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Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict

Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict Expert comment thilton.drupal 28 May 2026 Ethiopia will hold elections on 1 June amid persistent instability and simmering regional tensions. Ethiopia’s election on 1 June is likely to be among the least competitive of the seven national elections held since multiparty democracy was introduced in 1991. In the period since then, elections have been staged with the aim of reinforcing the incumbent government’s power, rather than offering Ethiopians tangible plural political choices. This time the build up to the election is also being overshadowed by tensions in the Tigray and Amhara regions, closely connected to Ethiopia’s strained relations with Eritrea and Sudan, heightening fears that regional conflict could further escalate. Perfunctory polls Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking an election victory that will enable his ruling Prosperity Party (PP) to reaffirm its mandate. It has also been suggested that an electoral victory could offer Abiy a route to enacting constitutional reforms that would strengthen central authority, such as creating an executive presidency and making changes to Ethiopia’s ethnic federal structure. On the surface, the numbers suggest a competitive electoral process. The National Election Board has reported more than 50 million registered voters (of a total population of around 130 million), with more than 11,000 candidates from 47 parties. But some opposition parties are reportedly aligned with the government, which is understood to be negotiating post-election power-sharing arrangements with them and is tactically not contesting some parliamentary seats. In 2021, the opposition Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) and the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) parties won four and five seats respectively and were given ministerial positions. Lacking a genuine choice, citizens find themselves trapped between apathy, the ballot and the bullet. Many challengers to the ruling PP will not contest the elections. Some are in exile, some are banned, some are imprisoned, and many may see little incentive to abandon their armed struggle against the government. This severely constrained political landscape and election process at best resembles an elite bargain. Lacking a genuine choice, citizens find themselves trapped between apathy, the ballot and the bullet. The Fano armed group in the Amhara region have warned that they consider anyone participating in the elections as an enemy of the Amhara people. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has increased its attacks since federal forces were deployed towards Tigray in the north in February. The polls will not take place in Tigray, which is still recovering from the devastating 2020-2022 war, with tensions between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) reaching boiling point again. Turmoil in Tigray In Tigray, the 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the government and the TPLF has unravelled in recent weeks. The TPLF has moved to restore its regional authority by reconstituting the pre-war legislative council, subsequently electing party chairman Debretsion Gebremichael as regional president. This followed the federal government unilaterally renewing the term of the interim regional administration president General Tadesse Worede, a retired Ethiopian general and chief of the Tigray Defense Forces (formed to fight federal forces during the 2020-2022 war), who was seen as a compromise candidate. The TPLF had also been barred from participating in the general election. Regionally, the logic of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ prevails. Despite both the government and TPLF not favouring a return to war, the risks of renewed conflict are significant. The TPLF’s unilateral assertion of regional authority leaves little room for the federal government to back down without appearing weak. Yet Abiy may not want to rush an armed response before the election, and severe fuel shortages resulting from the Iran war do not favour another drawn-out military campaign. Amid a decline in relations since the Pretoria Agreement was signed, the government appears to have attempted to undermine the TPLF’s dominance in Tigray with a dual strategy. Alongside squeezing Tigray economically, it has attempted to delegitimize the TPLF by tacitly supporting other Tigrayan opposition, including Abiy’s current advisor Getachew Reda’s Simret party, which is seeking to build a broader coalition. Abiy could continue this strategy rather than escalate. But he has also already moved forces north and a military response remains on the cards. A relapse into conflict in Tigray will not be confined to Ethiopia, but will likely lead to a wider regional conflagration, potentially drawing in Eritrea, Sudan and their respective allies. Regional spillover Regionally, the logic of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ prevails. The TPLF has reinforced relationships with Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both of which have strained relations with the Ethiopian government. These actors are more widely aligned with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. They have sought to counter the growing regional influence of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, who count Ethiopia and Somaliland among their partners. Eritrean forces operate in Tigray, and Eritrea provides the TPLF with its only accessible allied border. Tigrayan fighters based in eastern Sudan have fought alongside the SAF. A recent coordination meeting in Port Sudan brought together Ethiopian opposition groups with pro-SAF Sudanese and Eritrean participants. Related work The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will Ethiopia’s government sees this ‘Tsimdo’ alliance as a threat. It is concerned about the risk to its border areas with Eritrea and Sudan, including Western Tigray (known as Welkait by the Amhara) and Benishangul-Gumuz. In response, Ethiopia has reportedly facilitated support to the SAF’s enemies in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan People’s Liberation-North (SPLM-N). According to reports from Reuters and Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab, Ethiopia has provided a military training camp for the RSF in the border region of Benishangul-Gumuz. Reuters cited sources that claimed the camp was financed and supported by the UAE, which has been accused of transferring arms to the RSF; Abu Dhabi strongly rejects any claims that it supports the RSF and says it is ‘not a party’ to the conflict. The SAF also accused Ethiopia of allowing the launch of drones into Sudan from its territory, allegations that were denied by Ethiopia. A coordinated diplomatic response Regardless of the elections, an urgent and coordinated diplomatic response is needed that recognizes the gravity of the current escalation and its regional consequences. The African Union has taken a first step and re-appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as a regional envoy, with the aim of re-establishing mediation channels. His fellow Pretoria colleagues, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and South Africa’s former deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, could be suitable candidates to work with him. The AU needs to build a credible team that also should work in tandem with its other regional envoy, former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete. Crucially, this mediation need to be bolstered by coordinated efforts from major international actors with a stake in regional stability, notably the US, EU, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the ever-influential UAE.