Afganistan'da İyi Hasada Rağmen Gıda İhtiyacı Artacak

Despite a favorable harvest, needs are expected to rise as harvest stocks deplete

Despite a favorable harvest, needs are expected to rise as harvest stocks deplete Key Messages Key Messages Slow recovery from multiple years of drought, below-average production, and few labor opportunities are expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in Daykundi, Faryab, and Ghor provinces through January 2027. While the favorable 2026 countrywide harvest and stable prices are expected to strengthen food availability and purchasing power through September, these gains fall short of offsetting accumulated shocks. As food stocks deplete and reliance on markets grows from October, poor households are expected to face food consumption gaps and turn to negative coping strategies, including asset sales, rising debt, and reduced meal frequency. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected across the northern, northeastern, western, and southwestern regions through September, while several provinces are expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) between October and January. The ongoing harvest and seasonal income from agricultural labor, construction, and petty trade are supporting household food access through September. However, as harvest stocks deplete and agricultural labor declines seasonally from October, market dependence is expected to increase, leaving households with limited income and are expected to face food consumption gaps. The ongoing El Niño event is expected to drive above-average precipitation countrywide between October and January, consistent with historical patterns. A favorable start to the 2026/27 season is expected, with above-average precipitation supporting timely winter wheat planting, following four consecutive years of drought between 2021 and 2024. The population in need of food assistance is expected to peak between 8.0-8.99 million people in December 2026 and January 2027. Food stocks will likely start depleting in December, despite a favorable harvest, as poor households and returnees face the compounding impacts of past weather shocks, labor competition, and weak purchasing power. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 25, 2026. Food security context Afghanistan's staple food supply is dependent on a mixture of wheat imports, primarily from Kazakhstan, as well as domestic production. Most agricultural areas have a mix of rainfed and irrigated crop production. The majority of crop production (75-80 percent) is irrigated, largely from snowmelt from the mountains to lower-elevation areas or using solar irrigation systems. In the rainfed areas of northern Afghanistan, rainfall during the winter precipitation season (October-March) and the spring wet season (March-May) is important for crop production outcomes. In the lowland irrigated areas – responsible for most of the national-level wheat production – the amount of snowfall deposited during the winter months, as well as the rate at which it melts during the spring, is important for crop production. As such, the availability of sufficient water is important for both rainfed and irrigated crop production and, consequently, for food security in rural areas. Both food and cash crop production are important to rural livelihoods, with opportunities for labor linked to seasonal activity. From September to November, land preparation and planting of winter wheat occurs, providing a key source of income for non-land owning households. The second-season harvest of rice and maize also occurs at this time, providing labor opportunities and a seasonal increase in household food stocks and market supply. Household cereal stocks typically last three to five months following a normal harvest with some regional variability. In surplus-producing provinces such as Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Helmand, cereal stocks can last up to seven months, as households typically have access to their own land and own-produced food. Conversely, in deficit-producing provinces that have limited access to land, cereal stocks from own production typically only last up to three months. Once households exhaust their own-produced food stocks, they depend on food from markets to meet their food needs. Afghanistan is prone to weather shocks, including earthquakes, floods, and, during La Niña years, a tendency for below-average precipitation. The last four (2021-2025) October to May precipitation seasons have been marked by drought conditions. The compounding impacts of consecutive years of drought, a stagnant economy, and high volumes of returnees have resulted in reductions in household assets, which were sold to access food, further reducing households’ capacity to cope with further shocks. The influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan continues to strain already limited labor opportunities. Returnees often settle in urban areas with strained labor markets or return to their village of origin due to the high cost of living in urban areas. A common source of income is agricultural labor. Better-off households typically own larger farms that grow crops to be sold at market, while low- or medium-income households work on these farms. Non-agricultural labor opportunities are typically concentrated in urban areas and include construction workers, street cleaners, garbage collectors, and porters. Casual labor opportunities in rural areas are typically limited during the lean season, while second-season harvests will provide some agricultural labor opportunities. Reliance on remittances has remained high and has provided a relatively stable source of income. However, deportations from Iran and Pakistan have reduced the inflow of remittances, leading to the deterioration of a key source of income for many poor households. Regional economic pressures, including sanctions on Iran and increased returnee flows from Pakistan, have reduced economic activity, cutting jobs and wages in construction, agriculture, and informal sectors where Afghans typically work. Weakened economic conditions in Iran have further eroded the value of remittances sent home. Additionally, economic pressure has intensified the enforcement of migration policies, leading to the return of undocumented Afghans and further limiting remittance flows. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Afghanistan Food Security Outlook: February 2026 to September 2026 Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Afghanistan: April 2026 to September 2026 Latest Afghanistan Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Source: UNHCR Wheat harvest: The wheat harvest is progressing as typical, with harvesting complete or nearing completion in the lowland regions, particularly in the southern, southwestern, and eastern regions. Conversely, the harvest in the higher-altitude central, northeastern, and parts of the southeastern regions are in early stages, as crops mature and are harvested between late June and September. Following multiple years of drought between 2021 and 2024, the 2026 harvest is expected to be above last year and near the five-year average, supported by favorable precipitation during critical crop development stages during the October 2025 to May 2026 precipitation season. Improvements in crop production are concentrated in irrigated areas, while production in some rainfed areas of the north and northeast remains below average due to localized rainfall deficits during key growth stages. Pasture conditions: Pasture conditions and fodder availability are readily available supported by late spring precipitation, particularly in the eastern and southeastern regions. This is aiding average livestock body conditions in these areas. However, in the northern, western, and southwestern regions, pasture has not fully recovered, and households continue to rely on market-purchased fodder to maintain livestock. Returnee inflows: Afghans returning from Iran and Pakistan remain substantial, though the scale of forced returns has declined compared to the same period last year (Figure 1). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), most returnees are settling in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kunduz. Approximately 885,400 individuals were forcibly returned between January and June 2026, a decrease from approximately 950,600 returns during the same period in 2025, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). IOM data similarly indicate a decline in returns over the past six months, alongside an estimated 18 percent reduction in outflows from Afghanistan, driven by stricter migration policies in Iran and Pakistan and compounded by ongoing political tensions between the two countries and Afghanistan. The forced deportation of Afghan nationals from Iran and Pakistan continues to strain and increase competition for already limited resources and intensify competition for income-earning opportunities, causing significant limitations on households for accessing income, particularly in urban areas. While wages remain stable, wage labor availability remains constrained, with households having 1.9 days per week of agricultural labor opportunities. Labor opportunities: The number of days of labor available per week has remained broadly stable but below average countrywide. However, seasonal improvements, related to the harvest, in the number of available working days have been observed, recording a 9 percent increase between May and June based on WFP data. Construction labor opportunities have also increased, particularly in Farah, Herat, and Paktika. However, demand for availability remains below both last year's levels and the five-year average, by 19 percent and 14 percent, respectively, according to an analysis of WFP data. This is largely driven by the continued influx of returnees and high prices, which have limited landowners' and construction contractors’ ability to hire additional labor. Cross-border trade: Cross-border trade in provinces that border Pakistan has significantly declined, as the border closure persists and the Afghan deportation campaign in Pakistan continues. Similarly, cross-border trade in provinces bordering Iran has declined due to the ongoing situation in the Middle East and the forced deportations of Afghans from Iran. Fertilizer and fuel costs: Poor households are unable to afford adequate fertilizer without relying on credit or loans, limiting fertilizer application during the spring growing period across approximately 24 provinces and constraining production for the upcoming harvests. Fertilizer and fuel prices remain above both last year and the five-year average despite modest monthly increases, with urea prices particularly elevated, at 44 percent above last year and 14 percent above the five-year average. Similarly, fuel prices are 12 percent above last year's, reflecting high production input costs. Staple food prices: Wheat and wheat flour prices remained stable in June compared to May and remain 12 percent below the five-year average, though 10 percent above last year. Prices have held steady as wheat continues to flow through key trade routes from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, supported by a strong AFN. In contrast, prices for some imported commodities, such as rice and sugar, remain elevated due to the closure of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which has disrupted trade and raised transportation costs. Vegetable oil, largely imported from Gulf countries and previously shipped through Pakistan, rose sharply amid the ongoing border closure, then declined by 5 percent between April and May as imports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia increased; however, vegetable oil prices remain 6 percent higher than at the same time last year. Remittances: Remittance inflows have declined countrywide. Remittances from Gulf countries have remained largely stable despite the Middle East crisis, continuing to support household income and food consumption in the southeastern regions, which rely most heavily on these inflows. In contrast, remittances from Iran have significantly declined due to the ongoing situation in the Middle East and the large-scale forced return of Afghan migrants. Humanitarian food assistance In May 2026, WFP assisted 2.1 million people, providing nearly 3,700 metric tons of food assistance. WFP also continued to support Afghan returnees, assisting approximately 54,000 individuals. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces. Households are able to access limited income as harvest-related labor opportunities continue, although at below-average levels, as the harvest in high-elevation and deficit-producing areas is expected to be below average. Even with the below-average, households have access to own produced food from the harvest. However, following multiple poor production years from the 2021/22 season through 2024/25 season, these seasonal gains are insufficient, leaving poor households heavily reliant on market purchases. With below-average labor opportunities, households are unable to afford sufficient food on the market. As a result, poor households continue to face food consumption gaps and are engaging in negative coping strategies, including atypical livestock sales and taking on high-interest debt. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in Badakhshan province, where the wheat harvest is in early stages, as the harvest begins later in higher elevations. As a result, households have not yet gained access to harvest-related food and income, and are reliant on market purchases. With staple food prices elevated by high transportation costs to these remote areas, and household income limited by below-average labor opportunities, poor households are unable to afford sufficient food. The cumulative impacts following consecutive years of below-average production have left households with limited financial capacity to purchase food. Poor households are facing food consumption gaps and depleting already limited assets through atypical livestock sales and high-interest borrowing. In Nimroz Province, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing. Poor households face constrained income due to limited cross-border trade and limited time to recover from the past poor harvest seasons and associated low asset bases, despite seasonal improvements. Households that previously relied on cross-border trade with Iran have seen these income opportunities significantly decline, limiting their ability to purchase food. Poor households are experiencing food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in major urban centers, where poor households are highly market reliant. High competition for limited employment, intensified by the continued influx of returnees settling in urban areas, has driven down the number of available working days and left many poor households with insufficient and irregular income. Combined with elevated staple food prices, households are unable to cover the cost of basic food needs, resulting in food consumption gaps. Households are reducing essential non-food expenditures, liquidating small business assets, and increasing reliance on food purchased on credit. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing across the north, northeast, west, south, and southwest, as increased access to own-produced food stocks, harvest-related labor opportunities, and seasonal livestock income are supporting household food access. Agricultural labor opportunities and wage levels, while improved from the winter season, remain insufficient for land-poor households that are reliant on casual labor and sharecropping as primary income sources. While most households are expected to meet minimum food needs, some households are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), including the most vulnerable, particularly landless households, who are expected to rely on informal credit and borrowing to access food. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing across much of the southeastern region, supported by relatively stable remittance inflows and seasonal casual labor opportunities, particularly in construction, despite the main harvest being delayed until late June through early August. These income sources are supporting household purchasing power and allowing most households to meet minimum food needs. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Source: FEWS NET analysis of WFP data Precipitation will likely be above-average countrywide to start the October to May season from October 2026 to January 2027, consistent with historical El Niño patterns. Forecasted above-average precipitation in late 2026 and early 2027 will likely improve snowpack and snow water volume countrywide. Above-average daily mean temperatures are likely to persist through December 2026, with extreme temperatures possible. Vegetation and pasture conditions are expected to remain stable through September 2026 at relatively improved levels compared to last year, before declining seasonally through January 2027 with the typical onset of winter. Groundwater conditions are expected to remain below average due to cumulative multi-year precipitation deficits and continued extraction. Although above-average precipitation in late 2026 and early 2027, associated with the onset of El Niño, will likely support localized gains, frozen ground across many areas during winter and prolonged groundwater deficits from multiple years of drought (2021-24) and poor precipitation will be unlikely to result in sustained groundwater recovery. The national wheat harvest is expected to be above last year’s and near the five-year average, with regional variation following an uneven 2025/26 rainy season. The harvest is expected to be above average in surplus-producing regions in the southwest, below average in northern and northeastern regions, and average elsewhere. Rainfed wheat performance is expected to be below average in parts of the northern, central, and northeastern regions due to insufficient rainfall during critical growth stages, rising temperatures, and soil moisture deficits. In the eastern region, untimely rainfall, strong winds, and the potential spread of wheat rust may reduce yields compared to last year, while sudden temperature increases following rainfall may affect grain quality in some northeastern areas. Irrigated wheat performance is expected to improve compared to last year, particularly in Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Khost provinces, where favorable precipitation has supported improved crop performance. However, regional disparities persist; high input costs have constrained production in some southern areas, while untimely and insufficient seasonal precipitation has reduced yields in parts of the eastern, northeastern, and rainfed areas. Vegetable production in eastern, southeastern, and northern provinces is expected to be similar to last year and above the five-year average. Income from vegetable sales is expected to be average, supported by higher domestic demand following Pakistan's ban on vegetable exports to Afghanistan and the ongoing border closure, improving food access for poor households in these provinces. Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain fragile throughout the projection period. Some seasonal improvement linked to the harvest and livestock productivity is expected through September in rural areas; however, declining remittances and high prices of food and non-food commodities are expected to sustain below-average purchasing power. Conditions are expected to worsen from October to January, as labor opportunities decline significantly after the harvest and non-agricultural labor opportunities decrease with the onset of winter. Wheat flour prices are expected to remain broadly stable and below the five-year average throughout the projection period, supported by the likely average national 2026 wheat harvest and continued wheat imports from Kazakhstan (Figure 2). However, seasonal price increases are anticipated between October and January due to increased market demand and seasonal tightening of market supply. At the same time, the de-escalation of tensions in the Middle East is expected to support lower international fuel prices, reducing transportation and marketing costs. Combined with recent declines in global palm and soybean oil prices, domestic cooking oil prices are expected to remain stable or decline further relative to levels observed at the onset of the Middle East conflict. The returns of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan are expected to continue through January, though the number of returnees is expected to decrease marginally on a monthly basis based on recent trends. Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to be broadly available during the harvesting season from June through August but remain below both last year and the average across the north, northeast, south, east, west, and southwest. In the surplus-producing southeast, above-average opportunities are expected over the same period. From September, agricultural labor opportunities are expected to decline seasonally at the national level as the main wheat harvest concludes; however, localized labor demand is expected in provinces where second-season maize and rice crops are harvested, including Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Nangarhar, and Laghman provinces. Non-agricultural wage labor opportunities are expected to remain below last year's levels and the five-year average through September due to increased competition from returnees and higher construction material costs. From October onward, wage labor opportunities are expected to decline seasonally with the onset of winter. Livestock body conditions are expected to improve through October across most of the country, supported by favorable pasture conditions. However, in southwestern and eastern provinces, above-average temperatures are expected to deplete pastures earlier than is typical, potentially triggering early livestock migration and negatively affecting livestock body conditions in those areas. Livestock prices are expected to remain above both last year's and the five-year average through at least October 2026 due to improved livestock body conditions from better pasture and fodder availability and reduced supply due to the ban on livestock imports from Pakistan. From November through January, livestock prices are expected to follow a typical seasonal decline, driven by reduced demand and deteriorating pasture conditions. Humanitarian food assistance No humanitarian food assistance is currently planned during the projection period. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in Daykundi, Faryab, and Ghor provinces through the projection period. Although the harvest is expected to increase own-produced food availability and improve access to income earning opportunities, households in these provinces entered the harvest with eroded assets following consecutive years of below-average production. These seasonal gains are insufficient to offset the cumulative impacts of prior shocks, and poor households that are dependent on casual labor and sharecropping will most likely earn below-average income. Poor households are expected to continue facing food consumption gaps, with an increasing number of households facing food consumption deficits during the projection period. In the east and northeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in Badakhshan, Panjsher, and Kunar provinces, with Nuristan Province expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) beginning in October. Through September, households in Nuristan Province are expected to access some own-produced food and harvest-related income, supporting food consumption. Conversely, food consumption deficits are expected to persist in Badakhshan, Panjsher, and Kunar provinces, which are deficit-producing areas where households have limited access to food and income despite the favorable countrywide harvest. Food stocks are expected to deplete beginning in October, and households have not been able to fully recover from multiple poor production seasons and access to sufficient own-produced food, particularly in Nuristan Province. While harvest-related income is expected to increase, these provinces are typically deficit-producing regions, where remote and mountainous terrain limits agricultural production and labor opportunities. Prices are expected to be above average in these regions, as high transportation costs drive up food prices. From October through January, as food stocks deplete and seasonal labor income declines, poor households are expected to become increasingly market reliant. Households are expected to be unable to afford sufficient food, as below-average income and elevated food prices constrain their ability to meet food needs. In an effort to access food, poor households are expected to engage in negative coping strategies, including taking on debt to meet food needs and selling productive assets. Bamyan, Samangan, and Wardak provinces are expected to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September, as households have sufficient access to food and income-earning opportunities, supported by the harvest. However, these provinces are expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) beginning in October. As household food stocks deplete, households will need to purchase food from the market at a time when seasonal labor opportunities and income decline, leaving poor households unable to meet their food needs through market purchases. As a result, poor households are expected to face food consumption gaps and engage in coping strategies, including atypical livestock sales and taking on high-interest debt. The rest of the central highlands and northern areas are expected to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through January. In southwestern regions, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through the projection period, while Nimroz is expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Through September, harvest-related agricultural labor, own-produced food, and income from construction and petty trade support household food access across the region, with most households meeting minimum food needs. In Nimroz, however, access to food and income from harvests is expected to be below average. Below-average wheat production has left them with limited food stocks, while disrupted cross-border trade with Iran continues to constrain a key income source, leaving households reliant on markets, resulting in food consumption deficits. In western regions, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through January, with Badghis province deteriorating to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from October. Households will have access to own-produced food, sufficient food stocks, and harvest-related labor income through January, supporting food consumption. In Badghis, however, lingering impacts of drought and a localized below-average harvest will likely leave households with minimal food stocks, which are likely to deplete early. As market reliance rises ahead of the winter lean season and income remains below average, poor households in Badghis are expected to face food consumption gaps. In urban areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January. Poor urban households are anticipated to be entirely dependent on markets for food, while income is expected to remain constrained due to the ongoing influx of returnees. From October, as seasonal labor opportunities decline, households are expected to face gaps in access to income earning opportunities. With reduced income and elevated staple food prices, poor urban households face weak purchasing power and are expected to be unable to afford sufficient food. As a result, households are expected to reduce meal frequency while also liquidating small business assets and reducing essential non-food expenditures. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Livelihoods profilesFEWS NET Qualitative Typical sources of food and income by livelihood zone Weather monitoring and forecastUSGS, NOAA, UCSB CHC, FAO, media reports, and other sourcesQuantitative data on weather indicators (such as rainfall amounts) derived from remote sensing and modeling, and associated monitoring products (such as static and interactive maps); weather forecast products (such as maps); regular briefings from FEWS NET science partners (USGS, NOAA); partner reportsWeather patterns, which impact household food and income sources and access, particularly in rural areas Key informant interviewsInterviews with local extension officers, humanitarian implementing partners, and community leaders through our field monitoring network.Qualitative information across 34 provinces countrywideContributing factors (such as hazards, returnees, acute and ongoing conditions, wage workers' availability and wage tracking, production, crop and livestock diseases, price verifications, and physical access) to food security dynamics National and regional updatesFood Security and Agriculture ClusterQualitative information from FSAC partners present at the regional levelContributing factors to food security dynamics World Bank ReportsWorld Bank Economic Monitor Qualitative and quantitative informationInformation on imports, exports, and GDP Humanitarian food assistance distributions WFP and FSAC FSAC response dashboard Quantitative data on monthly assistance distributions; partner reports; assistance distribution plans from non-WFP partnersLevels of humanitarian assistance are factored into the analysis of households’ overall ability or inability to meet their basic needs Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: A closer look at above-average precipitation driven by El Niño and its impacts on food security outcomes Source: NOAA El Niño conditions have developed in the equatorial Pacific and are expected to strengthen through late 2026, with a high likelihood of persisting through at least early 2027. Seasonal forecasts indicate an increased probability of above-average precipitation across much of Afghanistan between October 2026 and January 2027, the start of the October to May precipitation season. This marks a notable shift following four consecutive October to May precipitation seasons (2021–2025) characterized by below-average precipitation, recurrent drought, and declining groundwater availability. El Niño conditions are expected to support timely winter wheat planting, partially recharge groundwater levels, and improve pasture and livestock body conditions. The anticipated above-average and timely start of the precipitation season is expected to improve soil moisture, support timely winter wheat planting, and enhance early crop development in rainfed agricultural areas. Rainfed areas, particularly in northern and northeastern regions, depend heavily on adequate winter precipitation, which begins in October and continues through May. In irrigated areas, above-average winter precipitation is expected to increase snow accumulation across the central highlands. Improved snowpack will likely enhance spring snowmelt and increase surface water availability for irrigation during the 2026/27 agricultural season, supporting crop development, pasture regeneration, and livestock production while easing the irrigation water shortages that have constrained production in recent years. Improved pasture and water access are similarly expected to strengthen livestock body conditions, increase milk production, and reduce reliance on feed purchases. Above-average precipitation also increases the risks of additional hazards and shocks, such as flooding. Although the snowmelt period (February to April) falls outside the projection period, there is concern that if precipitation substantially exceeds seasonal norms and snow accumulation becomes well above average, the risk of more severe flooding and landslides will increase. Such events could damage agricultural land, irrigation infrastructure, transportation networks, and housing, particularly in flood-prone valleys and mountainous areas. Typically, the combination of above-average precipitation and temperatures creates favorable conditions for the development and spread of crop diseases, particularly in the eastern, northeastern, southern, and western regions where humidity is higher during the growing season. Excessive soil moisture from prolonged or heavy rainfall may increase the incidence of root and foliar diseases, weakening crop growth and reducing yields in affected areas. These impacts could be exacerbated by the limited capacity of many farmers to effectively manage disease outbreaks due to financial constraints and limited access to quality agricultural inputs. As a result, localized production losses may partially offset the benefits associated with above-average rainfall. Improved agricultural conditions are unlikely to translate into proportional food security improvements for all households. Rainfed and irrigation-reliant farmers, poor households who own small plots of land and also rely on agricultural labor, and pastoralists will all benefit from increased precipitation. However, landless households will be unable to access own-produced food and will be reliant on markets for food. While above-average precipitation is expected to increase agricultural labor demand and own-produced food availability, weak economic conditions and heightened labor market competition from the ongoing returnee inflow constrain household access to food and income. Some poor households are expected to continue facing difficulty meeting both food and essential non-food needs, despite the favorable climate outlook. avaidya@fews.net Fri, 07/10/2026 - 15:39 Download the report 5