Despite war US military is leaving a stronger Iraq behind

Despite war US military is leaving a stronger Iraq behind

On September 30, the U.S. completed the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq. Heralding this event, Iraq declared “Sovereignty Day,” celebrating the end of U.S. occupation and return of full sovereignty to the people of Iraq. In practice, this withdrawal was little more than the departure of a few hundred soldiers that had returned to Iraq in 2014 – at the invitation of the Iraqi government – to provide support and assistance to the collapsing Iraqi Army in its fight against ISIS. Unlike the hundreds of thousands of troops needed in Germany and Japan at the end of WWII, the troops of Operation Inherent Resolve were neither an occupation nor a challenge to sovereign control. Nonetheless, the mission had become a political liability and a convenient excuse for anti-government militias to maintain independence, retain weapons and force its will both in the streets and within Parliament. While some voices in Washington argue for a keeping residual military presence, the reasonable solution is shifting to a diplomatic and development effort. This was U.S. policy after the first withdrawal in 2011 and should remain the policy going forward. The Strategic Framework Agreement, signed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki in 2008, envisioned this relationship and should remain the policy going forward. Critics claim Iraq’s security forces aren’t ready to handle their own borders or keep internal order. Senior Iraqi officials, including the national security adviser, have made it clear that premise is wrong. A Higher Military Commission established between U.S. Military leadership and Iraqi counterparts conducted a methodical, benchmarked evaluation to measure the capability of Iraq’s security forces. Today, the Iraqi military is one of the largest conventional forces in the region, certified as sufficiently equipped, organized and capable of managing both internal and external threats. There is, of course, no guarantee that this preparation would translate into a political will to fight any given enemy. Indeed, the Iraqi military has long suffered from internal political and sectarian divisions. But it is unlikely that the presence of a small U.S. force would make a difference on this front. A continued American footprint would also have catalyzed continued instability. Illegal, Iranian-backed factions characterize attacks against American troops and shared military facilities as resistance to occupiers, and the retention of major weapons stocks as necessary to fight the Americans. Disarming militias unwilling to answer to the central government is a major policy of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s administration, but the presence of American troops works contrary to this policy. It is unlikely a small U.S. presence will deter further Iranian expansion, as some analysts claim. The Iranians have seen serious blows to the strength and influence of their proxies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, and it is likely they will now push harder to keep — and try to expand — their proxy strength in Iraq, regardless of al-Zaidi’s disarmament program. Additionally, given the current war between the U.S. and Iran, U.S. forces in Iraq would be likely targets of retaliatory Iranian rockets and missiles in the wake of U.S. attacks in Iran. Keeping Iraq and its territories out of the protracted U.S.-Iran war should be a U.S. objective. The U.S. military departure from Iraq need not mean the end of support to the Iraqi military. Defense cooperation doesn’t require permanent basing or massive combat garrisons. Security assistance, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism coordination, and specialized training can easily be delivered “over the horizon” or with temporary train and equipping missions, as is done around the world. A security cooperation office – Office of Military Assistance-Iraq – will remain in the U.S. embassy to facilitate these programs. Ultimately, debating a residual force presence is an academic exercise, not a policy option. The Iraqi government made it clear that it would not renew the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement in 2012, and it is equally unlikely the Iraqi Parliament would do so in 2027. At the same time, neither the U.S. administration nor the American public demonstrates any appetite for another “forever war” in Iraq. While an existential threat to either Iraq or America might change that dynamic, such a low-probability event should not drive U.S. policy. The U.S. military was invited back to Iraq in 2014 to assist the Iraqi Security Forces in defeating ISIS. That mission expanded when the group’s defeat in Syria was included, but that mission has been accomplished. Going forward, the relationship with Iraq should be focused on diplomatic and development objectives. The 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) set out a comprehensive roadmap for the post-military relationship. That framework prioritized: Economic, financial, and trade cooperation; Energy, diplomacy, and political cooperation; Cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges; Health and environmental cooperation; and Law enforcement and judicial cooperation. In Iraq, these objectives are as relevant today as they were almost two decades ago. The lead for U.S.-Iraq relations belongs under the pillars of the SFA, not under the auspices of a military mission. The last quarter century has clearly proven the wisdom of this division of labor. It is best to stop turning to the Pentagon to solve inherently political, economic and diplomatic problems that would best be handled by the Department of State.