Botsvanalı politikacı
Nigeria: Can to Embark On Prayers for Freedom of Borno Abductees
[Leadership] The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Borno State chapter, has called on churches in the state to embark on a three-day fasting and prayers for the freedom of 78 Schoolchildren from Askira-Uba, who were abducted by Boko Haram terrorists over two months ago from their schools in Askira-Uba local government area of the state.
Retard d’installation de la saison dans les provinces de l’Est déjà en Crise ! (Phase 3 ! de l’IPC)
Start of season is delayed in eastern provinces already facing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) Key Messages Key Messages Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are anticipated through January 2027 in the Assoungha, Kimiti, Wadi Hawar, Dar-Tama, and Kobé departments with expected further deterioration. Refugees, who have lost their livelihoods, continue to arrive in these departments where they account for more than 30 percent of the population. Refugees remain highly dependent on markets and food assistance while increasing pressure on the livelihoods of host populations. Food consumption deficits among host households are worsening further due to the lean season, the persistent delay in the start of the season, and the lack of recovery in key income sources, particularly agricultural labor. The onset of the rainy season is significantly delayed in several provinces, particularly in the Sahelian zone. As of July 10, the season had not yet started in Lac and Kanem provinces or in northern Bahr El-Ghazal, Batha, Ouaddaï, and Wadi Fira. Delays of 10 to 30 days have been observed in Sila and Hadjer Lamis and, farther south, in Salamat, Moyen Chari, and Mandoul. These delays are hindering agricultural activities and agricultural labor, which are key income sources for poor households. The resulting decline in purchasing power is forcing households to accept in-kind payments, often on credit, sell productive assets (including additional livestock among pastoral households), and/or take on debt. Due to insufficient income, household demand for cereals in markets is atypically low, resulting in an atypical decline in prices despite the lean season. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes currently observed in Lac Province are expected to persist through January 2027 due to insufficient food stocks and income, except in the department of Wayi, which is expected to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes between October and January 2027 as harvests improve food consumption. The delayed onset of the season and attacks by armed terrorist groups are contributing to deteriorating livelihoods and declining household income and purchasing power. Food consumption deficits are worsening further among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host populations. Ongoing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in northern Kanem and Bahr El-Ghazal provinces are expected to persist through September due to the extension of the pastoral lean season following the delayed onset of the rainy season. Milk production is not expected to recover until after September, while livestock maintenance costs remain high. Market-dependent households are experiencing deterioration in most of their income sources and purchasing power continues to weaken, pushing them to resort to atypical sales of productive assets. The influx of refugees and returnees increased significantly in June, reaching 6,337 arrivals (compared with an average of 2,120 per month between March and May), following clashes on June 28 and 29, 2026, around Kulbus, Sudan. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 3,000 arrivals were recorded in Koulbous, on the Chadian side of the border, between June 30 and July 13, 2026. This brought the cumulative number of new Sudanese refugees arriving in the eastern provinces since April 2023 to 936,900, of whom 642,850 have been relocated farther into these provinces. These arrivals are increasing market demand and putting additional pressure on local livelihoods and host-community resources. The security situation remains a key driver of food insecurity in several provinces of Chad. According to ACLED, Chad recorded 23 security incidents between June 17 and July 17, 2026, resulting in 23 deaths. Most incidents (48 percent) occurred in the eastern provinces, particularly Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï. These incidents involved the army's efforts to disarm armed refugees, as well as clashes between agropastoralists around water points. Lac Province accounted for 22 percent of security incidents, including the looting of food supplies (particularly flour, rice, and oil) following Boko Haram attacks, such as the July 7 attack on the village of Foulatari in Fouli. These incidents are creating a climate of fear, driving population displacement and disrupting livelihoods. mratolojanahar… Fri, 08/07/2026 - 20:37 Download the report 34
Nigeria: Boko Haram - Borno Truckers Lament Attacks On Trucks, Trailers
[Daily Trust] Truck drivers operating along a key international trade corridor in Borno State have expressed frustration over the persistent burning of their vehicles by Boko Haram insurgents.
Trump's quick hits allow for AFRICOM comeback on continent
Donald Trump’s foreign policy features chaotic decision-making and bombastic rhetoric. But some of his half-baked ideas could have lasting consequences, creating escalation pathways that his successors may be unwilling to close. West Africa provides a crucial case study. Trump ordered strikes in Nigeria in December 2025 and May 2026, and his team has reportedly considered striking Mali. These moves are drawing West Africa deeper into the ceaseless “War on Terror.” U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) – which was rumored to be on the chopping block early in Trump’s second term – may emerge from these years as a bureaucratic winner, with dangerous implications for the future. West Africa has always been part of the War on Terror, but with limitations. After 9/11, as Washington argued that further threats were likely to emerge from geopolitical peripheries, the Bush administration created the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a counterterrorism training program. The broader Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership followed in 2005, and then AFRICOM in 2007. None of those programs forestalled the crises they were meant to prevent. In 2009-2010, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria transformed into a mass insurgency that continues to trouble that country today. In 2012, a rebellion in Mali produced the first large-scale jihadist takeover in West Africa and gave way to a multi-sided war that still roils the Sahel. Amid those developments, the U.S. avoided direct and overt confrontation with jihadists in West Africa but stepped up its involvement there: the U.S. logistically supported France’s intervention in Mali in 2013; increased its engagement with militaries in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, particularly after Boko Haram’s infamous 2014 kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls; and constructed a $100 million drone base in Niger starting in 2016, from which it conducted surveillance flights. Occasional scandals and shocks – the strangling of a U.S. Green Beret in Mali in 2017 by his colleagues, and a jihadist ambush that killed four American soldiers and five Nigeriens in Niger the same year – hinted at more “kinetic” U.S. presence in the region than was officially acknowledged. Yet in the Sahel and Nigeria, the U.S. avoided the kind of cyclical strikes that unfolded in Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere. Trump’s moves in Nigeria and potential moves in Mali are breaking down longstanding limits on applications of U.S. military power in a delicate region. For Trump, short-term political expediency may be a driver of these decisions. Striking Nigeria in the name of defending Christians caters to significant constituencies and organizations in the United States. Boasting that U.S. forces killed “ISIS Terrorist Scum” reinforces Trump’s brand of toughness. The president and his political appointees may not have a long time horizon in mind. But these short-term decisions, intermittent strikes, and leaked debates over opening new fronts all have long-term implications – especially for AFRICOM and for overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. Early last year, amid the Trump team’s initial fervor for cutting and reorganizing federal agencies, outlets reported that the administration was considering folding AFRICOM into European Command, effectively reversing the process that created AFRICOM in 2007. Yet AFRICOM not only survived but has played a significant role. Bureaucratic survival has allowed AFRICOM to continue deepening long-term relationships and institutional investments on the continent. The military command has pursued an old, failed model of counterterrorism, courting the would-be Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar and cultivating ties to West Africa’s civilian authoritarians in Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and elsewhere. After being expelled from the drone base in Niger by that country’s new military government in 2024, AFRICOM simply pivoted to seeking new sites for drone bases nearby – a search that seems to be continuing under Trump. Meanwhile, strikes in Somalia have increased in 2025-2026, underscoring AFRICOM’s multifaceted diplomatic and kinetic role. As the White House’s 2027 Pentagon budget request sets a record, at well over $1 trillion, AFRICOM stands to grow along with the rest of the military. Trump’s successor will likely inherit an AFRICOM engaged in at least periodic strikes in both East Africa and West Africa. AFRICOM presents itself as vital to core American interests. In the command’s 2026 posture statement, Gen. Davgin Anderson insisted that the Sahelian jihadist group JNIM (an affiliate of al-Qaida) “has the ambition to threaten the Homeland and conduct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities.” Yet JNIM, formed in 2017, has never attacked a target outside of northwest Africa, not even in France. Anderson also offered a selective account of what the drone base in Niger had facilitated, trumpeting a 2020 hostage rescue operation in Nigeria as proof of the need for surveillance of the Sahel. Anderson did not mention that other American hostages in the region have had very different outcomes. Another American, kidnapped in 2016 in Niger, was released in 2023 after negotiations. Also unmentioned was the fact that violence in the central Sahel nevertheless steadily increased even at the peak of U.S. surveillance from Niger, which coincided with a high tempo of French counterterrorism operations that killed numerous JNIM and Islamic State commanders. Meanwhile, Anderson offered no detailed plan for success or even drawdown, but rather made a set of generic assertions about the difference that AFRICOM supposedly makes, for example: “Through traditional military operations and a focus on innovation, defense economics, and information operations, we amplify our impact and meet strategic objectives.” The command clearly looks to Africa as a long-term theater of operations: in the posture statement, Anderson twice referred to 2050, adding in one instance, “Africa’s vast resources, strategic geography, and growing population make it critical to U.S. national security.” Strikes in West Africa are all too easily folded into a portfolio that contains many activities but few off-ramps. Africa also features prominently in Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy, released in May. The document includes a section on Africa that purports to end “decades of forever wars” and “failed counterterrorism policies under President Biden,” but the rhetoric reframes and escalates previous approaches, rather than meaningfully breaking with them. In an effort to square the disavowal of “forever wars” with the reality of an open-ended, heavy-handed commitment to training missions, dubious bilateral partnerships, and direct strikes, the document resorts to the same kinds of conflations and expansive language that have recurred throughout the War on Terror: “We are set on bringing home our troops and downsizing our global footprint. This, however, does not mean we will ignore threat groups in Africa capable of External Operations which seek to attack our interests.” The two key words here are “capable” and “interests” – any militant group is potentially “capable” of attacking the United States, and U.S. “interests” are often so broadly defined that any instability anywhere can be construed as a threat to “interests.” The next presidential administration may not continue the Trump White House’s polarizing rhetoric characterizing Christians as “the most persecuted people on earth” or condemning past U.S. policies as “globalist left-wing cultural hegemony.” But the next president will likely build upon some of the precedents Trump has set. This combination – the normalization of strikes in West Africa, and the underlying maintenance, from administration to administration, of sweeping, unfalsifiable rhetorical justifications for military involvement in Africa – is particularly dangerous.
Trump'ın Batı Afrika saldırıları AFRICOM'un kıtaya dönüşünü hızlandırdıUS-Saudi nuclear doubt, Boko Haram’s AI terrorism: 7 global relations reads
We have selected seven of the most interesting and important news stories covering global relations from the past few weeks. If you would like to see more of our reporting, please consider subscribing. 1. Nato launches defence projects to counter Russia and China Nato member states unveiled a series of defence initiatives in June aimed at strengthening weapons development, production and supply chains in response to security challenges posed by Russia and China. Read the full story here. 2....
NATO'nun Yeni Savunma Hamleleri, ABD-Suudi Nükleer Şüpheleri ve Boko Haram'ın Yapay Zeka TerörüNigeria: Gunmen Abduct Pastor's Wife, Three Children in Borno
[Vanguard] Suspected Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists have abducted the wife of a pastor and his three children in Damasak, headquarters of Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno State.
Nigeria: Stakeholders Demand Safer School As 78 Borno School Children Remain in Captivity
[Leadership] Borno State Commissioner for Education, Innovation, Science and Technology, Engr Lawan Abba Wakilbe has decried the continued captive of the 78 pupils and students abducted by Boko Haram/ ISWAP terrorists in Mussa and Lassa communities between May and June this year in their schools in Askira-Uba local government area.
Nigeria: A Decade of Boko Haram Insurgency - Nigeria's Enduring Security Crisis and the Human Cost of Terror
[This Day] More than a decade after Boko Haram emerged as one of Africa's deadliest insurgent movements, Nigeria continues to face persistent security challenges despite extensive military campaigns and billions of naira invested by government in defence and counterterrorism operations.
Boko Haram'ın Gölgesinde On Yıl: Nijerya'nın Bitmeyen Güvenlik Mücadelesi