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Xi and Trump won’t discuss China’s growing nuclear arsenal

Başlangıç 13 May 15:25 3 olay Güncellendi 11 May
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en güncel: 11 May
  1. Güvenlik13 May 15:25

    Xi and Trump won’t discuss China’s growing nuclear arsenal

    Washington, ABD

    Xi and Trump won’t discuss China’s growing nuclear arsenal Expert comment jon.wallace 13 May 2026 But they can make important progress at their summit, by sharing their threat perceptions about the nuclear escalation risks brought by AI. President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping will discuss some difficult topics at their summit this week – not least of which is the issue of nuclear weapons. China is reported to be growing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal on a scale unlike any other signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, the US’s Golden Dome missile defence project, announced by President Trump in 2025, threatens to fuel a new arms race. US negotiators want to discuss the increase in Chinese nuclear numbers. But China has already said that it will not do so. Any agreement on nuclear limits at this summit is therefore highly unlikely. Nor even is discussion of Chinese nuclear expansion plans. However, despite tensions between the two powers, there are areas where progress could be made. One way to approach strategic topics could be for one or both countries to share their threat assessments of new military systems and technologies – and how investment in them informs their concerns about pathways to nuclear escalation. The Trump administration is reportedly willing to talk about AI at the summit. That creates room to broaden discussion beyond the role of AI in nuclear launch decisions. Either side could share their analysis of specific systems – particularly relating to artificial intelligence – and how they interpret their risk potential. The other country could then comment on or correct these assumptions. That could be an important first step towards beginning a strategic stability dialogue. A 2024 statement by President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden on keeping AI out of nuclear launch decisions was helpful, reducing concerns that major nuclear powers might consider automating those decisions. Perhaps more importantly, it demonstrated that agreement was possible among major powers on this topic. Trump and Xi could reaffirm this commitment – and perhaps go further. That in turn could make an important contribution to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review currently underway in New York, building on reports of an emerging consensus at the conference. An AI hotline The Trump administration is reportedly willing to talk about AI at the summit. That creates room to broaden discussion beyond the role of AI in nuclear launch decisions. The US and China could discuss AI risks in escalation more generally, including how to handle AI errors: concerns are rising about the additional risks that AI-human interfacing might introduce into decision-making. These are new risks, and Washington and Beijing should discuss how to add crisis communication about an AI-caused emergency to their crisis communication protocols and exercise patterns. If the US and China were able to address this at the summit, it could lead to exploring an ‘AI hotline’ – as has already been suggested by the US summit team. Space Over the last decade, space issues have, on and off, provided an area for dialogue between the US and China. Partly that is because dialogue on space contained fewer historic tensions, and in part because the domain was recognized as ‘global commons’. But, as both states have invested more heavily in their space-based capabilities, and space-based enablers have become more central to modern warfare, dialogue on outer space has taken on a new strategic significance. The US is concerned about China’s space capabilities and whether it is planning to station weapons in space. China is concerned about Golden Dome. Discussing threats emerging from space-based systems, and maintaining space as a global common good, could once again provide an opportunity to tackle strategic questions without reference to nuclear stockpiles. Problem areas There are a number of thorny issues that could intensify tensions between the superpowers, hindering progress on nuclear issues. The US would like China to stop its material support for Iran, and to pressure Tehran to end the conflict on terms acceptable to the US. Washington might also want Beijing to help find a solution to the problem of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile. However, China has not indicated any willingness to support the US in this. Related work Avoiding a new nuclear arms race Another contentious issue is whether or not China has conducted low-yield nuclear tests. Earlier this year, at a session of the Conference on Disarmament at the UN in Geneva, the US accused China of conducting secret nuclear tests. China denies these accusations, and the CTBTO, which monitors compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, has not been able to substantiate the US allegations. If the US pushes too hard on this point, it could break the talks prematurely. Finally, the US’s Asian allies will be watching the talks anxiously. Taiwanese leadership is nervous about potential concessions on US arms sales to Taiwan, or any changes in US language about Taiwanese independence.

    Chatham House – What's New
  2. Diplomatik13 May 13:52

    Trump–Xi summit will be about managing US–China rivalry, not resolving it

    Washington, ABD

    Trump–Xi summit will be about managing US–China rivalry, not resolving it Expert comment LToremark 13 May 2026 The summit’s short agenda reveals a preference for continuing stability, which buys time. The question is how each side will use it. When US President Trump and China’s President Xi meet in Beijing this week, the US list of concrete deliverables is short: keep rare earths flowing, create a board of trade mechanism for non-sensitive sectors, and secure Chinese purchase commitments. The gap between this short agenda and the long list of issues between two nations engaged in grinding, multidimensional competition reveals a shared preference for managing their rivalry rather than resolving it. But while Xi pursues this relationship management as strategy, Trump takes a more transactional and improvisational approach. With three more Trump-Xi meetings expected this year – at APEC in Shenzhen, the G20 in Miami and a Xi state visit – the question now is how each side will use this continued stalemate. — Laurel Rapp and Max Yoeli discuss the coming summit from the US perspective. Trump brings a commercial focus to Beijing and will be accompanied by a CEO delegation, reflecting a turn away from focusing on more structural issues. Among his aims are Chinese purchases of American products like soybeans, LNG and Boeing aircraft. While such purchases, even if fulfilled, are unlikely to compensate for the damage to US businesses from the 2025 trade war, the optics are helpful for a politically vulnerable administration. Xi also brings economic concerns – especially with further US tariffs pending – and will push on technology access. He has also signalled that Taiwan tops his agenda. China has long criticized US military support for Taiwan, which Beijing considers Chinese territory. The Trump administration approved an $11 billion arms package for Taiwan in December but has not yet followed through with delivery – even after Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan approved a special defence budget last week. On Monday, Trump indicated he would discuss the package with Xi, casting doubt on longstanding US policy regarding Taiwan. The brief agenda spans only a fraction of the US–China relationship. On AI, officials seek to establish a communication channel rather than address underlying competition. On China’s nuclear build-up, Beijing has shown little appetite to engage. Although communication beats silence, such underwhelming efforts sidestep structural dynamics. Other issues like the South China Sea, industrial overcapacity and currency issues are marginal or absent. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has pushed Iran up the agenda, the focus will be on immediate resolution levers rather than underlying Chinese support for Iran, Russia and North Korea. Washington’s narrow focus is itself revealing. It partly reflects the Trump administration’s transactional, short-term approach. More significantly, the 2025 trade war and Chinese rare earth export controls reoriented leverage and exposed vulnerabilities – even more acute given depleted US munitions stocks amid the Iran war. Going into the summit, both leaders face domestic constraints. Trump is navigating affordability politics, inflation, an unpopular war and setbacks to his trade agenda, with his approval rating at second-term lows. Agricultural communities, core to his support, have lost export markets and face rising fertilizer prices. For Trump, the pressure is on ahead of November’s midterm elections when his Republican party must defend Congressional majorities. He is also on the clock to resolve the Iran war. Xi, meanwhile, faces debt, deflation, demographic headwinds and softening global demand. China’s latest economic growth target is its lowest since 1991, even as pre-war stockpiles and diversified imports help buffer Iran shocks. But Beijing operates on a longer timeline; Xi answers to party elites and the focus is on stability. An asymmetric stalemate The US and China have taken very different approaches to managing their economic rivalry. As the two leaders seek continuing stability to buy time, how they use it is telling. China has spent the past decade – especially since Trump’s first term – building its economic statecraft architecture, including export controls, the unreliable entity list, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and rare earth export licensing. China’s October 2025 rare earth export controls showed a willingness to use its dominance over rare earth supply chains as leverage. Although these measures were largely suspended by the so-called ‘Busan truce’, earlier April 2025 controls on permanent magnets and heavy rare earths remain in place. Beijing’s recent order directing companies not to comply with US sanctions against five refineries, accused of importing Iranian oil, also points to China’s growing assertiveness. Related work Trump’s treatment of US allies has weakened his negotiating position with Xi Cohesive strategy and patient investment have strengthened China’s hand in other critical domains too. China installed more solar capacity in 2024 than the rest of the world combined and dominates battery and EV supply chains. It is also accelerating frontier technology progress and increasingly pushing towards indigenization – even after Washington opened a door by giving the green light for Nvidia H200 chip sales. But there are gaps, notably advanced lithography, the machinery required to produce cutting-edge semiconductors. And China’s foundations are not unshakeable: fixed-asset investment struggled in 2025, the property sector continues to drag, and industrial policy draws mounting external backlash. The US picture is more mixed. Trump administration policy is an uneven companion to private sector innovation – and often a hindrance. In areas with bipartisan support, consistent policy and strategic coherence can deliver progress. Continued export control coordination with the Netherlands and Japan on lithography is one example; efforts to develop alternatives to China’s critical minerals dominance are another, though they will take years to fully realize. In other areas, progress is hampered by policy improvisation: the back-and-forth on tariffs, curtailed deployment of renewables, damaged research and state capacity, narrowing talent pathways, and a pattern of White House policy reversals. The US economy has nonetheless proven resilient, drawing on deep inherited advantages, such as AI infrastructure investment, energy abundance, deep capital markets, and innovation ecosystems. But tailwinds alone are insufficient. Without more coherent policy, including an industrial policy doctrine, gaps will emerge and grow. Evaluating summit outcomes For trade partners looking ahead, little will change. Hedging and trade diversification remain prudent policy. More broadly, evaluating the summit’s outcomes demands looking past immediate headlines and statements to the data and execution that follow. What commitments are made on the economic side – and whether they are fulfilled – are particularly important and will set the stage for future meetings.

    Chatham House – Expert comment
  3. Güvenlik11 May 06:55

    The Trump–Xi summit: can progress be made on Iran?

    Washington, ABD

    The Trump–Xi summit: can progress be made on Iran? Expert comment jon.wallace 11 May 2026 President Trump should not concede much on issues like Taiwan. But both powers have an interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz and making progress on AI safety. For Beijing, President Donald Trump is the gift that keeps on giving. His decisions have handed China’s leadership advantages of which it cannot have dreamed before he arrived in the Oval Office for the second time. Trump has cancelled the Biden-era subsidies for clean technology, allowing China to extend its lead. He has slapped tariffs on allies including Vietnam and India, driving them towards Beijing. He has called NATO into question and sided with Russia in its aims over Ukraine. And now he has tied up the US military and his own attention in a war with Iran which he cannot easily end. That comes after a year in which China demonstrated its rising power. In October, President Trump was forced to back down on tariffs, after Beijing threatened to withhold critical minerals. In March, Xi’s government published its latest five-year plan, showing how it intends to reap the fruits of its strategy of becoming the world’s dominant advanced manufacturer. Meanwhile China continued to rapidly develop a lead across much of the waterfront of technology, with the exception of the most advanced AI. Seeking short-term wins? When Trump meets President Xi Jinping this week in Beijing, therefore, one question is whether the encounter will confirm a further rebalancing between the two superpowers – in China’s favour. Trump’s allies, at home and abroad, are afraid that the president will make long term strategic concessions for a handful of soybean, sorghum and Boeing jet sales – seeking short-term ‘wins’ ahead of the midterm elections in November. He should resist that impulse. Hugely important issues for world stability are at hand, and there are vital US interests that he should pursue. Tension between China and Japan is rising, becoming an even more likely flashpoint than Taiwan, which Beijing considers Chinese territory. China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea and South China Sea worries other neighbours, including the Philippines and South Korea, with the latter openly debating whether to acquire nuclear weapons. China is also asserting that it is a ‘near-Arctic nation’, a triumph of language over geography which signals its ambitions for both a mining and military presence in that opening maritime region. In space, China’s ability to block or destroy other countries’ satellites is growing. Most immediate, though, is the conflict in Iran. The world needs a solution, and China has influence over Tehran that it has so far chosen not to use. Trump should also make cooperation on AI a priority: both Washington and Beijing increasingly recognize the threats emerging from the technology, as well as its transformational opportunities. Trump and the Washington consensus US discomfort over its relative loss of power to China, notably in manufacturing, has been rising for decades. The US has never had a rival like China: its economy size, technological ability, military capacity and ideology make it far more formidable than the USSR ever was. Alarm at Beijing’s growing challenge to US dominance is one of the forces that brought Trump to the presidency – twice. And China’s position as the greatest threat to the US is one of very few issues on which Republicans and Democrats can still agree. Europeans and other US allies have tended to see that Washington consensus as excessively belligerent – or they did until they began to realize the existential challenge that China’s export policy poses to their own manufacturing industries. Trump’s position has been something of an anomaly. The president is more doveish on China than almost all his administration. Many were disconcerted that he agreed to let Nvidia, whose chips underpin the US’s slender lead in AI, sell its H200 chips (only one generation behind the premier Blackwell chips) to China. He has frequently talked of his ‘friendship’ with Xi. That has led to fears that in search of election-year gains he might, for example, change US language on Taiwan from saying it ‘does not support’ independence to a statement that it opposes it. China has some leverage with Iran but will want something from the US in return, if it is to use it. Enough voices are warning against that outcome that it may deter the president. But for all the intense preparation for the trip, delayed because of the Iran conflict, there has been a lack of clarity on the US side about this meeting’s goals – partly because both the standoff in the Strait of Hormuz and the state of AI have been developing so fast. On Iran, Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, has called for the Strait of Hormuz to be opened ‘as soon as possible’ in talks with his Iranian counterpart. Asian countries including China have been among the most affected by the interruption caused to supplies of oil, gas, fertiliser and helium (needed for semiconductors, healthcare and pharmaceuticals). China has some leverage with Iran but will want something from the US in return, if it is to use it.

    Chatham House – What's New

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