Kenya devlet başkanı
Prime Minister met with President of Kenya in Oslo
Tuesday June 9th, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre met with Kenyan President William Ruto for a working dinner. The official visit reaffirms the long-standing, close relationship between Norway and Kenya.
Norway and Kenya sign a statement of intent on the Paris Agreement’s article 6
During Kenya’s President William Ruto’s official visit to Norway this week, Norway and Kenya signed a statement of intent under the Paris Agreement’s article 6.
Kenya police violence victims say compensation promise a 'smokescreen'
Two years ago, Gen-Z protests marked a new era for Kenyan politics, but led to dozens of deaths, and devastated families are unimpressed with government promises of compensation. Memorial protests are planned on Thursday to mark two years since the country’s biggest show of dissent, when Kenyans stormed parliament to protest new taxes amid wider anger over corruption. It was seen as a watershed moment, as young Kenyans joined together to demand accountability without regard for traditional ethnic dividing lines. People attend a demonstration against Kenya’s proposed finance bill in Nairobi, Kenya on June 25, 2024. — Reuters But it came at a price: 62 people died during weeks of protests in June and July 2024, and another 65 died during anniversary protests in the same period the following year, according to the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA). Rights groups put the toll higher, and say the overwhelming majority were shot dead by police and security forces. After showing little remorse for the killings, President William Ruto last week announced 2 billion shillings ($15.5 million) to compensate 1,100 people affected by violent protests between 2017 and 2025. He said it was an “acknowledgement that harm occurred” but stopped short of an apology. A photo of Kenyan President William Ruto from September 5, 2022. — Reuters/File A government-appointed panel for compensation said it had started the first 348 payouts on Tuesday, including 115 fatalities whose families received 3 million shillings (around $28,000) each. “He’s covering up the wrongs that he did. He just wants us to shut up because of the cash that he’s giving us — the peanuts,” said Gillian Munyao, whose son, Rex Masai, 29, was among the first to die in the June 2024 protests. “I’m not seeing justice anywhere … why pay us without giving the culprit?” Munyao told AFP at a Nairobi court last week, where the case is ongoing. Only three cases from the 2024 protest deaths, and one from 2025, have come to court, according to the IPOA. No officer has been convicted. Dozens of government critics were also abducted in 2024 and 2025, many never seen again, according to rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. In May 2025, Ruto vowed to stop the abductions and said there was an “accountability mechanism” to bring those responsible to justice. But many, including his own former attorney general, say he was directly responsible for the kidnappings, and there has been no sign of any investigation. ‘Smokescreen’ Lawyer Nick Karanja, who represents several victims ignored by the compensation panel, described the process as a “smokescreen”. One of his clients, Fenancia Njeri, 49, has not been offered anything for the death of her son, Issa Mburu, killed on July 7, 2025. “It’s been a whole year … very, very hard,” she told AFP, adding that she sometimes sees the policeman who killed her son near the informal settlement outside Nairobi where she lives. Ruto warned at the time that violent protesters should be “shot in the legs”. That’s what happened to Mark Clinton Deya, 26, who insists he was protesting peacefully when he was shot by police that day. He shows AFP a tattered photo of his right thigh ripped apart by a bullet that embedded itself in his other leg. “I was a chef … but now I can’t do that work. This leg can’t stand for long. It starts shaking,” he said. He filed a case with the IPOA but was never called back. Kenyan police continue to kill people during bouts of unrest with apparent impunity, with the government usually dismissing victims as rioters. A protester chants anti-government slogans on a road blocked with stones to prevent traffic from passing during a transport strike in Nairobi, Kenya. — AFP/File At least four were killed during fuel protests in May, and three more during protests against a proposed Ebola quarantine centre for US citizens this month. “Those are the things we are trying to change,” said Rex Masai’s father, Chrispine Odawa. “Without justice, they will not bring any change. Protests are still coming,” he told AFP.
Kenya'da Polis Şiddeti Mağdurları Tazminat Vaadini 'Perdeleme' Olarak GörüyorKenya: Fabricated Quote Used to Claim Trump Warned Kenyan President Ruto Over 'Oppressing Kenyans' At G7 Summit
[Africa Check] Fabricated quote used to claim Trump warned Kenyan president Ruto over 'oppressing Kenyans' at G7 summit
At G7 summit, Kenya calls for better recognition of Africa by international institutions
Kenya's President William Ruto attended the G7 summit after its host, French President Emmanuel Macron, invited him during the Africa Forward summit held in Nairobi a few weeks earlier. Ruto used the platform to advocate for Africa to be better recognised by international institutions. FRANCE 24's Bastien Renouil tells us more.
Kenya G7 Zirvesi'nde Afrika'nın Uluslararası Kurumlarda Daha İyi Temsilini Talep EttiThomas Partey denied entry into Canada and sidelined for sexual abuse allegation
First, a Canadian court dismissed his appeal aghast the government's refusal of his visa last week. Then, Kenyan president William Ruto was among the world leaders attending the G7 summit. And, men in Northern Benin are being forced to confront uncomfortable realitites aabotu the lives of the women who live and love them. A training programme is raising awareness about how men can make a huge difference in alleviating the health risks and social pressures placed on women in some conservative communities.
- Güvenlik12 Haz
Requiem mass for students killed in Utumishi Girls fire
In attendance are First Lady Rachael Ruto, Education CS Ogamba, Governor Kihika and Senator...
Utumishi Kız Okulu Yangınında Hayatını Kaybeden Öğrenciler İçin Anma Töreni Düzenlendi Kenya’s G7 role must address the economic pressures fuelling domestic criticism of President Ruto
Kenya’s G7 role must address the economic pressures fuelling domestic criticism of President Ruto Expert comment LToremark 10 June 2026 Kenya has felt the pressures of costly debt, risk-averse Western investment and China’s industrial dominance. The G7 summit on global economic imbalances is a chance to speak up. Kenya’s participation at the G7 summit in France on 16-17 June sees it walk a familiar tightrope between international opportunity and domestic political risk. Though Kenya has attended three G7 summits since 2017, its presence this year has been spotlighted by South Africa’s reported exclusion following US pressure. President William Ruto will see the invite as tacit endorsement of his efforts to present Kenya as a reliable broker between global powers. The G7 summit also follows Kenya’s co-hosting of the Africa–France summit on 11–12 May in Nairobi, framed as the first edition in a non-Francophone country by design – although critics took a more sceptical view. But Ruto’s international ambitions rest on shaky domestic foundations. Related work Does President Ruto have the means to appease Kenya’s protestors? Major anti-government demonstrations in June 2024, which led Ruto to dissolve his cabinet, followed a prolonged inflation crisis and proposed new taxes – but also came just weeks after a state visit to the US which drew criticism for its cost. Recent protests – over a US-backed Ebola quarantine facility on Kenyan soil, and a transport shutdown over rising fuel prices – show how external conditions continue to affect domestic politics. A purely symbolic Kenyan presence at the G7 would do little to alleviate these pressures. The summit’s headline focus on global economic imbalances, however, is a chance for Kenya to speak out on structural conditions that have constrained its domestic choices. Global economic imbalances and Kenyan debt The main theme of this year’s G7 refers to large and persistent disparities in the current account balances – the sum of a country’s trade in goods and services – of major economies. The world’s two largest economic powers feature on opposite sides of this equation: a US current account deficit of 0.9 per cent of global GDP last year contrasting with China’s surplus worth 0.8 per cent. This G7 focus is particularly timely for Kenya. As a lower middle-income country with a market-facing economy and persistent trade deficits, its experience shows how global imbalances can deepen existing vulnerabilities. Kenya’s defining weakness in recent years has been its public debt burden, with servicing costs consuming over a third of revenues. As the largest bilateral lender to Kenya, China has attracted much of the blame. But this is not the full story. There has also been a parallel rise in Kenyan borrowing from international commercial markets. The decade following the 2008 global financial crisis saw Kenya issue its first Eurobonds alongside a rapid surge in Chinese lending to Africa, as global interest rates remained low despite US deficits. In the post-COVID-19 era, however, the US deficit has contributed to higher global interest rates, leading to rising Kenyan borrowing costs and refinancing challenges. Billions of US dollars in Chinese lending agreed in 2014-15 for a major Kenyan railway project – converted to renminbi in 2025 – were set at floating commercial interest rates that subsequently surged after 2021. In parallel, Kenya’s struggles to secure liquidity for a $2 billion Eurobond repayment due in June 2024 brought a rapid slide in the Kenyan shilling, worsening the fiscal crisis that precipitated major youth-led protests. Kenyan leaders must shoulder the primary blame for the rapid accumulation of unproductive debt. But indirect exposure to global conditions has made the solutions more painful. Kenya’s trade imbalances Alongside its debt stock, China is also Kenya’s largest trade partner and runs a widening trade surplus: 2024 figures show Chinese exports to Kenya were $4.3 billion, against $196 million in imports. Closing this gap will be difficult for several reasons. One is that deals presented by China as addressing the disparity may ultimately keep it intact. In May, China finalized an interim agreement extending zero-tariff access to 53 African countries. Kenyan agricultural exports are an obvious beneficiary of tariff removal – as the continent’s mineral and energy exports were already tariff-free – but Kenya’s middle-income status meant it had first negotiated a reciprocal agreement to open its market to Chinese imports. A rumoured 10-year timeline for this also compares unfavourably to existing 25-year deals with the EU and UK. Related work Kenya’s conversion of Chinese debt to renminbi reflects economic pragmatism more than strained US ties However, more consequential drivers of this trade gap are the structural conditions underpinning China’s global surplus – including weak domestic consumption, industrial subsidies and an undervalued renminbi – which erode the relative competitiveness of Kenyan industry. The US remains a more significant market for Kenyan exports, totalling $662 million in 2024, but its tariffs have introduced significant uncertainty. The example of a French road project epitomizes how such imbalances constrain Kenya’s economic decisions. In 2019, Kenya signed a $1.5 billion deal with a French consortium to build an upgraded toll highway between central Kenya and Nairobi. Kenya cancelled the contract in 2024 amid rising costs and reports that the French partners declined to take on the risk of potential shortfalls in toll revenues. The contract was instead awarded to Chinese contractors who promised to accept this risk and deliver at a lower price, with labour and materials sourced from China. This underscores the difficult decisions facing Kenya. On the one hand, Western countries claim that their financing models create fewer dependencies than China, yet a risk-averse private sector was unable or unwilling to deliver at a time of acute vulnerability for Kenya. On the other hand, Chinese firms, with the muscle of state backing, can reduce project cost and fiscal risk – but imported materials and labour add to an already glaring trade deficit. Kenya’s G7 opportunity Kenya’s G7 participation is a chance to ensure that summit debates on global imbalances do not neglect a shared responsibility to emerging economies. An attainable first step following on from the Africa–France summit is to secure expanded G7 commitment to a first-loss guarantee mechanism to help derisk investment. Another more challenging objective will be to ensure that stricter EU trade measures do not disincentivize Chinese investments in African export industries. Kenya must also leverage its Ebola quarantine commitment to extract US concessions, including progress on a trade agreement first proposed in President Trump’s first term.
Kenya, G7 Zirvesi'nde Borç Yükü ve Çin'in Sanayi Hâkimiyetini Gündeme TaşıyacakKenya: One killed as protests at US Ebola centre turn violent
Frustrations are mounting as President William Ruto vows to press ahead with the quarantine facility for American citizens arriving from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
DSÖ: Ebola Salgınında Ölü Sayısı 84, Vakalar 471'e ÇıktıThe flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will
The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will Expert comment jon.wallace 20 May 2026 Diplomacy that does not disrupt the flow of foreign weapons, finance, and logistics into Sudan is underwriting, rather than ending the war. It is three years since conflict broke out between the two armed centres of power in Sudan: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The war has created a humanitarian crisis that is the worst in the world according to the UN, with 14 million people displaced. Why does the war persist? Although its roots are domestic, it is non-Sudanese actors that have kept the war alive. Externally procured weapons and cross-border logistical pipelines have sustained the battlefield capacity of both the SAF and RSF. That support shapes each side’s calculus, making continued fighting appear more rational than a negotiated exit. This diagnosis is increasingly articulated by policymakers and diplomats. Yet a coherent international strategy to disrupt flows of arms and funding into Sudan has yet to emerge. The April 2026 Berlin Conference crystallized that failure. It did deliver €1.5 billion in humanitarian pledges. And the Berlin Principles for Sudan is the most explicit multilateral call yet for external backers to halt their support to the SAF and RSF. Related work Gold and the war in Sudan But the Principles did not rule out the prospect of these warring parties controlling Sudan’s transition to peace. And it shied away from naming their external backers. It also made no recommendations on how to disrupt arms pipelines and imposed no real costs on the war’s enablers. The Quad – a group including the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, intended to lead efforts to end the war – has done little better. Its September roadmap contained no enforcement mechanism and was rejected by the SAF before it could be tested. That reflects the Quad’s structural dysfunction: The UAE and Egypt are accused of enabling Sudan’s warring parties, yet are expected to play a leading role in efforts to secure a ceasefire. Regardless of these failures, the US and its partners have the means to pressure those fuelling the war to fulfil their commitments to end it. What has been missing is the will. External arms pipelines The UAE’s role in sustaining the war remains the most consequential, and the most documented. A Wall Street Journal investigation, Amnesty International field documentation, and UN expert reporting all allege that the UAE has transferred arms to the RSF, including advanced Chinese drone systems. Abu Dhabi strongly rejects claims that it supports the RSF and has faced no formal censure. On the other side, Turkey reportedly supplied Bayraktar-type drone systems to the SAF at virtually no diplomatic cost (Turkey denies providing drones directly to the SAF). Iran is also alleged to have supplied drones to the SAF – something the SAF denies. One thing is certain: drone strikes in Sudan have surged, accounting for over 80 per cent of at least 880 documented civilian deaths between January and April 2026 alone. Permissive neighbours But scrutiny of these non-African suppliers has obscured the role of regional actors in perpetuating the war. Egypt publicly champions Sudan’s territorial integrity while supporting the SAF – and has integrated its commodity networks in the SAF war economy. It has also reportedly established a drone base in the Oweinat tri-border area with Libya and Sudan. That could signal a growing entanglement in the conflict. Reports indicate that Eritrea has hosted and trained pro-SAF militia in Eastern Sudan, helping the army retake central Sudan and Khartoum from the RSF last year. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has reportedly allowed its territory to be used to train RSF fighters. And this month the SAF accused Ethiopia – and the UAE – of being linked to a drone strike on Khartoum’s international airport: both countries denied involvement. Ethiopia also sits on the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) alongside Uganda – which the SAF accuses of backing the RSF: Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni met with the RSF commander known as ‘Hemedti’ earlier this year. The situation makes the PSC structurally incapable of holding either party in the war to account. Other countries also have significant roles. The UN confirms that Libyan territory has been used to facilitate cross-border movements of fighters, arms and materiel to the RSF. And the UN identifies similar supply lines through Chad. The Trump administration should seriously consider handing the Sudan file to Vice President JD Vance. Early this year, Kenya hosted RSF representatives in Nairobi, allowing them to announce the formation of a parallel government. The SAF accuses Kenya of supporting the RSF but President William Ruto strongly denies those claims. The war has generated a business logic that is now self-sustaining. Chatham House has documented gold as the war’s connective tissue, leaving Sudan through informal corridors across East Africa, with South Sudan a key RSF logistics node. Cutting the lifelines What Sudan needs now is ‘deproxification’: the end of the process by which external actors fuel the war, with the SAF and RSF acting as their proxies. This must involve the coordinated disruption of every arms route, gold shipment, and logistics corridor keeping the war alive. The US holds the greatest leverage but has yet to show the willingness to use it. Sanctions could impose real costs on the UAE for its patronage of the RSF. But Washington will not easily take such a step: it views good relations with the UAE as essential to the success of its policy regarding Gaza, Iran, and the Abraham Accords. The Trump administration should seriously consider handing the Sudan file to Vice President JD Vance. Both Tom Perrielo (President Biden’s Special Envoy) and Massad Boulos (Trump’s Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs) have carried insufficient weight in Abu Dhabi. Vance would likely be taken more seriously, having conducted high-stakes back-channel diplomacy on the Iran war. He would draw international media attention to the war. And, as vice president, he has more power to coordinate action across the US Treasury, State Department and others.
The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will