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Sudan: The U.S. Draws a Line On Sudan

Started 29 Sept, 05:21 2 events Updated 7h ago
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  1. Security29 Sept, 05:21

    Sudan: The U.S. Draws a Line On Sudan

    Washington, United States

    [Ayin Network] The United Nations General Assembly comes to a close this week with one individual missing from the event, Sudan's army chief Abdel Fatah al-Burhan. The US rejected granting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) leader a visa, exposing growing tensions between Washington, Sudan's military leadership and the regional powers shaping the war.

    AllAfrica – East Africa
  2. Diplomatic30 Sept, 04:05

    Burhan digs in as Trump's visa-for-ceasefire scheme blows up

    Washington, United States

    On the morning of September 24, Abdel Fattah Burhan should have been standing at the podium of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Instead, he was in Khartoum. The general who leads Sudan’s army and chairs its Sovereignty Council had been offered his American visa on a condition, which, as detailed by Reuters, involved signing the 90-day ceasefire that Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s adviser for Arab and African affairs, had been pitching for months. Burhan rejected the condition, telling a crowded stadium in Khartoum on September 26 that “we do not want a visa to any country...we will stay here with you until we die here in this country.” This episode caps a year in which American policy toward Sudan’s civil war has steadily become more hostile toward Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) — the very party that Boulos in a May interview called the “constitutional institution” that must be preserved. Sudan has been at war since April 2023, when its army, the SAF, fell out with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group it once had nurtured. The fighting has produced the world’s largest displacement crisis and famine in parts of the country. Both sides stand accused of atrocities, but the worst have been attributed to the RSF, whose capture of el-Fasher in October 2025 bore what the U.N. called “hallmarks of genocide.” At present, the SAF holds battlefield momentum. Over the past year, it has clawed back the capital, Khartoum, and swathes of territory in the country's center. Just days ago, it captured Sodari, a strategic town in North Kordofan state. The string of victories now place the SAF at the gates of Darfur, the RSF’s stronghold and the very region from which the SAF and its allied forces were violently ejected last year when el-Fasher fell. Given battlefield dynamics and the growing number of high-level defections that are hollowing out the RSF, an outright military victory appears in sight for the first time since the war erupted. It is against this background of shifting momentum that America has ratcheted up pressure, with almost all of it, in practice, on the side that is winning. Washington has reached for several tools over the last year. In January, 2025, it imposed sanctions on Burhan himself, for refusal “to participate in international peace talks” and “indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure.” Months later, in May 2025, the U.S. government determined that the Government of Sudan, which is led by the SAF, had used chemical weapons. In early September, a “secret dossier” pointing to chemical weapons use by the SAF was reported by the New York Times and the Washington Post, building on information supplied by a “Middle Eastern intelligence agency.” The allegation is serious and adds weight to Washington’s earlier determination. However, the program appears to have been wound up, it produced no confirmed fatalities, and the dossier contained no victim testimony. The dossier originated with Israeli intelligence, according to sources who spoke to Middle East Eye. That detail is significant given Israel’s reported recent contacts with RSF leadership, as well as Israel’s regional alignment that tilts heavily toward the paramilitary group’s primary foreign patron, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the chemical weapons report leaked, the U.S. was also in the process of attempting to expand an arms embargo on Sudan at the U.N. The measure originally restricted weapons flows only to RSF-dominated Darfur; Boulos and America’s U.N. ambassador, Michael Waltz, have pushed to extend it across all of Sudan. On paper, this is even-handed. It applies to both sides “with no carve-outs,” as Boulos and Waltz explained in a Foreign Policy article. In practice, a blanket embargo hits the army hardest. The SAF is the internationally-recognized government, and its arms purchases are, by that logic, legitimate acts of a state defending itself; an embargo would reclassify those purchases as contraband. The RSF, meanwhile, is a paramilitary with no such standing and therefore has nothing to lose. Also noteworthy is the fact that Boulos consistently declines to name the UAE. Conflict experts, American lawmakers and America’s own sanctions have identified Abu Dhabi as the RSF’s principal foreign backer, supplying the drones, armored vehicles, and Colombian mercenaries that have given the paramilitary its edge. Asked directly by the BBC about Abu Dhabi’s role, Boulos offered only that “there might be some traders or whatever that are doing these sorts of supplies.” Indeed, a crucial dynamic shaping Sudan’s civil war is the growing rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In November 2025, Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) pressed President Donald Trump at a White House meeting to get involved in peacemaking in Sudan. Burhan welcomed the move, and reportedly told MBS by phone before his trip that the war could not end without American pressure on Abu Dhabi. That framework was Riyadh’s, and it was decisively pro-army: Saudi Arabia sees the SAF as a bulwark against state collapse, not as one of two morally equal combatants, as Washington and Abu Dhabi do. Since Trump’s commitment to “start working on Sudan,” in November, however, the president’s attention has since been consumed by a grinding war with Iran, leaving the Sudan file to Boulos, whose brief spans the entire African continent. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, have drifted apart on several fronts. The Emirates quit OPEC, of which Riyadh is the de facto leader, in the spring. It has also deepened defense ties with Israel amid the U.S.-Iran war, while Saudi Arabia has taken an entirely different path, entering into the Mecca Defense Pact with Turkey and Pakistan, a move that is widely viewed as designed to curb Israel’s hawkishness and establish collective deterrence. Saudi banks have quietly also tightened scrutiny of transfers to the UAE, subjecting them to the kind of enhanced anti-money laundering scrutiny reserved for high-risk jurisdictions. Cargo trucks at the shared border have reportedly been queuing for days this summer awaiting Saudi clearance. Anwar Gargash, an Emirati presidential adviser, insisted publicly in New York that “the areas of interest between us and Saudi Arabia far outweigh any sort of disagreement.” But the reporting suggests otherwise. For Riyadh, the stakes in Sudan are only increasing. Its war against the Houthis across its southern border has recently re-opened following Houthi gains along Yemen's western coast. A second fractured state on the Red Sea — one potentially overrun by a group Saudi Arabia neither trusts nor controls — has looked, from Riyadh, like a threat since day one. This fear is what prompted the kingdom to co-host the first round of ceasefire talks in Jeddah at the war’s outset. As a result, Saudi Arabia is pushing back, and its patience with Washington's handling of the Sudan file appears to be thinning. According to The Africa Report, Riyadh recently threatened to quit the “Quad,” the mediation group convened by Washington, which includes Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In New York, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister sat down with Egypt’s foreign minister, and the foreign ministers of its Mecca Pact partners, Turkey and Pakistan, all of whom back Sudan's army (Turkey supplies drones; Pakistan has sent armoured vehicles). They issued a statement expressing support for Sudan’s “legitimate national institutions" and rejecting “parallel entities” — explicitly pro-army, anti-RSF language from a meeting neither Washington nor Abu Dhabi attended. Back in Khartoum a few days later, Burhan said Sudan could not be “blackmailed,” in reference to his denied visa. It is not a flattering view of a peace process that needs his cooperation to work. It is also increasingly a view shared by all of America’s Middle Eastern partners, with one exception.

    Responsible Statecraft

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