Pakistan ABD-İran Arasında Arabulucu Rolüyle Küresel Gündemde

A nation between adversaries

PAKISTAN is currently in the global spotlight for mediating between the United States and Iran. Islamabad’s rigorous mediation efforts helped bring about a much-needed ceasefire between the US and Iran in April, which culminated in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June 2026. Analysts see the current mediatory position as a new shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities, with Islamabad attempting to assert itself as a middle power and a relevant strategic player in Middle Eastern geopolitics. However, a comprehensive historical analysis reveals that mediation has remained one of Pakistan’s most essential foreign policy imperatives. Pakistan has long adopted an active strategy of mediation to prevent, manage, and settle disputes in the Middle East and within its immediate western neighbourhood. Far from being a passive regional actor, Islamabad has often positioned itself as a mediator in conflicts ranging from great-power rivalries to intra-Muslim problems. This approach is based on a deliberate foreign policy calculus determined by geography, strategic alliances, and the need to protect national interests while expanding diplomatic influence beyond South Asia. The logic behind Pakistan’s mediating role The primary strategic motive behind Pakistan’s mediation diplomacy is the need to keep regional disputes from spilling over onto its own borders. Unlike great powers, which may approach mediation largely for geopolitical or ideological reasons, Pakistan’s security is immediately influenced by conflicts in its near neighbourhood. Regional conflicts have historically been accompanied by refugee flows, cross-border terrorism, interruption of trade routes, arms trafficking, narcotics smuggling, and humanitarian crises, all of which have imposed significant economic and security costs on Pakistan. For Islamabad, mediation, therefore, constitutes a preventive tactic meant to contain problems before they evolve into greater challenges to Pakistan itself. Afghanistan is a glaring example of this security rationale. For over four decades, Afghanistan’s instability has had far-reaching implications for Pakistan, including inflow of millions of refugees, increased terrorism and border insecurity, and enhanced economic burden. As a result, Pakistan expended enormous diplomatic capital in promoting the intra-Afghan peace process, as well as talks between the Taliban and the US. Islamabad’s coordination and facilitation resulted in the 2020 Doha Agreement. These efforts were primarily motivated by Islamabad’s desire to construct a relatively stable Afghanistan capable of denying space to transnational terrorist organisations and minimising fears of long-term instability along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Thus, mediation is a strategic investment in Pakistan’s domestic security. A comprehensive historical analysis reveals that mediation has remained one of Pakistan’s most essential foreign policy imperatives. A similar rationale supports Pakistan’s efforts to defuse tensions in the Middle East, particularly efforts to reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan shares a lengthy border with Iran while also maintaining strong strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The signing of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in 2025 has further increased Pakistan’s geopolitical stakes in the Middle Eastern security environment, as has the recent mutual defence pact with Turkiye and Saudi Arabia. Any escalation between Tehran and Riyadh could place Pakistan in a perilous strategic position. These confrontations have often exposed Islamabad to opposing geopolitical realities, as well as exacerbating local sectarian tensions. The 1990s era of sectarian violence has had a significant impact on Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Islamabad doesn’t want to allow space for another wave of sectarian violence influenced by the Middle Eastern security environment. This is why Pakistan has continuously pursued a policy of passive or active mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For instance in 2016, when tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran escalated due to the execution of a famous Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Pakistan hurried to utilise shuttle diplomacy to defuse tensions. Pakistan’s then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif and chief of army staff Raheel Sharif advocated holding direct discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Islamabad and recommended that both countries establish focal persons to keep communication lines open for dialogue. These activities were widely considered as an effective tool for reducing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Similarly, in June 2017, a Saudi-led quartet (also including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) broke diplomatic relations and implemented a rigorous land, air, and sea blockade against Qatar. Saudi Arabia put enormous pressure on Pakistan to take Riyadh’s side. Rather than supporting the blockade, Pakistan maintained its neutral posture and initiated a joint diplomatic push with Kuwait and Turkiye to ease tensions between Qatar and the Saudi-led quad. Although the attempts did not yield significant results, they did reduce pressure on Pakistan’s foreign policy. An Iranian journalist reports from a media facilitation centre during the April 2026 talks held between the US and Iran in Islamabad.—Dawn Library Similarly, following strikes on Saudi oil sites in 2019, the then-prime minister Imran Khan conducted shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh in an effort to ease tensions and foster dialogue. Although Pakistan was not the primary architect of the ultimate Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, its diplomatic efforts highlighted Islamabad’s preference for regional de-escalation over bloc politics. More recently, Pakistan’s co-mediation with Qatar in supporting US-Iran negotiations under the Islamabad MoU demonstrated its broader goal of preventing another potentially destabilising conflict in its western neighbourhood. Secondly, Pakistan’s mediation diplomacy strengthens its strategic relevance within an increasingly competitive international system. As global politics grows more polarised, middle powers seek influence through diplomatic rather than coercive means. Pakistan positions itself as a responsible regional partner or net security stabiliser, capable of maintaining communication lines in situations where direct dialogue has become politically challenging. Islamabad believes that successful mediation in regional conflicts can boost Pakistan’s diplomatic profile by presenting it as a proactive rather than reactive actor in regional disputes. This is especially relevant in the context of global preferences to look at Pakistan through the security and counterterrorism lenses. Mediation allows Islamabad to change global perceptions by demonstrating diplomatic ability and a commitment to peaceful conflict settlement. Pakistan also wants to demonstrate it strategic value to major powers through mediation. High-profile facilitation operations, such as organising Henry Kissinger’s secret 1971 visit to Beijing, highlighted Pakistan’s ability to bridge the gap between Washington and Beijing. As of today, Beijing recognises Pakistan’s facilitation efforts, which have improved its status in Washington and Beijing. Islamabad has been consistently seeking strategic goodwill in the international community. States that successfully facilitate negotiations frequently collect diplomatic capital, which can later be used to gain political support, strengthen bilateral relations, or increase influence within multilateral institutions. Pakistan’s active participation in facilitating dialogue in Afghanistan, and encouraging regional de-escalation in the Middle East, allows it to strengthen ties with a wide range of international actors, including the US, China, Gulf states, Central Asian republics, and Muslim-majority countries. The diplomatic goodwill broadens Pakistan’s foreign policy options while reducing the likelihood of strategic isolation. Islamabad believes that an active mediatory role in regional conflicts can protect and further secure Pakistan’s long-term economic interests. Regional instability discourages foreign direct investment, interrupts trade corridors, increases international trade insurance costs, and causes large infrastructure projects to be delayed. As Pakistan strives to transform itself into a regional connectivity hub through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), peace in neighbouring regions has become an economic necessity rather than a diplomatic aspiration. Stability in Afghanistan is critical for developing overland trade with Central Asia, while lower tensions between the Gulf states and Iran can improve the security of Pakistan’s energy imports, and enhance the utility of Gwadar port. As a result, mediation indirectly helps to create an external environment that promotes economic growth and regional integration for Islamabad. Furthermore, effective diplomatic engagement can boost investors’ confidence by portraying Pakistan as a stabilising rather than destabilising regional actor. International investors often prefer regions with political certainty and amicable interstate relations. Finally, Pakistan’s mediation efforts are motivated by its overall diplomatic identity. Since independence, succeeding governments have continuously prioritised peaceful conflict resolution, negotiation, and negotiated agreements in their official foreign policy rhetoric. Individual mediation initiatives are definitely shaped by geopolitical goals, but Pakistan has often depicted itself as a country eager to provide good offices whenever conflicts endanger regional peace and international security. Whether facilitating dialogue in Afghanistan, encouraging Saudi-Iran engagement, or launching a diplomatic initiative to defuse tensions between the US and Iran, Islamabad has sought to position itself as a bridge between competing actors rather than a participant in regional rivalries. The historical record Pakistan’s diplomatic role as a successful mediator or back-channel facilitator started in late 1969 when Islamabad facilitated the US-China rapprochement. Pakistan facilitated a secret historic visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing. The visit paved the way for US-China diplomatic and economic engagement, which dramatically reshaped Cold War geopolitics. This episode remains a typical successful example of Pakistan using its contacts to achieve a significant diplomatic outcome. In Afghanistan’s context, Pakistan was a key player in the 1988 Geneva Accords, alongside Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The accords ultimately resulted in the evacuation of Soviet forces from Afghanistan’s territory. This outcome is widely recognised as Pakistan’s most significant multilateral diplomatic achievement. More recent initiatives have produced mixed outcomes. Pakistan facilitated the 2015 Murree peace talks, which were the first publicly acknowledged direct engagement between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. However the process eventually halted. Throughout the protracted Afghan peace process (2009-2020), Pakistan continuously promoted negotiations and backed the Doha Agreement. Islamabad’s initial coordination and efforts to bring the Afghan Taliban and the US to the negotiation table eventually resulted in a US-Taliban pact. However, Pakistan’s efforts did not result in a comprehensive intra-Afghan settlement. Limits of Pakistan’s mediation Despite Pakistan’s long history of promoting dialogue and providing good offices in regional and international conflicts, its overall success rate remains low. According to a qualitative assessment of Pakistan’s mediation record, only about one-third of its initiatives have resulted in concrete diplomatic outcomes, with the majority focusing on confidence-building, maintaining communication channels, or preventing further deterioration of warring parties’ relationships rather than achieving comprehensive conflict resolution. This lower success rate does not reflect lack of diplomatic expertise, but rather the institutional and structural limits Pakistan faces. One of the main issues is that Pakistan frequently mediates highly complex disputes. Conflicts such as the intra-Afghan conflict, external invasions in Afghanistan, Saudi-Iran tensions, Middle Eastern conflicts, and US-Iran tensions involve various stakeholders with competing strategic goals that cannot be resolved only by external mediation. Mediators can facilitate discourse, but they cannot compel opposing parties to compromise when the political costs of concessions are excessively high. As a result, Pakistan’s participation has frequently been restricted to facilitating negotiations, with ultimate decisions determined primarily by warring parties on their own political and strategic calculations. Another important restraint is Pakistan’s low diplomatic leverage in comparison to other regional and extra-regional countries. Successful mediation frequently necessitates the capacity to offer economic incentives, security guarantees, reconstruction assistance, or political assurances that motivate opposing parties to reach difficult concessions. Countries with significantly more financial resources, political power, and diplomatic networks to sustain long-term peace initiatives include the US, China, Norway, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Pakistan typically focuses on persuasion, trusted relationships, and geographical familiarity rather than economic incentives. While these assets are valuable, they are largely insufficient to resolve longstanding disputes. Pakistan’s internal security environment further complicates mediation efforts. Persistent tensions with India, ongoing instability along the Pak-Afghan border, menace of terrorism, and periodic economic crises all divert diplomatic focus and reduce the resources available for long-term international mediation. Effective mediation is a long-term process that requires consistent diplomatic engagement, technical expertise, and institutional capacity. Pakistan’s diplomatic machinery usually operates with competing internal and regional environments. This makes it difficult to maintain long-term involvement in various peace processes. Perceptions of neutrality also challenge Pakistan’s mediatory efforts in Middle Eastern conflicts. Theoretically, for mediation efforts to be successful, all parties must believe that the mediator is impartial and trustworthy. However, Pakistan’s deep strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states often cause concern among opposing parties. For example, Pakistan’s longstanding defence and security partnership with Saudi Arabia has historically hampered its ability to be perceived as completely neutral by Iran, despite Islamabad’s consistent efforts to maintain cordial relations with both nations. Similarly, Pakistan’s extensive engagement with the Afghan Taliban has occasionally prompted segments of the former Afghan political elite and some Western policymakers to question Islamabad’s neutrality, even though Pakistan actively encouraged negotiations and political settlements in Afghanistan prior to the fall of Kabul in 2021. These perceptions, whether accurate or not, frequently undermine the warring parties’ willingness to fully embrace Pakistani mediation. The geopolitical climate further limits Pakistan’s effectiveness as a mediator. Many recent conflicts are increasingly impacted by great power competition, and leave little diplomatic space for middle powers to independently secure comprehensive settlements. The Afghan peace process, for example, brought together the strategic interests of the US, China, Russia, Iran, India, Qatar, and numerous other Gulf states. Similarly, the ongoing conflict between Iran and the US is driven by larger issues such as nuclear proliferation, sanctions, Israel’s security, insecurity of GCC states and regional proxy conflict. In such cases, Pakistan can encourage dialogue and propose confidence-building measures, but it lacks the ability to address the underlying strategic calculations that drive the conflict. Another rationale for Pakistan’s relatively low success rate is the nature of the mediation role Islamabad normally adopts. Unlike well-established and well-known mediators such as Qatar, the UAE, and Norway, who aim to reach binding agreements, Pakistan has frequently served as a facilitator, host, bridge-builder, or provider of good offices. These roles are less apparent yet nevertheless diplomatically significant. Facilitators generate opportunities for dialogue, provide conducive environment for dialogue, establish communication channels and decrease misperceptions. Although these measures may not result in landmark peace treaties, they frequently keep preventing crises from escalating into broader armed conflict. Hence, measuring Pakistan’s mediation record exclusively based on the number of signed agreements understates its overall contribution to regional stability. Finally, Pakistan’s mediation activities have occasionally suffered from a lack of follow-up by the opposing parties themselves. Several times negotiations brokered by Pakistan began with hope but later disintegrated due to one or more sides withdrawing due to their domestic political factors or altered external or regional developments. Pakistan’s mediatory experience in intra-Afghan dialogue exemplifies this challenge. Although Pakistan played a crucial role in supporting the Doha talks, the subsequent political trajectory in Afghanistan, combined with deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after 2021, proved that successful mediation does not guarantee long-term peace. Similarly, Pakistan’s efforts to de-escalate tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016 and 2019 were overshadowed by broader regional forces before China helped broker the 2023 diplomatic reconciliation. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s moderate success rate as a mediator should not be regarded as diplomatic failure. International mediation is inherently risky, and even the most experienced mediators have struggled to reach long-term settlements in prolonged conflicts. Pakistan’s comparative advantage is less in imposing solutions than preserving dialogue when contact between adversaries has broken down. Despite Islamabad’s structural limitations, its geographic proximity, long-standing regional relationships, understanding of local political dynamics of Iran and Afghanistan, and ability to maintain engagement with mutually hostile actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran are valuable diplomatic assets. As regional crises become more frequent, Pakistan’s role as a facilitator and confidence-builder is likely to remain a significant component of Islamabad’s foreign policy strategy. The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.