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Food security impacts of organized criminal violence in Ecuador

Food security impacts of organized criminal violence in Ecuador Key Messages Summary statement on concern for acute food insecurity The current level of concern for acute food insecurity in Ecuador is low to moderate (relative to a scale of very low, low, moderate, high, and very high), with concern concentrated in the coastal provinces of Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, and El Oro due primarily to the economic impacts of criminal violence. Key Messages FEWS NET estimates that 1.0-2.49 million people (5-15 percent of Ecuador’s population) will require humanitarian food assistance in 2026. Acute food insecurity is expected to remain concentrated among poor households dependent on informal labor, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Venezuelan and Colombian migrants. National food availability is expected to remain adequate, but violence-related disruptions to income-generating activities are expected to reduce household purchasing power, particularly in the coastal provinces of Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, and El Oro, where criminal violence is most severe. High and increasing levels of organized criminal violence are a key driver of acute food insecurity in Ecuador. Organized criminal violence in Ecuador has risen sharply since 2020, displacing an estimated 316,000 people in 2025. Criminal organizations are increasingly targeting people not involved in criminal activity through intimidation and violence. Although agricultural production and national food supply are unlikely to be significantly affected, insecurity is expected to constrain economic activity, increase operating costs, and reduce labor opportunities. The economic impacts of violence are the primary pathway through which insecurity contributes to acute food insecurity. Extortion, insecurity along transportation routes, curfews, and elevated security costs are increasing the cost of doing business while reducing economic activity in affected areas. Poor households reliant on informal employment are particularly vulnerable, as labor opportunities and earnings are expected to remain constrained despite broadly stable macroeconomic conditions, near-average food prices, and adequate national food supplies. As a result, food access is expected to remain limited among poor market-dependent households even where markets remain functional. Violence is the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Ecuador; however, the impacts are likely to be compounded by extreme weather events and above-average temperatures, exacerbating acute food insecurity. National staple food availability is expected to remain near average; however, localized flooding, heat stress, and weather-related disruptions may reduce income-earning opportunities, increase non-food expenditures, and contribute to displacement. In coastal areas, El Niño-related declines in fish availability are expected to reduce incomes among fishing-dependent households, while poor households reliant on agricultural labor face reduced employment opportunities. These impacts will likely compound existing vulnerabilities among poor households, IDPs, and migrants. Key shock(s) Organized criminal violence Since 2020, Ecuador has experienced a sustained deterioration in security conditions driven by the fragmentation of major criminal organizations, intensifying competition over cocaine trafficking routes and ports, and the expansion of extortion and illegal mining economies. Violence remains concentrated along the country’s main commercial corridor along the Pacific coast — especially in Guayas, Manabí, Los Ríos, and El Oro provinces — but insecurity and criminal activity have increasingly spread inland and toward northern border provinces (Figure 1). Despite actions from the Ecuadorian government, including crackdowns and the arrest of senior leaders in 2025, criminal organizations have continued to adapt, fragment, and diversify revenue streams, contributing to increasingly localized and volatile territorial disputes, persistent violence, displacement, extortion, and disruptions to livelihoods and basic services. Source: InsightCrime cited by Small Wars Journal Coca cultivation inside Ecuador remains limited compared to neighboring Colombia; however, the country has become a major cocaine transshipment corridor, connecting Andean production zones to Pacific export routes. Cocaine primarily enters Ecuador through Colombia and transits through ports along the Pacific coast, particularly Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest city and primary port, and Posorja. Intensified enforcement at major ports has increasingly pushed trafficking activity toward secondary corridors and less monitored territories, contributing to the geographic diffusion and fragmentation of criminal activity rather than its elimination. Criminal organizations have also expanded into illegal gold mining, an increasingly lucrative industry. Gold prices rose from approximately 1,580 USD per ounce in January 2020 to around 4,560 USD in April 2026. Illegal mining operations are primarily concentrated in Azuay, El Oro, Imbabura, Napo, Orellana, Sucumbíos, and Zamora Chinchipe provinces. This has contributed to the spread of criminal activity beyond traditionally high-crime areas along the coast into the inland Sierra and Amazon regions. Available evidence suggests that the expansion of illicit criminal activity is contributing to heightened rates of homicidal violence, including among children. According to the Ecuadorian Observatory for Organized Crime (OECO) and national authorities, homicide rates increased from approximately 6.9 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to around 51 in 2025, with more than 9,000 homicides recorded in 2025 alone, a 30 percent increase from 2024 (Figure 2). Children and other individuals not involved in criminal groups have been targeted, with child homicides increasing by an estimated 640 percent since 2009. Source: FEWS NET using Ecuadoran Observatory of Organized Crime (OECO) of administrative data, produced by the Ministry of the Interior and the Attorney General's Office The Ecuadorian government has responded to the increase in criminal violence through an increasingly security-focused strategy centered on declarations of a state of exception,1 military deployments, mass incarceration, and expanded international security cooperation. The countrywide state of exception renewed in March 2026 included the deployment of approximately 75,000 security personnel and expanded military powers, including curfews and warrantless searches. Ecuador has simultaneously deepened cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as intelligence, maritime interdiction, surveillance, anti-money laundering, and container-scanning operations at major ports. These operations have disrupted criminal organizations’ leadership structures, trafficking operations, and revenue streams, but have not produced a sustained reduction in violence to date. Instead, enforcement pressure has often contributed to fragmentation, geographic diffusion, and the expansion of criminal activity toward secondary ports, inland territories, and illegal mining zones. The effects of violence increasingly extend beyond direct insecurity and are generating broader impacts on economic activity and livelihoods. Extortion targeting transporters, vendors, small businesses, and service providers has increased operating costs, contributed to business closures, and undermined household purchasing power, especially in urban and peri-urban areas. In some communities, particularly parts of Esmeraldas, Guayas, and Manabí, confrontations between armed groups and security forces have led people to avoid leaving their homes, disrupting regular access to schools, markets, health services, and other livelihood activities. Surging violence has particularly affected access to education and healthcare. Humanitarian reporting indicates that at least 147 schools have closed due to insecurity, leaving approximately 680,000 children out of the education system. In Guayaquil, more than 145 health facilities have reportedly shut down or reduced operations, affecting at least 186,000 people. Extortion, intimidation, targeted killings, and forced recruitment are major drivers of displacement. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that approximately 132,000 people were newly displaced by violence within Ecuador in 2025, while other humanitarian reports indicate an estimated 316,000 people internally displaced due to violence and loss of livelihoods in 2025. Approximately 30 percent of displaced households in Ecuador have been displaced at least twice due to persistent insecurity. In particular, reported increases in the recruitment, extortion, intimidation, and killing of children are prompting some families to send children away from violence-affected areas. These dynamics are affecting households’ access to stable sources of income, credit, social cohesion, and services and social support, especially in violence-affected urban areas, transport corridors, and displacement-affected communities. Violence-related displacement in Ecuador was among the highest in the Americas in 2025 and increasingly affects Venezuelan refugees and migrants residing in or transiting through violence-affected areas. Venezuelans in Ecuador experience high levels of discrimination, denial of services, and lack of protection amid increasingly strict migration controls. Many internally displaced households include Venezuelan or Colombian nationals. An estimated 60 percent of Venezuelans in Ecuador lack documentation, limiting their access to services and protection mechanisms. Food security context in areas of concern This analysis primarily focuses on four provinces in western Ecuador where the frequency and intensity of organized criminal violence is driving acute food insecurity: El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, and Manabí. These provinces lie along or near the Pacific coast and are the most economically important region of the country. Parts of northern Ecuador along the border with Colombia and the mountainous Sierra region of central Ecuador, such as Esmeraldas and Pichincha provinces, likely contain smaller but still substantial concentrations of acutely food-insecure populations; this analysis also incorporates conditions in these areas. Demographics The four provinces of primary concern are highly urbanized, with over half of the provinces’ populations residing in urban areas in Los Ríos (54 percent), Manabí (58 percent), El Oro (79 percent), and Guayas (81 percent). Guayas is Ecuador's most populous province and includes the country’s largest city, Guayaquil, with 3.3 million inhabitants. These urban areas also receive seasonal and permanent migrants from rural Ecuador. Around 64 percent of the population of Pichincha — which contains Quito, Ecuador’s capital and second-largest city — resides in urban areas. Esmeraldas is relatively more rural, with 45 percent of the population residing in urban areas. Of the four main ethnic groups in Ecuador, two are dominant in the coastal region: 60 to 90 percent of the population are mestizo (of mixed Spanish and Indigenous ancestry), while the second largest group is montubio (a distinct mestizo ethnic group mostly resident in the rural coastal plains, representing a mix of Indigenous groups, Spanish settlers, and African populations). Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian groups are minorities in most of the areas of concern, although Afro-Ecuadorians reportedly make up the majority of the population in Esmeraldas. Migrants from Venezuela and Colombia are concentrated in Guayas and Manabí; however, Ecuador is often considered a transit country for migrants travelling towards Peru, meaning many arrivals do not intend to remain in Ecuador long term. As of February 2026, Ecuador hosted approximately 440,500 migrants from Venezuela, the fifth-largest total in Latin America. Natural geography El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, and Manabí stretch along the Ecuadorian coast between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes Mountains. The coastal region is hot and humid, dominated by lowlands, fertile agricultural plains, a small number of conservation areas, and a multitude of rivers; the Guayas River is the primary watercourse. Tropical savannas prevail in the central and southwestern sections of the region, while extensive mangrove forests and wetlands dominate the coast. The hot, humid rainy season spans December/January to May, followed by a cooler and cloudier but drier season for the rest of the year. The risk of flooding is high during the rainy season, especially in strong El Niño years. The coastal natural region is highly fertile and hosts large coffee, cocoa, and banana farms, as well as maize and rice production. The cereal harvest peaks between April to June (the most critical harvest for national staple food supply), with a second harvest where irrigation is available between September and November. Bananas are the most heavily produced crop in El Oro and can be harvested year-round, but rice is the primary staple. Esmeraldas, located along the border with Colombia, has a somewhat wetter and more tropical climate compared to much of the coast. The primary crops are maize, cocoa, and (to a lesser extent) rice, with cereal harvest periods similar to the coastal region. Pichincha, located in the Andes Mountains, has a cooler and drier climate, with a shorter rainy season from approximately October to April and significant climatic variation depending on altitude. The main crops grown in Pichincha are maize and tubers, with the maize planting season in October, a harvest between April and August, and a secondary harvest in October. Typical livelihoods Urban livelihoods In urban areas, households depend almost entirely on markets to access food. While urban poor households have better physical access to food via markets compared to rural households due to stronger market integration, they are highly vulnerable to price inflation and income shocks given their reliance on cash income. Poor households in urban areas often reside in informal settlements and typically depend on low-skill, casual labor (e.g., construction, domestic labor, manufacturing, and commerce), often within the informal sector. This is supplemented by small-scale trading and street vending (e.g., selling foods, goods, and produce), other types of self-employment (e.g., informal logistics, moto-taxis, security services, waste picking and recycling), and, less frequently, formal employment or microenterprises (e.g., beauty services, food stalls). Urban households in Guayaquil may also find labor opportunities in port operations and fish processing. In general, households with low and unstable incomes below the national minimum wage of 400 USD per month may also face challenges with limited access to credit, inadequate social safety nets, and the capacity to accrue savings. Local income generation may be supported by remittances, which reached a record high of 7.7 billion USD in 2025, equivalent to nearly 6 percent of Ecuador’s GDP. Most households with access to remittances, which primarily flow from the U.S., are more likely to be in the middle or better-off wealth groups as the additional income improves their economic status relative to households that do not receive remittances. Guayas receives the largest share of remittances of any province. Like elsewhere in Central and Latin America, changes in U.S. immigration policy are currently driving the flow of remittances to family members outside of the U.S. Rural livelihoods Poor rural households depend on farming and agricultural labor (typically cash crop production), alongside livestock rearing (mostly cattle) in areas with suitable pasture, to produce food or earn income to purchase food. The agricultural sector is primarily controlled by agri-businesses or large landowners that hire rural workers for labor. Agriculture accounts for over 80 percent of total rural employment. Seasonal urban migration supplements farming incomes. Additionally, artisanal fishing is particularly important for livelihoods in coastal provinces, such as Manabí, Guayas, Santa Elena, and El Oro, and aquaculture (especially shrimp farming along mangroves) and tourism also provide sources of income in coastal areas. Households also engage in artisanal gold mining in El Oro and forestry and extraction of natural resources further inland. Rural households engage in varying degrees of own production of staple foods, depending on local growing conditions and access to fertile land. Rice production dominates much of rural Guayas, while maize is prevalent in Manabí and Los Ríos, and banana/plantains in El Oro. The rice harvest becomes available in April and the maize harvest in May, seasonally reducing households’ market dependence. Nonetheless, rural areas suffer from higher levels of poverty than urban areas. Land distribution is unequal, with the majority of land occupied by large farms that dominate the coastal provinces and prioritize exports over national supply. Markets and trade Macroeconomic conditions Ecuador has a diversified economy in which agriculture, commerce, and the crude oil sector play central roles in national production and exports. Macroeconomic conditions are stable, with steady economic growth and moderate inflation. Ecuador adopted the USD as its official currency in 2000, and dollarization has played a key role in macroeconomic stability, particularly by containing inflationary pressures. Inflation rates trended below 3 percent between 2023 and 2025; though food and transportation inflation increased at a faster pace, both have remained below 5 percent since late 2023. However, elevated public debt and exposure to external shocks, including commodity price variations and extreme weather events, continue to pose challenges. In 2025, GDP expanded by 3.7 percent, recovering from the 2024 economic contraction due to severe disruptions in electricity supply, a prolonged drought, and recurrent wildfires. Agricultural and crude oil exports are key sources of revenues: in 2025, crude oil, agriculture, and fisheries accounted for 16.5 percent of Ecuador's GDP, while food manufacturing and commerce contributed 7.1 and 14.7 percent, respectively. Although crude oil exports declined by 19.2 percent in 2025 due to lower international prices and weather-related disruptions in domestic production, oil revenues continued to play a critical role in financing public expenditure, accounting for nearly 24 percent of the national budget in 2024. The contraction in oil export revenues strained fiscal performance in 2025 and constrained government spending capacity. However, in 2025, Ecuador maintained a positive trade balance despite the declining oil exports, reflecting the strength of the non-oil export sector. Total exports rose by nearly 8 percent, supported by higher trade volumes and favorable international prices, particularly for agricultural, fishery, and food manufacturing products. Main trading partners for non-oil exports include the U.S., the EU, China, Russia, and Colombia, although escalating disputes with Colombia that began in January have disrupted trade (particularly electricity and sugar) with the latter. Escalating tensions in the Middle East have had mixed impacts, with higher crude oil prices supporting export revenues, while also increasing fuel and logistics costs. Although traditional exports to the Middle East declined in early 2026 due to lower cocoa prices, key sectors such as bananas, shrimp, and fish remained robust, supported by logistical adjustments, such as land transportation of cargo from Saudi Arabia to other destinations, and increased exports to alternative markets such as China, which partially offset these challenges. The increasing insecurity and violence in Ecuador are indirectly affecting macroeconomic conditions by increasing operational and transportation costs, amplifying the adverse effects of weather shocks and energy constraints. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that a 1.0 percent increase in Ecuador’s murder rate is associated with a 0.5 percent decline in economic activity. While overall economic performance has remained relatively resilient and GDP growth is expected to be 2.5 percent in 2026, heightened insecurity continues to increase fiscal pressure. Agricultural production and fishing sectors Rice and maize are the main cereal crops, accounting for over 75 percent of short-term crop production in 2024. Cash crops — including bananas, African palm, and cocoa — represented nearly 70 percent of permanent crop production. Production is primarily concentrated in coastal provinces. Guayas and Los Ríos are key production areas, contributing significantly to the production of maize, rice, bananas, and cocoa (Table 1). Table 1 Share of cultivated area by commodity and province Commodity Los Ríos Guayas Manabí Esmeraldas El Oro Maize 37.5% 12.7% 30.7% 2.6% NA Rice 27.3% 66.7% 4.9% NA 0.9% Banana 38.3% 29.8% NA NA 18.8% Cocoa 20.4% 15.3% 19.8% 16.9% NA African Palm 24.6% 7.0% NA 35.4% NA Source: Survey on Agricultural Area and Production (ESPAC), National Statistics Institute (INEC) Smallholder farmers generate approximately 60 percent of domestic food production; however, access to land, irrigation water, and agricultural infrastructure remains limited among smallholders, with most agricultural land owned by large-scale landowners or businesses that hire labor. The fishery sector employs over 150,000 people, including industrial and artisanal fishing and fish processing activities, and contributes significantly to income generation and export earnings. The main artisanal fishing ports are Esmeraldas, Manta, Puerto López, Anconcito, Santa Rosa, and Puerto Bolívar, which together account for approximately 70 percent of the country’s total landings. Impact of insecurity and violence on the economy Markets remain broadly functional, and staple food availability is adequate, but violence, curfews, fuel and logistics costs, and trade disruptions are raising transaction costs and weakening income access, especially for poor urban households, IDPs, migrants, transport workers, informal traders, and poorer rural households dependent on agricultural labor. Food availability and market functioning Food generally remains available in Ecuador: markets continue to function with largely stable supplies, supported by adequate domestic production and imports. Despite rising production costs and monthly fluctuations driven by economic, political, and security conditions, staple food prices were mostly near or below average as of April. Wholesale maize and rice prices were lower than in 2025 and the five-year average, reflecting above-average production and ample domestic supply. However, localized price increases were reported for vegetables and tubers in early May due to rising transportation costs and above-average temperatures. Production cost pressures Although insecurity is highly concentrated in coastal provinces such as Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manabí, and El Oro, it has not directly disrupted agricultural production; its primary impact has been an increase in production costs through extortion and elevated security expenses. Cereal production has remained largely consistent with slight fluctuations since Market Year (MY) 2014/15, largely attributed to extreme weather events (Figure 3). In MY 2026/27, maize production is anticipated to be 28 percent above the previous year due to expanded planted areas and higher yields, particularly among commercial farmers. Rice production is not expected to increase as deficit rainfall associated with El Niño conditions is likely to affect the winter harvest, but yields are forecasted to be similar to 2025. Conversely, palm oil production has continued to decrease since 2018 due to the spread of crop diseases. Source: FEWS NET with Production, Supply and Distribution Online, U.S. Department of Agriculture data Shifting transportation and input costs have also driven month-to-month shifts in food prices. Ecuador raised its Value Added Tax from 12 to 15 percent in 2024 to finance increased security expenditures, and the government ended its diesel subsidy in September 2025. This measure raised the cost of fuel and triggered protests and localized disruptions to economic activities, although government compensation measures have partially offset these costs. More recently, emerging pressures from escalating binational tensions with Colombia and volatile international commodity markets are additional factors shaping price and trade dynamics. The escalation in the Middle East has driven increases in fertilizer and fuel prices in 2026, temporarily disrupting Ecuador’s transportation sector. Violence and market conditions Rising violence in Ecuador is not significantly inhibiting food production or supply but is disrupting access to markets and economic activity in affected areas. Increased production costs (due to extortion and elevated security costs) and decreased household income, particularly among households reliant on informal labor, have negatively impacted food security. Source: FEWS NET with INEC data While most markets continue to operate under typical conditions, constraints on trade routes and rising logistics costs have fueled localized disruptions. Security-related measures, such as curfews, further reduce market access by shortening opening hours and limiting mobility for both traders and consumers. As of May, the government had imposed curfews across nine provinces to contain rising violence, with resulting decreases in market activity; for example, merchants at Caraguay market in Guayaquil reported lower prices and reduced shrimp sales due to the curfew. Internal displacement and migration also exert indirect pressure on market systems and livelihoods in host communities. In 2025, the number of IDPs in Ecuador increased by 58.3 percent compared to 2024, with the highest displacement rate per 100,000 inhabitants reported in coastal areas heavily affected by violence. The increased labor demand has driven more people towards informal employment. In March 2026, national rates of engagement in informal labor rose to 56.3 percent, the highest level since December 2024, and reliance on informal labor in some host provinces, such as Manabí and Cotopaxi, remained above the national rate (Figure 4). Average income declined by 10 percent (46.6 USD) compared to March 2025. Reduced income is driven by a higher proportion of workers receiving compensation below the minimum wage and reduced working hours due to shifting demand to informal labor. Assumptions for the most likely scenario: June - December 2026 Organized criminal violence is likely to slightly increase over the course of the outlook period. The Ecuadorian government has intensified its security measures targeting criminal organizations and expanded cooperation with the U.S., including joint counter-narcotics operations and previous security-focused strategies. While these efforts have successfully disrupted criminal organizations, they have not significantly reduced overall levels of violence. The most likely outcome of continued security-focused law enforcement efforts is that criminal organizations diversify their areas of operation and revenue streams in response to operations by security forces. Guayas, El Oro, Los Ríos, and Manabí will likely remain the most violence-affected provinces of Ecuador, but provinces in the Sierra region — including Pichincha — are likely to see an uptick in violence due to criminal activity displacing inland and competition among criminal groups over illicit mining sites. Provinces along the border with Colombia, including Esmeraldas, are also likely to see increased violence due to conflict among criminal groups over illicit cross-border traffic and potential intensified armed group activity in neighboring areas of Colombia. However, violence in both regions will likely remain below levels seen in coastal provinces. Internal displacement due to violence, which reached record levels in 2025, is likely to continue to increase as criminal groups expand operations to additional areas. Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain broadly stable based on GDP and inflation forecasts, but there is considerable downside risk to these forecasts due to violence, trade disruptions, and global market and policy fluctuations. In 2026, GDP growth is projected at 2.5 percent, driven by domestic demand and non-oil exports. Crude oil revenues are likely to increase, driven by higher international prices and domestic production recovery, supporting fiscal accounts and government expenditure. Headline and food inflation are anticipated to remain below 5 percent, driven by adequate domestic and imported food availability. However, rising global fuel prices and elevated dependence on imports are likely to push transportation inflation higher. As imports account for 76 percent of diesel demand in Ecuador, rising prices are likely to drive increased production and transportation costs, adding fiscal pressure as higher prices increase compensation needs. External trade risks, while currently secondary to domestic insecurity as an economic concern, are also likely to amplify price and income pressures during the outlook period. Trade tensions with Colombia and disruptions to regional border security operations have mostly impacted electricity supplies and the sugar trade to date; however, reciprocal tariffs announced in April — with Ecuador raising its import tariff on all products from Colombia to 100 percent — may exacerbate price increases for some commodities, particularly electricity, sugar, and chemical products. Staple food supply is anticipated to remain near average. The main rice and maize harvests for MY 2026/27 are underway, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts near-average production. Carryover stocks from the above-average maize and rice harvests in MY 2025/26 and anticipated near-average MY 2026/27 production are likely to support favorable cereal availability. However, production costs are expected to increase in 2026, driven by higher diesel and fertilizer prices. Staple food prices are likely to remain near average, supported by adequate domestic supply and imports. However, given that imports account for 76 percent of diesel demand, higher fuel prices are expected to continue exerting upward pressure on production and transport costs, contributing to near-term staple food price increases. Extreme weather poses a localized hazard in the Amazon Basin and coastal areas and a long-term hazard heading into 2027. Between May and December, the dry season predominates in Ecuador’s Sierra region, but rains fall year-round in the Amazon Basin. Analysis produced by the UN indicates episodic heavy rains and floods are concentrated in riverine areas of the Amazon region, causing periodic disruptions to livelihood activities, market activity, and access to basic public services. While the dry season also runs from June to December in Ecuador’s coastal region, the emergence of El Niño between May and July, which brings warm water to the tropical Pacific, is expected to adversely affect fishing conditions, particularly the availability of small pelagic species such as sardines, anchovies, and thread herring. The risk posed by El Niño to crop production is relatively low due to the timing of the ongoing main harvest, but irrigated second season crops, which are cultivated between June and December, may have reduced yields due to atypical heat. Migration into Ecuador is expected to remain stable, as it remains a destination and transit country for migrants from Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Colombia. The number of Venezuelans residing in Ecuador rose dramatically beginning in 2018 but has remained largely stable in the last two years (declining from 445,000 in May 2024 to 444,800 in February 2026). President Daniel Noboa’s government has tightened border controls since the February 2025 election, but this has not translated into widespread deportations. Large-scale voluntary returns to Venezuela are unlikely in the coming months given continued political and economic instability. Projected acute food insecurity outlook: May to December 2026 Over the coming year, FEWS NET estimates that between 1.0 and 2.49 million people (approximately 5-15 percent of the population) in Ecuador will likely need urgent food assistance to prevent food consumption deficits or unsustainable coping strategies that would undermine food consumption in the near-term. Although domestic food supplies are likely to remain adequate, the continued impacts of criminal violence are expected to constrain economic activity, particularly in coastal provinces, and drive food insecurity among households dependent on informal labor. Additionally, the anticipated effects of El Niño on fish availability are expected to contribute to acute needs among poor, fishing-dependent coastal populations. Acute food insecurity will likely be highest among poor rural and urban households who are heavily reliant on informal and casual labor and are consequently more vulnerable to labor market disruptions; this includes a disproportionately high share of IDPs and migrants from outside Ecuador. As of 2012 (the most recent year for which comprehensive government survey data is available), households in rural and urban areas typically directed 32 and 23 percent, respectively, of their monthly expenditures to food. In areas where localized disruption of markets limits household income, poorer households are likely to adopt coping strategies, such as reduced expenditure on non-food essentials, substitution of cheaper staples, and, particularly in rural areas, the sale of small animals such as poultry and other household assets, and labor migration to urban areas. In areas where expanding violence disrupts market functioning, poorer households will likely face increased stress on household savings and food reserves, with declining informal labor opportunities. Security measures intended to combat organized criminal groups, regardless of their effectiveness, are likely to have the unintended effect of hindering economic activity; this may exacerbate food insecurity if such measures are expanded in the long term. This is particularly true in Guayaquil and other urban centers, where curfews have already had a slight chilling effect on market activity. In rural areas, while agricultural production is expected to remain near average, violence is expected to contribute to disrupted access to agricultural and other labor opportunities, particularly among poorer rural households with little or no access to land for own production. An increase in organized criminal violence may also drive increased internal displacement, with some household members migrating to avoid recruitment, extortion, and other predatory behavior. Displaced households, especially those newly displaced, are less likely to have access to stable livelihoods in areas of displacement and more likely to depend on informal labor opportunities that may be limited if markets are disrupted; increased displacement to urban areas also increases labor competition. Adequate food supply and only moderate price increases are expected to support food access during the outlook period. However, fuel prices are likely to remain elevated, driven by global market conditions and government stabilization measures, increasing production and transportation costs. Poor and market-dependent households are expected to be more affected, particularly those relying on the transportation sector for income. Government stabilization measures are likely to partially mitigate fuel price volatility, but fiscal constraints and competing priorities, particularly increased security spending, may limit the government’s capacity to contain rising costs. Extreme weather events and above-average temperatures will remain a significant threat during the outlook period. Although this is not expected to significantly impact agricultural production in the short term, reduced demand may limit the availability of agricultural labor opportunities. Weather events may also exacerbate food insecurity by driving displacement and increased household non-food costs. In coastal regions where fishing is a major source of livelihoods, reduced yields due to El Niño will also negatively impact access to food among households employed in the fishing industry. Venezuelan and Colombian migrants in Ecuador — particularly those who lack regular status and full access to government services — will continue to experience disproportionately high rates of acute food insecurity. The majority of Venezuelan migrants rely on informal labor as their chief source of income and are vulnerable to labor market fluctuations. Internally displaced households are also more likely to rely on informal labor and lack access to their pre-displacement livelihoods, placing them at elevated risk of acute food insecurity. Although the most likely scenario assumes no significant change in external migration patterns in 2026, a major escalation of violence could drive large-scale migration out of Ecuador, driving increased needs in Ecuador and neighboring countries. Learn more about FEWS NET’s Rapid Food Security Analyses in non-presence countries FEWS NET may produce a Rapid Food Security Analysis for a non-presence country as part of FEWS NET’s broader global coverage. Given FEWS NET’s lack of presence in these countries, knowledge base and monitoring information is typically more limited. While the Rapid Food Security Analysis reporting template offers a standardized communications approach for all non-presence country reports, the complexity of the analysis differs by country and context. Level of concern: The publication of a Rapid Food Security Analysis should not be interpreted as an indication that FEWS NET has an elevated level of concern for acute food insecurity in these countries. The level of concern (very low, low, medium, high, very high) is indicated in the “Summary statement on concern for acute food insecurity” inset box on page 1. Analytical framework: While FEWS NET does not have an operational presence in the countries for which Rapid Food Security Analyses are produced, the analytical framework and methods of analysis used are consistent with project-wide approaches. To learn more, please see FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology. Scenario under analysis: FEWS NET typically assesses the most likely scenario for Rapid Food Security Analyses, following the same approach used for presence countries, unless otherwise specified. Time period of analysis: The time period for analysis is communicated in the assumptions and projected acute food insecurity outlook sections. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) compatibility: FEWS NET’s acute food insecurity analyses are IPC-compatible whenever possible. To ensure IPC compatibility, FEWS NET adheres to all protocols required of IPC-compatibility, as outlined on page 16 of the IPC 3.1 manual. In certain instances where the information available fails to meet the IPC’s minimum evidence requirements, as detailed on page 49 of the manual, IPC-compatible analysis is not possible. For this analysis of Ecuador, the types of evidence required to meet the IPC’s protocols for compatibility were not available to FEWS NET. FEWS NET’s analysis remains evidence-based, and this analysis is aligned with IPC classifications. Acute food insecurity mapping: If IPC compatibility is feasible, FEWS NET may provide area-level IPC Phase classifications. Sub-national IPC Phase classifications for an entire country are typically not possible with Rapid Food Security Analyses, but select area-level IPC Phase classifications may be offered where possible, focusing on areas of concern and depending on the level of detail achievable during the time period allotted for the analytical process. Population in need (PIN) estimates: Where possible, FEWS NET will provide a population in need (PIN) estimate in Rapid Food Security Analyses, depending on the availability and strength of the evidence. tfinstuen@fews.net Tue, 06/09/2026 - 12:39 Download the report 8