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US–Israel war with Iran: What is the impact on Gaza?

Started 08 May, 09:47 2 events Updated 08 May
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latest: 08 May
  1. Security08 May, 09:47

    US–Israel war with Iran: What is the impact on Gaza?

    Palestinian Territories

    US–Israel war with Iran: What is the impact on Gaza? 18 May 2026 — 14:00 TO 15:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 8 May 2026 Online How has the war distracted attention from Palestine? And how will it affect the Trump peace plan? Speakers discuss current conditions of the Gaza ceasefire along humanitarian, governance, and security dimensions, and the impact of the US-Israel war on Iran. As the Israel-US-Iran War continues, the Gaza ceasefire has ceased to be a priority for international or regional actors. On the ground, however, humanitarian conditions in Gaza are worsening, political pathways are narrowing, and temporary borders and security measures are becoming permanent. In this webinar, speakers will discuss where conditions currently stand with the ceasefire along humanitarian, governance, and security dimensions; how the Iran-US-Israel war is (re)shaping the calculations of different actors; and what future trajectories might be possible.

    Chatham House – What's New
  2. Diplomatic08 May, 09:39

    The Iran war has left Gaza neglected

    Palestinian Territories

    The Iran war has left Gaza neglected Expert comment thilton.drupal 8 May 2026 With the world distracted by the Iran war, the situation is worsening in Gaza, where neither Israel nor Hamas are under pressure to make progress on the ceasefire plan. In the shadow of the Iran war, the Gaza ceasefire has ceased to be a priority for international or regional actors, even while Palestine remains inextricably linked to other conflicts in the region. Meanwhile, with the world looking elsewhere, humanitarian conditions in Gaza are deteriorating, the room for political pathways is narrowing and supposedly temporary borders and security measures are at risk of becoming entrenched. It was always likely to be difficult to move from the initial ceasefire to the second phase of US president Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, given that it contains two of the biggest sticking points: the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of the Israeli army. But the Iran war, and the subsequent lack of external pressure on either Hamas or Israel, has given both parties time to double-down on their positions and cement the status quo, with dangerous consequences. Hamas refuses to disarm In April, Hamas rejected a disarmament plan from Nickolay Mladenov, the high representative for Gaza on the US-led ‘Board of Peace’, which linked the decommissioning of weapons to reconstruction efforts. Hamas officials asserted that they would not negotiate on the second phase of the ceasefire until Israel fully implemented the first phase, including allowing humanitarian aid to enter Gaza at the levels stipulated in the ceasefire agreement. Moreover, Hamas sees no incentive to disarm without a framework for establishing a Palestinian state. Unlike Northern Ireland or South Africa (historical cases to which the Israel-Palestine conflict is often compared) there is no peace process on the horizon, nor is there a political pathway available to Hamas if the group lays down its arms. Many Palestinians I’ve spoken with, including non-Hamas supporters, support a pathway in which Hamas could potentially maintain a political role in Palestinian governance. But this is a non-starter for Israel and ruled out in the 20-point plan. While the plan offers individual Hamas members amnesty if they disarm and ‘commit to peaceful co-existence’, they may well doubt this offer is sincere or worry about reprisals. Related work The risks of Trump’s peace plan: Two Gazas and an annexed West Bank If there were few incentives for disarmament before, Israel has introduced additional disincentives by reportedly backing other Palestinian armed groups to carry out attacks against Hamas. Groups like the Popular Forces near Rafah, the Counterterrorism Strike Force near Khan Younis, and the Ashraf al-Mansi group near Gaza City are based in the Israeli-controlled area of Gaza. These groups conduct operations in Hamas-controlled territory where nearly all of Gaza’s approximately 2.2 million civilians are living. The militias provide Hamas with another reason to reject disarming, adding another armed threat on top of Israel’s continued air strikes. Furthermore, because the militias are reportedly viewed as collaborators by many in Gaza, they may be inadvertently boosting Hamas’s support, while making it more difficult for any alternative anti-Hamas voices to emerge. No pressure on Israel to withdraw Just as Hamas leaders see little incentive to disarm, Israeli leaders see little incentive to withdraw from Gaza. According to Trump’s 20-point plan, the Israeli army’s withdrawal was meant to coincide with the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF). However, uptake for the ISF has been slow, with few countries expressing interest. While the American commander of the ISF has announced that five countries will be joining the force, there remains a lack of clarity over its mission and doubts about whether it will actually be deployed if that entails direct confrontation with Hamas in Gaza. This increases the likelihood of Israel maintaining a troop presence in Gaza in the long-term. After the ceasefire, Israeli troops occupied roughly 53 per cent of the Gaza Strip, demarcated on maps by its ‘Yellow Line.’ Recent reports appeared to show maps issued by the Israeli military with an expanded restricted zone of control in Gaza that added an estimated extra 11 per cent of Gaza’s territory beyond the ‘Yellow Line’. While the exact line of control may yet shift, these new lines of control are now at risk of becoming de facto long-term borders. Just as Hamas leaders see little incentive to disarm, Israeli leaders see little incentive to withdraw from Gaza. This would be in line with Israel’s embrace of so-called ‘buffer zones’ as a central strategy in both Syria and Lebanon in the regional realignment that followed Hamas’s 7 October attacks. This tactic is not new – Israel occupied parts of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, and maintained a buffer zone of about 300 metres around Gaza’s perimeter even before 2023. It seems highly unlikely that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reduce Israel’s area of control in Gaza, especially in an election year, even if Hamas were to make concessions. While this ‘buffer zone’ tactic may yield some short-term security gains for Israel, it could also play into Hamas and Hezbollah’s calls of resistance against the continued Israeli army presence. NCAG unable to enter Other key ceasefire measures also remain stalled. These include governance steps that could help stabilize the territory, like admitting the entry of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a transitional Palestinian governing body established by the Board of Peace. Since its launch in January, the 15-member NCAG has been based in Cairo, with members reportedly blocked from entering Gaza. There were questions from critics from the outset about NCAG’s legitimacy, autonomy and remit. Nevertheless, many Gazans expressed hope that NCAG could bring at least some Palestinian-led improvements. Now, however, that cautious optimism has shifted to frustration as NCAG’s physical absence from Gaza has reinforced its perceived impotence. By not admitting NCAG to Gaza while continuing to reject any meaningful role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the territory, Israel is contributing to conditions that make the territory appear lawless and ungovernable. This also strengthens Hamas by preventing the emergence of any alternatives. Positions hardened The wars in both Iran and Lebanon have only further entrenched these positions. For Hamas, the ability of the Iranian regime and Hezbollah to (thus far) survive multiple rounds of military operations will likely embolden their own position of defiance. For Israel, the lack of a knock-out blow in either Iran or Lebanon will likely harden its position on Gaza and further postpone any meaningful negotiations involving Palestinian self-determination, even under a new government.

    Chatham House – Expert comment

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