As Trump blows up the Mideast, regional leaders look to Europe

As Trump blows up the Mideast, regional leaders look to Europe

“Anything’s possible” was Donald Trump’s response when asked if he would launch a new attack on Iran after the midterm elections. Fears of what a return to all-out war would bring have set off a flurry of diplomacy. Two noteworthy tracks from European and regional powers have emerged as last-gasp attempts to prevent, or at least limit, the destruction a renewed conflict would cause. If they succeed, they could become the pillars of a new “coalition of the willing” to stabilise the Middle East without America in the lead. The negotiators The first track brings together the E4—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—and the R4 of Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The foreign ministers of the E4+R4 met in Istanbul on October 23rd to discuss preserving the viability of a two-state solution in Israel-Palestine, ending the US-Iran war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and defending Saudi Arabia against the latest offensive launched by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group. On the European side, the addition of Italy to the E3 is welcome. It bolsters Europe’s diplomatic weight, offsetting Britain’s Brexit-induced weakness and Germany’s loss of regional influence over its staunch support for Israel. Berlin’s relations with Tehran have also been tense since 2022, when Iran’s human-rights abuses and its military assistance to Russia soured ties. Italy does not carry the same baggage, nor did it take part in the E3’s decision last year to trigger the “snapback” of sanctions on Iran. That could eventually help it reopen the path to negotiations. The Istanbul meeting also showed how far the R4 has come since it formed earlier this year in response to the shifting power balance in the Middle East. All its members but Egypt signed the Mecca Defence Alliance, a military pact, in August. The pact was recently tested when members activated the collective defence measures in response to the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia. The grouping signals that the region’s powers are increasingly willing to take responsibility for their own security. The second diplomatic track opened three days after the Istanbul gathering, when security chiefs from Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia met Iran’s leaders in Tehran. The meeting was an attempt by regional powers to avert a new round of fighting by including Iran in a serious diplomatic process. It also allowed Iran to host, giving it a PR victory at a time when the Trump administration is attempting to impose a full blockade on the country. These regional powers are scrambling to de-escalate as Tehran has made clear that its response to renewed US or Israeli strikes would be far more damaging than anything the Middle East has absorbed in the past eight months. It has already shown its reach through its ally in Yemen. In recent weeks the Houthis have damaged critical infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia and attacked shipping through the Red Sea. A joint effort by the Houthis and Iran to disrupt transit through two vital waterways—the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb—would have global economic ramifications. Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia probably also warned Iran during the Tehran meeting that further strikes on its neighbours’ critical infrastructure and civilian targets would undo any prospect of regional integration. A coalition of the middle Whether these tracks succeed or fail, they point to a changing reality. Most glaring is America’s absence from both meetings, as European and regional powers increasingly try to work around an unpredictable Washington rather than with it. For the R4, the Trump administration’s handling of Iran has shattered the assumption that America’s armed forces offer iron-clad protection to its allies, a reality Europeans are also confronting over Ukraine. America and Israel might have the military capacity to devastate the region, but they have proved unable or unwilling to win the peace. Left to pick up the pieces, Middle Eastern and European countries have been made all too aware that stronger diplomatic efforts are needed for their own security. If war and maximum pressure pushed Iran, a country of more than 90 million people, towards state collapse, the consequences for its neighbours and Europe would be disastrous. This is particularly so given that neither America nor Israel is likely to invest the time and money needed to rebuild it. Yet the Islamic Republic’s elite will probably remain in power for the foreseeable future. And as the Tehran meeting showed, the hard-line military factions that the war has brought to the fore currently dominate decision-making. Averting disaster The immediate priority for both tracks is to prevent a return to high-intensity war. It remains to be seen whether the E4+R4 can exert influence over both Trump and Tehran to end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But their combined leverage, if used with greater purpose and willingness, could add new force to diplomacy. Teaming up more actively with the R4 would also give Europe better access to Washington and Tehran, both of which have increasingly dismissed European influence. That would improve Europe’s chances of advancing two of its strategic objectives: ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s future nuclear programme, and stabilising the Middle East. The E4 and R4 could also use their combined economic clout to press China to use its deep trade ties with Iran to secure the lasting reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The regional powers have also seen an advantage in fostering deeper cooperation with Europe. Relative to Russia, China and the US, Europeans can provide a more reliable partnership in security, defence and economic affairs. As the R4 countries seek to strengthen their defences, modernise their militaries and heal their economies after successive wars, Europe remains an attractive partner. The E4 could also help middle powers in the region contain and potentially moderate the behaviour of both Israel and Iran. Europeans could restrain Israeli military activity in Lebanon and Syria through stronger economic and technical support to central governments and increased funding for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The R4 will similarly look to European countries to expand measures targeting Israeli occupation policies and illegal settlements. On Iran, Europe and its regional partners could use the prospect of eventual sanctions relief to nudge Tehran towards a stronger agreement on its nuclear programme and reducing its destabilising conduct in the Middle East. The E4 and R4 share concerns that in a future deal with Iran, Washington may be willing to curtail the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities. Europeans could therefore make EU sanctions relief conditional on enhanced international monitoring, whatever Washington agrees bilaterally with Iran. The R4 could reinforce this by offering to be the first to invest in Iran’s post-sanctions economy, given that European companies, wary of reputational exposure, are likely to be slower to return. Both the E4 and R4 view Iran’s missile and drone programme as a direct threat. Yet precisely because of its demonstrated effectiveness in the past year, Tehran is unlikely to negotiate a major rollback. Instead, the E4 and R4 could intensify efforts to slow Iran’s advances by disrupting supply chains from China and Russia and interdicting shipments to groups such as Hizbullah and the Houthis. They could also press Beijing to demand that Iran halt technology transfers to non-state armed actors. Security without superpowers The E4+R4 format creates opportunities for Europeans and regional powers to lay the foundations of a broader security architecture for the Middle East, one that goes beyond the deterrence framework envisaged by the Mecca pact. In the long run, it could even include Iran and Israel by merging the Tehran track and the Abraham Accords into a single process. Europe’s own experience with security mechanisms across the EU could prove useful in de-escalating tensions, managing military capabilities, and, eventually, building shared security and prosperity. A return to full-scale war between America and Iran may be inevitable given Trump’s zero-sum instincts and apparent desire for a hard-power legacy. But even if the E4+R4 effort falters, it points to an emerging order shaped by the region’s middle powers. These countries are now looking to Europe, not America, to shore up their diplomacy. For Europeans, it is a chance to bring their diplomatic weight to bear after a long period of marginal influence in the Middle East. The initiative’s underlying commitment to de-escalation and a more inclusive diplomatic approach is precisely what the region needs. This article was republished with permission from the European Council on Foreign Relations.