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Trump’ın müzakere hamleleri İran’ın tarihi sömürü hafızasıyla çarpışıyor

ABD ile İran arasında 7 Nisan’dan bu yana hassas bir ateşkes devam ederken, geçen hafta beliren anlaşma umutları ABD’nin İran’a yönelik yeni saldırılarıyla gölgelendi. Beyaz Saray’ın nihai bir karara varılmadığını açıklaması, müzakerelerin seyrini belirsizliğe sürükledi. Daha önce Haziran ve Şubat aylarındaki görüşmeler, İsrail ve ABD’nin askerî müdahaleleri nedeniyle çökmüştü. Bu gelişmeler, İran’ın yabancı müdahalesine karşı yaklaşık 134 yıl öncesine uzanan derin hafızasıyla birlikte değerlendiriliyor. 1891 baharında, ekonomik çıkarları tehdit altındaki bazaari tüccar sınıfının öncülüğünde Şiraz, Tebriz ve Tahran gibi büyük kentlerde patlak veren Tütün Protestoları, yabancı imtiyazlarına karşı kitlesel bir direnişe dönüşmüştü. Bugün de benzer bir güvensizlik, İran’ın müzakerelerde taviz vermekten çekinmesine yol açıyor ve Trump yönetiminin “anlaşma sanatı”nı zorluyor.

Başlangıç 04 Haz 04:05 2 olay Güncellendi 01 Haz
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  1. Diplomatik04 Haz 04:05

    Trump's art of the deal meets Iran's long memory of foreign exploitation

    Washington, ABD

    As the government’s standing plummets to an all-time low due to a reckless disregard for the welfare of its people, mass protests sweep across major Iran’s cities, including Shiraz, Tabriz and Tehran. Driven by a threat to their economic survival, the merchant class, or bazaaris, are leading the demonstrations. This is not a news report from December 2025. This is the spring of 1891, the opening salvos of the Persian Tobacco Protest. Recognizing that unfettered concessions to foreigners pose a threat to both national sovereignty and their own economic interests, the powerful Shia clergy joined the merchants in an open revolt. It was Iran’s first bitter lesson in what happens when a ruler sells out the nation to ensure his own political survival. It wouldn’t be the last. Iranians know their history well, especially when it comes to confronting foreign aggressors. Amid whispers of diplomatic backchannels and leaks about potential deals, Iranian officials have taken to the social media platform X to send cryptic, and at times humorous, references to past triumphs. Most notably, foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei invoked the Sasanian Empire's victory over Roman Emperor Philip the Arab, when Rome was forced to accept peace on Persian terms in the 3rd century. But make no mistake: these posts are not cautionary tales directed at the United States and Israel alone. They can also be read as stern warnings to Tehran's own negotiators. Any concessions, or capitulations, made by the Islamic Republic can trigger severe domestic backlash because in the Iranian historical imagination, yielding an inch inevitably leads to Western exploitation and destabilizing protests. For Iran’s hardliners, a deal is tantamount to surrender. This mindset can be traced to what Hamid Dabashi, professor of Iranian studies and comparative literature at Columbia University, describes as a “long historical memory which is very much alive and resonant in their contemporary politics.” According to Dabashi, even the current ruling government is “entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding that memory.” Two examples of historical violations of Iran’s economic sovereignty illustrate why this memory remains so potent today. The French, Russian and British empires all vied with each other to extract concessions from Iran in the late 19th century. In 1890, the Qajar Shah granted British entrepreneur Major G.F. Talbot total control over the cultivation, sale and export of Iranian tobacco. Britain had already forced the opium trade on China and fought a war when its emperor tried to ban its sale decades earlier. By commodifying a daily staple in Iran, the secret deal ignited the tobacco riots, uniting merchants and the Shiite clergy in a boycott of the drug, this time leading to a successful campaign to force the Shah to cancel the concession. The D’Arcy Concession would later allow the British government, at the direction of then-Lord of the Navy Winston Churchill, to establish an “Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,” today’s British Petroleum, in 1911. The company would later control 84% of Iran's oil profits. When Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized that wealth in 1951, the response was an Anglo-American-backed coup in 1953 that reinstated the shah’s absolute royal rule. The suppression of Iranian independence sowed decades of popular resentment against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, ultimately erupting in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For Iranian nationalists, these episodes prove that concessions to foreign entities inevitably lead to intelligence infiltration and total loss of sovereignty. It is this legacy that Western powers tend to misjudge. As Dabashi points out, “the most significant part of Iranian anticolonial nationalism” that the U.S. and Israel have failed to understand is that these two formative episodes “have been paramount in the minds of all Iranians since this war began, and it informs every single sentence in their negotiations with United States.” Cutting through the rhetorical noise from both sides, it would be politically suicidal for any Iranian government to accept the full terms the U.S. and Israel are attempting to impose. The White House is pushing for an expansive, face-saving surrender that demands Iran give up its 60% enriched uranium, halt its missile program, dismantle its regional alliances and permanently relinquish state control over the Strait of Hormuz. For Tehran, these are contemporary equivalents of the 19th-century concessions and non-negotiable pillars of national defense that cannot be bartered away. More significantly, despite domestic hardships, Tehran retains significant leverage, holding the global energy market hostage through its grip on Hormuz and still waving the disruptive wildcard of the Red Sea via its alliance with the Houthis. To concede the inconceivable when they have weathered the initial military onslaught would not be in their interest and would completely undermine the regime’s narrative of resistance. Some former U.S. officials have acknowledged this problem. As former CIA Director Bill Burns noted in an interview with The Economist, “We’ve kind of boxed ourselves in at this point. You can declare victory and walk away, but with the future of the Strait of Hormuz up in the air, it’s hard to make that a plausible option.” He argued that escalation through blockades and infrastructure strikes alone would be unlikely to force “this hard-bitten regime to run up the white flag,” leaving serious diplomacy backed by leverage as the “least bad” remaining option. The more difficult challenge, he suggested, would be the future of the Strait of Hormuz itself. Having rediscovered the immense strategic leverage the waterway provides, Tehran is unlikely to relinquish influence over it willingly. The realistic path to a settlement lies in a formulation where both sides can claim victory without crossing their respective red lines. Iran enters the room with a clear objective of clawing back its frozen funds and assets, which remains the primary leverage the United States wields. A viable middle ground requires Washington to narrow its sights to a strict nuclear framework, temporarily shelving its demands for regional disarmament or the integration of the Abraham Accords. Still, the path forward will depend on who has the luxury of time. Tehran has historically counted on American impatience to force a diplomatic breakthrough, but President Donald Trump seems to be in no rush. He recently shrugged off domestic political pressure, saying “I don’t care about the midterms,” and that he could “out-wait” the Iranians. Recent history suggests that a drawn-out dispute is more likely than a rapid resolution. The Russia-Ukraine war has stretched over five years without a peace deal, the Doha accords required 18 months, the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or “Iran Deal” took 20 months, and the Paris Peace Talks after World War I dragged on for nearly five years. By contrast, the current war began just three months ago. Tehran can afford to sit at the table, but it can only concede up to the point where its core interests remain intact. To cross that red line would mean repeating the fatal mistakes of the Qajar and Pahlavi shahs, sparking severe domestic backlash that no Iranian government can survive. The lessons of Talbot's tobacco monopoly and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s oil exploitation remain absolute truths for the current leadership. Trump may view these talks as a standard business transaction, but history has taught Iran that a compromise with the West is a trap where the foreign superpower always walks away with the ultimate prize.

    Responsible Statecraft
  2. Diplomatik01 Haz 04:05

    Should Trump just end the Iran War without a deal?

    Washington, ABD

    Last week, there were genuine signs that the United States and Iran might be edging toward an agreement to formalize the ceasefire that has tenuously held since April 7. Then, the U.S. launched a new round of attacks on Iran and the week ended with the White House saying there would be no final determination on an agreement. Talks last June and then in February collapsed when Israel and the U.S. launched attacks against Iran, a move that critics argue was aimed at disrupting ongoing diplomatic efforts. In April, within hours of a U.S. delegation leaving talks in Islamabad, Trump announced a counter-blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. Then, when a diplomatic solution seemed near last week, pro-war voices in the media and think tanks began to openly criticize it, and Trump responded by launching new attacks. This familiar cycle — progress on talks met with outrage from hawkish voices, followed by further escalation — has led some anti-war voices to wonder whether the pursuit of a comprehensive agreement risks making things worse. If every moment of diplomatic progress triggers a hawkish freakout, and those who oppose diplomacy will never find any agreement satisfactory, then forcing the war to end in a broad negotiation may be handing the war's architects the leverage they want. With an agreement once again seemingly close, the upshot for some restrainers is that Trump should either strike a narrow deal or simply walk away. “I don't want to hear [Trump] say, ‘It's either a deal or we go back to war.’ Because that framing redounds to the benefit of the Iran hawks,” Andrew Day, senior editor at the American Conservative magazine, told Responsible Statecraft. “The pro-Israeli Iran hawks get very agitated during diplomacy. So whenever Trump seems to be making progress, they freak out. They criticize him, they ramp up the pressure. They push for unreasonable demands,” Day added, saying that this cycle has recently led to the U.S. inserting poison pills into the negotiations. As a result, Day tells RS, “continuing with diplomacy makes a war more likely,” so the U.S. should simply end the military conflict without a larger agreement that includes addressing the nuclear issue or, as Trump has suggested more recently, expanding the Abraham Accords. Day and other skeptics of continued diplomacy do not rule out a more narrow deal that could formalize the ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and provide some sanctions relief to the Iranians. But they say that pushing for another round of talks aimed at solving bigger questions beyond the current war could distract from the more immediate issue. “Trying to get a settlement now that includes anything on nuclear weapons is a huge impediment to just getting the war over with,” Ben Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities, told RS. “We don't need any deal at all. I think that's the underrated option.” Others see the current moment, with both sides economically damaged and perhaps cognizant of both the limits and consequences of war, as the kind of opening that makes a larger deal possible. They argue that walking away from that opportunity without a comprehensive agreement simply delays future military confrontations. This group emphasizes that a smaller, cleaner exit isn’t necessarily stable, either. It’s true that, in the years before and after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Washington and Tehran managed to reduce tensions without resolving their underlying antagonism, and without going to war. But that era is over, according to Trita Parsi, the executive vice president at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. As he told RS, a “small deal” would simply punt on major issues while doing little to prevent a new round of escalation. Parsi agrees that any effort to make a resumption of war less likely will face intense pushback from Iran hawks in Trump’s orbit and in Israel, who will not see any kind of agreement with Tehran as satisfactory. But he contends that “[Trump] is going to be more inclined to break with them if there is a big deal on the table that really fits his persona and his desire to do big historic things.” Reaching any kind of comprehensive agreement will certainly not be easy. For one, both supporters and skeptics of pursuing further talks with Iran note that any momentum toward ending the war could be complicated by Israel playing spoiler and would require Trump to be willing to meaningfully break with Israeli war aims. In addition, the gaps on the nuclear file remain wide, and the domestic politics on both sides complicate compromise. Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins, says a deal between the U.S. and Iran is “eminently possible” in theory, but he hasn’t seen Trump display any real appetite for dealmaking in this situation. “Since the war has started, he has still asserted maximal goals while offering minimal returns,” Nasr told RS. “He's essentially demanding that Iran surrender at the nuclear front. And Iran is balking at that. A serious attempt at a negotiated diplomatic negotiation means a serious attempt at diplomatic negotiation, not essentially insisting on surrender.” Iran's performance in the conflict, including the regime’s ability to close the strait and inflict global economic pain, means that Iran may now believe that it has more reason to hold out for better terms in any future negotiations. A history of unpleasant diplomatic experiences with Trump, dating from his unilateral withdrawal from the original nuclear deal through the surprise attacks in February, could also make Iran wary of any agreement. “It seems like there's almost insurmountable trust problems that will hang over any kind of deal,” says Friedman. That trust deficit is compounded by different factions in the U.S. government pushing for different outcomes, and the lack of a clearly articulated strategy since the start of the war, adds Sumantra Maitra, a senior fellow at the Center for Renewing America. “There is no coherence in their thought process. If I was an Iranian, and I was negotiating with the U.S. administration, I'd listen to American negotiators, and I don't really know what they want and what they even know about the nuclear [issue],” he told RS. “For the Iranians to trust any American guarantee is difficult.” Nasr agrees that trust may be the largest variable blocking any successful negotiation. He says that a step-by-step process of trust-building measures, such as both sides removing their respective blockades of the Strait of Hormuz or the United States beginning to remove some of its troops from the region, could open the door for a larger agreement. Events from the past few weeks have shown that building the necessary trust even for a smaller deal is not straightforward. But Parsi argues that getting to a bigger deal may not be as difficult as it seems. Any agreement that ends the war and reopens the strait already requires a significant degree of trust between two parties that just fought each other. If that trust can be secured, it becomes the foundation for something more durable rather than just a pause. "We're already talking about a deal that is, at its minimum level, rather large," he says. "The additional trust that is needed to get to a more significant deal is not really that significant."

    Responsible Statecraft

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