AKP Washington'da eski Fransa Büyükelçiliği binasını merkez yapıyor

Erdogan's party pours millions into new DC pied-a-terre

On Washington’s 16th Street, overlooking Meridian Hill Park, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is transforming the former French Embassy into a permanent base for its growing influence operation in Washington. The party bought the Beaux-Arts mansion for roughly $4.9 million in 2024, and its latest July 12th Foreign Agents Registration Act filing shows that another $1.3 million has since flowed from AKP headquarters, much of it going toward renovation work at the property. The office is run by Halil Mutlu, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s cousin and the AKP’s registered representative in the United States. The same filing lists 85 political activities over six months from December until May of this year, including meetings with State Department officials, congressional staff and some of Washington’s most prominent Turkey and Syria think tank experts. Since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel, the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv has gradually moved from surface-level diplomatic hostility toward something closer to an open strategic rivalry, with Syria becoming the most visible flashpoint between the two regional middle powers. Much of this tension is airing out in President Donald Trump’s Washington. The Washington battle front A March discussion at the Brookings Institution, which the filing cited, captured this shift. Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Bass discussed rhetoric from Israeli political figures describing Turkey as the “future Iran,” while Brookings fellow Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, referencing statements by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, said the idea that Türkey could emerge as a greater threat than Iran had moved from the fringe in Israeli security circles into mainstream political discussion . Against this backdrop of escalating tension, Mutlu’s meetings offer a glimpse into the Washington policy circles the AKP has been cultivating. On January 29, the filings show separate meetings with Atlantic Council fellow Rich Outzen and Washington Institute senior fellow Anna Borshchevskaya. Five days later, the party attended a Helsinki Commission hearing on Syria where Outzen and Borshchevskaya testified alongside the Hudson Institute’s Michael Doran. On February 9, the filings report a private meeting between Mutlu and Doran. These three experts approach Turkey from different perspectives, but their public work has generally envisioned a significant positive role for Ankara in the emerging regional order. Outzen has argued that U.S.-Turkey relations are poised to improve as their interests increasingly align; Doran has described Turkey as a key U.S. partner in stabilizing Syria and balancing Israeli security concerns; and Borshchevskaya has called for deeper American engagement in Syria to displace Russian influence, identifying Turkey as one of the regional actors capable of providing Damascus with alternatives to Moscow. In testimony before Congress, Doran argued that pushing Russia out of Syria depended on balancing Turkey and Israel. He later described Turkey as “the arm of NATO into Syria” and said Ankara could help build Syria’s new security forces. Outzen similarly called for a larger Turkish role in Syria’s stabilization and military training, while warning that Israel’s preference for a weak, fragmented Syria could collide with Ankara’s desire for a unified state. That rivalry is already shaping policy on Syria and the sale of advanced U.S. weapons. Erdogan said in June that Israeli attacks on Syria and Lebanon had reached the point of threatening Turkey itself. Israel, meanwhile, has fought Turkey’s return to the F-35 program, with Israeli officials warning that selling Ankara advanced fighters could threaten Israel’s qualitative military edge. That fight has landed directly in the Oval Office. At his July 28 meeting with Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu brought a map of Syria to argue that Turkey controlled more Syrian territory than Israel. According to an Israeli official, the map claimed Turkey effectively controlled 5% of Syria compared with a mere 0.1% held by Israel. Trump has been moving in Ankara’s direction. At the NATO summit in Ankara earlier in July, he announced that he would lift CAATSA sanctions imposed over Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air-defense system, and he signaled openness to selling Ankara F-35s. A changing regional balance Turkey’s push in Washington also comes as Israel’s political standing in the United States is weakening. A March Pew survey found that 60% of Americans held an unfavorable view of Israel, up from 42% in 2022. Among Republicans under 50 years old, 57% viewed Israel unfavorably. Gallup similarly found that Americans no longer sympathized more with Israelis than Palestinians, ending a pattern that had lasted more than two decades. Israel’s loss of popular support is bound to open some political space for other regional powers to make their case in Washington, and Turkey is trying to occupy some of it. The Meridian Hill headquarters gives the AKP a permanent base, while Mutlu’s meetings place Erdogan’s party inside the policy circles debating the very questions on which Ankara and Jerusalem are clashing. The larger shift now extends far beyond Washington. On Friday, Erdogan joined Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca to sign a mutual defense agreement declaring that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three. The pact brings together NATO’s second-largest military, nuclear-armed Pakistan and the Gulf’s most powerful Arab state at a moment when regional governments are reassessing the post-Iran war Middle East geopolitical landscape. The mansion on Meridian Hill is only one piece of this broader realignment. But it gives the competition a physical address. As Israel works to convince Washington that Turkey is emerging as the region’s “next Iran,” Erdogan’s party is building its own infrastructure to make the counterargument.