The wishful thinking behind the war with Iran

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The wishful thinking behind the war with Iran Expert comment jon.wallace 21 July 2026 Iran has survived war with the US by adapting its doctrine. The US must also change its thinking. Nearly five months after the United States and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran, it is becoming increasingly difficult to escape one conclusion: the central objectives that underpinned Washington’s decision to go war have not materialized. Wars should ultimately be judged not by the number of targets destroyed or sorties flown, but by whether they achieve their political objectives. By that measure, the campaign against Iran deserves a sober reassessment. The expectation that military pressure would trigger regime collapse, force Tehran into political capitulation, or fundamentally degrade its strategic capabilities has, so far, not been borne out. At best, those expectations were overly optimistic. At worst, they reflected wishful thinking masquerading as strategy. First, regime change has not happened – and there is little evidence to suggest the war will bring it about anytime soon. Iran undoubtedly faces deep domestic dissatisfaction. Years of sanctions, inflation, corruption and political repression have generated repeated waves of unrest, culminating in the nationwide protests of late 2025 and early 2026, which were brutally suppressed by the security apparatus. The discontent which led to those protests is likely still brewing. But history repeatedly demonstrates that authoritarian regimes often prove far more resilient under external attack than anticipated. Foreign intervention often allows regimes to recast themselves as defenders of national sovereignty – blunting internal dissent in the process. Opposition movements can be reluctant to mobilize while the country is under attack. That appears to be precisely what has happened in Iran. Rather than imploding, the Islamic Republic has weathered what many in the US and Israel believed would become an existential crisis. Political fractures remain, and the economy continues to deteriorate: the rial touched record lows at the weekend. But the state retains the institutional cohesion, security capacity and elite discipline necessary to survive. The war may even have strengthened some of the very institutions it was intended to weaken. Second, the assumption that Iran’s military capability has been decisively degraded is difficult to sustain. Throughout the campaign, President Donald Trump repeatedly declared that Iran’s missile force had been ‘obliterated’ and that much of its launch infrastructure had been destroyed. Israeli officials similarly highlighted the destruction of launchers, production facilities and command-and-control nodes. Yet developments over the past five months suggest those assessments were, at minimum, premature. Iran has demonstrated a sustained ability to launch ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones across multiple theatres, from the Strait of Hormuz to countries hosting US military bases – including recent strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq and Jordan. Whether acting directly or through its regional partners, Tehran has maintained a tempo of operations inconsistent with claims that its arsenal has been nearly exhausted. There is no reliable public estimate of Iran’s remaining missile stockpiles or production capacity. Definitive claims about its military depletion are difficult to sustain. Strategic attrition More importantly, Iran has demonstrated an ability to learn. It has not prioritized preserving its military assets. Instead, it has adapted its doctrine based on previous rounds of confrontation in 2024 and 2025. What once appeared to be operational shortcomings increasingly resemble the learning curve of a military preparing for a prolonged conflict rather than a single decisive exchange. Iran has not sought battlefield dominance but strategic attrition, gradually increasing the political, economic and military costs for its opponents In 2024, Iran carefully choreographed its military response to both Israel’s attack on its Syrian consulate in April of that year and the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas fighters that October. Missile attacks on Israel were launched in measured waves, often lacking precision. Even its retaliation for US strikes against Fordow and other nuclear facilities in June 2025 appeared designed to demonstrate resolve without provoking an uncontrollable regional war. This was read by some as hesitation or lack of capability. But it is now clear that it was strategy. Iran possessed greater capacity to escalate, as it has demonstrated in the current war. But it chose not to exhaust its options. That restraint, interpreted by some as weakness, is consistent with a strategy of preserving escalation options while collecting valuable intelligence on Israeli and American missile-defence systems, response times and interception patterns. In the 2026 conflict, Iranian targeting has become noticeably more selective. Rather than launching as many projectiles as possible, Tehran has focused on maximizing the strategic value of each strike. Attacks against Gulf energy infrastructure, ports and logistics nodes generate disproportionate economic, political and psychological consequences for the US and countries in the region. This reflects a fundamentally different theory of victory. Iran has not sought battlefield dominance, but strategic attrition, gradually increasing the political, economic and military costs for its opponents over time. In other words, Iran appears less focused on winning a short war than on managing a long confrontation, imposing incremental costs on its adversaries while preserving military and political options for future rounds of escalation. Making a deal The final assumption of the war, that Iran would capitulate politically and agree to a deal beneficial to the US and Israel, also proved wrong. Tehran’s red lines remain remarkably similar to those that existed before the war. Enrichment of uranium on its soil remains non-negotiable. Its ballistic missile program may be damaged and depleted to some extent but is still central to its deterrence strategy. Its support for its proxies across the region has not been weakened (though its ability to fund and supply them may have been). In fact, the war has caused Tehran to expand the range of issues it considers core national interests, now adding control of the Strait of Hormuz to its list of red lines. Related work Iran and the new Persian Gulf equilibrium Far from appearing weakened, Iran increasingly projects confidence that it has weathered the storm. Whether that confidence is justified is almost secondary. It is Tehran’s perception of its situation that will shape its behaviour. This is why the current trajectory is so troubling. If policymakers continue to base their strategy on assumptions that have repeatedly failed – that the regime is on the verge of collapse, that military pressure alone will produce capitulation, or that additional strikes will fundamentally alter Tehran’s calculations – they risk fighting a war with an Iranian regime that exists more in their expectations than in reality. The likely outcome is neither decisive victory nor durable peace, but an increasingly familiar cycle of tit-for-tat, temporary ceasefires, failed negotiations and renewed escalation. Each fresh round of fighting will doubtless be presented by the US as the one that will finally break Tehran’s resolve. Yet each round is more likely to convince Iran that strategic patience, rather than compromise, remains its best option. Until US assumptions are revisited, the war risks becoming self-perpetuating, driven less by achievable political objectives than by the hope that the next round of military pressure will succeed where every previous round has failed.

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