Ukrayna’nın Hava Savunma Krizi: Müttefiklerden Acil Yardım Çağrısı

Ukraine needs help against Russian missiles now. What more can allies do?

Ukraine needs help against Russian missiles now. What more can allies do? Expert comment jon.wallace 28 July 2026 Recent air defence pledges won’t deliver interceptors for years. Europe could help now by providing fighter cover, or by delivering more offensive weapons. Will it act? Ukraine’s air defence faces a crisis. Russia’s missile and drone production has outstripped Ukraine’s ability to deploy interceptors capable of shooting them down. The result is ever larger and more frequent Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure. In some recent attacks, Ukrainian air defences failed to shoot down any incoming ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s allies recognize there is a crisis, and four initiatives have been announced in recent months. These include money for purchasing American Patriot missiles; permitting Ukraine to manufacture its own Patriots; supporting Ukraine’s indigenous Freya anti-missile project; and providing Franco/Italian SAMP-T air defence systems. All are important. But they fall woefully short of addressing the current crisis, because they will either take too long to arrive or provide token numbers of interceptors. Better options exist. But a lack of political will – and continued fear of provoking Russia – remain serious issues for Ukraine’s European allies. Russia’s turn to bombardment Russia began targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure with missiles and drones almost as soon as their effort to conquer the country failed in 2022. Initially, capabilities fell short of ambitions. Russia depended on comparatively small numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles for its strikes. And Western sanctions disrupted Russian missile production. But Moscow has since found ways to circumvent sanctions and import vital components, while establishing new missile production lines and obtaining Shahed drones from Iran. (Russia now produces its own upgraded model of the drone). Ukraine has developed ingenious solutions for shooting down Russia’s attack drones. Today it intercepts 90 per cent of them, and approximately 89 per cent of incoming cruise missiles. But the situation is dire when it comes to intercepting Russia’s Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles. Only Patriots have achieved confirmed kills. Meanwhile, Russian production now outstrips America’s: Russia is producing an estimated 1,440 ballistic missiles per year compared to the US manufacturing 650 Patriots. To make matters worse, the US and its allies in the Middle East expended 1,700 Patriots – roughly three years of production – during the first five-weeks of conflict with Iran. Meanwhile, the number of Russian ballistic missiles penetrating Ukrainian defences has grown. Ukrainian defences failed to intercept any of 29 such missiles on the night of 5-6 July. Meaningful action Russia’s recent missile successes have galvanized Ukraine’s partners into action. But their proposals don’t offer the speedy solution that is needed. In June, the Ukraine Contract Group of European states pledged $4 billion in support for Ukrainian air defence, including over $1 billion for Patriot missiles. But it is doubtful the US will supply the missiles given the depletion of its own stockpiles, and those of its Gulf allies, during the conflict with Iran. Ukrainian-made Patriots will not enter service any time soon. Experts expect that it will take 18-24 months to establish a pilot production line. That could be what drove the US to offer Ukraine a license to produce Patriots domestically – announced during the NATO summit earlier this month. But Ukrainian-made Patriots will not enter service any time soon. Experts expect that it will take 18-24 months to establish a pilot production line. And certain Patriot motor and fuel components will require a further 24-30 months to manufacture. France argues that the European Union should channel its funds into purchasing the Franco/Italian SAMP-T missile system for Ukraine along with Aster 30 missiles. The idea may be appealing in terms of boosting Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’. But the initiative cannot meet Ukraine’s air defence needs. Currently France and Italy jointly produce fewer Aster missiles per year – 80 to 100 – than Russia produces ballistic missiles per month. A European Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition, unveiled in Paris on 14 July, likewise focuses on long-term projects for European ballistic missile defence, rather than contributing to Ukraine’s needs now. Ukraine’s Freya initiative aims to develop a mass-produced anti-ballistic missile interceptor. But most experts expect that it may require years before the project yields results – Ukraine has said it wants to field a prototype in mid-2027. The need for new approaches Ukraine’s air defence crisis will therefore not be resolved by providing more interceptor missiles – whether those be Patriots, Asters or Freyas. But there are options available that would allow Ukraine’s allies to speedily contribute to its air defence. Ukraine first proposed extending a ‘SkyShield’ over the west of the country in 2024: that would see around 120 European combat aircraft protect Western Ukraine by conducting air patrols. Manned combat aircraft can shoot down cruise missiles with a high rate of efficiency by employing laser guided rockets (which cost a mere $50,000). This method has proven highly successful in the Middle East in countering Iranian cruise missiles and drones. Through SkyShield, Europe could protect roughly 30 per cent of Ukraine’s territory from most threats, enabling Ukraine to concentrate its air defences in Eastern and Central Ukraine. Backers of the plan argue that the risk of Russia shooting down combat aircraft would be minimal, because the aircraft could operate from bases outside of Ukraine, and patrols would stop hundreds of kilometres short of the frontline. Europe could theoretically implement SkyShield in a few weeks. Unfortunately, the political will still appears lacking. No government beyond Ukraine has formally endorsed Skyshield, fearful of provoking a direct, escalating confrontation with Moscow. However, Poland has taken a tentative step in this direction: in late-2025 Warsaw authorized its armed forces to shoot down drones and missiles heading towards Poland while over Ukrainian territory. By supporting Poland’s initiative, European states can at least deny Russia the ability to use NATO airspace to attack Ukraine from the west. If not SkyShield then what? Little can be done in the short term to improve Ukrainian air force capabilities because of shortages of pilots and ground crew. Europe can therefore best protect Ukraine by supporting its efforts to disrupt Russian missile production. Ukraine’s attacks on Crimea and Russian oil infrastructure are well reported. But Ukraine has also struck Russian missile production facilities this year – temporarily disrupting Russian missile production. Related work How a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire could imperil Ukrainian and European security Ukraine’s allies could help this campaign by boosting Ukraine’s stockpile of offensive weapons. German Taurus missiles, with their sophisticated bunker penetrating warheads and immunity to jamming, would enable Ukraine to destroy Russia’s hardened missile assembly plants. Germany has produced a respectable 600 Taurus missiles, most of which remain in its inventory. Existing Ukrainian aircraft, such as the Su-24M, could deploy Taurus within weeks of a decision being made. Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz previously expressed openness to supplying Taurus but appeared to walk back that position earlier this year. NATO allies should ask Germany to revisit its position: Taurus is an advanced system. But Ukraine has used other European cruise missiles, such as Stormshadow/SCALP-ER in strikes on Russia, without provoking the kind of escalation feared. Any such effort could be usefully backed up by secondary sanctions on countries that help Russia import missile components. Whatever the method, more help for Ukraine’s air defence is needed now. Russia’s campaign against civilian infrastructure could constitute a war crime and poses the greatest challenge to Ukraine’s survival. And, though Ukraine’s population has proven unbelievably resilient, allies should avoid complacency. Ukraine now has suffered one of the longest sustained bombardment campaigns in history – longer than Japan suffered in World War II – even if the intensity is lower. Today the Kremlin is combining air strikes with disinformation, all with the aim of dividing and demoralizing Ukraine’s population. It would be reckless to count on Ukrainians continuing to bear these attacks without allies doing everything in their power to mitigate their severity.