The Iran war destroyed the strategic logic of the Abraham Accords

The Iran war destroyed the strategic logic of the Abraham Accords

The Abraham Accords sought to succeed where decades of negotiations had failed. By separating Arab normalization with Israel from the Palestinian issue, the effort bypassed the core concept of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which explicitly tied the normalization to the creation of a Palestinian state on its 1967 borders. The Accords made no attempt to discuss or adjust this principle; instead, they discarded it outright. This American approach was based on an exchange of interests. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain acquired the security assurances they had long sought to protect them from Iran, along with prospects for military and technological cooperation with Israel. Morocco secured America’s recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, fulfilling Rabat’s long-standing demand. Sudan, for its part, was primarily concerned with getting off Washington’s state sponsor of terror list and ending the economic and financial isolation that has long burdened the country. Each party had its demands, and Washington was ready to pay the political price of fulfilling them. The positions of states that refused to join the Accords were also instructive. Saudi Arabia held fast to an unequivocal principle: no normalization with Israel without a clear path to a Palestinian state. The kingdom could not deviate from this position, mindful as it was of the consequences that such a reversal would have on its standing in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Qatar and Oman had their own considerations. Both countries derive their authority in the region from their ability to maintain open channels of communication with a range of parties, be they the United States, Iran, or other Middle Eastern powers. Joining the Abraham Accords would have weakened or even eliminated this geopolitical advantage. Kuwait, meanwhile, grounded its approach in a firm constitutional and political commitment, and it declared on several occasions that it would be the last Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. The Abraham Accords did not simply set aside the Palestinian issue but also suggested that it no longer held pride of place among regional priorities. As Palestinian factions watched the wave of normalization extend from Abu Dhabi all the way to Rabat, the message they received was clear: the Arab World was moving forward, and the Palestinian cause was fading away. Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks can mainly be understood as a violent rejection of this trajectory. Palestinian armed groups saw that the course of events was set to eclipse the Palestinian issue and remove it from the regional and international agenda. They saw no other way to stop this trajectory than a massive shock that would shake the region to its core. In the end, this shock had disastrous effects that reverberated across the region, with Gaza paying the heaviest price. But these events revealed a fundamental truth: any regional system that attempts to bypass the Palestinian issue is fragile, and its weaknesses are quickly exposed. The tragedy of Gaza was the most painful proof of that fact. Then came the Iran war of 2026, and the agreements that resulted from it, which revealed a consequential shift. It has now become clear that the security guarantees underlying the Abraham Accords were far less solid than they first seemed, and that previous attempts to contain Iran had failed to meet their objectives. In fact, the war revealed that Iran has become a leading Middle Eastern power that cannot be excluded from any security frameworks in the Persian Gulf. Because of the war, the accords have lost one of their most important strategic justifications: the belief that an American security umbrella alone could offer security and stability to its allies in the region. The collapse of this strategic basis for the Abraham Accords should come as no surprise. For those who believe that true peace can only come after a just resolution of the Palestinian issue, this reality is not a reason to fret but rather a reminder that a structure built on a faulty foundation cannot last. Today, the question is no longer what we lost, but rather who benefited from the old trajectory. It is believed that Jews and Arabs are descended, respectively, from Isaac and Ishmael, the first two sons of Abraham. The Israeli descendants of Isaac sat at the negotiating table, while the Palestinian sons of Ishmael remained outside. This was not merely a detail in the development of the accords but rather a fundamental flaw that doomed it from the start. What we saw afterward was a natural consequence of this flaw. Today, it has become necessary to find a new framework, one that we might call the Sons of Abraham Accords. The goal here is not merely a new name but a different philosophy grounded in a basic truth: that any peace worthy of Abraham’s name must recognize both sides, both peoples, and the rights of both parties to land and dignity. The creation of a serious pathway to the creation of a Palestinian state is not a gift but an indispensable pillar on which any lasting peace will rest. The Sons of Abraham Accords will not be a fleeting celebration on the White House lawn but rather a longer and more arduous political process — one that establishes an irreversible pathway toward Palestinian statehood in exchange for full normalization with Israel. The result will be a stronger, more stable order, built on an indispensable foundation. For Abraham had two great sons, and any peace deserving of his name must accommodate them both.