Ukrayna müttefiklerine Rusya seçimleri öncesi halka teklif sunma çağrısı

Ukraine’s allies should make an offer to Russians before September’s ‘elections’

Ukraine’s allies should make an offer to Russians before September’s ‘elections’ Expert comment jon.wallace 30 July 2026 Russia’s parliamentary election result will be what the Kremlin wishes it to be. But it is an opportunity for Europe to communicate with a population that is feeling the effects of Putin’s war. On 21 September, Russians will go to the polls to ‘elect’ a parliament that they have long nicknamed a ‘crazy printer’ – for the speed with which it rubber-stamps whatever laws the Kremlin proposes. The vote will extend over three days. No international observers will be permitted to monitor the process. Electronic voting, which is almost unverifiable, is permitted in 33 regions. And the parties and candidates appearing on the ballot are carefully vetted by the presidential administration. No one in Russia expects any electoral surprises. Indeed, many ordinary Russians will be more concerned by other issues, such as a rumoured imminent mobilization to support the war in Ukraine. But these elections aren’t routine. Feeling the war For three years the Kremlin’s efforts to prevent ordinary Russians from noticing the war with Ukraine were successful. Wages were rising, affluent cities lived their ordinary lives, and volunteers joined the Russian army enticed by attractive wages. But this year the situation has changed. For the first time, Russians will be voting in parliamentary elections during a war that feels close to home, no longer a distant ‘special military operation’. Gasoline is becoming scarce across the country because of Ukraine’s attacks on refineries, with queues at petrol stations stretching for hours. Smoke from burning warehouses is visible from space, with Russians bracing anxiously for the collapse of the country’s extensive e-commerce system. Authorities have blocked mobile internet and cellular communications ‘for security reasons’, depriving people of services they have taken for granted. Why shouldn’t Ukraine, or preferably its allies, seek to communicate with the Russian people, bypassing the Kremlin? No wonder around two thirds of Russians call peace with Ukraine their greatest wish. Even the head of the country’s largest state-owned bank and former economy minister, German Gref, says the same. Can this uncertainty and discontent be transformed into a no confidence vote in September’s elections? Casting a ballot in a closed booth is certainly safer for average Russians than taking to the street or posting an anti-regime message on social media. But are ordinary citizens ready to register discontent with United Russia, which at its recent congress openly called itself ‘Putin’s party’? Today this is far from obvious: Russians are frightened, dispirited, and unwilling to admit that their leaders bear responsibility for the war. The offer Nevertheless, even in such a situation, the elections present an opportunity for Ukraine’s allies to send a signal that could nudge Russians into action. Since 2024, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been calling on the Kremlin to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from strikes on energy infrastructure. Putin has refused many times. But Russians who are facing fuel shortages and the disruption of their way of life may think differently. Why shouldn’t Ukraine, or preferably its allies, seek to communicate with the Russian people, bypassing the Kremlin? Why not remind Russians of their rights – including to elect their own government – and make an offer: if United Russia loses these elections, the allies will ensure that Ukraine terminates its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. This would be a more sophisticated offer than a moratorium on long-range air attacks, such as President Zelenskyy recently discussed with President Trump. Some would argue that this is a hopeless prospect. First, Russia’s media is controlled, and any message may simply fail to get through. Second, many Russians regard Ukrainians as enemies and would consider following Kyiv’s lead a betrayal. Third, even if an appeal strikes a chord, the election results will be whatever Putin wants them to be. Finally, the Kremlin would undoubtedly use such a move as a proof of the West’s interference in Russia’s ‘domestic affairs’. Related work Will Ukraine’s Wildberries attacks force Putin to the negotiating table? However, these arguments only go so far. True, Russia’s information sphere is tightly controlled, and millions still go to their TVs for information. But other media do exist: according to a recent study by the CASE Centre, at least 7–9 million people in Russia access them regularly. These people share what they learn with friends and relatives. A message may get through. Of course, in the Russian system the Kremlin will ensure vote counts deliver its desired outcome. But people in authoritarian regimes tend to have a keen sensitivity to when vote manipulation goes too far or becomes too grotesque: protests in Russia in 2011 and in Belarus in 2020 speak for themselves. Notably, Putin’s cronies already suspect that Ukrainians are attacking Russia to influence the upcoming vote. Deputy leader of the United Russia faction Andrei Isayev recently urged Russians not to react to refinery bombings like aggrieved ‘teenagers’, claiming that Ukraine attacks them precisely to orchestrate an election that would produce a Duma without a stable majority. So, if the enemy suspects and fears something, why not do what he’s afraid of? This proposal is unconventional. But the time has come to address not the Russian president and not the Russian opposition, but ordinary Russians. If the West ever hopes to see a new Russia, its future depends precisely on these people. Second, it would be useful to communicate to Russians that Ukraine and its allies are willing to discuss a path towards possible de-escalation. If Russians choose it and aren’t heard, it will become an additional source of disillusionment with their government. And the elections represent a unique opportunity to translate Russians’ economic grievances and discontent into political protest. What are the chances that such an initiative would trigger change in Russia? Negligible. But what would those behind it have to lose? Nothing. There is therefore no reason not to try. The Europeans have spent decades merely reacting to Russia, doing their best not to provoke the Kremlin bear. The result can hardly be called a success. Perhaps the time has come to be a bit more innovative?