The diminishing office of foreign secretary

The diminishing office of foreign secretary

THE government has made its choice, picking Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad as the next foreign secretary. But more important than the government’s pick, however brilliant, is the state of the office he is set to inherit. Formally, the foreign secretary remains the bureaucratic head of the country’s diplomatic machinery and the senior-most career diplomat. Over the years, however, the stature of the office has become greatly diminished. This decline, although not an entirely new phenomenon, has become quite pronounced over the past few years, notwithstanding the fact that some very bright diplomats – including Sohail Mahmood, Dr Asad Majeed Khan and Syrus Sajjad Qazi – occupied the office during this period. The hierarchy of the Foreign Office remains unchanged and the foreign secretary continues to be responsible for its administration, management of the foreign service and implementation of foreign policy. The top diplomat’s involvement in the US-Iran mediation process could have supplied institutional memory and diplomatic craft to a process otherwise driven by political and military principals Increasingly, though, consequential decisions are being made elsewhere. Even more worrisome is how many of those who held this position acquiesced to the new state of affairs and assumed a low profile. For that matter, when was the last time anyone heard a foreign secretary publicly articulate Pakistan’s external policy, or deliver a substantive speech setting out the country’s approach to a major international issue? Perhaps the clearest recent example is Pakistan’s mediation between the United States and Iran, which has been one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Islamabad in recent years, involving high-level contacts and extensive negotiations, eventually leading to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. In the midst of such significant diplomatic developments, the foreign secretary remained largely unseen from the centre of activity. As one serving ambassador put it, speaking candidly to Dawn: “The foreign secretary was not only not on the table, she wasn’t even in the room.” Indeed, greater involvement of Ambassador Amna Baloch – a three-decade career diplomat who has served in the PM’s Office, the Foreign Minister’s Office, Chengdu and as ambassador to the EU – could have put her negotiating experience to good use. Moreover, the top diplomat’s involvement in the mediation process could have supplied institutional memory and diplomatic craft to a process that was otherwise driven by political and military principals. Political & strategic shift When it comes to routine diplomacy and the day-to-day functioning of the ministry, the foreign secretary is still the boss; files move through the office, missions are administered and the normal business of diplomacy continues. The real problem arises when foreign policy intersects with crucial strategic relationships, sensitive political questions or high-stakes initiatives. At that point, the foreign secretary increasingly appears to be outside the principal decision-making circle. This highlights a fundamental change in the character of the office. There are broadly two sides to this shift; one is political and strategic, while the other is administrative and institutional, although the two have increasingly become intertwined. On the political side, the country has gradually developed what diplomats privately describe as a ‘parallel’ foreign policy structure. This means that decision-making on major relationships increasingly involves actors outside the traditional diplomatic hierarchy, particularly where political and security considerations are involved, and the FO often finds itself dealing with the consequences, or implementing decisions in whose formulation it had a limited role. The growing influence of the military establishment is often cited as the principal reason for this shift. While there is certainly some truth to that argument – particularly because the distinction between foreign and security policy has become increasingly blurred – blaming the military alone would be an oversimplification, and ignore an important historic reality. The country has experienced long periods of military rule, yet even under military governments, the FO retained a significant role in policy formulation and implementation. Some of the country’s most prominent foreign secretaries, including Niaz A Naik, Abdul Sattar, Riaz Khokhar and Riaz Mohammad Khan served during those periods, and remained important sources of foreign policy advice to the governments of the time. Additionally, the hierarchy dealing with foreign affairs within the PM Office has also expanded under the current administration, reducing the space traditionally available to the foreign secretary. Important files travel through parallel channels, direct contacts are established outside the institutional machinery and, increasingly, multiple centres are dealing with foreign affairs, without necessarily being part of the diplomatic structure. Looking inward There is, however, another side of the coin, which is perhaps less discussed because it requires the foreign service to look inward. The FO was once expected to be a place where senior diplomats collectively assessed international developments and developed policy options before these were placed before the political leadership. That institutional culture appears to have considerably weakened. Senior officers point to the absence of regular structured discussions within the ministry on long-term policy issues, while the forum of additional secretaries, which traditionally provided an opportunity for collective thinking, now meets infrequently. The result is that the ministry has increasingly become occupied with management of immediate events rather than thinking ahead. This institutional decline is particularly visible in its management of personnel. Postings and ambassadorial assignments, once among the most important instruments available to the foreign secretary for managing the service and developing professional expertise, have increasingly become vulnerable to political influence and personal recommendations. There is a widespread perception within the service that summaries relating to politically or otherwise ‘connected’ candidates can move with remarkable speed, while others sometimes wait longer periods, or end up getting lesser attractive assignments. Life after retirement A foreign secretary who is looking beyond retirement may find it difficult to engage in institutional battles, or take positions that could create discomfort for those who may exercise control over their post-retirement job. This state of affairs is not peculiar to the FO, but for an institution that is supposed to provide independent professional advice on matters of national importance, the implications are particularly serious. “Hankering after a post-retirement contractual appointment, either in Pakistan or abroad is in my view, the foremost reason,” retired Amb Abdul Basit said, adding that because of this, “most of them become excessively pliable and hence weaklings. They lose courage to speak their mind and differ”. A pattern, Amb Basit said, has been established and all retiring foreign secretaries since 2012 have been rewarded in different ways. The incoming foreign secretary, therefore, will inherit much more than an administrative challenge; he will take charge of an institution whose formal responsibilities remain extensive, but whose stature has steadily diminished. As Amb Basit put it: “Someone has to break this pattern. I hope the next one is the one who is able to restore the traditional strength and dignity of the office. He or she has the capacity to transcend ephemeral trappings of the corridors of power.” Published in Dawn, September 10th, 2026