Mali attacks show security cannot be delivered by military means alone

Mali attacks show security cannot be delivered by military means alone

Mali attacks show security cannot be delivered by military means alone Expert comment jon.wallace 30 April 2026 The latest attacks, following months of JNIM raids on Mali’s vital fuel supplies, show the need for negotiation at a regional, national and local level. Jihadist and Tuareg separatist militants launched a sequence of shocking attacks across Mali on 25-26 April. The unprecedented scale, geographical spread and levels of coordination demonstrated by the strikes has sent shockwaves across West Africa. The attacks have also fundamentally challenged the narrative of regained sovereignty and security projected by the military leaders of Mali and its partners in the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) – a group of three military governments that broke away from the regional ECOWAS bloc in January 2025. Key towns – from Kidal in the desert far north to Kati, a key garrison town near the capital, Bamako, 1500 km to the southwest – were targeted simultaneously. The defence minister Sadio Camara, architect of the ruling junta’s military alliance with Russia, is dead, killed by a suicide vehicle bomb attack on his home; the chief of intelligence is reported gravely injured. For days, nothing was heard from Mali’s President Assimi Goïta, though on 28 April he appeared in a televised address. The Al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist coalition, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the secular Tuareg Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), have openly acknowledged their new alliance – restoring a partnership that previously existed only in 2011-2012 and briefly in 2014. This assault on the heart of the regime exposed the frailty of its intelligence networks. And the FLA and JNIM’s seizure of Kidal, the historic ‘capital’ of Tuareg nationalism, has badly bruised the government’s prestige. Russian Africa Corps mercenaries, assigned to defend the town, were forced to negotiate a humiliating withdrawal – laying bare the limits of Moscow’s ability to support its Sahelian allies. The enemy of my enemy is my friend It is unclear how long the fluid alliance of JNIM and FLA militants can hold, or whether its momentum can be sustained. Both groups have benefited from cooperation, notably in sharing expertise in drone warfare techniques. But they have different objectives and have clashed in the past. Related work West Africa needs regional solutions to combat the escalating Sahel security crisis Tuareg separatists do not seek control over the south of the country but fight for the independence or autonomy of their northern homeland – ‘Azawad’. The attacks on Bamako in the south were an efficient way to stretch the military, allowing rebels to seize control of parts of the north. JNIM jihadists, though motivated chiefly by communal grievances, fight to establish a national government operating under Sharia law. Meanwhile, a major threat to the stability of Mali’s military regime could come from within. The attacks deal a grievous blow to the legitimacy of a junta that seized power accusing previous administrations of security failures – a pattern that has prompted successive coups elsewhere in the region. The attacks could therefore potentially create a new coup threat for President Goïta. Stress testing Sahelian alliances The assault lays bare the limitations of Mali’s mutual defence agreement with AES partners Niger and Burkina Faso. Beyond unverified social media reports of Burkinabè drones in Malian airspace, and a joint statement, the two other confederation members have yet to intervene in support of their ally. They too are struggling to hold jihadist factions at bay. The AES announced the creation of a joint armed force at the end of 2025: its declared troop strength was bolstered from 5,000 to 15,000 just days ago. But that has not yet translated into any immediate operational shared response to the weekend’s attacks. The limits of Russian support have also been exposed by the hasty retreat of 400 Africa Corps mercenaries from Kidal. Precious Russian equipment has been left in rebel hands, including mine-resistant vehicles. The retreat generated a sense of betrayal among junta figures: some have pushed to further diversify relationships beyond Moscow, including with Turkey. Russia has framed the events as a Western imperialist attack on West African sovereignty. The Africa Corps released a statement claiming without basis that Ukrainian and European mercenaries participated in the attacks. The reality is, as in Syria, Venezuela and Iran, Moscow has been unable to prevent allied regimes from being challenged or overthrown. That inflicts significant damage to its narrative in the region. Political options The Sahel is a vast territory with profound development challenges, where jihadist groups are well entrenched and highly mobile. Given these realities, a purely military solution is not viable. Indeed, beyond the border areas, the stabilization of the Sahel through security solutions alone has proven beyond the capacity of the region or any international partners. For almost a decade up to 2022/23 a large UN peacekeeping force and strong French military deployment were unable to halt JNIM attacks. The soldiers who seized power in the coups of 2020 and 2021 turned to Russia and Wagner (now renamed Africa Corps) as their primary security partner, breaking with the French and then the UN. But the Russians’ hardline tactics – including regular reports of serious human rights abuses – have proved less effective. And the regime’s rash decision to abandon a 2015 peace accord with the Tuaregs and attack them in the Saharan far north, in the name of reasserting national sovereignty, left its forces stretched on several fronts. When the jihadists began raiding the vital import highways from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, it was powerless to respond. Since the attacks, JNIM has declared a siege of Bamako, while Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has attempted to capture Ménaka, the capital of Mali’s easternmost region, increasing pressure on the junta. There seems little prospect that Tuaregs would again strike a separate settlement with the government. A much more comprehensive political solution is required. Political negotiation and local level mediation are required to address community tensions and grievances. In Mali at least, this moment could open space for the civilian opposition, including influential exiled imam Mahmoud Dicko, and other exiles, some of whom are reported to have established contacts with JNIM. La Coalition des Forces pour la République (CFR), an opposition group, has now called for the resignation of the military government and an inclusive transition to civilian government. Back in 2013-2015 Tuareg separatists negotiated a ceasefire and then a full peace accord with the government, while the jihadists pursued the path of violence. But the JNIM-FLA alliance and the military regime tore up that agreement in 2023, and today there seems little prospect that Tuaregs would again strike a separate settlement with the government. A much more comprehensive political solution is required.