La poursuite des violences présage une soudure précoce pour les ménages

La poursuite des violences présage une soudure précoce pour les ménages

Continued violence signals an early lean season for households Key Messages Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Annex 1: Updates to events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027 in the eastern part of the country. Conflict will continue to disrupt livelihoods, markets, and trade. These disruptions are expected to widen food consumption gaps and increase households’ reliance on negative coping strategies, such as taking on debt and selling productive assets, leading to an early start of the lean season in September. Households most affected by conflict, particularly those located near front lines where mobility is severely restricted, are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Beginning in mid-December, households that were able to cultivate during agricultural Season 2 (S2) are expected to experience improvements in food security, but a significant proportion of poor households will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through January across most of the country. Declining purchasing power and deteriorated livelihoods will continue to result in minimally adequate food consumption, but households will be unable to meet their essential non-food needs. Some territories in the Kasaïs affected by communal conflict, repeated displacement, and asset losses will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the lean season. The Ebola virus disease outbreak continues to expand geographically and with increased case numbers. Measures imposed to contain the spread of the disease, including border closures and roadblocks, are reducing cross-border trade flows in some areas and restricting population movements, weakening trade systems. The outbreak is disrupting food supplies while causing income losses for thousands of poor households that depend on cross-border activities. As the lean season approaches, food availability is expected to begin deteriorating, resulting in increased market dependence. This report provides an update to the June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook and July 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of August 25, 2026. Current anomalies in food security conditions as of August 2026 Source: FEWS NET using ACLED data Localized clashes between the M23 and the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) are continuing in North and South Kivu provinces, without any major new territorial offensive, despite ceasefire mechanisms that have been put in place. In North Kivu, the main hotspots are around Masisi and Walikale, where fighting and incidents of property destruction have been reported despite periods of relative calm. In South Kivu, fighting has resumed over control of the highlands of Fizi, Mwenga, Uvira, and Kalehe. These clashes continue to drive displacement and disrupt preparations for S2. The conflict has intensified and expanded geographically in 2026 compared with 2025 (Figure 1), affecting a growing number of households. In July and August, the ADF continued attacks against civilians in Ituri, Haut-Uélé, and North Kivu. These attacks disrupted trade, agriculture, and mining activities, reducing household income and forcing more than 10,000 people to flee their homes and temporarily abandon their livelihoods. The ADF also hindered agricultural activities by imposing various taxes and levies, increasing production costs and reducing agricultural households’ income. In Mambasa, the ADF imposed fees of 25 to 50 USD to allow access to fields (ACLED). In Beni, mobile incursions and targeted attacks continue to disrupt access to fields, mining activities, and major trade routes. Activity by the Convention for Popular Revolution (CRP) militia remains concentrated in Djugu Territory. Despite the CRP’s announcement of a ceasefire in May 2026, mediation efforts with the government have made no notable progress, while sporadic clashes have continued. The persistence of violence restricts movement, access to fields, and the normal resumption of economic activities among civilians, particularly displaced households and farmers. The Ebola virus disease outbreak has spread to six provinces, including Bas-Uélé in August, and 55 health zones. The number of cases continues to increase, with 5,514 confirmed cases and 2,642 deaths reported in the DRC as of August 22, making this the largest outbreak ever recorded in the country. The outbreak and response measures, including the closure of some border crossings with Uganda and the establishment of health checkpoints, are placing increasing pressure on commercial activities and population mobility in affected areas. However, these restrictions have not yet resulted in a significant decline in commodity flows or widespread disruptions to market supplies. In Beni, where markets depend on maize from Uganda due to low local production associated with insecurity, some traders have reorganized their supply chains by relying on intermediaries and informal trade channels. These adaptations increase transaction costs and delays, but local agricultural production is maintaining satisfactory and stable market availability. In addition, key informants report that agricultural and mining activities are continuing without major disruption, including in Ituri, where the outbreak’s epicenter is located. Between March and July 2026, 5,322 people, or 887 households, including deportees and voluntary returnees from Angola, were registered at the Kamako and Kandjaji border crossings in Kasaï Province, according to the Food Security Cluster. Most of these returnees had fled to Angola during the Kamwena Nsapu conflict (2015-2019). As they now need to reestablish their livelihoods and income sources, their limited resources reduce purchasing power, making them particularly vulnerable to seasonal or demand-driven increases in food prices and constraining their ability to meet essential needs. Although preparatory activities for S2 have begun, insecurity continues to severely constrain these activities. Below-average S1 and S2 harvests in recent years, amid increasing insecurity, have limited seed availability for the current season, representing a major constraint in several areas affected by conflict and displacement. In North Kivu, farmers in Lubero report difficulties accessing quality seeds and agricultural tools, while insecurity also restricts access to some farmland. Below-average S1 production signals an early start to the lean season in September due to declining household food stocks. This situation continues to increase households’ market dependence amid high prices. Prices of staple foods, particularly cassava flour and white maize flour, remained broadly stable between July and August 2026 but remain above the five-year average, particularly in conflict-affected areas. In Beni, cassava flour prices were 80 percent above the August 2019-2024 average. Similar increases relative to the average were observed in Bukavu (84 percent), while increases remained more moderate in Kalemie (17.3 percent). Humanitarian food assistance Food assistance distributions are ongoing across the country, although they remain insufficient relative to needs. As of mid-August, only 25 percent of the funding requirements for the food assistance component of the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) had been met. According to Food Security Cluster data at the end of May, humanitarian food assistance continued, particularly in eastern DRC, with interventions concentrated in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. In May, more than 102,000 people received assistance in Lubero Territory (North Kivu) through food distributions, representing approximately 7 percent of the territory’s population. In Ituri, nearly 99,500 people also received assistance in Djugu, primarily through cash transfers, representing approximately 6 percent of the territory’s population. Updates to key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through January 2027 Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the DRC Food Security Outlook from June 2026 to January 2027 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence: The multiple ongoing conflicts in the DRC are expected to persist and continue to drive household displacement and disrupt livelihoods and sources of income. Fighting between the M23 and the FARDC, supported by Wazalendo militias, is expected to continue in North and South Kivu despite political signs of de-escalation from the Congolese government and the rebels. In Ituri Province, attacks by the CRP militia are expected to continue at sustained levels, given the failure of negotiations between the government and the militia. The militia is expected to continue attacking FARDC positions and committing abuses against civilians. Seasonal flooding and sudden landslides are expected, given the above-average rainfall forecast during the return of S2 rains between September and November across most of the country. High river levels and likely flooding will disrupt some household livelihoods, particularly fishing, subsistence agriculture, and river trade, by limiting access to resources and disrupting local economic activities. Projected acute food insecurity outcomes through January 2027 Conflict-affected areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and some areas of Tanganyika and Maniema will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027. Beginning in September, households that were able to cultivate will have limited stocks from the S1 harvest following estimated below-average production, resulting in an early start to the lean season. Disruptions to S2 agricultural activities due to persistent clashes and continued population movements, as well as shortages of inputs and seeds, will reduce the area cultivated and, consequently, demand for agricultural labor. The Ebola outbreak is primarily exacerbating acute food insecurity among affected households due to increased healthcare expenditures and income losses. Although markets and commodity flows remain unaffected, restrictions on cross-border trade are reducing food access amid declining purchasing power. Poor households will become increasingly dependent on markets amid high prices, prompting them to intensify coping strategies, including selling productive assets, reducing healthcare expenditures, and, in some cases, begging. The small proportion of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes is expected to increase in areas experiencing recurrent clashes, particularly in the highlands of Fizi, Uvira, Mwenga, and Kalehe. In these areas, persistent clashes prevent thousands of households from accessing markets and their livelihoods, including their fields. These households may be forced to resort to extreme coping strategies, such as begging. Between December and January, despite seasonal improvements associated with the S2 harvests, the affected areas are expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Conflict will continue to significantly restrict access to land for many households, resulting in below-average production and continued market dependence. In response to reduced income and own production, poor households will resort to negative coping strategies, such as reducing essential healthcare and education expenditures. In frontline areas experiencing regular and persistent clashes, a small proportion of households — located in Ituri (Djugu), North Kivu (Walikale, Masisi, Lubero, and Oicha), and South Kivu (Fizi and Uvira) — are expected to continue facing large food consumption gaps due to lack of access to their own production and markets, maintaining Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. In the southwest, Kwamouth Territory will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2027. Despite the demobilization of some Mobondo militia members, displacement will persist, and agricultural households will continue to have limited access to seeds and inputs. With limited access to their own production and reduced agricultural income, households will have weaker purchasing power and restricted food access, forcing them to rely more on coping strategies, including selling assets. Most areas in the southwest will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to crop diseases, livestock diseases, and degradation of seed quality following repeated rainfall irregularities, which continue to constrain agricultural production, household income, and households’ ability to meet essential non-food needs. Other territories will remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1), supported by better socioeconomic conditions in Kinshasa. Most areas of the Grand Kasaï will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through January 2027 with the availability of S1 harvests. However, some territories no longer facing conflict (Dibaya and Luiza in Kasaï Central, and Kamonia and Mweka in Kasaï) will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes beginning in October during the lean season, as previous communal conflicts, repeated displacement, and asset losses have limited households’ access to their own production. Reduced agricultural labor opportunities due to a decline in the area planted have lowered household income and will increase vulnerability to seasonal price increases, particularly during the lean season. Deteriorating purchasing power will further reduce food access, forcing poor households to intensify consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing meal size and frequency and consuming less-preferred foods, as well as livelihood coping strategies, including reducing healthcare expenditures and increasingly relying on borrowing or credit. In areas of the central basin, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist through January 2027. Expected flooding will reduce production, disrupt trade, and damage transportation infrastructure, limiting market access and increasing transportation costs, which will keep food prices high. In addition, shocks such as cassava mosaic disease have further reduced agricultural production and food availability and access among poor households. To meet their food needs, these households will use coping strategies such as reducing essential non-food expenditures. S2 harvests are expected to begin in December and January, and will improve food availability and consumption, despite likely below-average yields. In the southeast, provinces are expected to maintain Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes through January 2027, supported by stable income and markets. However, in Mitwaba and Pweto territories in Haut-Katanga Province, poor households will remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to limited income-earning opportunities amid persistent insecurity associated with the Mouvement Debout Katanga pour la Libération du Congo (MDKC) rebellion and Bakata Katanga militias, which restrict population mobility and hinder returns. Access to typical sources of income and food, particularly agricultural labor and own production, will remain limited, especially during the lean season, constraining households’ ability to meet essential non-food needs. Annex 1: Updates to events that would likely change projected acute food insecurity outcomes Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s June 2026 to January 2027 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below. Evidence SourceData format Food security element of analysis Conflict monitoring and analysisACLED, media sources such as UN Radio (Radio Okapi), key informants and other sources, daily reviewsQuantitative/qualitativeType, intensity, and locations of conflict incidents; analysis of conflict impacts on household access to food and income Ebola outbreak monitoringCDC, National Institute for Public Health, World Health Organization (WHO), media sources such as Radio Okapi, Actualité CDQuantitative/qualitativeData on trends in Ebola virus disease cases Population movements and displacement trendsReports from partners (IOM, OCHA, UNHCR)QuantitativeDisplacement trends (number of people, places of origin and displacement), reasons for displacement, living conditions, and needs Annex 2: Seasonal calendar Source: FEWS NET qhiggins@fews.net Tue, 09/22/2026 - 13:53 Download the report 6