avrupa için stratejik değer taşıdığı vurgulandı. AVRUPA'NIN ANKARA’YA İHTİYACI VAR FT analizinde, Avrupa ordularının özellikle insansız hava araçları, güdümlü füze sistemleri, mühimmat ve kara platformları konusunda Türk savunma sanayisinin üretim kapasitesine ihtiyaç duyduğu ifade edildi. Gazete, Avrupa ülkelerinin savunma üretimini kısa sürede artırmak isterken Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu seri üretim kabiliyeti, mühendislik altyapısı ve sanayi ölçeğinin öne çıktığını belirtti. Haberde, Türk savunma sanayisinin Avrupa NATO üyelerinin acilen ihtiyaç duyduğu sistemleri üretebilecek kapasitedeki sayılı sektörlerden biri olduğu değerlendirmesi yapıldı. '10 MİLYAR DOLARLIK BAŞARI’ Gazete, Türkiye'nin savunma sanayisinde son yıllarda yakaladığı ihracat başarısına da dikkat çekti. Haberde, geçen yıl yaklaşık 10 milyar dolarlık savunma ihracatı gerçekleştiren Türkiye'nin, bu ihracatın yarısından fazlasını NATO üyesi ülkelere yaptığı belirtildi. FT'ye göre Ankara, artan jeopolitik ağırlığını Avrupa ile daha güçlü savunma ortaklıklarına dönüştürmeyi hedeflerken, Avrupa da Türkiye'nin üretim kapasitesinden daha fazla yararlanmak istiyor. ‘TÜRKİYE BİZE YAKIN OLMALI’ Financial Times, Finlandiya Cumhurbaşkanı Alexander Stubb'ın değerlendirmelerine de geniş yer verdi. Stubb'ın, "Türkiye'nin güvenlik açısından bize olabildiğince yakın olması gerektiği anlayışına zihnimizi açmalıyız. Dünyada güç göstermek istiyorsak büyük düşünmeye başlamalıyız" sözlerine yer veren gazete, Avrupa'da Türkiye'nin stratejik önemine yönelik yaklaşımın belirgin şekilde değiştiğini vurguladı. ‘YENİ DÖNEMİN SİMGESİ’ Haberde, 7-8 Temmuz'da Ankara'da gerçekleştirilecek NATO Zirvesi'nin de bu değişimin en önemli göstergelerinden biri olduğu ifade edildi. Gazete, yıllar önce Türkiye'de düzenlenmesi planlanan ancak gerçekleşmeyen NATO zirvesinin bugün Ankara'da yapılacak olmasının Avrupa'nın Türkiye'ye bakışındaki değişimi ortaya koyduğunu yazdı. FT'ye göre zirvede yalnızca savunma harcamaları değil, Türk savunma sanayisinin Avrupa'nın güvenlik altyapısına nasıl daha fazla entegre edileceği de önemli gündem maddeleri arasında yer alacak. ‘TÜRKLER EN HAZIRLIKLI GELEN ÜLKE’ Financial Times, üst düzey NATO yetkililerinin Türkiye'ye ilişkin değerlendirmelerini de aktardı. Haberde görüşlerine yer verilen üst düzey bir NATO savunma yetkilisi, Türkiye'nin mühendislik altyapısı ve üretim kapasitesine dikkat çekerek, "Türkiye'nin sahip olduğu girişimcilik ruhu, mühendislik uzmanlığı ve endüstriyel ölçek Avrupa'da yalnızca Almanya ile kıyaslanabilecek seviyede. Ancak Türkiye çok daha rekabetçi maliyetlerle üretim yapabiliyor" değerlendirmesinde bulundu. Aynı yetkili, Türk heyetlerinin NATO toplantılarına en hazırlıklı delegasyonlardan biri olarak katıldığını belirterek, "En zor soruları soruyorlar. Yanınızda olmasını isteyeceğiniz ülkelerden biri" ifadelerini kullandı. YERLİ ÜRETİM ORANI YÜZDE 80'İN ÜZERİNE ÇIKTI FT, Türk yetkililerin savunma sanayisinde kullanılan girdilerin değer bazında yüzde 80'den fazlasının artık yerli kaynaklarla karşılandığını açıkladığını da aktardı. Gazeteye göre bu oran, Avrupa'nın tedarik zincirlerini çeşitlendirmeye çalıştığı bir dönemde Türkiye'yi önemli bir üretim merkezi haline getiriyor. ORTAK ÜRETİM MODELİ AVRUPA'DA İLGİ GÖRÜYOR Haberde, Türkiye'nin Avrupa ile savunma alanındaki ortak üretim projelerinin de hız kazandığı belirtildi. Geçtiğimiz yıl İspanya'ya, Airbus ortaklığıyla gerçekleştirilen yaklaşık 2,6 milyar avroluk eğitim uçağı satışının buna örnek gösterildiği haberde, bu modelin gelecekte farklı savunma platformlarında da uygulanabileceği ifade edildi. ‘DENKLEMDE TÜRKİYE ÖNE ÇIKIYOR’ Financial Times, Avrupa'nın Çin'e uzanan Orta Koridor ulaştırma ve enerji güzergahında Türkiye'nin merkezi konumunun da stratejik önemini artırdığına dikkat çekti. Gazete, tüm bu gelişmelerin Türkiye'yi yalnızca bölgesel bir güç olmaktan çıkarıp Avrupa'nın gelecekteki güvenlik planlarının en önemli aktörlerinden biri haline getirdiği değerlendirmesinde bulundu.
Financial Times: Türkiye Savunmada 10 Milyar Dolarlık Başarıyla Avrupa'ya OdaklandıThe world adrift
THE world is at an inflection point, in the middle of geopolitical upheaval and turmoil. It is more unstable today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Rising geopolitical tensions and fierce geoeconomic competition are contributing to instability. The old order with its rules has gone. The international system is fragmenting. Multilateralism remains under unprecedented stress. Power shifts continue to reshape the international landscape, marking the advent of a multipolar era. The disregard for international law and norms by big and regional powers has left countries having to navigate a rule-less terrain at a time of uncertainty and volatility. Hard power is back, and with a vengeance. Not that it ever went away. But now it’s the first option, not the last for powerful countries to use to bend other states to their will. Diplomacy only happens after missiles fly. The US and Israel’s attack on Iran, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s war on Gaza, Lebanon and Syria and India’s military action against Pakistan all testify to the increasing use of force. All these actions flouted international law and the legal prohibition on the use of force. They were carried out with impunity, further fragmenting an already crumbling global order. The future outlook isn’t just troubled. It appears chaotic. What should we make of this state of disorder? A number of recent books deal with a world in transition, the present disarray and what might follow. They include The Triangle of Power: Rebalancing the New World Order by Alexander Stubb, The Return of the Great Powers by Brendan Simms, and Statecraft: The New Rules of Power in a Divided World by Jack Watling. These scholarly works offer insightful though varying perspectives on the current state of play and differ in how they see the future panning out. Stubb is the president and former prime minister and foreign minister of Finland. He draws on that experience for his analysis of the international system and how to address its weaknesses. The liberal world order is in tatters, he argues, and trust that has been the basis of the international system, is broken. What happens next will depend on the interplay between the triangle of the Global West (US and Western allies), Global East (Russia, China) and Global South (the global majority). The latter is underrepresented in the current global system and wants a redistribution of power. It does not want to take sides but seeks agency in the system. What kind of international order will emerge from a divided and unstable world? Stubb sees the Global South playing a key role in rebalancing and shaping the new order. He calls for cooperative multilateralism and choosing ‘Helsinki’ over ‘Yalta’. This means accommodating the views and interests of the Global South and economically empowered middle powers by more powerful states. Cambridge historian Brendan Simms’s compelling book is about the return of “traditional geopolitics and the “new great power world”. This is seen as a departure from the post-Cold War period when international law and economic cooperation were dominant. Globalisation was valued as delivering benefits for all. But the belief that great power conflict and rivalry had ended and cooperation would outrank raw power was belied in the past decade. The world was no longer flat as interdependence came to be weaponised. Globalisation began to be reversed as a reaction to its homogenising effects and the vulnerabilities it created. Now, Simms writes, military might is valued more than economic heft, law or morality. Decisions are driven by geopolitical logic and not economic logic. Hence, “geopolitics may kill us before climate change does”. Global governance is in retreat as major powers compete for primacy. But this doesn’t mean great powers can do what they want and succeed. There are constraining factors. Nevertheless, Simms sees great powers dominating the world in the foreseeable future and shaping the new order. But without a single hegemon. He points to the risks of war between the great powers and urges the need for a strategy that recognises that reality and seeks to deal with it. Statecraft’s focus is on how states compete in a dynamic contemporary milieu, how they can exercise leverage and influence and effectively pursue their interests even when they do not possess the majority of power in that environment. Watling is principally concerned with how countries can achieve better strategic outcomes through their statecraft at a time of chaos. States, he says, pursue strategies but it is humans that bear the consequences. In today’s fraught security landscape, the need for statecraft has never been greater. This is especially so because today the competition is multipolar not bipolar while the arena for competition has vastly expanded. In a divided world what matters is not a country’s size or economic resources. The states that thrive are those that practice statecraft across all domains, not just defence. A broader question is raised by today’s rule-less international environment where big and regional powers act unilaterally and wantonly resort to force to achieve their objectives. Does this mean might-makes-right? If recent developments are anything to go by, the answer is no. Stronger powers have been unable to prevail because modern warfare, with its drones, missiles and asymmetrical strategies, has levelled the ground between them and smaller/weaker countries The US/Israel-Iran war showed the failure of military force. Its use did not compel Iran to surrender. In today’s world, military superiority does not guarantee dominance or victory. This is testified by America’s Operation Epic Fury, Russia’s unwon war against Ukraine and India’s aggression against Pakistan last year. Then there is the middle powers question. Can they reshape geopolitics or is that just for great powers to do? The debate continues. Some say only great powers move the board. Others see middle power activism as the new normal, as an important aspect of the emerging global order. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told Davos which side he is on. Middle powers acting together could deal with bigger powers from a position of strength. He was acknowledging their power to reshape the world. Countries must adapt to a shifting global environment. But the problem isn’t just complexity. It’s a fractured and unmoored world that will remain volatile and unpredictable for the foreseeable future. The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. Published in Dawn, June 29th, 2026
Küresel Sistem Sürükleniyor: Soğuk Savaş'tan Bu Yana En Büyük İstikrarsızlıkThe Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world
The Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world The World Today iallan.drupal 8 June 2026 Europe must resist the temptation to become a fortress in a closed West. Instead, amid America and China’s gepolitical struggle, it has the history and values to be the place where the rest of the world finds common cause, writes Grégoire Roos. Introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’ The international order by which much of the world, for better or for worse, has lived for nearly eight decades is eroding. What might succeed it? To try to answer that question and the many others that come with it, we are introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’, a strand for fresh ideas about the direction of global order. To start, Grégoire Roos presents his vision of a new role for Europe – we hope you enjoy it and the occasional essays, interviews and conversations that will follow. Visitors to the recent exhibitions in Germany commemorating the 250th anniversary of the painter Caspar David Friedrich would have been struck by the peculiar, almost mystical, posture of his solitary figures on the edge of the void. So intent are they on the world dissolving into mist before them that they seem almost to overlook the first light gathering beyond it. Neither simply melancholic nor entirely despairful, those are figures of hesitation – poised between what is fading and what is beginning. Carney’s speech said what many European leaders hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Friedrich’s wanderers offer a fitting metaphor for Europe’s predicament today: a civilization pressed to decide whether it wishes merely to remember the world it once shaped, or to help mould the world now coming into view. That question is no longer aesthetic or philosophical alone. It has become brutally strategic for the whole continent. In this regard, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s speech at Davos earlier this year was striking not because it told us anything entirely new, but because it said plainly what many European leaders still hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Finnish president Alexander Stubb, for his part, has moved from describing a ‘triangle of power’, that is, a world order structured around three geopolitical blocs: the Global North, led by the United States and Europe, the Global East, led by China and the Global South, with no leading power. He now admits that it looks more like a ‘rectangle’, since the old transatlantic reflex can no longer be taken for granted given the accelerating split between the United States and Europe. And hovering over both is the bracing admonition of S. Jaishankar, India’s minister of external affairs, that Europe must outgrow the habit of thinking that ‘Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.’ Together, these interventions amount to a strategic summons. Europe can afford neither nostalgia nor delusion. The temptation is to respond to this moment in one of two familiar and equally sterile ways. The first is melancholy: to speak as if the answer lay in restoring the vanished certainties of the post‑1945 or post‑1989 order. The second is mimicry: to conclude that, since the age is one of hard power, Europe must simply become colder, harsher, more transactional. Both instincts miss the point. Europe’s opportunity to recover relevance and purpose lies elsewhere. A wider European grammar By Europe, what is meant here is not only the European Union but a wider civilizational basin encompassing all European societies that belong to the continent’s historical argument even when they do not sit within the same institutions. There are already faint signs of such a wider European grammar: the European Political Community, for all its looseness, convenes nearly the whole continent around a language of common stability and prosperity that reaches well beyond the EU’s formal borders. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. That opportunity is to become what one might call the centre that holds. The phrase matters. Europe has long been haunted by the fear that ‘the centre cannot hold’, W.B. Yeats’s 1919 description of post‑First World War Europe, where ‘mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’. Today’s fear is that pluralism dissolves into chaos, that compromise decays into weakness, and that openness ends in fragmentation. Yet, for the centre to hold, it cannot close itself against plurality. It must remain open. This is not civilization as enclosure, still less as the closed‑West idiom now favoured in Washington. It is civilization in a radically different sense: not walls, but, in the words of Pope Leo XIV, ‘bridges through dialogue and encounter’. A centre holds not by suppressing difference, but by giving it form – by accommodating plurality without surrendering coherence. Europe’s deepest historical achievement has never been domination as such. It has been the difficult art of giving form to plurality; of building institutions in which rival powers, rival classes, rival memories and rival truths can coexist without tearing the political fabric apart. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. — Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog. Photo: DeAgostini / Getty Images. This is not a claim of innocence. Europe knows too much of empire, hierarchy, hypocrisy and violence to indulge in moral self‑worship. It has preached universalism while practising exclusion; it has spoken in the language of law while often living by exceptions. Precisely for that reason, any serious European project for the 21st century must begin not in self‑congratulation but in humility. An ‘open centre’ is not a closed fortress with better manners. It is not a sanctimonious core issuing instructions to a wayward periphery. It is not the centre to which everyone must return, but the point at which differences can still be held in balance, and a common direction can still be forged. In that sense, it is not an exclusive point of reference, but it has the potential to act as a force for measure and equilibrium in a world of excess and instability. Jaishankar’s witty provocation should be heard in Europe not as an insult but as a moral reality check. Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America do not organize their priorities around Europe’s anxieties. Their concerns lie elsewhere: development, debt, technology, borders, food security, urbanization, energy access and sovereign room for manoeuvre. If Europe wishes to matter in such a world, it must first accept that it is no longer the measure of all things. And, paradoxically, that act of decentring is a moral necessity as well as a geopolitical one. Europe’s ‘fourth way’ French philosopher Paul Ricœur understood early that the true test of universality in a plural world is whether it can be translated without turning imperial. His idea of ‘linguistic hospitality’ offers a clue: Europe will recover credibility not by renouncing universality, but by learning to translate it. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. But accepting that the world is no longer Europe‑centric does not mean renouncing the European vocation altogether. It means redefining it. In the emerging configuration sketched by Carney and Stubb, Europe’s ‘fourth way’ would not be a nostalgic third way warmed over for a harsher age, but a path between American volatility, Chinese‑style authoritarian capitalism, and a wider world increasingly tempted by transactional hedging. Europe’s offer would be neither hegemonic nor passive, neither imperial nor merely procedural, but something rarer: a power of reconciliation. It would be the proposition that liberty can be married to protection, innovation to conscience, prosperity to social cohesion, sovereignty to cooperation, and identity to openness. Carney’s phrase – actually borrowed from Stubb – for this is ‘value‑based realism’. The term is useful precisely because it refuses both sentimental idealism and crude simplification. Yet, such a project cannot be proclaimed abroad before it is built at home. World order – or order abroad – rests on order at home. This is the point on which too much Brussels rhetoric and too much national politics across the continent still founders. Europe’s external incoherence is not only the result of institutional complexity. It is the outward symptom of an inward crisis: distrust in politics, social atomization, cultural pessimism, waning prosperity, exhausted public services, generational frustration and, perhaps worst of all, the growing sense that democratic governments are failing not only in action, but also in imagination. 58% of respondents across 10 countries in Europe were dissatisfied with how democracy was working, according to a Pew study. The malaise is measurable. In 2025, Pew found a median 58 per cent across 23 countries dissatisfied with how democracy was working, with satisfaction in Europe ranging from 75 per cent in Sweden to just 19 per cent in Greece. No society will sustain ambition abroad for long if its citizens experience only drift at home. Politics depends on the existence of what Hannah Arendt aptly called a ‘common world’ in which citizens still feel they have a stake, a voice and a future. Once that world frays, public life gives way to resentment, passivity or tribal retreat. Foreign policy follows the same rule. A society unsure of its own future cannot sustain ambition abroad for long. A Europe that doubts itself will oscillate between sermon and retreat, proclamation and paralysis. Arendt, writing in the aftermath of Europe’s totalitarian collapse, understood as much. Domestic renewal So, the first chapter of any credible European playbook for the new world order is domestic renewal. Not as a preface to geopolitics. But as geopolitics’ very condition of possibility. Europe needs a new civic and material bargain with its own citizens. It needs to prove, in visible ways, that democracy can still build, protect and inspire. That means affordable and reliable energy, yes, but also housing in which the least privileged can imagine living with a sense of pride and dignity; transport and digital infrastructures that reduce distance rather than reproduce fractures; universities and research ecosystems capable of attracting not only the best minds unsettled by America’s academic crackdown, but also talent from Africa, Latin America and Asia; culture and the arts made accessible to everyone; manufacturing strength in the sectors that will define technological sovereignty; public institutions that are competent enough to be trusted and simple enough to be legible. The World Today Related work The decline of the West and the rise of ‘the Rest’ will lead to a new world order Recent efforts to present Europe as a haven for research freedom suggest that some have begun to grasp the stakes, even if slogans still fall well short of strategy. Yet in this age, power requires more than capability. It requires promise. Europe’s greatest strategic deficit is not merely military or fiscal; it is narrative. It does not sufficiently know how to speak of itself except as a market, a rulebook or a risk‑averse peace project. None of that is irrelevant. But none of it is enough. Europe must relearn how to talk about greatness without drifting into a new form of megalomanic expansionism; about ambition without arrogance; about civilization without exclusion. It must once again sound like a place that knows where it wants to go. If it succeeds in doing so at home, then its external projection becomes clearer. The open centre would not present itself to the wider world as a tutor. It would act as a partner of choice in solving concrete problems: scaling research cooperation, widening access to education and training, financing infrastructure that is sustainable rather than extractive, designing AI and digital standards that protect human dignity and fair competition, building resilient supply chains without demanding ideological conformity or falling into moral lectures, and strengthening multilateral rules while accepting that those rules must better reflect non‑European realities. The open centre does not merely invite others into institutions Europe built yesterday; it is willing to reshape those institutions so that others can recognize themselves within them tomorrow. Inclusion is not charity That principle matters particularly in global governance. Europe cannot go on invoking the legitimacy of multilateralism while resisting any meaningful redistribution of voice within it. If the world’s demographic, economic and political gravity is shifting south and east, then institutional authority must begin to follow. That would start with Africa and greater Asia gaining a seat at the table of the permanent members of the UN Security Council – even if that alone would obviously not save the United Nations. A Europe serious about being an open centre would do the same more broadly: not out of self‑denial, but out of strategic intelligence. Inclusion is not charity. It is the condition under which legitimacy survives. Such openness also means taking science and risk seriously. A centre that holds in the 21st century cannot be merely juridical or diplomatic; it must be epistemic. It must be able to absorb uncertainty, marshal expertise and govern frontier technologies without either naivety or paralysis. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. Europe should not accept the false choice between hyper‑regulation and techno‑anarchy. It can be the place where innovation scales without shrinking the individual, and where technology remains bounded by dignity, judgment and purpose. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. The real point, then, is not that Europe should seek to become ‘No.1’. That would be to mistake yesterday’s grammar of power for tomorrow’s. Europe’s ambition should be more original than that. It should aim at becoming the indispensable organizer of cooperation among powers that do not fully trust one another but cannot flourish alone. It should become the arena in which compatibility is made possible: between markets and morals, states and societies, science and politics, plurality and cohesion. That is what an open centre is for. The virtue of steadiness This would also answer a deeper moral question. In a fragmented world, the highest political virtue is no longer purity; it is steadiness. For the centre to hold, it cannot impose uniformity as a citadel of self‑reference. It must remain open; what Édouard Glissant called a space of relation – an ‘initiation to totality without renouncing the particular’. It is to prevent disintegration. It is to create enough trust, enough credibility, enough competence and enough shared aspiration that differences do not become fatal. Having spent the past 12 centuries wrestling with plurality in a confined space, Europe is unusually equipped for that task. It has learned, often painfully, that coexistence is a political achievement, not a natural state. The world may yet find that capability useful. Viktor Orbán’s defeat may point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. None of this will happen through managerialism alone. The preliminary conclusion is therefore also an opening: Europe now needs political leadership driven by substance, steadiness and the audacity to dream. Substance, because rhetoric without delivery will deepen the contempt already stalking democratic politics. Steadiness, because the coming years will reward those who can sustain direction amid shocks. And audacity to dream, because no great political community has ever renewed itself by balance sheets alone. ‘Dream’ is not the opposite of ‘resolve’. In world politics, it is often its truest companion. Hungary’s recent turn after Viktor Orbán’s defeat may, in this respect, point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. Fear can mobilize; only a dream can awaken. That is why the next cycle of major European elections matters so much, beginning with France’s presidential contest in 2027. The question in those campaigns will not simply be who governs. It will be whether Europe continues to be narrated as a civilization in decline, oscillating between fear and nostalgia, or whether it rediscovers the ambition to shape the age in its own register. The continent does not need leaders who promise a return to the 19th century with better apps. It needs leaders willing to state, calmly and convincingly, that Europe can still be a maker of order because it is willing first to become a maker of confidence, possibility and purpose at home.
Chatham House: Avrupa, ABD-Çin Rekabetinde Açık Merkez OlmalıWhy a single 'peace deal' for Ukraine war just won't work
The time is ripe for European leaders to set aside the self-licking summits in European capitals and get in the room with the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia to orchestrate a modern-day Helsinki Conference. A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking agreements, each of which will be incredibly difficult to negotiate, but all of which will be vital if we are to avoid a general war in Europe. In a recent post on X, former U.S. diplomat Dan Fried, commenting on the June 7 E3 Leaders’ Statement on peace in Ukraine, said, “If Russia wants to end the war it can, you know, end the war.” It’s important to pause here and note that Fried was the State Department Coordinator for Sanctions Policy from 2013 until 2017. I know, because I was directly involved at the time, that Fried is the architect of the policy of making Russia sanctions permanent by linking them to the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement, which Russia and Ukraine interpreted in radically different ways. The main aim of sanctions conditionality was therefore to delay any possibility of peaceful settlement, and in that it succeeded. Eleven years on, Fried’s remark echoes a common line of argument in pro-war Western circles: that Russia could simply end the war without a negotiated settlement. And yet an unconditional about-face by Russia is quite obviously never going to happen, and so the comment serves only to prolong the war. The E3 statement flowed from the same logic. It offered nothing new or unexpected. Critically, it reiterated the line that roughly $300 billion of Russian assets will remain immobilized until Russia “ceases its war of aggression and compensates Ukraine for the damage caused by the war.” The current World Bank estimate of the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine stands at $588 billion. So, the E3 position amounts to confirmation that Russia will never see its money again and moreover will still have $288 billion left to pay. This, I fear, is another example of Fried’s logic — that peace in Ukraine is indeed possible, but only on terms that Russia would be unable or unwilling to accept. As Western mainstream media carpet bombs the world with news that Ukraine is turning the tide in the war and could still win, then the calculus may be among Western policy hawks that continuing the war is no bad thing. It’s certainly clear that no one appears in a rush. The E3 statement follows a sixteen-month period of endless and repetitive meetings by European leaders and Zelensky in which everyone violently agrees, but to which the Russians are never invited. Only in recent months, notably since President Donald Trump’s Alaska Summit with Putin, has the topic of a negotiated end to the Ukraine war slowly bubbled to the surface in Europe. President Alexander Stubb of Finland, President Emmanuel Macron of France, Prime Minister Bart de Wever of Belgium have at various times dipped their toes in the water of suggesting diplomatic talks with Russia. Last week, Zelensky himself issued an open letter to Putin about a possible meeting. But, being that the letter contained several pages of personal barbs and insults about Putin, it is hard to see this as anything more than a self-licking stunt, of the type Dan Fried would support. The Europeans and Zelensky appear dug in for the long haul. A senior Russian contact remarked to me recently that the Europeans spend a lot of time talking about the possibility of talks, but not the substance of what might be on the agenda. In truth, a vast amount of work will be needed in preparatory negotiations to map out the shape of a future peace settlement, requiring a clarity of focus that has hitherto been missing. A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking deals, possibly negotiated separately with different signatories. Talk of a single ‘peace deal’ for Ukraine is a lazy over-simplification. The latest E3 statement bundles up separate issues in the same basket as does the now dormant US brokered plan. A peace settlement for Ukraine will require, inter alia, the following. A bilateral peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the U.S. and others. The existing U.S.-brokered draft is the right place to start, as that includes the most contentious issue of territory, and in particular the future status of the remaining territory in Donetsk which Russia has not conquered. It would also need to cover sensitive topics such as the size of Ukraine’s army, Ukrainian children who were removed to Russia, and minority languages in Ukraine. A clear plan and timeline for Ukraine to join the European Union. This can only be negotiated bilaterally by the EU and Ukraine, without U.S. or British involvement. It is arguably as difficult as a bilateral peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Zelensky has said he wants to see Ukrainian accession by 2027, but this is not going to happen, and not only because the war may still be ongoing. The Europeans aren’t over eager about Ukraine joining because Ukraine is nowhere near ready, and Europe can’t afford it. Chancellor Merz has recently resurfaced the idea of “associate membership,” in which Ukraine gets no voting rights or money. Every rational observer should be able to judge that many Ukrainians will want clarity on the glidepath towards EU membership as a condition for ending the war. An agreement between Russia and Europe, including the United Kingdom, on the future shape of their relationship. The third issue is equally as complex. Should Ukraine eventually join the EU, then it would join existing former Soviet and Warsaw Pact members (the Balts and Poland) who frame Russia as an existential threat. Relations between Europe and Russia are more shuttered today than they were during the Soviet era. Europe needs cheap energy to stem the tide of self-imposed deindustrialization; Russia would like European investment again and a more open people-to-people relationship. There will need to be a settlement on how sanctions against Russia are eased during a post-war period. Ignoring an EU-Russia deal risks pressing the pause button on a future general war at a time when Europe is rapidly rearming, An agreement within NATO. A peace settlement for Ukraine will only land when its future NATO aspiration is taken decisively off of the table. Anyone who still believes that Russia will give up on this clearest of redlines is dangerously misguided. Ukraine needs cast iron security guarantees that should involve a hard commitment to boots on the ground should Russia renege on its commitments.This will require Russia to have confidence that NATO isn’t stoking the fire in the background to reignite tensions as a pretext for intervention. These are incredibly complex issues and will require U.S. leadership to shift the Europeans into line. The NATO-Russia Council could have provided a forum for discussion and deconfliction but was formally disbanded in December 2025. Perhaps a NATO-Ukraine-Russia Council might emerge, to take its place, reopening a vital avenue for military dialogue and deconfliction. Amid signs that the Trump Administration is tiring of the Ukraine peace process, the time is ripe for a serious push to bring the disastrous war in Ukraine to a close. Rather than the Europeans and Americans tussling over who should be in charge of the negotiations, the truth is that every Western nation will have a role to play, together with Ukraine and Russia, to hammer out the various agreements needed for peace. That may require a grand summit similar in scale to the Helsinki Conference of 1975. On the back of the E3 Statement, however, I am not holding my breath.
Ukrayna'da kalıcı barış için tek bir anlaşma yeterli olmayacakFinland's Stubb urges Europe to step up and lead peace talks with Russia
Finnish President Alexander Stubb also outlined a three-step approach for restarting diplomacy with Moscow.
Finnish leader dismisses intel allegations about Russia plotting to attack Baltic states
Alexander Stubb emphasized that he “reads all reports from special services” and does so “very carefully”
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act now
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act now Expert comment LToremark 11 May 2026 The World Health Assembly in Geneva presents a narrow window of opportunity for action to save multilateral cooperation on global health. Three things need to happen. The 79th World Health Assembly (WHA) – the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO) – will take place in Geneva on 18–23 May amid major challenges to global health cooperation. The United States has withdrawn from WHO, leaving a $600 million funding gap and forcing WHO to cut its budget for 2026-27 by 20 per cent. Bilateral health deals under the America First Global Health Strategy are being signed across Africa and Asia, bypassing multilateral frameworks and transferring costs onto the partner countries without commensurate power. In February, WHO Director General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus described 2025 as potentially the most difficult in the organization’s history. Two recent speeches provide the clearest political diagnosis of the current international moment. On 5 March, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney told the Australian parliament that the rules-based order is not in transition – it is in rupture. That same day – and building on Carney’s speech – Finland’s President Alexander Stubb opened the Raisina Dialogue by arguing that the Global South will decide what the next world order looks like, and that the West has one last chance to prove it is capable of dialogue rather than monologue. Although neither mentioned global health explicitly, both were talking about it. Related work The good, the bad, and the possible: What the America First Global Health Strategy means for Africa – and the world As global health diplomats head to Geneva, the question WHA79 must answer is not whether WHO needs reforming, but who will drive that reform, in whose interests and on what political basis. Although Carney and Stubb approach the issue from very different angles, they converge on a clear answer: middle powers must act with urgency – and Western middle powers must act in genuine partnership with the Global South. Carney’s argument is strategic: great powers can compel; middle powers can convene. But not every country can convene because convening power flows from trust, which is earned through consistency between stated values and demonstrated actions. In the global health context, this matters enormously. WHO has never had enforcement powers; its authority has always rested on the legitimacy conferred by member states who believe it acts in their collective interest. That legitimacy is now under structural pressure. A WHO seen as a residual institution – one that the powerful use when convenient and abandon when not – cannot perform its core functions of surveillance, standard-setting and emergency coordination. The middle powers who remain committed to it must therefore act not merely as supporters but as active co-architects of its renewal. Carney’s concept of ‘variable geometry’ is equally important for global health. Rather than waiting for a comprehensive multilateral settlement that may take years, middle powers should build different coalitions for different issues, based on shared values and common interests. This is not a retreat from multilateralism, Carney argues, but its evolution. For global health, the implication is direct. Issues such as pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, digital health governance and climate-health linkages each require a different coalition, moving at different speeds. The WHO reform process is necessary but slow. Variable-geometry coalitions can build the normative and financial infrastructure that a reformed global health architecture will eventually need to incorporate. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control showed what is possible. Similar courageous steps must now be taken in other areas, such as negotiations on a pandemic agreement or possibly in relation to digital health. Stubb’s argument adds a political dimension to Carney’s intervention: the Global South cannot be a passive recipient of whatever order emerges – it is the decisive actor. The triangular contest he describes between a Global West, Global East and Global South is directly visible in WHO’s governing bodies. How Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa engage at WHA79 – whether they drive the reform process or treat it as a Northern preoccupation – will shape the outcome far more than any European position paper. Stubb’s challenge to the West is blunt: stop treating engagement with the Global South as a communications exercise and start treating it as a power-sharing negotiation. The global health corollary is equally blunt: a reformed WHO governance structure that still reflects 1948 power distributions, rather than today’s distribution of disease burden and health capacity, will not be legitimate in the world that is now emerging. In his speech, Stubb called for concrete structural reform of global multilateral institutions: new permanent representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America in global institutions, not as a rhetorical concession but as a condition of legitimacy. Passivity is not a strategy, he said – a charge directed at Europe as much as anywhere. For the European and other Western middle powers who dominate WHO’s financing and governing bodies, this is uncomfortable but necessary. Being present is not the same as exercising leadership and showing willingness to cede structural power. Professing commitment to multilateralism while resisting the governance reforms that would make multilateral institutions genuinely representative is precisely the double standard that Stubb warns will cost the West its last chance.
Global health reform cannot wait for a new world order. Middle powers must act nowSalı günü CHP grubunda kim konuşacak? TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş'tan açıklama
TBMM Başkanı Numan Kurtulmuş, "Avrupa'nın 'Biz bize yeteriz.' deme lüksü kalmamıştır. Avrupa'nın içine kapanma lüksü de kalmamıştır. Avrupa içerisindeki bütün ırkçılık, İslam karşıtlığı, yabancı düşmanlığı gibi Avrupa siyasetini rotasından çıkaran gelişmelere rağmen AB mutlaka genişleyerek kendisini korumak mecburiyetindedir. Genişlemeyi düşündükleri zaman ilk görecekleri yer Türkiye'dir." ifadesini kullandı. Kurtulmuş, Finlandiya ve İsveç'e yönelik resmi ziyaretinin dönüşünde gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtladı. Finlandiya ve İsveç'in NATO süreçlerinde birtakım gerilimlerin bulunduğunu aktaran Kurtulmuş, NATO'ya girmesinden sonra her iki ülkenin Türkiye ile ilişkilerinde yeni bir dönemin başladığını dile getirdi. Ziyarete ilişkin değerlendirmelerde bulunan Kurtulmuş, her iki ülkenin meclis başkanının 28-29 Haziran'da İstanbul'da düzenlenecek NATO Parlamenter Zirvesi'ne katılacağını belirtti. Bir gazetecinin "zirveye NATO ülkelerinin tamamının meclis başkanlarının gelip gelmeyeceğine" yönelik sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, 20'nin üzerinde meclis başkanının zirveye katılacağını bildirdiğini, daha zamanın olduğunu ve son ana doğru katılacak meclis başkanı sayısının artacağını söyledi. İsveç Kralı Carl 16. Gustaf ile görüşmesinin sorulması üzerine Kurtulmuş, çok samimi bir görüşme gerçekleştirdiklerini belirterek, "Yaklaşık 40 dakika sürdü, bu da Türkiye'ye verdiği önemi gösteriyor. Hem ikili ilişkileri hem bölgesel konuları hem Avrupa'nın geleceğiyle ilgili konuları hem de dünyanın geleceğiyle ilgili konuları, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletlerin fonksiyonsuz hale gelmesi gibi başlıkları değerlendirdik. Büyük oranda müşterek fikirlere sahip olduğumuzu gördüm. İyi bir görüşme oldu." diye konuştu. Bir gazetecinin, yaptığı ziyaretlerdeki muhataplarına yönelik "Türkiye'nin etrafında ve küresel ölçekte yaşanan krizleri onlar da derinden hissediyor mu?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, bu konunun İsveç Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsündeki yuvarlak masa toplantısının soru cevap kısmında gündeme geldiğini hatırlattı. Türkiye'nin şu anda dünyayı yakından ilgilendiren hangi küresel sorun varsa hepsinin fiziki, fikri ve siyasi olarak tam ortasında yer aldığını dile getiren Kurtulmuş, Türkiye'nin, bu sorunların hiçbirine uzak duramayacağını, bigane kalamayacağını vurguladı. Kurtulmuş, bu nedenle ülkelerin, sorunların hepsiyle ilgili Türkiye'nin ne düşündüğünü öğrenmek istediğini söyledi. Türkiye için dış politikanın sadece belli kurumlar aracılığıyla yapılacak bir iş olmadığını belirten Kurtulmuş, parlamenter diplomasinin öne çıktığını, parlamenter diplomasinin ağırlığını daha fazla artıracaklarını, bu çalışmaların Türkiye için milli bir vazife, zorunluluk olduğunu dile getirdi. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Finansmana erişim konusunda ekonomi yönetimine talimat verdim! "AVRUPA'NIN 'BİZ BİZE YETERİZ' DEME LÜKSÜ KALMAMIŞTIR" Bir gazetecinin Kurtulmuş'un Finlandiya Cumhurbaşkanı Alexander Stubb ile görüşmesini ve Stubb'ın "AB, üye sayısını 40 ülkeye çıkarmak için çaba göstermeli ve İngiltere, Kanada, Türkiye, Norveç ve İzlanda'yı potansiyel üye adayları olarak göstermelidir." sözlerini sorması üzerine Kurtulmuş, ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın ikinci dönemine başlamasıyla birlikte Avrupa ile Amerika arasında, Avrupa'nın güvenliği konusunda ciddi ihtilafların ortaya çıktığını dile getirdi. AB'nin yeni perspektiflere ihtiyaç duyduğunu vurgulayan Kurtulmuş, şöyle konuştu: "Aynı tezleri tekrarlamanın bir anlamı yok. Bunları çok net şekilde, açıklıkla söylüyoruz. Burada Avrupa'nın 'Biz bize yeteriz.' deme lüksü kalmamıştır. Avrupa'nın içine kapanma lüksü de kalmamıştır. Avrupa içerisindeki bütün ırkçılık, İslam karşıtlığı, yabancı düşmanlığı gibi Avrupa siyasetini rotasından çıkaran gelişmelere rağmen AB mutlaka genişleyerek kendisini korumak mecburiyetindedir. Genişlemeyi düşündükleri zaman ilk görecekleri yer Türkiye'dir. Finlandiya'da Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Stubb'ın bunu da açıklıkla kabul ettiğini ve etrafına anlatmaya başladığını da gördüm." "Görüşmelerde, Ukrayna konusunda özellikle Trump'ın tavrı Avrupa'da güvensizlik yaratıyor duygusu oluştu mu?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, ABD-AB ilişkilerine dair görüşlerine hiç kimsenin "Hayır, öyle değil." demediğini, "Trump'ın özellikle ikinci döneminde Avrupa ile Amerika arasındaki görüş ayrılıkları NATO'yu da etkisizleştiriyor." cümlesini bilerek kullandığını söyledi. Türkiye'yi bu ülkelerin ileride vazgeçilmez görme ihtimallerinin olup olmadığının sorulması üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Oraya doğru ilerliyor." ifadesini kullandı. Artık ne iki kutuplu ne de tek kutuplu bir dünyanın var olduğunu dile getiren Kurtulmuş, hiçbir ülke, kıta ve bölgenin tek başına dünyayı yönetemeyeceğini, bunun açık bir gerçeklik olduğunu vurguladı. Halkalı-Kapıkule arasında tarihi adım! 4 saatlik yolculuk 1,5 saate düşüyor TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş, şöyle konuştu: "Bu kadar çatışmanın, kavganın ve gürültünün olmasının temel nedenlerinden birisi de bu. Ortaya çıkmaya başlayan 'çok kutupluluk' dediğimiz hatta ben bu durumu 'çok merkezlilik' kavramının daha doğru ifade ettiğini düşünüyorum, dolayısıyla çok merkezli bir dünyaya doğru gidiyoruz. Batılıların 'orta güç' olarak tanımladığı ülkelerin ortaya çıkmakta olduğunu görüyoruz. Hiç şüphesiz Türkiye bunlardan birisi. Jeostratejik önemi, jeokültürel avantajları, tarihi birikimi ve potansiyeli itibarıyla Türkiye bu ülkelerden birisidir. Türkiye birçok ülke tarafından aranılan bir müttefik haline gelecektir." "SORUNLARA ÇÖZÜM BULMAKTA AVRUPA KITASININ ÇARESİZ KALDIĞINI DÜŞÜNÜYORUM" Bir gazetecinin Avrupa'da lider sorununun bulunduğunu belirtmesi ve görüşmelerde Türkiye'nin Sudan'da, Somali'de, Libya'da yaptıklarının görülüp görülmediğine yönelik sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, Avrupa'da lider sorununun olduğunu, önemli liderlerin döneminin özellikle Angela Merkel'den sonra sona erdiğini söyledi. Avrupa siyasetinin kayda değer lider çıkaramadığını dile getiren Kurtulmuş, şöyle devam etti: "Bu sonucun Avrupa siyasetinin doğasından kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum. Kendi içlerinde politik ihtilafları başarılı bir entegrasyon tecrübesi olan Avrupa Birliği ile belli bir aşamaya kadar getirdiler, siyasi entegrasyonu sağladılar. Avrupa Parlamentosuyla, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi gibi birçok kurumla… Ekonomik açıdan para birliğini büyük oranda temin ettiler. Ama ortak bir savunma gücüne bundan 20 sene evvel sahip olabilselerdi bugün çok köklü bir Avrupa kimliğinden bahsedecektik ve bu kimlik doğal olarak da Avrupa'nın tamamına liderlik yapabilecek siyasi figürleri çıkaracaktı. Bu kadar dağınık ortamda Avrupa'yı kapsayacak kuvvetli bir siyasi figüre de çok ihtiyaçları yok. Çünkü kendi aralarında fikirleri farklılaştı. Daha kötü gelişmeler de oldu. 20 sene evvel Avrupa için düşünülemeyecek birçok çıkış, örneğin aşırı sağın bu kadar yükselmesi, yabancı düşmanlığının ana akım siyasetleri bu kadar etkiler hale gelmesi, İslam düşmanlığının artması aslında Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin 'ortak sözlü anayasası' diyebileceğimiz değerler sisteminde büyük tahribatlara neden oldu. Dolayısıyla hem siyasi birliği gerektirecek siyasal birlik atmosferinde törpülenmeler oldu hem de toplumsal normlarda özellikle aşırı sağ akımlar Avrupa siyasetinin ana gövdesini büyük oranda tahrip etti. Rusya'nın Kırım'ı işgaliyle başlayan süreçte de bir tepki geliştiremedikleri için, sorunlara çözüm bulmakta Avrupa kıtasının çaresiz kaldığını düşünüyorum." Avrupa'nın bu tablodan çıkıp çıkamayacağına yönelik soru üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Söylediklerimi zaten kendi aralarında konuşuyorlar. Benim söylediğim kadar açık söylemiyorlar belki ama gidişatın farkındalar ve bu durumdan çıkmak için gayret gösteriyorlar." dedi. "BATILI DOSTLARIMIZIN ARTIK BU MAZERETLERİ ESKİSİ GİBİ İFADE ETMEDİKLERİNİ GÖRÜYORUM" Bir gazetecinin "İsrail'in Lübnan'a, İran'a bu şekilde saldırmasının, Gazze'de bunları yapmasının Avrupa'nın güvenliğini de tehdit edecek hale geldiğini düşünüyorlar mı?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, Avrupa'nın güvenliğini tehdit edecek bir algının oluştuğunu zannetmediğini ancak bundan 1-2 sene önce Gazze konusunda, Filistin konusunda, İsrail'in saldırganlığı konusunda konuştuklarında "Öyle diyorsunuz ama şunlar da var." diyerek mazeret üreten Batılı dostların artık bu mazeretleri eskisi gibi ifade etmediklerini söyledi. TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş, şu ifadeleri kullandı: "Ortada açık bir saldırganlık ve soykırım var. Gazze topraklarında başlayan çok sert bir 'apartheid' rejim uygulaması var. Lübnan'da fiili bir işgal var. Bunların hiçbirisinin Amerika ve İsrail'in İran'da başlattığı savaşla uzaktan yakından ilgisi yok. İsrail artık giderek savunulamaz bir ülke konumuna geliyor. Netanyahu ve çetesinin tamamen yalnızlaşacaklarını düşünüyorum." Bir gazetecinin, Türkiye'nin savaş ortamında peş peşe barış zirveleri gerçekleştirdiğini, dünya ölçeğinde 5-6 organizasyona ev sahipliği yaptığını belirtmesi üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Ortalama bir Avrupa ülkesi bunlardan bir tanesini bir yılda ancak yapabilir. Bu da Türkiye'nin gücünü gösteriyor, algıyı çok olumlu hale getiriyor. Dışarda yeni bir perspektif sunabilen, bu kadar türbülansın ortasında istikrarı koruyabilen bir ülke olarak Türkiye'nin hem Rusya-Ukrayna hem de Amerika-İran gibi konularda arabuluculuk yapabilen, en azından uzlaştırmacı, fikir üretebilen bir ülke görüntüsü var, bunlar çok kıymetli." değerlendirmesinde bulundu. Parlamentolar Arası Birlik (PAB) 152. Genel Kurulunun İstanbul'da yapıldığının hatırlatılması üzerine Kurtulmuş, başarılı, herkesin memnun kaldığı bir organizasyonu tamamladıklarını vurguladı. Rahmi Koç'un 'Kürt kadın' ifadelerine soruşturma! "ÇOK AÇIK ŞEKİLDE İNSANLIĞA KARŞI SUÇLAR İŞLENİYOR" Bir gazetecinin "Türkiye bu tür zirveleri peş peşe gerçekleştirirken İsrail'in bölgedeki saldırganlığının önüne nasıl geçeceğiz? İsrail'in Lübnan’a saldırıları var. Bu sorun nasıl çözülecek?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, şu değerlendirmelerde bulundu: "Bunun çözümünde en kestirme yol, Netanyahu hükümetinin arkasındaki destekçilerinin bu desteklerinden vazgeçmeleridir. Çok açık şekilde insanlığa karşı suçlar işleniyor. Yapılan o kadar uluslararası müzakereye ve anlaşmalara rağmen bırakın Gazze'de ateşkesin sağlanması ve insani yardımların yapılabilmesini, dediğiniz gibi yeni bir savaşı, işgali ısrarla sürdürüyorlar. Gazze'nin işgaline ilave olarak Batı Şeria'da köy köy, kasaba kasaba, ev ev işgali devam ettiriyorlar. Beyrut'u bombalıyorlar. Daha dün Litani Nehri'nin kenarındaki tarihi kaleyi işgal eden İsrail, dur durak bilmiyor. Başta ABD olmak üzere İsrail'in arkasında bu desteği veren ülkeler İsrail kadar sorumsuzluk içerisindeler. Burada özellikle İran'a yönelik savaşın başlatılması bir kere daha ortaya koydu ki bölgedeki savaşla ilgili Amerika ile İsrail arasında hedefleri bakımından çok ciddi farklılıklar var. Netanyahu kendi kişisel siyaseti bakımından olumlu bir sonuç elde etmeye çalışıyor. Rakip ve düşman olarak ilan ettiği İran'ı bir şekilde dizginlemek, yapabilirse İran'da bir rejim değişikliği yapmak, değişiklik olmayacağını gördükten sonra kendince kazanım olarak kabul ettiği Hürmüz Boğazı’nın açık tutulması ve nükleer kapasitenin kısıtlanması gibi alanlarda alınacak kararlarla barış görüşmelerinden sonuç almak istiyor. İsrail’in aslında İran'la bir işi de yok. İsrail, bölgede Arz-ı Mevud'un artık son adımını atmak istiyor. Bölgeyi bu kadar parçalanmış bir halde bulmuşken, ABD'nin de sınırsız desteğini arkasına almışken her şeyi bitirmek istiyor. Yapabilirse Arz-ı Mevud toprakları içerisinde olan her yeri içine alabileceği son adımını atmak istiyor."
CHP'de Grup Toplantısı Krizi: Kurtulmuş'tan 'Parti Yönetmeliği' VurgusuStubb’dan AB’ye Türkiye çıkışı... ‘Ciddi düşünmeliyiz’
Avrupa Birliği’nde (AB), mevcut uluslararası konjonktürün de etkisiyle genişleme sürecinin yoğun şekilde tartışıldığı bir ortamda Finlandiya Cumhurbaşkanı Alexander Stubb’dan dikkat çekici bir çıkış geldi.