Pakistan'ın Üç Cepheli Coğrafi Açmazı

Three-front challenge

PAKISTAN’S ruling elites have long regarded the country’s geographical location as a strategic asset enabling it to project itself as a significant regional player and bolster its geopolitical position. But location cuts both ways. It has also been a liability. Few countries have faced the headwinds from their geography as Pakistan. An overbearing and hostile eastern neighbour, contested borders inherited from colonialism, unresolved Kashmir dispute, volatile neighbourhood and a western neighbour roiled by strife and foreign interventions, all combined to create a permanent security dilemma. That dilemma drove the country’s enduring search for stability. Pakistan’s long-standing strategic nightmare was having to confront two ‘hot fronts’ simultaneously. The imperative to avert this shaped its strategic thinking, security policy and strategy. The tyranny of geography always weighed heavily on the country. That has not changed. What has changed is the scale and gravity of the threat. Pakistan now faces a three-front security challenge — from India on its eastern frontier, from cross-border terror attacks emanating from Afghanistan and unrest, terrorism and militant violence at home. The most troubling aspect of the internal security situation is that never before have two of Pakistan’s provinces been so destabilised at the same time. In the past, both saw violence. But it was localised, confined to specific areas, not province-wide. Never before did Azad Jammu and Kashmir erupt with violent public protests as being witnessed today. The use of coercion and strong-arm official actions have only worsened the situation. The arc of Pakistan’s security threats keeps expanding. The spike in militant attacks across KP and Balochistan continues. In the first six months of 2026 there were over 200 terrorist attacks almost entirely by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan in KP, with 300 people killed. The areas of attacks have expanded, which shows a worrying increase in the outlawed group’s reach. Balochistan saw more than 100 attacks in the same period, mostly by the Balochistan Liberation Army. The militant, separatist group has also demonstrated greater reach and diversified its targets. They range from railway tracks, gas pipelines, state buildings and foreign investment projects to the non-Baloch settler population. Meanwhile, the rising number of TTP attacks in the Pakhtun areas of Balochistan indicates its theatre of operations has expanded much beyond KP — even as far as Karachi as the recent attack on the Rangers headquarters reveals. Balochistan has for decades been in crisis and stricken by insurgencies. But the cumulative effect of the failure to address its troubles has left the province completely alienated from the centre. Balochistan’s problem is fundamentally political. People have long felt disenfranchised, with their basic demands ignored. Anger among youth at the province’s exclusion, lack of a legitimate political process and the state’s constant branding of Baloch nationalists and non-violent dissident groups as traitors have all played into the crisis. This has provided fertile ground for outside interference, which has increased in recent years. Instead of pursuing political solutions, the state’s managers have relied mostly on military operations and use of force to deal with the unrest. This has only deepened public disaffection and driven more people into the arms of extremist forces. In KP, governed by the opposition PTI, the security challenge is compounded by the fact that the federal and provincial governments are at loggerheads. They also diverge on how to deal with militancy. The mistrust between the local population and security forces remains a major impediment in the fight against terrorism. The response to militant violence is predicated primarily on kinetic means absent meaningful efforts to win community support. Yet effective counter-insurgency rests heavily on trust. AJK is facing unrest and a virtual public revolt, with the region paralysed by violent protests. This political crisis had been brewing for the past several years. Alienation grew with a governance system run from Islamabad, which also failed to address AJK’s economic problems including youth joblessness. Resultantly, a broad-based coalition of civil society and political groups, the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) emerged to press its economic and political demands. Despite the authorities’ earlier accommodation of some economic grievances, they later banned the committee and used force to deal with the situation. They failed to see the serious implications of losing Kashmiri hearts and minds for Pakistan’s position on India-occupied Kashmir. Already prominent leaders from occupied Kashmir are voicing concern over the loss of life in AJK. The stand-off continues between protesters and law enforcers with no end in sight to the crisis. The issue of reserved refugee seats lies at the heart of the protests. JAAC demands their abolition as they are manipulated by the powers that be to make and unmake governments. With elections looming, there is no resolution yet. The threats to Pakistan’s security from its two external fronts remain clear and present. In the east, Pakistan faces an Indian government that routinely hurls threats. Having suspended the Indus Waters Treaty last year, it says it will not allow a single drop from ‘India’s rivers’ to enter Pakistan. Other than weaponising water, India is significantly upgrading its military capabilities and has embarked on a major rearmament programme. More alarmingly, India is now putting its nuclear arsenal in deployment mode. It has mated 12 nuclear warheads to missiles and operationally deployed them, according to the Swedish think tank SIPRI. This is a dangerous departure from the posture of recessed deterrence adopted by India and Pakistan, by which they keep warheads and launchers in separate locations. This aims to ensure a long fuse in a crisis. The undeclared shift in India’s nuclear policy will have destabilising consequences for strategic stability, forcing Pakistan to respond to this emerging threat. The western frontier remains exceedingly unstable. Relations with Afghanistan are frozen while the border has been closed and trade suspended since October 2025 when deadly clashes took place between the two neighbours. Hostilities erupt from time to time with Pakistan launching air strikes against militant targets across the border. Islamabad has sought to mount pressure and raise the costs for Kabul for its unwillingness to move against the TTP. But so far, this has not produced the outcome Pakistan wants. Over the decades evolving security dilemmas pushed Pakistan to become a security state, prioritising defence over economic development, social services, democracy and other policy concerns. Despite the trade-off, it still struggles to secure itself. From hot borders to insurgencies at home, the arc of Pakistan’s security threats continues to widen. The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2026