The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will

The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will

The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will Expert comment jon.wallace 20 May 2026 Diplomacy that does not disrupt the flow of foreign weapons, finance, and logistics into Sudan is underwriting, rather than ending the war. It is three years since conflict broke out between the two armed centres of power in Sudan: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The war has created a humanitarian crisis that is the worst in the world according to the UN, with 14 million people displaced. Why does the war persist? Although its roots are domestic, it is non-Sudanese actors that have kept the war alive. Externally procured weapons and cross-border logistical pipelines have sustained the battlefield capacity of both the SAF and RSF. That support shapes each side’s calculus, making continued fighting appear more rational than a negotiated exit. This diagnosis is increasingly articulated by policymakers and diplomats. Yet a coherent international strategy to disrupt flows of arms and funding into Sudan has yet to emerge. The April 2026 Berlin Conference crystallized that failure. It did deliver €1.5 billion in humanitarian pledges. And the Berlin Principles for Sudan is the most explicit multilateral call yet for external backers to halt their support to the SAF and RSF. Related work Gold and the war in Sudan But the Principles did not rule out the prospect of these warring parties controlling Sudan’s transition to peace. And it shied away from naming their external backers. It also made no recommendations on how to disrupt arms pipelines and imposed no real costs on the war’s enablers. The Quad – a group including the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, intended to lead efforts to end the war – has done little better. Its September roadmap contained no enforcement mechanism and was rejected by the SAF before it could be tested. That reflects the Quad’s structural dysfunction: The UAE and Egypt are accused of enabling Sudan’s warring parties, yet are expected to play a leading role in efforts to secure a ceasefire. Regardless of these failures, the US and its partners have the means to pressure those fuelling the war to fulfil their commitments to end it. What has been missing is the will. External arms pipelines The UAE’s role in sustaining the war remains the most consequential, and the most documented. A Wall Street Journal investigation, Amnesty International field documentation, and UN expert reporting all allege that the UAE has transferred arms to the RSF, including advanced Chinese drone systems. Abu Dhabi strongly rejects claims that it supports the RSF and has faced no formal censure. On the other side, Turkey reportedly supplied Bayraktar-type drone systems to the SAF at virtually no diplomatic cost (Turkey denies providing drones directly to the SAF). Iran is also alleged to have supplied drones to the SAF – something the SAF denies. One thing is certain: drone strikes in Sudan have surged, accounting for over 80 per cent of at least 880 documented civilian deaths between January and April 2026 alone. Permissive neighbours But scrutiny of these non-African suppliers has obscured the role of regional actors in perpetuating the war. Egypt publicly champions Sudan’s territorial integrity while supporting the SAF – and has integrated its commodity networks in the SAF war economy. It has also reportedly established a drone base in the Oweinat tri-border area with Libya and Sudan. That could signal a growing entanglement in the conflict. Reports indicate that Eritrea has hosted and trained pro-SAF militia in Eastern Sudan, helping the army retake central Sudan and Khartoum from the RSF last year. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has reportedly allowed its territory to be used to train RSF fighters. And this month the SAF accused Ethiopia – and the UAE – of being linked to a drone strike on Khartoum’s international airport: both countries denied involvement. Ethiopia also sits on the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) alongside Uganda – which the SAF accuses of backing the RSF: Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni met with the RSF commander known as ‘Hemedti’ earlier this year. The situation makes the PSC structurally incapable of holding either party in the war to account. Other countries also have significant roles. The UN confirms that Libyan territory has been used to facilitate cross-border movements of fighters, arms and materiel to the RSF. And the UN identifies similar supply lines through Chad. The Trump administration should seriously consider handing the Sudan file to Vice President JD Vance. Early this year, Kenya hosted RSF representatives in Nairobi, allowing them to announce the formation of a parallel government. The SAF accuses Kenya of supporting the RSF but President William Ruto strongly denies those claims. The war has generated a business logic that is now self-sustaining. Chatham House has documented gold as the war’s connective tissue, leaving Sudan through informal corridors across East Africa, with South Sudan a key RSF logistics node. Cutting the lifelines What Sudan needs now is ‘deproxification’: the end of the process by which external actors fuel the war, with the SAF and RSF acting as their proxies. This must involve the coordinated disruption of every arms route, gold shipment, and logistics corridor keeping the war alive. The US holds the greatest leverage but has yet to show the willingness to use it. Sanctions could impose real costs on the UAE for its patronage of the RSF. But Washington will not easily take such a step: it views good relations with the UAE as essential to the success of its policy regarding Gaza, Iran, and the Abraham Accords. The Trump administration should seriously consider handing the Sudan file to Vice President JD Vance. Both Tom Perrielo (President Biden’s Special Envoy) and Massad Boulos (Trump’s Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs) have carried insufficient weight in Abu Dhabi. Vance would likely be taken more seriously, having conducted high-stakes back-channel diplomacy on the Iran war. He would draw international media attention to the war. And, as vice president, he has more power to coordinate action across the US Treasury, State Department and others.