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US diplomatic incompetence is tanking hopes for Korean peace

The head of South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, Chung Dong-young, announced recently that the ministry will restart work on railroad sections leading north to the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula’s eastern shore. Chung’s initiative provoked Foreign Minister Cho Hyun to criticize the Unification Ministry’s “peaceful coexistence” agenda toward North Korea for being “too idealistic.” Chung countered, arguing that "Nothing will happen if we stay put…This is not idealism but the most realistic and practical approach at this point.” Chung is right. Unless South Korea can embrace a leading role in pursuing engagement and cooperation with North Korea, it is unlikely to escape the current state of prolonged hostility and frozen diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. This would probably mean taking the lead in the engagement process and allowing the United States to take a background role until agreements are reached. Since entering office last year, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has sought to improve inter-Korean relations and made some important changes to South Korea's diplomatic posture toward North Korea. The South has now returned to a "peaceful coexistence" policy toward the North. The principles he mentions date back to former President Kim Dae-jung’s March 2000 Berlin Declaration, which included respect for North Korea’s system, a pledge to end military provocations, and an end to South Korea's efforts to absorb the North. Nevertheless, despite these goodwill gestures, the Lee administration has so far failed to elicit a response from the Kim Jong Un leadership. At the heart of Seoul’s North Korea policy paralysis is Washington’s diplomatic incompetence. Like past U.S. administrations, the Trump administration has shown no genuine willingness to move away from the decades-long failed policy of pressuring and containing North Korea. Sanctions against North Korea have done nothing to reverse the regime’s nuclear buildup, but Washington continues to insist on sweeping non-military sanctions that only harm the North Korean civilian economy. Easing these sanctions was North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s main ask at the 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi summit; the economic restrictions remain a major obstacle to any meaningful inter-Korean cooperation or U.S.-North Korea negotiations. With no path to even partial sanctions relief, North Korea has hunkered down, and South Korea has struggled to articulate a path forward. As the public clash between Ministers Chung and Cho has shown, internal tensions and divisions within the South Korean government over North Korea policy have led to policy paralysis in Seoul. Within the Lee administration, different actors — the Unification Ministry, the National Security Council (NSC), the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry — have pursued differing and at times conflicting priorities. For instance, in his efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and improve inter-Korean relations, Unification Minister Chung has called for scaling down U.S.-South Korea joint military drills and halting the South Korean military’s live-fire and field exercises along the inter-Korean border. (In the past, such adjustments have been used repeatedly to lower tensions and promote dialogue.) Chung has also proposed acknowledging North Korea as a separate neighboring country, which would recognize the two-state reality and help end reunification myths on both sides. But other actors (the NSC, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry) have been more reluctant, in part due to fears of pushback from conservative hawks in South Korea and U.S. officials. These agencies have acted as the "status quo" force, being more risk-averse in policy discussions. On the surface, this dynamic can look like a mere institutional rivalry, but it reflects a more fundamental dilemma South Korea has long faced: pursuing its own foreign policy while avoiding a policy gap in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Given Washington’s crucial role in Seoul’s security, South Korean leaders must treat their relationship with the U.S. as a key consideration when formulating policy toward the North. The institutional division within the Lee administration can be understood in this context. The NSC, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry are all in regular contact with their U.S. counterparts, and major projects are ongoing. Seoul is pursuing nuclear-powered submarines, shipbuilding, and an embrace of AI companies, all with U.S. cooperation. These projects could be at risk if Seoul proposes actions or initiatives regarding North Korea that anger the U.S. government, especially given U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictability. These entrenched institutional interests are driving the Lee administration’s internal division on North Korea. Still, a determined president could move his administration toward a more proactive North Korea engagement initiative. If Lee hopes to forge a path out of the diplomatic deadlock, he cannot count on a U.S.-North Korea breakthrough. By subordinating its most essential national interest to a dysfunctional and disinterested White House, South Korea will deny its own responsibility. As soon as possible, the Lee administration should initiate a bolder diplomatic initiative, and Washington should support it. For this to work, Washington will have to remain in the background as Seoul works to advance a clear roadmap aimed at exchanging partial U.N. sanctions relief for a verified end to production of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. As in the 1990s, that halt would be overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the ground in North Korea. Other elements could be added, but the core exchange would likely be of interest to Pyongyang. If Seoul assumes greater leadership in engaging with Pyongyang, that would also help the Trump administration, which is constrained by many other foreign policy priorities and distractions. The Lee administration can take up the heavy lifting of outlining a negotiating framework, allowing President Trump to jump in for a high-profile role and claim a U.S. diplomatic win that Bush, Obama and Biden were unable to get. President Lee has been aware of this internal tension since he took office. He has been trying to please all parties until now. This posture is unsustainable and will not bring about any meaningful positive change in the worsening status quo. There will be no better time for him to make a new, realistic move on North Korea issues.