Insécurité alimentaire d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) persiste à Ménaka et Kidal

Insécurité alimentaire d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) persiste à Ménaka et Kidal

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity persists in Ménaka and Kidal Key Messages Key Messages Significant consumption deficits are driving ongoing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the regions of Kidal1 and Ménaka, due to persistent insecurity that continues to severely disrupt livelihoods, markets, and food access. In Ménaka, an improvement toward Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected starting in October due to the availability of harvests and gathered products. In contrast, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in Kidal through January 2027 with severe disruptions to economic activities and the dysfunction or even shutdown of markets. The number of people in need is estimated between 2-2.49 million people, with the peak between July and September. The combination of the impacts of insecurity, electricity, and fuel crises, as well as high food prices in a context of low incomes, have contributed to the increase in the number of people in need compared to the average. Starting in October, harvests, in-kind payments, and the seasonal decrease in prices will improve access to staple food. However, in conflict-affected areas, the deterioration of livelihoods and persistent insecurity-related disruptions will continue to compel households to resort to coping strategies to meet their essential needs, resulting in the persistence of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. A decrease in agricultural production is likely in certain areas of the south and west of the country, with below-average rainfall forecasts in the south and center of the country, the persistence of insecurity, and constraints on access to agricultural inputs. The decrease in area planted and yields related to difficulties in accessing fields and population displacement will result in localized decreased cereal production, particularly in insecure areas. The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 22, 2026. Food security context The insecurity and conflicts that have shaken the northern and central regions of Mali since 2012 have spread to other parts of the country. The conflict, born from separatist demands in the north by rebel groups, worsened around 2015 with the intensification of activities by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Although JNIM remains primarily active in the northern and central regions of Mali, its operations have progressively extended to the southern and western areas, notably the regions of Kayes, Nioro, Koulikoro, Nara, Kita, Bougouni, Koutiala, Dioïla, Ségou, San, and Sikasso, throughout 2025. Since September 2025, JNIM has also been targeting fuel convoys from Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, sharply reducing the country's fuel supply in southern and western Mali and increasing transportation costs. These conditions have persisted in 2026. In the north, ongoing fighting between the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) since 2023 has led to an escalation of violence followed by intercommunal violence. Atypical population displacements and even village abandonments, following ongoing repression by armed groups, continue to disrupt markets and degrade household livelihoods, particularly in the tri-border area with Niger and Burkina Faso commonly called the Liptako-Gourma region. An intensification of military offensives by FAMa, with support from its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and the Africa Corps, is underway across the country as part of efforts to secure populations and their property. On April 25, 2026, JNIM and FLA launched a coordinated offensive in northern, central, and southern Mali, resulting in a sharp escalation of the conflict and affecting six regions of the country. JNIM's declaration of a blockade on Bamako disrupted key supply corridors, leading to acute fuel crises and a decrease in commercial flows in several regions. Attacks by armed groups, clashes with the army, and army drone strikes on JNIM and FLA positions continued through June, primarily in the regions of Gao, Mopti, Kayes, Koulikoro, Tombouctou, Kidal, and Ménaka. The prolonged conflict has had a considerable impact on agriculture and livestock, the main livelihoods of the Malian population. Agricultural households depend heavily on subsistence farming (millet, sorghum, maize, and rice). In addition to their high vulnerability to weather shocks, such as floods and droughts, the ongoing conflict disrupts agricultural production, socioeconomic activities, and access to markets and market functioning. For pastoral households, the inability to follow typical transhumance routes compromises animal health and livestock productivity. Populations in the north depend heavily on trade flows from surplus-producing areas in the south and center of the country and from neighboring countries such as Algeria and Mauritania for the majority of their basic food needs. Although the majority of the population resides in the production areas of the south and remains relatively unaffected by the conflict, a progressive extension of the conflict is observed in this part, increasingly causing localized disruptions to markets and trade routes. These shocks have significantly disrupted typical seasonal variations in northern and central Mali. Persistent insecurity has disrupted agropastoral activities, leading to a localized decline in agricultural production due to field abandonment. During June, households in the southern, central, and western regions are carrying out planting for the ongoing main agricultural season. The lean season has begun, and households are increasingly dependent on markets for their food needs. However, reduced access to food linked to early depletion of stocks, disruptions to trade flows, and high cereal prices will maintain elevated food assistance needs in northern and central Mali. Learn more Follow these links for additional information: Latest Mali Food Security Outlook Report: February 2026 – September 2026 Latest Mali Food Security Outlook Update: April 2026 – September 2026 Latest Mali Key Message Update: May 2026 Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis Current anomalies in food security conditions as of June 2026 Source: FEWS NET using ACLED data The escalation of security incidents since the attacks on April 25, 2026 has led to intensification of military offensives. In Kidal and Ménaka, the reinforcement of military surveillance continues, followed by aerial bombardments to limit infiltrations. In the border area with Mauritania in the regions of Ségou, Koulikoro, Nara, and Nioro, attacks by armed groups continue to be reported (Figure 1). With the blockade announced by JNIM on Bamako in April, attacks followed by vehicle burnings on the main corridors connecting Bamako to certain major cities were observed in May and June and are disrupting commodity supply flows, particularly in the Kayes and Nioro regions. Population displacements continue following attacks by armed groups in the center and north of the country. In Kidal, departures of populations from the city to camps within the region or to other regions, or even to Algeria since April 25, continue with the intensification of attacks by armed groups and military offensives in the region. Also, approximately 4,257 new refugees from Burkina Faso registered at the end of May in Koro (Bandiagara region), raising the number to more than 70,000 people according to UNHCR. The loss of autonomy, activities, and assets reduces the economic capacity of displaced and refugee households. In June, in response to the intensification of armed group activities, the government prohibits the use of high-cylinder capacity motorcycles and access to around 30 forests. Households are adapting by using smaller motorcycles and carts to access fields and transport products to markets. The 2026/27 agricultural campaign is beginning in a context of unfavorable rainfall prospects in production zones in the south and center, persistent security constraints, and limited access to agricultural inputs. Despite a typical start to the rainy season, June rainfall remained average to below average in the agricultural zones of the south. Furthermore, fertilizer prices at the end of April compared to February showed increases of 13 percent (DAP), 25 percent (urea), and 27 percent (NPK), according to key informants in Bamako, due to the escalation in the Middle East. These factors are limiting the areas under crops dependent on fertilizers (maize, rice, and cotton) in favor of others such as cowpea or millet/sorghum, while maintaining income opportunities for poor households through ongoing agricultural activities. In areas of insecurity (population displacement and disruptions to activities), poor households face limited access to agricultural inputs and reduced demand for labor. As a result, income-earning opportunities remain below normal. The ongoing harvests of off-season rice crops in the regions of Ségou, Mopti, and Tombouctou are improving rice availability in the country, as well as household access and income for agricultural households. Yields are average to below average due to difficulty accessing inputs, including fuel for irrigation. Although livestock conditions have improved due to the recorded rainfall, the thefts/kidnappings and disruptions to transhumance in pastoral and agropastoral zones of the center and north of the country have hindered access to pastures, reducing the recovery of livestock production. In insecure zones, the fuel, electricity, and insecurity crises have led to an increase in transportation costs and in prices of basic necessities. According to key informants, difficulties related to fuel availability and the increase in its price by more than 100 percent compared to official prices — particularly in the north, in Tombouctou (128 percent), Gao (71 percent) and Ménaka (185 percent) — are reducing the mobility of people, economic activities and household incomes, as is occurring elsewhere in the country,. The seasonal decrease in the supply of local cereals is more pronounced than in a typical year due to the fuel crisis, the attacks on main corridors, and the increasing transport costs. Despite the availability of local cereals at generally near-average prices, the availability of food commodities remains significantly below average in the north. In the regions of Ménaka, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal, disruptions imposed by armed groups on main supply routes persist, significantly reducing market supply, particularly in Kidal where looting of shops and supply shortages are reported. In most regional capital markets, the price of main staple cereals (millet, sorghum, maize, wheat semolina) compared to the average is stable or decreasing. However, in Ménaka and Kidal, cereals are increasing by 32 percent and 60 percent respectively, according to key informants and AVASAN. In Bamako, the attempted blockade disrupted the supply of imported products, driving up prices of certain imported food commodities. Humanitarian food assistance Humanitarian assistance operations suspended after the coordinated attacks on April 25 gradually resumed in most of the country in May, with the exception of the Kidal and Ménaka regions. Food assistance continues to be provided to displaced and refugee households as well as to people in need, particularly in the Mopti, Tombouctou, and Gao regions. From April to May 2026, WFP, in coordination with UNHCR and the government, provided food assistance to 132,000 people, including 82,400 refugees and 24,600 internally displaced persons in the center and north of the country. However, persistent insecurity and low resource mobilization, estimated at 7 percent (OCHA) as of June 22, limit access and the volume of assistance. In the Kidal and Ménaka regions, food assistance is greatly reduced, or even suspended due to the security situation. Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of June 2026 Food insecurity has further deteriorated in the Kidal region, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are now observed, while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist in Ménaka with an increase in the number of people in need. In these areas, the sharp decrease in food commodity supplies and shortages observed in certain markets, combined with already high prices and the significant decrease in income, are considerably reducing household access to food during the lean season. In Kidal, market functioning is severely disrupted or even at a standstill, with extremely reduced supply linked to the significant reduction or even halt of commercial flows coming from Algeria and the rest of the country via Gao. Food consumption is deteriorating seasonally but is more pronounced with significant gaps. Due to more acute security disruptions in Kidal than in Ménaka, where commodity prices are 60 percent higher compared to the average, economic activities are practically at a standstill, and the proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is likely higher in Kidal. The atypical recourse to consumption strategies of reducing meal size and frequency will contribute to worsening consumption deficits and a deteriorating nutritional situation worse than in a typical year. Households are also resorting to coping strategies, including the sale of all their livestock and productive assets, leading to a deterioration of their livelihoods. Poor households depend on solidarity and begging. In these two regions, a small proportion of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is likely where poor households live off begging and local solidarity due to enormous difficulties in accessing food. In the food insecure zones of Liptako Gourma, covering parts of Gao, Mopti, Bandiagara, Douentza, and Tombouctou, food consumption is deteriorating with the persistence of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes since May (the onset of the lean season). Displacement, limited access to fields and markets, livestock losses, and the presence of Burkinabe refugees are worsening the food situation compared to areas less affected by insecurity, where markets are more functional and mobility is less restricted. The early lean season, households' heavy dependence on markets, and reduced income are generating atypical recourse to strategies of reducing non-food expenditures, atypical livestock sales, and borrowing to meet food needs. Despite the low income and food obtained from agricultural activities, gathering, and animal production, food consumption remains degraded due to the reduction in the number, quantity, and quality of meals. Poor households are unable to meet their food needs except by resorting to coping strategies such as of dependence on labor migration, available agricultural labor, gathered products, sale of goods/equipment, and community solidarity. Poor displaced households and refugees in this area are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Their situation is more critical, as they depend heavily on community solidarity and humanitarian assistance. They are experiencing a sharp deterioration in their food consumption linked to the drastic reduction in the quantity and number of meals and are sometimes dependent on begging. In other parts of Gao, Mopti, Bandiagara, Douentza, Taoudenni, and also northern Ségou, San, Nara, and Nioro, where security incidents are less frequent and markets more functional, the food security situation remains generally Stressed (IPC Phase 2) with a proportion of the population, particularly IDPs and the poorest, in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). The decrease in income due to insecurity and the fuel crisis reduces households' capacity to meet their food and non-food needs. Although households are also experiencing a decrease in agricultural and pastoral income, market access conditions, mobility, and economic activities are relatively better in these areas. Consequently, coping strategies remain less severe than in the Liptako Gourma, even though food consumption remains limited by a reduction in the quality and diversity of meals. Urban centers across the country, particularly Bamako and regional capitals, are Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Poor households in urban centers are experiencing a decrease in their purchasing power linked to the rising cost of living caused by the combined impacts of the electricity crisis, fuel crisis, and price increases. The decrease in employment opportunities linked to these factors is generating a significant reduction in income that no longer allows poor households to adequately meet their food and non-food needs. Faced with increasing prices on the market, households are resorting to borrowing, reducing non-food expenditures, and relying on solidarity from relatives/friends, or even selling assets/equipment to access food. A small proportion of displaced and very poor populations in major cities such as Bamako, Ségou, San, Mopti, Gao, and Tombouctou are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). These households are experiencing difficulties following the loss of their assets and the precariousness of their livelihoods. Most agricultural areas in the south remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes due to the average availability of stocks from recent harvests (although decreasing in some areas), products from in-kind payment, and staple food prices similar to or below the five-year average. However, for some poor households, persistent insecurity and the fuel crisis are reducing income, leading them to intensify agricultural labor, migrate, and reduce non-food expenditures to meet their food needs, thus placing them in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions underpinning the most likely scenario through January 2027 Source: WMO Volatile insecurity is expected to continue and intensify through January 2027, with a level of incidents similar to or higher than that of 2025 due to the expansion of armed groups and the intensification of military offensives. This will result in isolated attacks by armed groups across the country increasingly targeting economic infrastructure and industrial units, particularly in southern Mali, as well as an intensification of military operations in the center and north. These security disruptions will lead to population displacements, particularly in the regions of Kidal, Gao, Kayes, Nioro, Nara, San, and Ségou. Regional cross-border trade, particularly in the Liptako-Gourma zone, is expected to remain severely limited due to the escalation of conflict. Insecurity and trade restrictions — such as the ban on cereal exports — are also expected to reduce trade and amplify the already significant informal flows, which have become increasingly costly due to informal taxes and illicit payments imposed by armed groups. In Kidal, cross-border trade with Algeria is expected to remain extremely limited and marginal through January 2027. The persistence of trade flow disruptions, particularly fuel on the country's main import corridors due to intermittent attacks by JNIM and the attempted blockade of Bamako, are expected to continue but at a lower intensity than the level of April 2026. The increase in fuel prices and disruptions on routes to Bamako will continue to raise the costs of industrial and agricultural production and transportation costs, limiting supplies. The country's supply of food commodities and basic necessities will remain below that of a typical year due to the impacts of insecurity compounded by high transport prices and seasonal road deterioration. In the Kidal and Ménaka regions, the decrease will be more pronounced due to enormous difficulties in physical access to markets and mobility restrictions in these regions. Below-average rainfall conditions are expected between July and September in the southern and central parts of the country, with a normal to late start in the central and western parts of the country (Figure 2). From September to November, rainfall is estimated to be average in the country. A decrease in agricultural production in October is likely in certain areas of the south and west of the country due to below-average rainfall prospects, persistent security constraints, and limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides). However, a projected increase of 4.1 percent in cereal production compared to last year is expected, according to the Agricultural Service's campaign plan. Faced with the expected rainfall deficit in the major production zones in the south, a decrease in cereal supplies on the markets would be likely for agricultural households due to the expected stock retention. This decrease will result in food prices above the five-year average during the period from July to October 2026. A decrease in livestock production compared to a typical year will be observed in the central and northern regions of the country due to the reduction in herd sizes linked to thefts/kidnappings and excessive livestock sales. However, due to the average seasonal recovery of pastoral conditions starting in June, an average recovery in production across the country is expected through January. In Kidal and Ménaka, pastoral income will be sharply decreased due to conflict-related disruptions. Cereal prices are expected to experience their seasonal increase and will be similar to or higher than the five-year average in the country due to low carryover stocks, high production and transportation costs, and difficulties accessing certain production areas. In insecure areas, particularly in Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka, the decrease in supply linked to supply difficulties, or even disruptions resulting from insecurity, will contribute to maintaining food prices higher to significantly higher than the five-year average. Despite the significant departure of able-bodied workers to neighboring countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, and Algeria, household income from migration will be below average particularly in the insecurity zones due to difficult economic conditions in host areas and difficulties in sending remittances. The Malian economy will remain resilient with economic growth expected at 5.5 percent in 2026 compared to 4.9 percent in 2025 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Growth will likely be supported by the mining sector and economic recovery measures. However, risks will persist, such as the resumption of the blockade of transport routes, the persistence of the electricity crisis, commodity price volatility, weather shocks, and escalation in the Middle East (IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank). Despite moderate overall inflation, the purchasing power and food access of poor households will remain severely degraded. Humanitarian food assistance Monthly food assistance primarily in the form of vouchers, in-kind, and cash transfers from the government and humanitarian partners currently underway will intensify from June to September, which corresponds to the agropastoral lean season. The harmonized national response plan provides food assistance to 1.89 million people throughout the country with rations covering at least 50 percent of kilocalorie needs in priority areas (the insecure areas of the center and north). However, the combined effects of low funding mobilization (7 percent) and humanitarian access difficulties, particularly in the regions of Kidal, Ménaka, and Gao, will likely result in a reduction in coverage level in needs or the number of people. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 In the Ménaka and Kidal regions, the ongoing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist through September 2026. The severely deteriorated food consumption with significant gaps will continue during the lean season. This situation is explained by enormous difficulties in accessing food resulting from the sharp decrease in income, high food prices linked to the sharp decrease in flows of food commodities and livestock due to market dysfunction. Movement restrictions, more pronounced in Kidal due to army airstrikes and repression by armed groups, will limit household access to gathered products and animal production. The significant gaps in food consumption in these two regions worsen malnutrition levels during this lean season. Displaced households that are dependent on local solidarity will find themselves in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse. From October to January 2027, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will persist in Kidal, while an improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will be observed in Ménaka. In Kidal, livestock losses, distress sales, and disruptions to transhumance have reduced the availability and accessibility of animal products, creating significant consumption gaps that will limit seasonal improvement. As gathering will only slightly improve significantly degraded food consumption, households will continue to adopt consumption strategies including reducing meal size and frequency. Excessive livestock sales will also occur in a context of considerably reduced economic activities, enormous market dysfunction or even their shutdown, and suspended humanitarian assistance. The seasonal decrease in prices and the availability of harvests, animal products, and gathered products in Ménaka, although below a typical year, will generate seasonal improvement in food consumption. Despite the reduction in food consumption gaps, poor households will continue to resort to both consumption strategies (reducing the volume and number of meals) and negative coping strategies (excessive livestock sales due to the significant decrease in economic activities and high food prices). In the food insecure zones of the Liptako Gourma, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist through September 2026 due to the early agropastoral lean season in a severely disrupted economic context, which significantly reduces household income and access to food and the use of negative coping strategies. Food consumption will remain severely deteriorated, with significant livelihood deterioration. Poor households will face enormous difficulties in accessing food, which will lead to the use of consumption strategies to reduce the volume and quality of meals, and coping strategies including sales of productive assets/equipment, atypical livestock sales, and in-kind and cash borrowing, as well as increased consumption of gathered products. From October, with the harvests, poor households in the area will be Stressed (IPC Phase 2). In addition to their own production, in-kind payments and the decrease in prices in markets will improve household access to staple cereals; this will contribute to improving food consumption through January 2027. A small proportion of households in these areas, particularly poor displaced households and refugees who no longer have access to typical sources of income and food and are dependent on declining humanitarian assistance, will remain in food insecurity ranging from Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June to January 2027. In other insecurity-affected areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist until January 2027. From June to September, during the lean season, the decrease in income and heavy market dependence will accentuate difficulties in food access, leading to a more pronounced seasonal deterioration in consumption. Households will have consumption deficits, with reductions in the quantity and quality of food, and will resort to intensified agricultural labor activities, remittances from migrants, borrowing in kind or cash from the community and traders, atypical sales of livestock and assets, and reduced non-food expenditures. From October onward, the food situation will improve due to the availability of harvests and market garden products, although low compared to average, and the seasonal decrease in prices of staple cereals. However, the severe deterioration of livelihoods in an economically disrupted environment and the persistence of insecurity-related impacts will not allow households to meet their food and non-food needs without resorting to negative coping strategies. In urban centers, primarily in regional capitals, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027, with an increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June to September. The decrease in household income in urban centers due to the combined effects of electricity, fuel, and insecurity impacts will lead to atypical reliance on labor activities, borrowing, local solidarity, and reduction of non-food expenditures to access food. A small proportion of very poor households and displaced persons will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027 due to the decrease in their purchasing power, which leads them to resort to coping strategies of reducing food expenditures and selling assets/equipment. In the agricultural zones of the south, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are expected to continue until January 2027 due to the availability of stocks and prices below or near the five-year average. However, the increase in the cost of living linked to the combined effects of insecurity, electricity, and fuel crises will generate a more pronounced deterioration in food consumption for poorer households, who will then resort to atypical intensification of labor and forest exploitation. Annex 1: Key sources of evidence used in this analysis Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Livelihood profilesFEWS NET QualitativeTypical sources of food and income by livelihood zone Security dynamicsAfrica Eye, Cluster de protection, ACLED, et sources médiatiquesQualitativeSecurity conditions and conflict dynamics Regional situation updatesFood Security ClusterQuantitative/qualitativeUpdates on humanitarian access, the security situation, and fuel and food prices Refugee situationFlash alert UNHCR June 2, UNHCR June 18Quantitative/qualitativeTrends in the refugee situation and the number of refugees in the Bandiagara region, as well as the number of newly arrived Burkinabè refugees in Koro Seasonal forecastsNOAA/PRESASS/WMOQuantitative/qualitativeJune to September 2026 cumulative rainfall forecast Off-season cropsFood Security ClusterQualitativeAssessment of off-season crop production Humanitarian assistanceOCHAQualitativeConstraints affecting the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Mali following the escalation of insecurity Humanitarian fundingOCHAQuantitative/qualitativeHumanitarian funding levels Humanitarian assistanceCICR/WFPQuantitative/qualitativeNumber of people assisted by WFP and the ICRC Cereal price projectionsFEWS NET, l’Agence de Veille et d'Alerte en Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (AVASAN)QuantitativeProjected price trends and their impacts on food access, household income, and purchasing power Mobility restrictionsTimbuktu Institute, DW and media sourcesQualitativeImpact of the attempted blockade by armed groups on transportation and the government's response Macroeconomic conditionsInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB)Quantitative/qualitativeMacroeconomic forecasts and risks to the Malian economy for 2026 Annex 2: FEWS NET’s analytical approach explained Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision-makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision-makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework. How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance. How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Annex 3: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET Annex 4: Events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision-makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence. National The worsening of the combined impacts of insecurity on the country's supply Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An unforeseen deterioration of the security situation or an intensification of disruptions to trade flows, including for fuel beyond the current level, would further accentuate the country's supply difficulties for essential commodities. This situation would particularly affect imported products, leading to a high and sustained level of transport and food prices. An increase in the number of people in need classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse in the southern regions affected by the sharp reduction in supply, and even a shift from Minimal (IPC Phase 1) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) for areas heavily affected by insecurity and conflicts would be likey during the lean season in northern Ségou, San, Diéma (Nioro region) and Mopti. Food availability in the country, despite harvests starting in October, will be reduced due to disruptions of domestic and imported flows resulting from blockade attempts, high transport costs and longer transport times. The resulting increase in food prices, combined with declining incomes due to the significant decrease in economic activities and the mobility of people and goods, will reduce poor households' access to food. However, in rural areas, harvests starting in October, followed by the seasonal decrease in prices, will mitigate difficulties in accessing food, while urban households dependent exclusively on the market will continue to experience the aftereffects of this situation until January 2027. A more severe rainfall deficit than expected Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Although a rainfall deficit is expected in the country's agricultural areas, a more severe and widespread deficit, affecting pastoral areas in the north of the country in addition to agricultural areas in the center and south, would further deteriorate agropastoral production prospects starting in July-August. In anticipation of below-normal harvests, large producers could retain part of their stocks, thereby reducing supply on markets. The more pronounced seasonal decrease in market supplies from July to October linked to this situation will lead to a more significant increase in cereal prices, which will further reduce poor households' access to markets. For pastoral areas, the deficit in pasture production will lead to a more pronounced decrease in livestock production and even atypical livestock losses. Thus, a likely deterioration in the situation from Minimal (IPC Phase 1) to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in agricultural areas or an increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse will be observed in urban centers and areas currently in a situation of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the country. Regions of Kidal and Ménaka The intensification of conflicts Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the scenario that conflict intensifies beyond current levels in the Kidal and Ménaka regions, the enormous disruptions to economic activities and market supply will reduce household capacity to meet their food and non-food needs and humanitarian assistance more than expected. The ongoing population displacements, particularly in the Kidal region, and the disruption of market supply chains will contribute to a more pronounced deterioration of household livelihoods and higher food consumption gaps. In this scenario, the Emergency (IPC Phase 4) situation will persist in both Kidal and Ménaka with an increase in the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through January 2027. Agropastoral zones in the west and south of the country The intensification of conflict Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Any intensification of attacks by armed groups during this period of agricultural season establishment in these farming areas will contribute to the disruption of ongoing agropastoral activities, market functioning, and reduced income-earning opportunities and population mobility. This will further reduce the capacity of poor households to meet their food and non-food needs. Reprisals against civilian populations, including the looting of goods/equipment by armed groups in reaction to the intensification of military security operations, will generate population displacements and a marked deterioration of household livelihoods. As a result, a likely deterioration of the situation will be observed, moving from Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) or resulting in an increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Annex 5: A closer look at the differentiated impacts of the conflict escalation in Kidal and Ménaka and its impacts on food security outcomes Source: FEWS NET In Kidal and Ménaka, insecurity has worsened in a context of escalating security incidents in the country following coordinated attacks between JNIM and FLA in the regions of Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and the cities of Kati and Bamako against military positions on April 25, 2026. In the Kidal region, armed groups remain present in the cities of Kidal and Tessalit after the strategic withdrawal of the army and its Africa Corps allies. A similar attempt by EIGS in Ménaka was quickly neutralized by the army in early May 2026. In the Kidal and Ménaka regions, the reinforcement of military surveillance followed by aerial bombardments continues, in an attempt to reduce the capacities of armed groups and limit infiltrations, particularly in the border area with Algeria. The recent escalation of insecurity has severely deteriorated food security in Kidal and Ménaka, but its effects are more severe in Kidal, where the heavy dependence on markets and trade with Algeria further limits access to food and income. In Ménaka, the diversification of livelihood sources as well as the harvests and gathered products expected from October should allow for a partial seasonal improvement despite the persistence of significant difficulties. The recent escalation of insecurity in the Kidal and Ménaka regions has resulted in various repercussions on livelihoods, markets, and flows. In Kidal, a predominantly pastoral area, between approximately 80 and 90 percent of poor household income comes from livestock and pastoral labor, while more than 80 percent of their food consumption depends on markets. This heavy dependence relies notably on livestock sales and food imports from Algeria. Kidal's dependence on food imports from Algeria and households' predominant reliance on markets for their food consumption strongly expose the population to disruptions in trade flows and market supply, with direct consequences on food access. The Kidal region is heavily linked to commercial trade from Algeria, particularly pasta, powdered milk, wheat semolina, flour, vegetable oil, dates, and rice, which constitute the staple foods for the overwhelming majority of the region's population. In addition, the main source of fuel for the Kidal region is Algeria. Other cereals such as millet (which is less consumed in Kidal) and rice come from Gao. However, commercial trade with Algeria has been disrupted since 2025 due to insecurity, resulting in a reorganization of supply chains through Gao. Imports continue to arrive from Algeria, but now increasingly transit through Gao, lengthening delays and supply difficulties to Kidal even before the April 2026 attacks (Figure 3). In Kidal, the insecurity following April is severely disrupting market supply chains. According to key informants, the interruption of trade flows following the attacks has led to the closure of certain markets and the looting of shops. Trade exchanges with Algeria have sharply decreased or even stopped, considerably reducing food availability in the region. Furthermore, the intensification of military offensives and attacks by armed groups has caused population departures from the city to camps within the region, to other regions such as Gao and Ménaka, and to neighboring countries of Algeria and Niger. Between April 25 and May 10, 2026, according to OCHA, 2,045 people reportedly displaced to Gao. According to informants, more than 30 percent of the city's population has left the city for calmer areas, and displacements were continuing. The households that remain are those who do not have the means to pay for increasingly expensive transportation to leave the city. These households depend on their stocks and local solidarity, while losses of livestock, goods/equipment, and economic activities reduce their access to food. Consequently, food consumption has severely deteriorated, with key informants reporting that some households are reducing or skipping meals to preserve their food stocks longer. Insecurity directly affects pastoral livelihoods in this region, the main source of income for the majority of households, by causing a dual shock: the decrease in animal production, which reduces access to food and income, and the disruption of livestock sales, which further restricts household income. This livestock sector is heavily affected by the current resurgence of insecurity, which has led to the displacement of animals from typical grazing areas toward the Algerian border, creating overgrazing. This increases the risks of animal diseases, leads to a decrease in animal production, and reduces household access to animal products. In addition, sales have experienced a significant decline according to key informants since the movement restrictions toward Algeria, the primary destination for livestock sales in the region, linked to the escalation of the security situation since April 25, 2026, consequently resulting in poor sales. As a result, poor households' access to their main sources of income is also severely limited amid rising prices and market dysfunction. In Ménaka, as an agropastoral zone, households have more diversified sources of food and income than those in Kidal. Between 20 and 40 percent of household income comes from livestock and pastoral labor, while approximately 10 percent comes from agriculture and agricultural labor. Food consumption comes from markets for 40 to 50 percent and between 20 and 40 percent from gathering and own production. With the escalation of insecurity in Ménaka in 2023, more than 20 percent of the population, particularly displaced persons and poor urban households, depend on their food reserves. They reduce their consumption to make these stocks last, rely on the solidarity still available from wealthier households, and resort to atypical livestock sales that may lead to asset depletion, while their livelihoods remain severely degraded. In Ménaka, poor households have complementary opportunities through the gathering of wild products and agricultural production. This diversification reduces their dependence on markets and constitutes an additional source of food, particularly during the post-harvest period. In Ménaka, persistent insecurity disrupts economic, agricultural, and pastoral activities, as well as trade, reducing the supply of food products to markets that mainly come from Gao, Niger, and even Algeria. Insecurity continues to disrupt livestock sales and animal movements, limiting household access to income and animal production amid staple food prices above the five-year average. High prices and sharply decreasing income limit household access to food. More than 20 percent of the population is experiencing a significant decrease in their assets and is in a state of destitution, particularly the displaced. Unlike Kidal, where security disruptions have severely compromised market functioning, trade flows in Ménaka, although decreasing, remain more functional due to the continuation of supply circuits with Ansongo, Gao, and Niger. Thus, despite limited trade volumes, food commodities remain available in markets, but at high prices. In both regions, access restrictions severely limit the capacity of humanitarian assistance to mitigate food deficits, leading households to increasingly rely on local solidarity for a limited period before their assets are depleted. Atypical recourse to livestock asset depletion and begging to mitigate significant food consumption deficits is observed; this will worsen the seasonal deterioration of the nutritional situation. Difficulties will be more pronounced for households in Kidal who are experiencing more acutely the impacts of the escalation of insecurity that have disrupted economic activities, the mobility of nomadic populations which is very limited, and suspended humanitarian assistance. The regions of Kidal and Ménaka are currently experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, sustained by significant food consumption deficits and a sharp deterioration of livelihoods linked to persistent insecurity. Starting in October, an improvement toward Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected in Ménaka due to access to millet harvests, wild food products, the seasonal decrease in prices, and the maintenance, although limited, of market supplies. However, this improvement will remain constrained by persistent insecurity, low incomes, and the continued erosion of livelihoods. In Kidal, by contrast, the impacts of insecurity are expected to remain more severe. Households' heavy dependence on markets and pastoralism, the significant decrease or even halt in commercial supplies, and the growing isolation of the region are expected to prevent any significant improvement, maintaining Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through January 2027. Despite the expected improvement in Ménaka, both Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes reflect severe acute food insecurity and persistent needs for urgent humanitarian assistance to protect household food consumption and livelihoods. Annex 6: FEWS NET’s Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA) To inform the June 2026 to January 2027 Mali Food Security Outlook (FSO), FEWS NET conducted a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA), assessing how access to food and cash income will be affected by ongoing and anticipated shocks. HEA OA is one of six direct food consumption outcome indicators on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table and is used in FEWS NET’s convergence of evidence approach. It is the only outcome indicator that provides evidence of future outcomes. FEWS NET considers two main factors to assess the reliability of HEA OA results as direct evidence of food consumption: Likely accuracy of the problem specifications, which is largely dependent on the availability of credible information to estimate or make inferences about key sources of food and income. Relevance of the baseline to current livelihoods, which is often – but not always – tied to the age of the baseline. FEWS NET assesses that the information available for developing problem specifications for Central Livestock, Millet and Remittances Livelihood Zone (ML04) in Menaka region, Mali was sufficient but with some deficiencies. The reference year for the baseline of Central Livestock, Millet and Remittances Livelihood Zone (ML04), Mali is October 2019–September 2020, and FEWS NET assesses the current relevance of the baseline is high. Based on these factors, FEWS NET has moderate confidence that the results of the HEA OA accurately present the size of food consumption deficits experienced by the population group of analysis. Problem specifications: The table below provides a broad overview of the quantity and price problem specifications (PS) behind the HEA OA. A PS translates a shock into food security consequences at the household level through a quantitative assumption on the quantity and price of key food and cash income sources during the projection period relative to levels documented in the reference year. While the OA assigns a point estimate to each key food and cash income source (e.g., maize, wheat, rice) , the annex summarizes these point estimates into broader categories (e.g., main staple grains) and approximate ranges for the purpose of a high-level summary. Results: Following the PS table, there are two sets of OA results presented. Annual results are presented in graphs with three bars. The first (left) bar shows the relative importance of different food and cash income sources in the reference year (a typical year). The second (middle) bar shows the sources of food and cash income available in the year of analysis, after incorporating the impact of shocks and household coping capacity. This is compared against two thresholds shown in the third bar: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. Seasonal results are presented in a graph with multiple bars showing month by month results for the consumption year. This is where FEWS NET derives results that inform the projections of acute food insecurity outcomes over the eight-month period of the FSO. The Survival Threshold represents the costs of covering minimum food needs (2,100 kilocalories per person per day) and other essential survival items (e.g., soap, salt, kerosene for cooking, water for consumption, etc.). The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represents the cost of the Survival Threshold plus the costs of maintaining livelihoods (e.g., commodities and services such as productive inputs, health, and education). HEA OA outcome indicator thresholds with associated IPC Phases Minimal (IPC Phase 1) Stressed (IPC Phase 2) Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Emergency (IPC Phase 4) Famine (IPC Phase 5) No livelihood protection deficit Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80%Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; survival deficit <20%Survival deficit ≥20% but <50%Survival deficit ≥50% Population group: the OA is generally conducted for three to four wealth groups constituting the analyzed population group, namely Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Middle (M), and Better-Off (BO) households. Scenario description(s): FEWS NET conducted an outcomes analysis for two livelihood zones. For illustrative purposes, FEWS NET chose to present in this annex the OA results for the central livestock, millet, and remittances zone (ML04), as it is a zone of great concern in the region. As a contribution to the FSO analysis, FEWS NET conducted an OA based on the most likely scenario. The PS as well as the corresponding outcomes are summarized below. Problem specifications: Food or income sourceProblem specificationsJustification Quantity produced or collected Crop production, including all area-specific key parameters among main staple grains, pulses, legumes, tubers, vegetables, fruits, etc. Main staple cereals – 26 to 50% Cowpeas – 26 to 50% The decline in cereal production is due to reduced cultivated area resulting from difficulties accessing farmland and population displacement, which has significantly reduced agricultural production. Livestock and milk production, including all area-specific key parameters among camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc. Herd size (goats and sheep) – 51 to 75% The decline in livestock production is the result of excessive livestock sales and livestock theft/raiding, which have reduced herd sizes compared to a typical year, particularly among poor households, with some experiencing asset depletion. Production of milk and other livestock products, including butter and cheese, has declined significantly. Other food and income sources including labor, petty trade, gifts/remittances, wild foods, fish, typical social safety nets, and other Agricultural labor – 0 to 25% Construction labor – 26 to 50% Labor migration – 101 to 125% Self-employment – 26 to 50% Petty trade – 50 to 75% Remittances – 101 to 125% Economic disruptions caused by insecurity, population displacement, and the departure of major economic actors from the area have reduced employment and income-generating opportunities, leading to increased labor migration and greater reliance on remittances. Prices for items sold - income sources Crop production, including all area-specific key parameters among main staple grains, pulses, legumes, tubers, vegetables, fruits, etc. Most crops are not sold; only small quantities of millet and vegetables are typically marketed in a normal year. Livestock and milk production, including all area-specific key parameters among camels, cattle, sheep, goats, etc. Goats – 75 to 100 % Sheep – 100 % Difficulties accessing markets within the livelihood zone have reduced demand, causing livestock prices to decline. However, reduced market supply due to smaller herd sizes has helped keep prices similar to or only slightly below typical levels. Other food and income sources including labor, petty trade, gifts/remittances, wild foods, fish, and other Agricultural labor – 176 to 200% Construction labor – 151 to 175% Labor migration – 101 to 125% Self-employment – 101 to 125% Petty trade – 101 to 125% Remittances – 101 to 125% Wage rates and labor costs have increased because the sharp decline in local employment and income-generating opportunities has led households to demand higher wages to offset their reduced incomes. Prices for items bought - food and basic non-food items Main staple grains and other staples (pulses, oils, etc.) Staple cereals (millet) – 226 to 250% Staple cereals (rice) – 226 to 250% Cereal prices have increased due to reduced supplies of staple cereals resulting from insecurity-related constraints on market access and higher transportation costs. Livelihood protection items that are key parameters, including all area-specific key parameters among agriculture inputs, health, education, and more Agricultural inputs – 101 to 125% Education and health – 101 to 125% Other essential expenditures – 101 to 125% The increase in the prices of these items is driven by disruptions to supply chains and difficulties accessing health and social service facilities. Inflation (changes in inflation compared to reference year) Inflation – 101 to 125 % Outcomes: Annual OA Outcomes Source: FEWS NET Seasonal OA outcomes Source: FEWS NET qhiggins@fews.net Fri, 07/24/2026 - 13:31 Download the report 5