Pakistan'ın 79. Bağımsızlık Günü'nde 'Mucize' Beklentisi Sürüyor

Endless wait for a miracle

PAKISTAN celebrated its 79th Independence Day a couple of days ago. Once again, the anniversary arrived wrapped in the optimism that perhaps the next year will be different and bring some relief to ordinary citizens. The source of this optimism is the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Walls have been covered with graffiti, while stre­ets have been decorated with buntings, flags and pictures of the leaders of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Pakistan’s streets witnessed similar enthusiasm just over a decade ago, when the country’s power elites sold the nation the dream of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Though the Makkah Agreement is different from CPEC in essence, as the latter project was conceived as a plan for economic connectivity, the recent trilateral accord is a geopolitical initiative involving the region’s middle powers, and ordinary people have attached their hopes to it. Just as they expected CPEC to bring relief to their lives, create employment and generate economic activity, the perception now being nurtured is that the accord will bring foreign investment into the country, Saudi money, oil on deferred payments and employment for more Pakistanis in the Gulf. Waiting for a miracle to happen is an old practice of Pakistan’s power elite. Every few years, the ruling establishment constructs a new narrative of hope: that a breakthrough is just around the corner, prosperity is waiting beyond the horizon, and Pakistan need only remain patient for the miracle to unfold. This habit of looking abroad for transformation dates back to the country’s inception, when its leadership placed its hopes in the US, joined Seato and Cento, and became a Western defence and security partner alongside Iran. Pakistan’s dreams of geopolitical influence and economic gains through its defence partnership with the US have been shattered repeatedly. Yet, its power elites have repeatedly restored their optimism and embraced new partnerships, expecting external allies to increase the country’s strategic weight and generate financial inflows. The same pattern has extended from Pakistan’s relationship with the US and its Western alliances to its strategic partnership with China, the CPEC, the anticipated opening of Central Asia, and now, the emerging security architecture involving Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. One may recall that when Nawaz Sharif began his third term as prime minister in 2013, and CPEC was formally launched in 2015, it was described as a ‘game changer’. Islamabad’s streets were covered with Pakistani and Chinese flags, creating the impression that an extraordinary partnership was about to transform Pakistan’s economic destiny. China and Pakistan were and remain close strategic partners, and CPEC has delivered important infrastructure and energy projects. But more than a decade after its launch, the promised transformation remains incomplete. Pakistan continues to struggle with debt, inadequate exports, weak productivity and recurring balance-of-payments crises. It still depends on IMF programmes, financial deposits, loan rollovers and other forms of support from friendly countries, including China and Saudi Arabia. CPEC therefore demonstrates the limits of relying on external partnerships as substitutes for the difficult domestic reforms required for sustained economic transformation. Pakistanis have been conditioned to look outward for a change in their fate. In the same sequence, the power elites cultivated the dream of economic transformation through Afghanistan. When the Taliban came to power, Pakistan’s dreams of connecting economically and strategically with Central Asia and regions beyond would come true. One may recall Independence Day in 2021, when the power elites were echoing similar narratives about Afghanistan. As the Taliban approached Kabul, flags of the Islamic emirate appeared at some mosques and other locations in Islamabad. The Taliban entered the Afghan capital on Aug 15, a day after Pakistan celebrated its Independence Day. The mood in influential Pakistani circles was strikingly jubilant. The prime minister at the time, Imran Khan, remarked that Afghans had broken the “shackles of slavery”. Pakistan became one of the strongest advocates of international engagement with the new Taliban administration, although it stopped short of granting formal recognition. At a public seminar, I heard a retired security official confidently predict that the Taliban’s victory would trigger a profound social and political transformation inside Pakistan. He argued that the new order in Afghanistan would eliminate corruption and inspire a more just system in Pakistan. He carefully avoided using the word ‘Sharia’, perhaps because of his professional background, but his meaning was difficult to miss. It was another utopian moment. The reality moved in the opposite direction. Afghanistan’s economic and humanitarian crisis produced new displacement, while the banned TTP intensified its attacks. Relations between Islamabad and Kabul deteriorated sharply. Instead of facilitating regional connectivity, insecurity across the border became one of Pakistan’s gravest internal threats. That episode has been recounted many times, although the security establishment now appears reluctant to revisit the assumptions that shaped its initial enthusiasm. The latest defence pact has sparked another wave of optimism. It may indeed strengthen Pakistan’s strategic position. Its significance should therefore be assessed realistically rather than burdened with promises it may never have been designed to fulfil. Partners and projects change, but the underlying psychology remains remarkably constant. Pakistanis have been conditioned to look outward for a change in their fate. The internal front, however, remains far more complex and generates little optimism. Reforming institutions is more difficult than signing agreements. Building political consensus is less dramatic than receiving a foreign dignitary. Improving governance does not produce the spectacle of flags lining Islamabad’s avenues. One wishes an Independence Day would come when our optimism is the result of something Pakistan had achieved at home: an economic transformation initiated by our own policies; functioning institutions; sustainable peace in Balochistan; stable relationships with Afghanistan and India; the elimination of all insecurities; the rule of law; and, above all, the return of true democracy. Perhaps it is human nature for individuals and nations caught in a crisis to search outside themselves for rescue. Pakistan suffers from the same temptation. Every few years, it discovers another reason to be jubilant, another alliance and another reason to wait for the miracle. The writer is a security analyst. Published in Dawn, August 16th, 2026