L'insécurité maintient Kidal et Ménaka en Urgence (Phase 4 de l'IPC) au pic de la soudure

L'insécurité maintient Kidal et Ménaka en Urgence (Phase 4 de l'IPC) au pic de la soudure

Insecurity is maintaining Emergency in Kidal and Ménaka amid lean season peak Key Messages Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Annex 1: Updates to key sources of evidence used in this analysis Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Key Messages Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist in the Kidal and Ménaka regions due to significant food consumption gaps linked to difficulties accessing food as insecurity disrupts livelihoods and markets. In Ménaka, an improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected beginning in October due to the availability of harvests and wild foods. In contrast, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Kidal through January 2027 amid severe disruptions to economic activities and poorly to non-functioning markets. Area planted is below last year’s level for cereal crops and cotton, with localized declines due to insufficient rainfall observed during June and July, producers’ limited access to inputs, and insecurity. While ongoing agricultural labor activities are therefore providing average income-earning and food opportunities for poor households in agricultural areas, these opportunities are below average in other areas, particularly those affected by insecurity and localized rainfall deficits. Beginning in October, the availability of harvests, in-kind payments, and the seasonal decline in prices will improve household access to food, supporting more widespread Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes in the south and west of the country and an improvement from Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in conflict-affected areas. In these areas, deteriorating livelihoods and persistent disruptions associated with insecurity will lead households to rely on coping strategies to meet their food and non-food needs. This report provides an update to the June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook and July 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of August 25, 2026. Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 Source: USGS The security situation remains concerning, despite a relative decline in attacks against transporters along roads in the south and west. Security incidents remain high and are characterized by the continuation of joint operations by armed groups, as well as the proliferation of hotspots involving ambushes and the use of explosive devices and kamikaze drones, particularly in the central and northern regions. Several areas, particularly in the center of the country and in the Kidal and Mopti regions, continue to experience attacks and reprisals against civilians, who are forced to displace to safer areas. These incidents are resulting in restrictions on population mobility. In the Kidal and Ménaka regions, economic activities, markets, and population and livestock movements remain severely disrupted. In Kidal, recurrent clashes between armed groups and the army, particularly drone attacks and the coordinated attack on Anéfis in early July by the coalition of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), continue to disrupt market supplies from Gao and Algeria, keeping prices high. In addition, opportunities for labor, trade, and the sale of livestock products and animals have declined sharply due to household displacement, the movement of herds farther away, and market shortages, resulting in a significant decline in household income in the region. As of July 7, 2026, approximately 8,444 displaced people with limited access to livelihoods were reported in Gao. In Ménaka, livelihood opportunities are below average and commodity flows are low to moderate. Staple food prices remain above average, including millet by 9 percent in Ménaka, according to data from the Food and Nutrition Security Monitoring and Early Warning Agency (AVASAN), and wheat semolina by 23 percent in Kidal in July, according to key informants, thereby reducing household purchasing power. Market supplies remain disrupted by insecurity and logistical difficulties along the main trade corridors. Imports along the main corridors are below average, particularly along the Dakar-Bamako corridor, due to threats of attacks, logistical challenges, and deteriorating road conditions. This primarily affects supplies to the Kayes, Kita, and Koulikoro regions and the Bamako District, which serves as a transit point for commodities destined for other regions in the south and center of the country. Despite a relative decline in attacks, delivery delays and detours by transporters due to the poor condition of the main Kayes-Bamako road continue to limit trade flows, resulting in higher prices for imported goods. However, cereal prices generally remain similar to or below the five-year average and last year’s levels due to average stock availability, except in Ménaka and Kidal, where they remain high at levels similar to or above the five-year average. Trade flows, particularly fuel supplies, have improved since July due to the decline in attacks along the country’s main import corridors. Increased military escorts and strengthened surveillance reduced disruptions in July compared with June and May. According to key informants, most regions affected by the fuel crisis, such as Ségou, Diola, Koutiala, San, Mopti, Bandiagara, and Douentza, are now receiving supplies at relatively regular intervals, consequently improving economic and even agricultural activities that depend on machinery. Despite improved rainfall in August, which has allowed crop establishment and maintenance activities to continue actively in line with the agricultural calendar, localized rainfall deficits (Figure 1) and limited access to inputs are undermining harvest prospects in affected areas. Insufficient and high-cost agricultural inputs, combined with inadequate rainfall and below-normal cumulative rainfall in parts of the country, have reduced cultivated area compared with last year. In insecure areas of Mopti, Gao, Nara, San, and northern Ségou, limited access to fields and population displacement have reduced cultivated area. Irregular rainfall from the beginning of the season through the end of June resulted in the conversion of approximately 28,000 hectares originally planted with cotton to maize, sorghum, millet, cowpeas, and groundnuts, according to the Multidisciplinary Agro-Hydro-Meteorological Assistance Working Group (GTPA). The area planted is slightly below last year’s level, by 7 percent for cereal crops and 20 percent for cotton. Insecurity in the Kidal, Ménaka, Ansongo, and Liptako-Gourma areas is severely disrupting pastoral movements toward wet-season concentration areas and forcing pastoralists to alter typical migration routes. These changes are resulting in atypical livestock concentrations in these areas in the center and north. In addition, restrictions on access to around 30 classified forests, mainly in the south and center, are also disrupting livestock movements. In the northern regions, pasture and water point replenishment levels range from below average to average. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian assistance is increasing only slowly amid funding mobilization and humanitarian access constraints across the country, particularly in Kidal, where assistance remains suspended. As of August 25, funding for food assistance was estimated at 14.9 percent of requirements, forcing humanitarian agencies to focus primarily on the July-September lean season, which likely explains the decline in assistance during the first two quarters. According to the Food Security Cluster, 685,057 people received food assistance by the end of the second quarter, a 26 percent decline compared with the same period in 2025. Consequently, current levels of humanitarian assistance remain insufficient to prevent more severe outcomes. Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Mali Food Security Outlook from June 2026 to January 2027 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence: Trade flows along the Dakar-Bamako corridor are expected to remain significantly reduced throughout the projection period. Despite a decline in attacks along the country’s main supply corridors, the high risk of attacks by armed groups, combined with deteriorating road conditions during the rainy season, slow container returns, and fewer escorted transporter convoys, will continue to limit the volume of goods transiting along this corridor. This situation is expected to sustain increased reliance on the Abidjan corridor, which operators will increasingly use for their supplies. The updated seasonal forecast in July indicates near-average cumulative rainfall across the country from August to October, in contrast to earlier forecasts that indicated below-average rainfall conditions between July and September in the south and center of the country. However, short-term forecasts of below-average rainfall toward the end of August are expected to worsen localized deficits, affecting normal crop development. In the north, above-average rainfall is expected through October. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 In Kidal, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to continue through January 2027 due to severe deterioration in food consumption. The deteriorating security situation is severely disrupting market supplies and causing shortages. The sharp decline in income is limiting household access to food, while reduced food and livestock flows, linked to poorly functioning markets, large-scale population displacement, and disruptions to transhumance, are keeping food prices high. These disruptions are also contributing to below-average livestock production. Because market access is severely limited and livelihoods have eroded after several months of successive shocks, poor households will continue to face food consumption gaps, reducing the quantity and number of meals consumed. This situation will exacerbate malnutrition, which was already high during last year’s lean season before the disruptions, with a GAM prevalence of 13.2 percent according to the October 2025 ENSAN. In response to food consumption gaps, poor and displaced households will continue to rely on negative coping strategies such as atypical livestock sales, even at low prices due to poorly functioning markets, and begging. In Ménaka, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist through September due to deteriorating livelihoods and a significant erosion of household purchasing power. Persistent insecurity continues to limit access to income and markets, resulting in food consumption gaps among poor households and sustaining high levels of malnutrition amid disruptions to basic social services. Beginning in October 2026, the availability of harvests (although limited in some areas), wild foods, and gifts/zakat from the harvest will support improved food consumption and an improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. However, the seasonal improvement in food consumption will remain very limited due to reduced availability of dairy products, high staple food prices, and sharp declines in harvests and wild foods. Poor and displaced households will continue to rely on coping strategies such as selling productive assets and female livestock to meet their food needs, while also using consumption-based coping strategies such as reducing household food rations. In insecure areas of Liptako-Gourma, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist through September 2026. Households will continue to face severely deteriorated food consumption due to significant income reductions and limited food access, driven by persistent livelihood disruptions and insecurity-related restrictions on access to fields. Poor households will face severe difficulties accessing food, leading them to employ consumption-based coping strategies such as reducing the quantity and quality of meals, as well as livelihood coping strategies such as selling productive assets/equipment, atypical livestock sales, borrowing in cash and in kind, and increased consumption of wild foods. However, beginning in October, harvest availability, in-kind payments, and the seasonal decline in staple cereal prices will support Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, improving household access to staple cereals and food consumption through January 2027. In other insecure areas of the center and north of the country, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027. Declining income and market dependence will exacerbate difficulties accessing food from August to September, with a more pronounced seasonal deterioration in food consumption. Poor households will intensify agricultural labor, rely on remittances from migrants, borrow cash or in-kind from the community and traders, and reduce non-food expenditures, further eroding their livelihoods. Beginning in October, the food security situation will improve due to the availability of harvests and market garden produce, although these will remain below average, along with the seasonal decline in staple cereal prices, reducing households’ reliance on coping strategies. However, the significant deterioration of livelihoods and persistent impacts of insecurity will prevent households from fully meeting their food and non-food needs, resulting in continued reductions in non-food expenditures. In urban centers, particularly regional capitals, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027, with an increase in the number of poor households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from August to September. Declining household income due to the combined effects of electricity and fuel crises and insecurity will lead households to rely more heavily than typical on labor opportunities, borrowing, community support, and reductions in non-food expenditures. A small proportion of very poor and displaced households will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027 due to deteriorating purchasing power, forcing them to rely on negative coping strategies such as reducing food expenditures and selling assets/equipment. In agricultural areas of the south, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027 due to available stocks, expected average harvests, and food prices below or similar to the five-year average. However, the rising cost of living associated with the combined effects of insecurity, electricity, and fuel crises will drive a more pronounced deterioration in food consumption among poorer households, who will increasingly intensify labor activities and forest product collection, leaving a small proportion in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Annex 1: Updates to key sources of evidence used in this analysis Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below. Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Seasonal forecastsIRIQuantitative/qualitativeForecast cumulative rainfall from August to September 2026 Security dynamicsInstitute for Security Studies (ISS)QualitativeImpact of changes in armed groups’ strategies on conflict dynamics Security of regional trade corridorsSahel WatchQualitativeTypes of threats and attacks along the main supply corridors and security responses Humanitarian assistanceFood Security ClusterQuantitative/qualitativeUpdate on food assistance during the second quarter of 2026 Crop progressAgro-meteorological multidisciplinary technical group (GTPA)Quantitative/qualitativeArea cultivated as of the end of July compared with last year Population displacement from KidalIOMQuantitative/qualitativeNumber of people displaced from Kidal to Gao as of July 7, 2026 Staple food pricesAVASAN, key informantsQuantitative/qualitativeStaple food prices in July 2026 and the five-year average Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET qhiggins@fews.net Tue, 09/22/2026 - 16:21 Download the report 6