North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has consequences far beyond Ukraine

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North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has consequences far beyond Ukraine Expert comment thilton.drupal 9 September 2026 North Korea is emerging as Russia’s reserve arsenal – and potentially its reserve army. This deepening partnership has strengthened Pyongyang’s military capabilities and its strategic position in East Asia. The first road bridge connecting North Korea and Russia opened this week, providing the latest sign of the deepening partnership between the two countries since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. North Korea’s military partnership with Russia has moved far beyond the transactional arms supply that developed after the invasion. Pyongyang is increasingly becoming an institutionalized part of Moscow’s war-making capacity – supplying ammunition, ballistic missiles and soldiers. In return, the North Korean regime is gaining economic resources, potential military technology, and extensive experience of modern warfare that it would struggle to acquire elsewhere. Deepening military ties Military cooperation has deepened since the two countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024. South Korea’s Defence Intelligence Agency estimates that North Korea has sent more than 16,000 personnel to Russia since October 2024 and supplied more than 15 million artillery rounds. North Korea itself acknowledged for the first time in April 2025 that it had sent troops to Russia, saying they had fought alongside Russian forces in Kursk. Pyongyang subsequently dispatched approximately 1,000 military engineers for mine-clearance operations. North Korea replenishes Russia’s war machine, while Russia improves North Korea’s future ability to wage war. The military relationship continues to evolve. Ukrainian intelligence reported in August that a North Korean missile unit of around 90 personnel had begun deploying to Russia’s western Voronezh region. It said that Moscow expects the unit eventually to have up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers. Pyongyang had already supplied dozens of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia. Much larger numbers may follow. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested in August that another 30,000–50,000 North Korean soldiers could eventually be deployed. South Korean intelligence has been more cautious, assessing that Pyongyang is preparing for a potential deployment but finding no signs that one is imminent. Kim Yo Jong, the outspoken sister of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has dismissed the Ukrainian claim as ‘completely groundless.’ Mutually beneficial The possibility of another major deployment is ominous, but North Korea’s emergence as Russia’s reserve arsenal – and potentially reserve army – is already underway. It is likely to continue because it is mutually beneficial. Russia receives much-needed ammunition as well as ballistic missiles and manpower that can supplement its own forces. North Korea, meanwhile, receives economic and material compensation. A NATO Defense College study estimates that North Korean munitions and rockets supplied between September 2023 and February 2024 alone were worth $4.3–4.8 billion – an enormous sum relative to North Korea’s economy. This does not mean Pyongyang received an equivalent cash payment: the terms remain opaque, and at least some Russian compensation has taken the form of critical provisions like oil, food and other strategic goods. There are limits to this cooperation. North Korea cannot indefinitely deplete its own ammunition stocks or manpower without weakening its military posture at home. But North Korea’s totalitarian system allows the Kim regime to tolerate costs, including substantial battlefield casualties, which many governments would find politically difficult to sustain. Battlefield experience More important in the long term is what the Kim regime is learning from the deployment in Ukraine. Its soldiers have encountered drones, electronic warfare, artillery coordination, mine warfare, logistics and Western weapons systems in sustained, large-scale combat. Its missile forces have gained valuable experience from repeated battlefield testing. Related work North Korea and Russia’s dangerous partnership The results may already be visible. Earlier in the war, Ukrainian sources assessed North Korean missile accuracy at 1–3 kilometres. By early 2025, they reported that missiles were landing within 50–100 metres of their targets. Possible explanations include better targeting data or Russian-supplied guidance components. At the same time, North Korea may also have made improvements based on feedback from the battlefield. The result is a circular military economy: North Korea replenishes Russia’s war machine, while Russia improves North Korea’s future ability to wage war. Ramifications for East Asia These dynamics make the Russia–North Korea partnership much more than a sole European security issue. Any Russian assistance that improves missile reliability, electronic warfare or other military capabilities can ultimately be incorporated into Pyongyang’s forces back home. This could prove valuable for North Korea in any future conflict with South Korea, Japan or the US. For example, North Korean missiles fired at Ukraine are being tested against Western-supplied air-defence systems. The resulting data could help Pyongyang improve its tactics against different but technologically related defences operated by US allies in East Asia. The partnership also strengthens Pyongyang’s diplomatic position. Russian support alone does not fully explain North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal or its increasingly sophisticated missile programme. But it reduces Kim’s dependence on improved relations with Washington for sanctions relief, diplomatic recognition or greater international legitimacy. The partnership with Moscow also gives Kim greater room for manoeuvre in dealing with China, North Korea’s traditional ally and principal economic partner. Russian money, energy and military cooperation reduce Beijing’s ability to use North Korea’s economic dependence as leverage. But they cannot replace China entirely: geography, trade and long-standing political ties ensure that Beijing remains indispensable to Pyongyang. Impact on US diplomacy All this matters as President Donald Trump again explores diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. In August, Trump ordered the Pentagon to ‘substantially reduce’ US-South Korean military exercises, which he said ‘send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile’ to North Korea. However, Pyongyang offered no corresponding concession. Kim Yo Jong effectively invited Trump to bid higher by declaring that the US’s ‘hostile policy’ remained unchanged. Pyongyang launched ballistic missile tests shortly after her statement. Russian support has reduced Kim’s need to accept limited concessions from the US. Washington is still proceeding with the five-day trilateral Freedom Edge exercise with South Korea and Japan, which began on 7 September. This reflects the limits of Washington’s willingness to accommodate Pyongyang: although Trump has reduced some bilateral US–South Korean exercises, the US remains committed to long-term trilateral deterrence aimed at not just North Korea but also China. For now, this leaves little common ground for renewed diplomacy that’s agreeable to all parties. Washington is unwilling to dismantle the regional security architecture that Pyongyang opposes, while Russian support has reduced Kim’s need to accept limited concessions from the US. Moscow therefore gives Kim more freedom to walk away from negotiations and more leverage to demand a higher price for returning to them. An alliance built to outlast the war The institutional infrastructure supporting the Russia-North Korea relationship is also expanding. The completion of the first road bridge across the Tumen River adds a new physical cross-border connection to the existing railway link. Such infrastructure gives the relationship enduring practical foundations beyond the Ukrainian battlefield. This month may provide further evidence of the future direction of relations. North Korea’s Foundation Day on 9 September is one of the country’s major political anniversaries and could provide Pyongyang with a natural stage for emphasizing its relationship with Moscow. Regardless of any ceremony, the bilateral relationship is no longer a transactional short-term arrangement. It is here to stay, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine. Related work North Korea’s ‘Victory Day’ takes place with Kim Jong Un’s power transformed A future crisis on the Korean Peninsula – or even a wider East Asian crisis, for example involving the Taiwan Strait – could feature a North Korea with combat-tested weapons and more experienced armed forces. The mistake for policymakers would therefore be to assume that any eventual ceasefire in Ukraine will automatically dissolve this partnership. Russia’s war accelerated the relationship, but there are now military, economic and strategic reasons it will outlive the war. Washington, Seoul and Tokyo will need a long-term strategy to counter a partnership whose consequences will endure far beyond any summitry. That strategy should include stronger sanctions monitoring and closer intelligence-sharing, while continuing to adapt allied missile and drone defences based on the lessons emerging from Ukraine. Fundamentally, any strategy must assume that Pyongyang will retain its battlefield knowledge and much of Russia’s support long after the fighting in Ukraine ends.

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