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Despite harvest, macroeconomic pressures sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes

Despite harvest, macroeconomic pressures sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes Key Messages Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing across Northeast Syria (NES) and Northwest Syria (NWS). Despite an improved harvest, seasonal gains are bypassing poor households. Income remains concentrated among wealthier households and is largely absorbed by debt repayment, while internally displaced persons (IDPs) and households that lost key livelihoods face a strained labor market and persistent food consumption gaps. May flooding along the Euphrates damaged cropland and irrigation in Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa and wildfires destroyed standing crops at the peak of the harvest, driving more As-Suwayda households into Crisis (IPC Phase 3). From June 2026 to January 2027, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across NES and NWS and emerge in Latakia Governorate in October. Widespread seasonal declines in income, along with winterization and planting input costs, will converge with receding agricultural and tourism income, widening consumption gaps among poor households ahead of the January lean season. Macroeconomic deterioration is eroding purchasing power for market-dependent households and leaving populations in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). The SYP depreciated by 15 percent between April and June, fuel price increases are raising transport and food prices, and the government reduced the subsidized bread ration twice in six weeks. The population in need of humanitarian assistance will peak between 5.0-5.99 million between October 2026 and January 2027 as summer income recedes and winter expenditures mount. Despite improved agricultural production, macroeconomic deterioration and localized livelihood losses continue to prevent poor and displaced households, particularly in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) areas of NES and NWS, from meeting their basic food needs. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 22, 2026. Food security context Syria's food security context is shaped by more than a decade of civil war, which caused extensive damage to infrastructure, precipitated a severe economic collapse, and compounded the effects of recurrent agroclimatic shocks. From 2011 to 2024, the civil war displaced millions, devastated agricultural infrastructure, restricted market access, and severely undermined public services and state capacity. It also disrupted key productive sectors, including agriculture, oil production, and trade, leaving the economy fragile and eroding household purchasing power. The fall of the Al-Assad regime in December 2024 and the formation of a transitional government in March 2025 ushered in a period of transition, during which governance has fragmented across multiple authorities while localized violence involving multiple non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continues to trigger displacement. In NES — much of Al-Hasakah, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor — the Kurdish-led administration and its armed forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), retain de facto control amid ongoing negotiations over integration with Damascus; NWS, comprising Idlib and northern Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, has been the primary destination for displaced populations, with Idlib and northern Aleppo hosting the country's largest concentration of IDP camps and returnee movements; the coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus have experienced episodes of sectarian violence targeting the Alawite community; and southern Syria remains contested among local armed factions, with periodic Israeli military operations. Displacement remains a defining feature of Syria’s food security context. Although 2.04 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin since December 2024, more than 5.87 million people remain internally displaced, and 4.6 million Syrian refugeesremain outside the country. IDP site populations in NWS have declined by approximately one third since February 2026 as camp residents depart — though many returning households arrive to damaged housing, contaminated land, and depleted productive assets that keep their food security situation closer to that of displaced households than of host communities. Most IDPs live outside formal camps, typically in host communities where access to basic public services, stable sources of income, and affordable food is limited. Displacement continues to disrupt agricultural production, labor markets, and social support systems, while Syria’s fragmented governance landscape and competing sub-national authorities create administrative barriers and operational constraints for food and nutrition assistance delivery. Livelihoods vary across Syria’s diverse ecological and economic zones. Rural households rely primarily on crop and livestock production, seasonal agricultural labor, petty trade, remittances, and food assistance, while urban households depend mainly on wage labor, small trade, and limited formal employment (Annex 3). Markets supply the majority of food for both urban and rural populations, making household purchasing power a central determinant of food access. Other major expenditures include fuel, electricity, health care, housing, and transport. Agricultural labor demand typically peaks during planting and harvest periods, and livestock production depends on seasonal pasture availability between October and April. However, conflict-related damage to infrastructure, movement restrictions due to insecurity, drought, and high input costs have reduced cultivated area and limited agricultural labor opportunities in many areas. At the same time, the impacts of conflict, drought, and high fodder prices have constrained livestock production, forcing many herders to sell animals or exit the sector. The 2024/25 rainy season was among the driest in decades, with rainfall more than 50 percent below average, sharply reducing cereal output and pasture conditions in key rainfed wheat areas. These overlapping shocks continue to constrain agricultural activity, disrupt trade flows and market functioning, and weaken household income and purchasing power across many parts of the country. Syria’s economy remains fragile in the post-Assad transitional period. Although some macroeconomic improvements occurred in 2025, including modest increases in remittance inflows and public-sector salaries and an easing of food inflation in localized areas, purchasing power remains constrained by persistently high prices for food, fuel, and other essential goods. Heavy reliance on imports, past years of currency depreciation, and weak domestic production continue to sustain elevated staple food prices. High fuel costs, transport constraints, liquidity shortages, and limited livelihood opportunities also restrict economic activity and income generation across much of the country. As a result, relative improvements in economic conditions are fragile and uneven, especially in drought‑affected or insecure regions. Humanitarian food assistance has become an important component of household food access following years of conflict, displacement, and poor economic conditions. However, the scale, coverage, and consistency of assistance have varied over time due to operational constraints, funding availability, and access challenges associated with Syria’s fragmented governance landscape. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Syria Food Security Outlook: February 2026 to October 2026 Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Syria: April 2026 to October 2026 Latest Syria Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Source: FAO Atypically high Euphrates River flows caused localized flooding in areas of Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa from mid to late May, affecting approximately 27,000 people and impacting agriculture, infrastructure, and market access. High inflows from Turkey and above-average rainfall pushed reservoir levels above 97 percent of capacity, prompting spillway openings at the Euphrates Dam for the first time in more than three decades and sharply increasing downstream discharge. The floods displaced more than 8,000 people in Deir ez-Zor, inundated displacement sites in Ar-Raqqa, damaged access routes and water systems, and disrupted agricultural activities and market access. Impacts were most severe in Deir ez-Zor, where approximately 7,200 hectares of agricultural land — more than 8 percent of the governorate's cultivated area — were inundated during the wheat harvest, with damage assessments across both governorates reaching up to 17,000 hectares. Water levels receded in late May. Above-average rainfall during the 2025/26 season has substantially improved crop production following several consecutive years of drought (Figure 1) but has not reversed the cumulative drought impacts on groundwater, rangelands, and household productive assets. National wheat production is projected at approximately 2.3-2.5 million metric tons (MT), a significant increase from the approximately 900,000 MT produced in 2024/25, the worst cereal harvest in 36 years. The improved harvest is increasing grain availability and seasonal agricultural income, particularly in NES. However, as of mid-June, farmers had delivered only approximately 62,000 MT to collection centers in Al-Hasakah, against a procurement target of up to 1.0 million MT, reflecting delays caused by the new electronic procurement platform. Slow procurement is delaying harvest income for some farming households and creating uncertainty over the volume of wheat that will be purchased through official channels. Improved pasture and crop residue have substantially improved livestock production conditions countrywide. Abundant crop residue is supporting animal feeding, improving livestock body conditions, and reducing household reliance on purchased feed. Improved pasture and feed availability have also reduced pressure on breeders to sell animals, allowing herders rebuild herd sizes. Wildfires have caused localized crop losses at the peak of the 2025/26 harvest. The Syrian Ministry of Emergency reported approximately 6,500 fires countrywide during June, of which 4,026 affected agricultural land. Fires burning mature standing crops immediately before harvest resulted in localized crop losses, reducing harvest income and in-kind food stocks; fires affecting stubble and rangeland are also degrading the above-average livestock feed resources otherwise available this season. Macroeconomic conditions have deteriorated since February 2026, driven by renewed currency depreciation and accelerating inflation. The SYP lost approximately 15 percent of its value on the parallel market between early April and early June 2026. Depreciation is directly impacting consumer prices, given Syria's heavy reliance on imported staples, fuel, and inputs, with the average monthly cost of essential goods and services rising 10 percent between February and May 2026. The government has also reduced the subsidized bread ration twice since early May — from 1,200 to 1,050 grams, then from 10 loaves to eight (1,000 grams) — directly increasing food costs for poor households reliant on subsidized bread as a primary staple. Nominal income adjustments have not offset these trends: the 50 percent public sector salary increase in May 2026 was quickly eroded by rising prices, while the mandatory conversion of foreign remittances at the official exchange rate, well below the parallel market rate, suppresses the real value of remittance inflows. Escalating Israeli military operations and intercommunal clashes are disrupting agricultural livelihoods and market access in southern Syria. In Quneitra, ground incursions, checkpoints, and destruction of farmland have become more frequent since early 2026, deterring cultivation and restricting grazing access in border-zone communities. In As-Suwayda, recurrent clashes between local factions and government-affiliated forces, alongside Jordanian airstrikes in early May targeting smuggling networks, have disrupted movement, market activity, and public salary delivery. Insecurity is constraining land-based income and food access for affected households during the peak agricultural season. Official fuel price increases in early May are driving up transport and retail food prices countrywide. The Syrian Petroleum Company raised official fuel prices by 1,729 percent — with diesel increasing from 0.75 to 0.88 USD/liter and 90-octane gasoline from 0.85 to 1.10 USD per liter — citing elevated global oil prices and shipping disruptions linked to the Strait of Hormuz. High fuel costs are transmitting into higher transport, irrigation, and market costs for agricultural producers during the harvest and summer cropping period. Large-scale returns from displacement camps in NWS over the past year have increased pressure on services and livelihoods in areas of return. Camp populations in NWS declined from approximately 1.5 million to around 500,000 between mid-2025 and mid-2026, as households returned to areas of origin. While returns reflect improved security conditions, many returnees lack access to livelihoods, markets, and basic services in areas of return and face damaged housing, limited labor opportunities, and high reestablishment costs. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian food assistance, a critical source of food access for millions of people across Syria, has been significantly scaled back since May 2026 due to deepening funding shortfalls. WFP reduced its caseload and withdrew from Aleppo, Idlib, and northeastern Syria, and remaining assistance is concentrated in the areas of most acute need: bread distribution continues to reach large numbers of beneficiaries in NWS and southern Syria but is largely absent across central Syria, coastal areas, and NES. The scale of assistance remains insufficient relative to needs across the country. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in NES despite a substantially improved harvest, as debt burdens, weak labor markets, and the loss of key income sources limit household food access. Above-average rainfall between February and April 2026 substantially improved crop production, but the gains to farming households are smaller than the harvest suggests: much of the resulting income is being used to repay accumulated debt and recover production costs, delays associated with new wheat procurement procedures have slowed the realization of harvest income, and localized shocks — including flooding along the Euphrates, wildfires, and crop disease — reduced production for affected households. Similarly, while improved pasture and abundant crop residue supported livestock body conditions and herd retention, many poor pastoral households still own too few animals to meaningfully benefit from increased milk production or livestock sales. The poorest households depend on labor income rather than production, and opportunities remain constrained: the government ban on informal oil refining eliminated a primary income source for a large portion of the population in Deir ez-Zor while labor supply — saturated by former refining workers and former SDF-affiliated workers awaiting integration — continues to exceed demand, suppressing wages and limiting the benefit of seasonal agricultural labor. Consequently, poor households — including IDPs, former refining workers, and unintegrated former SDF dependents — remain unable to meet their minimum food needs. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in NWS despite the strong harvest, as poor households are unable to meaningfully benefit from seasonal improvements in food and income sources. Although favorable spring rainfall supported good yields, many landowning households planted late or left land uncultivated during the poor October-December planting window, limiting harvest yields and crop income. Among households that did harvest, much of the resulting revenue is being absorbed by debt repayment and input cost recovery, and March-April flash flooding caused severe localized losses in key irrigated production zones, including the Al-Ghab and Al-Ruj plains and the Al-Siha basin. IDPs and returnees — who account for 61 percent of the population in Idlib and 32 percent in Aleppo — have captured few of these gains: repeated displacement has stripped them of livestock, equipment, and land, while unexploded ordnance (UXO) and permanent orchard loss have further degraded the productive assets available to them. These displaced and returnee households depend on agricultural labor for income, but wages remain suppressed by labor supply far exceeding demand and by farming households' prioritization of family labor over hired workers. Compounding this, poor households remain heavily market dependent, and food prices are rising with fuel costs and currency depreciation rather than easing seasonally with the harvest. Poor households, particularly camp-based and recently returned IDPs, consequently face food consumption gaps and are engaging in negative coping strategies, including accumulating debt and selling productive assets. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist across southern Syria, where most poor households are meeting minimum food needs but cannot cover essential non-food expenditures without borrowing, purchasing food on credit, or selling non-productive assets. Near-average harvests, summer cultivation, and seasonal employment continue to support household income across most of the region, though UXO contamination and damaged farmland in former frontline communities of Rural Damascus continue to restrict access to agricultural land. However, some households are facing more severe outcomes. In As-Suwayda, above-average rainfall has not resolved chronic water scarcity in eastern subdistricts, limiting agricultural production, while insecurity continues to disrupt movement and market activity. In Quneitra, increasingly frequent Israeli military operations have reduced access to farmland and lowered crop production among households in the immediate border zone. A small portion of households, particularly in As-Suwayda and the Quneitra border zone, are likely facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In the coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist. Seasonal income from fishing, summer tourism, seaport activity, and greenhouse and orchard production supports minimally adequate food consumption for most households, though many continue to borrow money or purchase food on credit to cover essential non-food expenditures. Above-average rainfall replenished reservoirs and improved irrigation access, supporting agricultural production, particularly in Tartus. However, households formerly employed in government or military structures under the Al-Assad government have lost stable income without adequate substitutes and now rely on casual labor, while community tensions linked to the area's association with the former government continue to constrain private sector recovery and tourism. Some poor households without income-earning opportunities face the greatest difficulty meeting minimum food needs and are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Domestic wheat production for the 2025/26 season is expected to remain below the level needed to meet national requirements despite improved growing-season rainfall and a significant recovery from the drought-affected 2024/25 harvest. While above-average February–May rainfall improved yields, below-average rainfall during the October–December 2025 planting period had already reduced wheat and barley planted area, so yield gains applied to a smaller cultivated area. Water availability for summer cultivation is expected to improve across most production zones. Above-average rainfall between February-May improved surface water, groundwater, and river flows — including the Euphrates, Orontes, Barada, and Al-Aouj — supporting crop establishment, pasture conditions, and irrigation availability for summer cultivation. Wheat import requirements are expected to remain above average through the projection period. Below-average domestic production and high import-linked input costs,sustain structural import dependency. Government wheat procurement policies are expected to weaken farmer incentives. The fixed procurement price of 46,000 SYP/ton remains below production costs — particularly in irrigated systems — due to exchange rate depreciation and high input costs. Despite partial mitigation through bonus incentives, farmers are likely to favor private sales or on-farm storage, with reduced wheat planting anticipated for the 2026/27 season. Fertilizer prices are expected to remain above average through the projection period, constraining input application and limiting yield recovery. Despite partial reactivation of domestic fertilizer production, elevated global prices will continue to keep costs high. Reduced application rates — particularly urea — ahead of the 2026/27 winter cereal planting season will likely compress achievable yields below what improved water availability would otherwise support. Source: WFP The SYP is expected to continue depreciating on the parallel market through the projection period, sustaining food price inflation (Figure 2). Continued gradual depreciation is expected given structural import dependence, limited foreign exchange, and the widening gap with the official rate. Real incomes are expected to remain below the minimum expenditure basket despite the May public sector salary increase, as price rises outpace nominal gains. Market supply conditions are expected to improve gradually due to trade normalization, easing of sanctions, and expanding cross-border trade routes. Fuel supply is expected to remain constrained but operational, with output reliability from the Baniyas and Homs refineries continuing to influence irrigation, transport, and broader food system functioning. Livestock sector conditions are expected to remain mixed. Improved pasture and rangeland conditions following favorable rainfall are expected to support livestock body conditions and production. Elevated wildfire risk is expected to persist through the summer dry season, particularly in coastal forest and orchard zones of Latakia and Tartus, with fire-related losses reducing local food availability and agricultural incomes and increasing recovery costs for affected households. Security conditions are expected to remain broadly stable but with persistent localized disruptions. Tensions in NES, coastal areas, and the south — alongside governance transitions between the SDF and the Syrian government — are likely to continue constraining agricultural production, market access, service delivery, and investment, while attacks on energy infrastructure in eastern Syria remain an ongoing disruption risk. UXO contamination in former frontline areas is expected to continue restricting safe land access and constraining agricultural rehabilitation through the projection period. Documentation barriers, limited formal employment access, depleted assets, and high urban living costs are expected to persist through the projection period, constraining income recovery for IDP and returnee households regardless of aggregate economic improvement. Humanitarian food assistance Ongoing funding shortfalls are expected to continue limiting the coverage and consistency of humanitarian food assistance throughout the projection period. Following WFP's May termination of its subsidized bread program — which had supported more than 300 bakeries serving up to 4.0 million people daily — and the reduction of emergency food assistance from 1.3 million to 650,000 people, WFP's operational presence is expected to contract further, from 14 to seven governorates, during the summer. No significant new funding is anticipated during the projection period. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in NES through January 2027, as harvest-driven income gains remain concentrated among landowning households and bypass the poor households driving the area classification. The 2026 cereal harvest is expected to provide meaningful income for farming and agricultural labor-dependent households, particularly in Al-Hasakah, and summer cultivation of cotton, sugar beet, maize, and vegetables will sustain agricultural labor demand through September; however, much of the harvest-generated income will be applied to debt accumulated during prior drought years before translating into improved food consumption. IDP households, daily laborers, former informal oil refining workers, and former SDF employees awaiting integration capture limited benefit from seasonal income and will likely remain dependent on oversupplied casual labor markets. Beginning in October, seasonal income sources are expected to narrow as agricultural labor demand recedes. During this period, livestock sales become the primary cash income source for pastoralist households, but for those still rebuilding drought-depleted herds, feed and other expenditures will absorb much of the sale revenue, while education and winter planting input costs will add pressure on indebted farming households. Poor households are expected to face persistent food consumption gaps through the projection period, worsening as seasonal income declines from October onwards and household stocks are depleted ahead of the lean season beginning in January. In NWS, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027, as poor households remain unable to meaningfully benefit from seasonal income gains. Through September, harvests of cereals, summer vegetables, and orchard crops will generate seasonal income for farming and agricultural labor-dependent households, cotton, maize, and sugar beet cultivation will sustain agricultural labor demand, and improved pasture and crop residue will support livestock body conditions. However, the displaced and returnee households who make up the majority of the population in Idlib and a large share in Aleppo lack the land, livestock, and productive assets needed to benefit from the season, and will remain dependent on agricultural labor markets where wages are suppressed by labor supply far exceeding demand. Beginning in October, seasonal income is expected to narrow as the olive and pistachio harvests close the agricultural income year, while education, winterization, and winter planting input costs will compound pressure on household food budgets. Poor households, particularly camp-based IDPs, are expected to face persistent food consumption gaps through the projection period, worsening as seasonal income recedes from October and household resources are depleted ahead of the lean season beginning in January. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist across the southern governorates through January 2027, with most poor households able to meet minimum food needs but unable to cover essential non-food expenditures without borrowing or purchasing food on credit, or drawing down savings. Through September, summer agricultural and orchard income across Rural Damascus, Daraa, and As-Suwayda will support farming households, and normalized Syria-Jordan trade is expected to sustain farm gate prices for producers. However, some households will face more severe outcomes. Returnee households — arriving in large numbers in Daraa and Rural Damascus — are directing income toward rehabilitation and resettlement costs at the expense of food expenditure, while IDP households face limited employment, high urban living costs, and the reduced subsidized bread ration. In As-Suwayda, public sector salary delays linked to governance fragmentation are pushing households into informal credit cycles, and in Quneitra, Israeli military operations continue to restrict border-zone farming and grazing access, with suppressed summer cultivation risking knock-on effects into the October-December planting window. From October, education, winterization, and heating costs will coincide with the withdrawal of summer income, most acutely for recent returnees facing their first winter with rehabilitation costs not yet stabilized, though autumn orchard income and livestock sales will provide partial offsets for farming and herding households. Some households — particularly recent returnees, IDPs, and border-zone communities in As-Suwayda and Quneitra — are expected to face food consumption gaps consistent with Crisis (IPC Phase 3), worsening as winter expenditures mount ahead of the January lean season, though they will remain a minority of the area population. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in the coastal governorates of Tartus and Latakia through September. In October, Tartus is expected to remain Stressed through January 2027, while Latakia is expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as summer income recedes without a year-round replacement. Through September, summer tourism and related employment will sustain purchasing power for most host community households in both governorates. Tartus will further benefit from year-round greenhouse production and Baniyas refinery employment, with fishing and port labor providing additional seasonal income. In Latakia, tourism is expected to recover only marginally, with community tensions linked to the governorate's association with the former government continuing to suppress visitor confidence, while large IDP populations increase labor supply pressure during the peak summer window, moderating wages for seasonal service workers. Beginning in October, Tartus's greenhouse and refinery income base will likely maintain household purchasing power through the autumn and winter, covering staple food and heating costs and sustaining Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. In contrast, Latakia lacks an equivalent year-round income bridge: fishing income and residual hospitality employment will extend only partially through October. As tourism wages withdraw and education, winterization, and heating costs mount, a growing number of Latakia households — particularly IDPs and those without a year-round income source — will be unable to meet minimum food needs, and the governorate is expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with an increasing share of households facing food consumption gaps. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Challenges facing farmers in SyriaDanish Refugee CouncilQualitativeDrought Population censusIOMQuantitativeIDP and returnee proportion of population by governorate and impact of hazards on sub-population groups Monthly market monitoringWFPQuantitativeStaple food prices trends Middle East situationUNHCRQualitative Population movement and displacement Euphrates River floodOXFAMQuantitative and qualitative Impact of floods on agriculture and livestock Syria Food Security Assessment 2025Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and WFPQuantitative and qualitativeAssessing food security at household level Humanitarian overview OCHAQualitativeMulti-sectoral analysis: source of income and food and impact of hazards Operational response FSALQuantitative Actual and planned assistance by subdistrict, food assistance, and livelihoods support coverage Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. National Significant fluctuation of the SYP beyond assumed levels Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A depreciation beyond current parallel market rates — driven by loss of confidence in the redenominated currency, policy shocks affecting remittance conversion, or regional escalation — would rapidly increase prices of imported staples, fuel, and agricultural inputs, further eroding purchasing power for the market-dependent majority of households. Salaried income, already well below the minimum expenditure basket, would lose further real value, and remittance-dependent households would see transfers compressed further. This would increase the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes countrywide and could drive area-level deterioration from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in areas where large shares of households are already marginally meeting minimum food needs (such as the southern and coastal governorates). Conversely, sustained stabilization or appreciation would ease food price inflation and improve real purchasing power, reducing the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Significantly below-average or delayed October-December 2026 rainfall Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Significantly delayed or below-average rains would constrain land preparation, reduce area planted and germination for the 2026/27 winter wheat and barley season, lower agricultural labor demand during the planting window, and curtail pasture regeneration ahead of winter. Given that three major drought episodes between 2006 and 2021 have depleted approximately 60 percent of groundwater reserves in NES, a poor season would compound existing water deficits and increase reliance on costlier irrigation at a time of elevated fuel and input prices. Rainfed farming households — many entering the season already committed to debt repayment — would reduce area planted or forgo planting, while reduced income from planting season labor would erode food access for IDP households and daily laborers ahead of the January lean season. This would increase the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in NES and NWS and deepen the severity of consumption gaps among households already in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), though area-level classifications would likely remain at Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Southern governorates Expansion of Israeli military operations or renewed armed violence in the south Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An expansion of military operations beyond the Quneitra border zone, a breakdown of the As-Suwayda ceasefire, or renewed intercommunal violence — would restrict access to farmland, pasture, markets, and labor opportunities, disrupt the October-December planting window, and drive price spikes for bread, fuel, and fresh foods in affected areas. Given Quneitra's small population, a relatively modest increase in the number of households losing land-based income and food access could push the share facing consumption gaps above the threshold for area-level reclassification, driving deterioration from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3); in As-Suwayda, where a share of the population already faces Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, sustained conflict would similarly drive deterioration of the area classification to Crisis (IPC Phase 3). kmartin@fews.net_1 Fri, 07/10/2026 - 20:16 Download the report 5