Trump'ın Afrika planları, Mısır-Etiyopya geriliminin gölgesinde

How the Egypt-Ethiopia feud could upend Trump's plans in Africa

On July 19, President Donald Trump’s top Africa adviser, Massad Boulos, held a series of talks in Cairo with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia. The participants framed the discussions as an effort to bolster security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. These talks came as Egypt and Eritrea separately insisted that governance of the Red Sea should remain the exclusive responsibility of its littoral states, a thinly veiled warning to Ethiopia, a landlocked nation of 140 million people with growing maritime ambitions. Later, on August 4, Boulos rejected speculation that Washington was assembling an anti-Ethiopian alliance, insisting it seeks amicable relations with all regional states. That rebuttal signals Washington’s delicate balancing act in an increasingly fractured region. Indeed, just days after the talks in Cairo, Washington declared its interest in seeking deeper involvement by more American companies in Ethiopian Airlines’ planned $12.5 billion airport near the capital, Addis Ababa. The U.S. may not be deliberately favoring Cairo over Addis Ababa, or vice versa. But without a coherent strategy, it is taking a scattershot approach to addressing thorny issues like the Egypt-Ethiopia Nile dispute, Red Sea access, and the African Union’s security mission in Somalia. This risks hardening the very alignments from which Washington is trying to distance itself. “I think Washington believes it can have its cake and eat it too: it can advance its own strategic objectives in the region around counterterrorism, critical minerals, maritime security and commercial diplomacy, while managing through ignorance the increasingly volatile regional competition playing out,” said Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. official who worked on Africa at the CIA, State Department and National Security Council. At the heart of the dispute is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Despite Cairo’s protests since work on the dam began in 2011, it was inaugurated in September 2025, and is now Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam. The $5 billion project remains contentious. Attention today has shifted to how Ethiopia will manage water releases to downstream Sudan and Egypt, especially during droughts, and whether any commitments will be binding. In January, Trump informed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi he was ready to restart mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia, calling for Ethiopia to undertake predictable water releases during droughts. But words alone may prove futile. During Trump’s first term, the U.S. suspended some assistance to Ethiopia after Addis Ababa refused to sign a proposed U.S.-brokered agreement. Trump later suggested Egypt might “blow up” the dam. Given Trump’s prior support for Egypt, Ethiopia has been suspicious of American motives, David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and adjunct professor at George Washington University, told RS. “U.S. engagement with Eritrean officials in Cairo will add to Ethiopia’s concerns,” he said. Indeed, the contact was notable given decades of strained U.S.-Eritrea relations, and because it came amid heightened tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa’s wariness toward Washington will further complicate any U.S. efforts to soften the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry, which has now spilled into the Red Sea. Along with Eritrea, Egypt has sought to contain Ethiopia’s ambitions for maritime access in the Red Sea. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the governing authorities in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia whose independence is recognized only by Israel. The agreement envisaged granting Ethiopia a 50-year lease for a 12-mile stretch of coastline near the Gulf of Aden in exchange for the eventual recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Egypt responded by offering arms and troops to Somalia, while reaffirming its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Amid increasing regional and international pressure on Addis Ababa, Turkish mediation in late 2024 helped restore diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, effectively sidelining the MoU. But Ethiopia remains determined to gain access to the Red Sea, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has framed as an existential economic necessity. Abiy has barely concealed Ethiopia’s ambition to secure access to Eritrean ports, particularly Assab, at times framing the port as historically Ethiopian territory that was lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993. His rhetoric has provoked deep alarm in Asmara, pushing Egypt and Eritrea closer. Egypt and Eritrea signed a maritime transport agreement in May, announcing a shipping route linking their ports and again insisting that the maintenance of Red Sea security be reserved for littoral states. In response, Ethiopia accused Egypt of attempting “to encircle and obstruct our efforts to gain maritime access to the Red Sea.” This has created a self-reinforcing cycle: Egypt views Ethiopia’s drive for a port as key to its ambitions to become the dominant regional power in the Horn, while Ethiopia sees Egyptian cooperation with Somalia and Eritrea as encirclement. It would be a mistake to describe Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia as a fixed bloc, however. Somalia, after restoring diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, now seeks to balance its relations with Cairo and Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, Eritrea’s distrust of Ethiopia stems from the neighbors’ own deep history of conflict — including their devastating border war in 1998-2000, which killed tens of thousands — rather than Cairo’s influence alone. Still, growing distrust could harden these alignments into lasting divides. And Washington’s cross-cutting diplomacy may worsen that risk by leaving regional governments unsure of its intentions. In May, the U.S. pursued a reset with Eritrea after their long period of cold relations, including the prospect of sanctions relief, which can be read as an attempt to discourage Ethiopia from using force in its quest for maritime access. At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met his Ethiopian counterpart, Gedion Timothewos, for talks on security cooperation, commercial opportunities and promoting regional de-escalation. Washington’s decision to withdraw support later this year from the United Nations logistics operation underpinning the African Union’s mission in Somalia adds a complication. The mission has provided a unique multilateral mechanism for Egyptian and Ethiopian cooperation – in this case, in maintaining security in Somalia. Mogadishu may now seek to forge bilateral agreements with both countries that would encourage them to compete for influence instead of cooperating. Washington’s initiatives in the region aren’t necessarily contradictory. But American outreach to Cairo and Asmara may reinforce Addis Ababa’s perception that it is being contained, while Egypt and Eritrea may see closer U.S. commercial ties with Ethiopia as a boost to their rival. “Absent a real strategy, these are all zero-sum policies. It’s one reason why Boulos keeps having to try to defuse the conspiracies swirling around U.S. policy by denying their existence,” said Hudson. “At some point, Washington needs to make clear to everyone what it is hoping to achieve.” Now, Washington risks watching regional escalation outpace its diplomacy. The stakes extend beyond diplomatic tensions. Even though Abiy ruled out war with Eritrea last year, military mobilizations and hostile rhetoric have kept the risks of miscalculation and escalation alive. Washington may also find working multilaterally with regional partners to devise a unified strategy desirable. On the Nile, Washington could support an AU-led agreement on drought management, data-sharing and predictable water releases. On Ethiopia’s Red Sea access, it could build on Turkish mediation by backing a commercial deal under Somali sovereignty, while tying its outreach to Asmara directly to regional de-escalation rather than treating it as an isolated Red Sea transaction. “Washington could encourage Ethiopia and Eritrea to engage in discussions for guaranteed Ethiopian access to the sea and even suggest some incentives that Eritrea might find attractive,” said Shinn, adding that other key players could participate in such an initiative.