Moscow’s Afghan outreach

Moscow’s Afghan outreach

RUSSIA’S growing engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers is reshaping the regional diplomatic landscape. For Pakistan, which has historically maintained close links with Afghan political and religious networks, the development presents both a challenge and an opportunity. The question is not whether Moscow will replace Islamabad as Kabul’s principal interlocutor, but whether Russia’s expanding diplomatic, security and economic engagement will give the Taliban greater room to manoeuvre in their dealings with Pakistan. Russia’s approach towards the Taliban has been gradually shaping up. In July 2025, Moscow became the first country to recognise the Taliban government formally. Earlier, it announced the removal of the Taliban from its list of prohibited terrorist organisations in April that year. In May 2026, Russian officials announced plans to establish a “full-fledged partnership” with Kabul, encompassing security, trade, cultural exchanges, and humanitarian cooperation. That same month, a military-technical cooperation arrangement further underscored the deepening relationship. Moscow, therefore, has been moving beyond limited diplomatic engagement towards a more sustained relationship with the Taliban authorities. Multiple factors may be shaping Moscow’s approach toward the Taliban. First, Moscow remains concerned about the spread of militant violence into Central Asia, narcotics trafficking, and the activities of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). The deadly 2024 attack near Moscow reinforced Russian concerns about transnational extremist networks. From the Kremlin’s perspective, dealing with the Taliban is a pragmatic necessity — whatever its reservations about the nature of their government, the Taliban exercise effective control over Afghan­istan’s state institutions and security apparatus. In parallel, Russia seeks to preserve its influence in Eurasia and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a source of instability that could invite renewed intervention by external powers. Economic cooperation, including potential opportunities in energy, transport, agriculture, and infrastructure, adds another dimension to this policy. Moscow’s outreach should, therefore, be understood as an effort to protect its own interests and expand its regional options. Russia’s close ties with Kabul won’t automatically ensure action against anti-Pakistan terrorists. Second, Russia’s recognition of the Taliban has important implications for Pakistan’s diplomatic leverage. For years, Islamabad’s geographical proximity, economic connections, and historical links with the Taliban gave it considerable access to Kabul. Russian recognition gives Kabul an additional source of international legitimacy. Its expanding relations with Moscow also offer the Taliban another channel for diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and economic opportunity. The more external partners Kabul acqui­res, the less dependent it may feel on Islamabad for diplomatic access and international engagement. This does not mean that Pakistan’s influence will disappear. Geography, cross-border commerce, people-to-people links, and the management of shared security concerns remain important. However, these factors do not automatically translate into political compliance. Pakistan’s leverage will increasingly depend on whether it can demonstrate the mutual benefits of cooperation rather than rely on historical relationships or geographical realities alone. Third, Russia’s approach to the TTP will be the most consequential test. Islamabad’s central secu­­rity concern is that terrorist groups operating from Afghan territory threaten Pakistan’s citizens and security personnel. The Taliban authorities’ generalised statement is that Afghan territory will not be used against other countries, but they are reluctant to specifically say that Afghan territory will not be allowed to be used against Pakistan. Moscow’s priorities, however, do not match Pakistan’s. Russia’s immediate security concerns centre particularly on IS-K and the threat of extremist violence spreading into Central Asia and Russia itself. Although the Taliban also oppose IS-K, this convergence does not necessarily mean Moscow will place Pakistan’s concerns about the TTP at the centre of its Afghan policy. Pakistan should, therefore, avoid assuming that Russia’s close relations with Kabul will automatically produce action against anti-Pakistan terrorists. Russian influence could provide an additional diplomatic channel, but its effectiveness will depend on Moscow’s willingness to address the TTP issue and the Taliban leadership’s readiness to respond. Fourth, Russia’s interest in regional stability gives it a potential role in facilitating dialogue, reducing tensions and encouraging practical cooperation. Pakistan should welcome constructive Russian involvement without outsourcing its Afghan policy to Moscow. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could provide a useful multilateral framework. Pakistan, Russia, China, and the Central Asian states share an interest in preventing Afghanistan from becoming a base for transnational terrorism. Coordinated intelligence exchanges, border-security cooperation, counter-narcotics measures, and structured consultations with Kabul could help establish a regional approach. Such cooperation would be more sustainable than expecting any single country to exercise decisive influence over the Taliban. Fifth, Pakistan needs to adapt its Afghan policy to a more competitive diplomatic environment. Islamabad should deepen engagement with Russia while maintaining direct communication with the Taliban leadership. It should also coordinate with China, the Central Asian republics, and other relevant regional actors to develop a common understanding of the threats emanating from Afghanistan. At the bilateral level, Pakistan has to involve the Taliban in a meaningful dialogue and create a workable environment that builds the Taliban regime’s stake in the mutual benefits of the two countries. This could include arrangements to exchange information on terrorist networks, investigate cross-border incidents, prevent attacks, and maintain communication between security officials. Economic cooperation and the facilitation of legitimate trade should accompany these measures, giving both sides practical incentives to reduce tensions. Diplomatically, Russia’s Afghan outreach is thus neither an inevitable strategic setback for Pakistan nor a guarantee of improved regional security. It is a development that reflects the Tali­ban’s efforts to widen their international options and Moscow’s decision to protect its own interests. Whether this produces greater stability or further competition will depend on how regional states use their expanding diplomatic channels. Pakistan will have to carefully observe that Russia’s engagement helps address the region’s shared security concerns. Islamabad’s influence over Kabul will ultimately depend less on who has the closest relationship with the Taliban and more on who can help produce practical results: a secure border, action against militant violence, functioning trade routes and a stable regional environment. The writer is a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan. He served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the UAE and Iran. Published in Dawn, October 29th, 2026