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Recent escalation of conflict negatively impacts livelihoods and market functionality

Recent escalation of conflict negatively impacts livelihoods and market functionality Key Messages Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Annex 1: Updates to key sources of evidence used in this analysis Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Annex 3: Projected acute food insecurity outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance Key Messages Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with pockets of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected across all other governorates. Needs are likely to peak during the lean season through September before modest seasonal improvements occur with the October cereal harvest. However, widespread food consumption gaps are likely to continue due to negative impacts to harvests and labor demand from below-average rainfall, limited livelihood opportunities, elevated food and fuel prices, and continued economic deterioration. Conflict has escalated significantly since July, marked by intensified confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Sana’a Based Authorities (SBA), increased clashes between the SBA and the internationally recognized government (IRG), expanded use of drones and missiles, and attacks on critical infrastructure and trade routes. Conflict activity reached the highest levels recorded in 2026, contributing to displacement, disruptions to fuel supply chains, market functionality, and trade flows, including damage that temporarily halted operations at Mukha port. Elevated hostilities are expected to persist through the projection period, increasing disruptions to livelihoods and markets and placing additional upward pressure on imported food and non-food prices. Rainfall through mid-August has generally been below average, constraining pasture regeneration, livestock body conditions improvements, rainfed crop production, and agricultural labor opportunities, particularly in Ta’izz, Lahij, Abyan, Shabwah, and Hadhramaut. Despite decreases in expected yields and crop damage and losses from localized flooding in some areas, the main cereal harvest beginning in October is expected to temporarily improve food availability and access for rural households. Nevertheless, the limited scale of production will provide only short-lived improvements in food access for producing households. This report provides an update to the June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook and July 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of August 28, 2026. Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 The conflict has recently escalated, with renewed Saudi-SBA confrontation and increased intensity of clashes and strikes between the IRG and SBA. Saudi Arabia and the SBA engaged in retaliatory strikes during July and August, substantially weakening the informal truce between the parties. SBA activity included missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi energy and critical infrastructure and Saudi-linked shipping, and attempts to enforce a blockade on Saudi ports continued in August. Saudi Arabia expanded its reliance on IRG-aligned forces, regional maritime coordination, and selective airstrikes. Despite the escalation, both sides have largely calibrated their actions below the threshold of sustained high-intensity conflict, and Omani- and UN-supported mediation channels remain active. In the conflict between the IRG and SBA, heavy clashes occurred in western Ta’izz, southern Al-Hudaydah, and western and northwestern Al-Dhali’, with dozens of additional clashes on the other active frontlines. Although neither side achieved sustained territorial gains or appears capable of launching a countrywide offensive, hostilities expanded beyond ground fighting and shelling to include missiles, drones, fighter aircraft, and other attacks against military targets and critical infrastructure, and the IRG’s strikes on SBA’s arms depots in Ma’rib and Al-Jawf. Civilian casualties and disruptions to fuel supply chains and essential services were reported in IRG-controlled areas. This included the SBA’s multiple projectile attacks against Mukha port, which caused severe damage to key infrastructure, forced suspension of operations, and disrupted trade and supply chains across western Yemen. The estimated recovery cost is 79 million USD, with 16 fatalities, 22 injuries, and significant livelihood impacts on 1,500 port workers and thousands more dependent on associated port activities. ACLED data show that June and July recorded the highest conflict activity of 2026, with 132 and 131 events, respectively, compared to the monthly average of 51.4 events between January and May. These levels also exceeded the monthly average of 92 direct SBA-IRG confrontations since the 2022 truce. Preliminary data through August 21 indicate a further rise, with more than 250 direct IRG-SBA incidents recorded (mainly air/drone strikes, clashes, and shelling, Figure 1), averaging 12 per day, compared with an average of 1.7 incidents per day between January and May. From August 1 to 22, International Organization for Migration (IOM) data suggests 567 households were displaced, largely due to conflict, and mainly from Al-Hudaydah, Ta’izz, and Ma’rib governorates. The escalation is driven by the deterioration of the peace process, improving military capabilities on both sides, especially with the introduction of drone use, and economic and political pressures across the country, especially in Al-Jawf Governorate, where tensions and clashes were reported between the SBA and local tribes. Source: FEWS NET using ACLED data Through mid-August, observed rainfall has been light to moderate across western and southern parts of Yemen; however, overall rainfall performance has been largely below average, with some localized positive anomalies. High livestock production costs, particularly for feed and veterinary medicines, are straining pastoral resources, with substantial challenges in areas that received significantly below-average rainfall, including Ta’izz, Lahij, Abyan, Shabwah, and parts of Hadhramaut. Localized heavy rainfall and flash floods affected more than 53,000 people and resulted in 73 fatalities, dozens of injuries, and damage to homes, markets, roads, agricultural land, water sources, and community assets. Impacts were most severe in Abyan and Ta’izz, where floods damaged sorghum, maize, and other crops, beehives, water extraction equipment, and irrigation pumps, and in the Ahwar Valley and Sana’a City, where transportation was disrupted. In IRG-controlled areas, liquidity shortages and limited government revenues continue to constrain the economy, negatively impacting governmental obligations, including public sector salary payments and the delivery of public services. In July, the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY-Aden) announced an auction of 30 billion YER worth of treasury bills, with a 20 percent annual yield, to attract investors to finance public expenditure and improve market liquidity. In parallel, CBY-Aden has continued suspending the licenses of exchange facilities and remittance agents for regulatory violations, aiming to increase liquidity and maintain the exchange rate. Poor service provision and upward price pressure have also reduced economic activity and limited household purchasing power. Prolonged power outages and recurrent cooking gas shortages have disrupted livelihoods, including small businesses, service delivery, handicraft production, and transportation activities. Aden has been hit hardest: electricity outages reached eight hours off with two hours on, amid extreme temperatures and high humidity, compounded by public water shortages and severe constraints in liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) availability for both household and commercial use. Gas shortages have escalated as LPG refueling has been suspended at some stations, contributing to sharp price increases: a 20 kg LPG cylinder was reportedly selling for above 15,500 YER on the informal market in early August, nearly double the official price of 8,500 YER; by late August, prices of a 20 kg LPG cylinder hiked to above 20,000 YER on the informal market. Shipping costs through the Red Sea have risen sharply, with downstream impacts on prices for most imported goods. Although the price of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) remained stable in July, the average MFB cost was 6 percent higher compared to January, with more pronounced increases in Socotra (22 percent), Ma’rib (12 percent), and Abyan and Hadhramaut (11 percent). In addition, the recent increase in the customs exchange rate, compounded by limited government oversight, has contributed to high inflation for non-food items, with the construction sector among the hardest hit. In SBA-controlled areas, the economy remains fragile, driven by depleting foreign currency reserves, liquidity constraints, sanctions, limited revenue streams, reduced competition and investment, a deteriorated business environment, and the erosion of livelihoods. Despite stability of the exchange rate and fuel prices due to strict price controls, economic pressures intensified in August amid port disruptions and escalating conflict. The maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia increased uncertainty in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and insecurity has severely limited fishing activities along the coast. Shipping data indicates Bab al-Mandeb transits fell by 24 percent by early August compared to before the blockade, and mainstream tanker traffic declined by 42 percent as ships were rerouted or delayed, driving higher logistics costs and increased insurance premiums. While market price data remain limited, a recent assessment in Al-Hudaydah and Hajjah indicated that between January and July 2026, prices of several key commodities increased, including wheat flour (17 percent), mezah rice (14 percent) and canned beans (17 percent). Humanitarian food assistance In SBA areas, operational constraints persist, and all activities remain suspended. In IRG-controlled areas, WFP completed the fourth cycle of Targeted Emergency Food Assistance (TEFA), reaching more than 1.5 million of the targeted 1.7 million people during July, covering between 25 and 50 percent of a household’s minimum energy requirements per month. Despite insecurity-related disruptions to deliveries in parts of Al-Hudaydah, Ma’rib, and Ta’izz, WFP began the fifth distribution cycle in mid-August. Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Yemen Food Security Outlook from June 2026 to January 2027 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence: Continued escalation in the conflict between the IRG and SBA is likely, reflecting an erosion of the informal rules of engagement that have been in place since the 2022 truce. Increased use of drones and missiles and long range (stand-off) attacks, alongside intermittent, yet high-intensity, fighting and localized attempts to improve tactical positions, are expected to raise the overall level of hostilities. The geographic distribution of clashes will likely remain uneven and more concentrated along established front lines in southern Al-Hudaydah, Lahij, and Al-Dhal’i, while Ma’rib, Al-Jawf, and Shabwah face an increased risk of troop mobilization, stand-off strikes, and attacks against military, economic, and civilian infrastructure. Conflict between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the SBA is expected to persist throughout the projection period but will remain below the threshold of sustained, high-intensity war. The SBA is expected to maintain intermittent missile and drone attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea and threaten or attack energy infrastructure around Jizan and Yanbu, while Saudi Arabia is likely to respond through a combination of direct or supported strikes against SBA military capabilities, greater operational reliance on IRG-aligned forces, and expanded international maritime coordination. Both parties will seek to increase their leverage while calibrating operations to avoid further escalation. In accordance with shifting conflict dynamics and the expanded disruption of varied maritime and overland trade routes, some temporary and localized market shortages are likely in conflict-affected areas, while upward price pressure is expected to accelerate, especially for imported goods, through higher fuel prices, increased freight and insurance charges, longer shipping times, disruptions to Black Sea wheat exports, and additional risk premiums applied by traders on multiple shipping routes. War-risk insurance premiums for Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb shipping routes are expected to remain above pre-July levels throughout the projection period. Fishing and associated income-generating activities in Red Sea coastal areas are expected to reduce and remain below last year's levels due to persistent insecurity and elevated maritime risks. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 High levels of acute food insecurity are projected to persist countrywide, with the number of households experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes peaking during the lean season, which continues through September, and then gradually improving with the onset of the main cereal harvest starting in October. At the area level, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta’izz governorates, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), will likely persist across all other governorates. Across Yemen, livelihoods are expected to remain severely constrained, and households dependent on casual labor, public-sector salaries, small-scale agriculture, livestock production, fisheries, and petty trade will continue to earn extremely limited, often irregular income, leaving them highly vulnerable to additional shocks and largely unable to afford their essential needs amid elevated prices. Below-average rainfall during Yemen’s second rainy season is expected to persist, reducing vegetation health, pasture regeneration, and yields for rainfed agriculture, and further constraining already limited agricultural labor demand in affected areas. In some areas of the northern and central highlands, comparatively better conditions are anticipated for pastoral and agropastoral households due to near-average rainfall in these areas. Nevertheless, labor demand is expected to remain below both last year’s levels and the long-term average given the lingering impacts of flooding and above-average input and production costs, exacerbated by extremely high competition for labor opportunities. These constraints are anticipated to be more pronounced in areas that received below-average rainfall, including parts of western Yemen, Ta’izz, Lahij, Abyan, Shabwah, and Hadhramaut, as well as in areas affected by flooding and heat stress. Through September, food consumption gaps are expected to widen for many poor households, as seasonally low labor demand and high and above-average prices are expected to severely limit access to food. However, the onset of the main cereal harvest in October is anticipated to gradually and temporarily improve food availability and access for some rural households. Nevertheless, anticipated below-average rainfed harvests and the limited scale of smallholder production in Yemen will result in only modest and short-lived household food stocks which are unlikely to meaningfully improve outcomes through January. Escalating internal and external conflict dynamics are likely to continue negatively impacting livelihoods and adding upward pressure on prices of essential goods. In frontline areas, particularly Ta’izz, southwestern Al-Hudaydah, Ma’rib, and Al-Jawf, localized and temporary disruptions to markets and associated livelihoods are likely to persist. Clashes, stand-off attacks, and conflict-related movement restrictions are expected to limit access to productive assets, cause delays in trade and market resupply, constrain income-generating opportunities, and increase transportation and transaction costs. As a result, localized, temporary supply shortages and upward pressure on food and non-food commodity prices are anticipated, further reducing purchasing power among conflict-affected households, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs) and households with extremely limited and irregular sources of income. Maritime insecurity will likely continue driving up the costs of imported goods, while simultaneously limiting fishing and import-related income-earning opportunities. Livelihoods tied to fishing are expected to seasonally increase from October, as monsoon winds subside and fishing conditions improve, including around Socotra. However, high fuel and operating costs; insecurity and increasing militarization in the Red Sea; and recent damage and operational setbacks at Mukha port will constrain seasonal improvements, keeping incomes below last year’s levels and significantly below average. Scarce labor opportunities and the limited number of working days most households are able to access are expected to continue limiting purchasing capacity, while price increases are eroding purchasing power, with most poor households unable to afford a minimally adequate diet, resulting in widespread food consumption gaps and the use of unsustainable coping strategies to reduce those gaps. In SBA-controlled areas, the business environment is expected to remain extremely poor, with limited investment, business relocation, and reduced labor demand among small- and medium-sized businesses severely constraining income among poor households. The combined impacts of disruptions to multiple maritime shipping corridors, elevated global prices, and slow recovery of Red Sea ports are likely to gradually increase prices for food and non-food items, despite price controls. This erosion of household purchasing power will likely further reduce access to food and increase reliance on severe coping strategies, such as begging and engaging in high-risk jobs, such as child labor. IDPs and households with extremely limited income are of highest concern, especially in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, Ta’izz, and Amran governorates, where anecdotal evidence suggests more extreme outcomes may persist among some IDPs. In IRG-controlled areas, persistently poor macroeconomic conditions, limited government revenue, oil-export constraints, liquidity shortages, and unreliable public services will continue to undermine household purchasing power and access to food. Maritime insecurity, shipping surcharges, port and transportation disruptions, and elevated fuel and food import costs are expected to sustain upward price pressure, while existing price controls are unlikely to fully contain global price transmission. Although external financial support, exchange-rate interventions, seasonal factors, and associated temporary employment are expected to provide limited relief, these gains are unlikely to offset above-average food prices, living costs, and below-average purchasing power. Consequently, poor households are expected to continue experiencing food consumption gaps and relying on unsustainable coping strategies such as reducing health expenditures and selling essential productive assets. Annex 1: Updates to key sources of evidence used in this analysis Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below. EvidenceSourceData formatFood security element of analysis Agroclimatology monitoring, forecast, and anomaly impactYemen Agrometeorological Early Warning Information Bulletin, July-September 2026; The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)QualitativeCurrent and forecast seasonal rainfall, vegetation conditions, agricultural stress indicators, and flooding impact Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Source: FEWS NET Source: FEWS NET Source: FEWS NET Annex 3: Projected acute food insecurity outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance ecalderon@fews.net Tue, 09/01/2026 - 14:44 Download the report 6