İsveç kralı (1973-günümüz)
International safety review of Finnish SMR design completed
Finland's nuclear regulator has published a summary report of a Joint Early Review conducted with regulators from the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine to assess the safety of Steady Energy's LDR-50 reactor for district heating.
Will the UK’s next prime minister finally have a ‘national conversation’ on defence?
Will the UK’s next prime minister finally have a ‘national conversation’ on defence? Expert comment thilton.drupal 3 July 2026 The Defence Investment Plan recommits the UK to a national conversation on defence and security. The failure to deliver one so far undermines public trust and leaves the UK vulnerable to hybrid threats. Keir Starmer has released the long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP), which sets out the UK’s military spending plans, ahead of the NATO summit next week. The DIP also contains a commitment to a ‘national conversation campaign on defence and security’. However, this plan for a ‘national conversation’ was already adopted by Starmer’s government in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2025. The conversation was to focus on the rationale for investing more in defence, the role of the public in support of national security and resilience, and countering misinformation. The review recommended it take the form of a ‘two-year series of public outreach events across the UK, explaining current threats and future trends’. This has not yet happened. Meanwhile, intelligence services have warned that Russian sabotage, hostile reconnaissance, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns are increasingly directed at the UK, a country viewed as ‘enemy number one’ and a ‘soft target’. The first step in countering these ‘hybrid’ attacks targeting the UK’s political stability is for a new prime minister to inform the public and build a societal response. Building trust and consent The commitment from the Starmer government in 2025 reflects UK and NATO doctrine, which emphasize the ‘central proactive element’ of strategic communications in countering hybrid threats. Increased public awareness can spur civil society action to recognise hybrid threats and address vulnerabilities, acting as a deterrence by denying or reducing the impact of such threats. However, the UK government faces a strategic challenge: low public trust. According to 2024 polling, the UK government is one of the least trusted by the public among OECD countries. A ‘national conversation’ could be an important way to improve the public’s trust in the government. Allowing the public to feel they are part of a dialogue with authorities and including them in decision-making can build long-term public trust. Communications can foster cohesion through values-led narratives which promote civic unity. Withholding information on threats can negatively impact public confidence. Sharing more about security also requires government to trust the public. The UK government has been accused of a ‘Stalinist’ culture of excessive official secrecy, with information either not shared due to fear of public and media panic, or a desire to control the narrative of the threat. Withholding information on threats can however negatively impact public confidence, especially if the British public perceives allied governments or independent media as offering greater candour than official UK sources. In turn, a national conversation that builds trust and explains the level of threat facing the UK will help the government to secure public approval for increased defence spending as outlined in the DIP. This is vital considering that higher defence spending generally requires a combination of cuts elsewhere, tax rises, or borrowing – all options that could prove unpopular with the public if the government doesn’t better explain and justify its decisions. What role should the public play? A key element of the conversation is to engage the public in supporting national security and resilience. To send a clear demand signal to society through outreach activities, the government must first organize and articulate policy on the public’s role. According to Dr Fiona Hill, a co-author of the SDR, civil aid organizations currently feel ‘there is no green light from above’ and ‘a sense of inaction’ in planning to support emergency responses. While the government is researching policy options on aspects of societal resilience, there appears to be limited political direction or ownership with no single minister responsible. Related work Britain’s next prime minister faces deep foreign policy challenges – whether Burnham or another The SDR also recommended the conversation should support ‘efforts to counter threats to information integrity as a critical component of national cohesion’. This reflects an online information ecosystem which is becoming easier to manipulate, with impacts offline. Violent disorder has occurred every summer since 2024, fuelled in part by misinformation on platforms including Elon Musk’s X and Meta’s Facebook. Possible calls to action might include asking the broader public to engage in media literacy initiatives, such as those available in libraries and online, for example via civic organizations in Finland and Sweden. Given the potential of misinformation to cause polarization and destabilization, the UK government has taken some limited steps to improve resilience, but actions on media literacy are focussed on parents and limited to a government campaign rather than a broader civic coalition. Strategic questions Attempts to destabilize UK society currently exist in a ‘space between peace and war’, with attacks seeking to exploit vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions. Europe’s Centre of Excellence in Countering Hybrid Threats therefore recommends a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, using societal resilience as an organizing framework to cohere other disparate policy areas. In Nordic states, this has extended to social, cultural, and constitutional policy, while the German zeitenwende (turning point) shift since 2022 has linked investment in the military with infrastructure resilience and economic development.
Sweden's Meteor missile: The 'long arm' Ukraine's air force has sorely needed
Soon, Ukraine will have a new weapon: Swedish Gripen fighter jets carrying Meteor missiles, which can hit targets farther away than any missile Ukrainian pilots have now. That extra range could help blunt one of Russia's most destructive weapons by pushing Russian pilots to drop guided bombs from
NATO plans to replace AWACS with Saab GlobalEye jets, sources say
BERLIN/PARIS, July 2 - NATO plans to replace its ageing fleet of AWACS aircraft with GlobalEye surveillance planes from Sweden's Saab, four sources familiar with the matter told Reuters, a move that could test uneasy relations with U.S. President Donald Trump.
NATO, AWACS Uçaklarını Saab GlobalEye ile Değiştirmeye HazırlanıyorRussian embassy in Sweden comes under repeated drone attack
The embassy condemned the attack as a blatant attempt to intimidate the Russian mission
Rusya Yanlısı Yetkililer Kırım'da Ukrayna'yı Dört Ölümle SuçladıUkraine signs $2.5 billion contract with Sweden for Gripen E deliveries by 2029
The deal is a first step in Kyiv’s planned ambition to purchase up to 150 of the advanced combat jets, noted Swedish Minister of Defense Pål Jonson on social media.
Tesla's June registrations rise in France, Sweden, Denmark as Europe recovery continues
KUALA LUMPUR: New registrations of Tesla vehicles rose across several European markets in June, extending a recent recovery in the US electric vehicle maker’s regional sales.
‘I did nothing wrong’: Sweden’s migration regime hardens, upending lives
Once a European nation receiving large numbers of refugees and migrants, Sweden completes a decade-long overhaul.
Russian threat will outlast Putin, Sweden's military intelligence chief says
Nilsson also said Sweden saw no signs that Russia's political system or Vladimir Putin's grip on power were under immediate threat, despite economic strains caused by the war and Western sanctions.
ABD'den Ukrayna'ya Oreşnik Uyarısı: Saldırı 24 Saat İçinde OlabilirMinister Anand to travel to Latvia, Estonia and Sweden
The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today announced that she will travel to Latvia, Estonia and Sweden from May 19 to May 22, 2026.
Participation of Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, in the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, 22 Mayıs 2026, Helsingborg
Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan participated in the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Helsingborg, Sweden. ##dinamik:gallery:gla|src=/images/enformasyon/gg/sayin-bakanimizin-nato-disisleri-bakanlari-toplantisi-na-katilimi-22-mayis-2026-helsingborg-1/## Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan met with Marco Rubio,...
No: 98, 20 May 2026, Regarding the Participation of H.E. Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, in the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting
H.E. Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, will participate in the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting to be held in Helsingborg, Sweden on 21-22 May 2026.
Swedish intelligence believes Russia will remain a threat to its neighbours after Putin
Sweden's military intelligence believes the Russian regime is likely to remain a threat to its neighbours long after Kremlin ruler Vladimir Putin leaves power.
ABD'den Ukrayna'ya Oreşnik Uyarısı: Saldırı 24 Saat İçinde OlabilirRussian Threat Likely to Endure After Putin, Sweden Says
The Russian regime is likely to remain a threat to its neighbors well after President Vladimir Putin’s time in office ends, the head of Sweden’s military intelligence agency said.
ABD'den Ukrayna'ya Oreşnik Uyarısı: Saldırı 24 Saat İçinde OlabilirPoland signs €4.5 billion deal to buy three submarines from Sweden
"Relations between Poland and Sweden are the best they've ever been," says the Swedish prime minister.
Poland Signs $4.8 Billion Defense Deal, Deepening Sweden Ties
Poland has signed a final deal with Saab AB to purchase three submarines for around 47 billion kronor ($4.83 billion) as Warsaw seeks to bolster its maritime defense capabilities and forge closer ties with NATO ally Sweden.
Saab, Polonya İçin Üç A26 Denizaltı ÜretecekItaly-Sweden Synergies in Cybersecurity Discussed in Stockholm
(ANSA) - STOCCOLMA, 23 GIU - In the context of current global challenges, all countries are now obliged to ensure secure and “non-vulnerable” technological ecosystems. Cybersecurity is therefore a strategic element in the dialogue between Italy and Sweden as well. To better and more concretely support bilateral collaboration, the event “CyberSEcurIT - Cybersecurity Synergy between Sweden and Italy: Perspectives from Academia, Industry, and Government,” dedicated specifically to cybersecurity, was held in Stockholm on June 22 and 23, 2026. Organized by research groups specializing in cybersecurity at the University of Padua, Örebro University, and the Royal Institute of Technology (Kungliga Tekniska högskolan – KTH), in collaboration with the Italian Embassy, the event was hosted at the Embassy and on the KTH campus. Ambassador Michele Pala, in welcoming the participants to this event, emphasized its importance: “Italy certainly contributes industrial capabilities and leadership to the European effort to build secure technological ecosystems. However, it is increasingly important to establish solid and strategic partnerships, and the Nordic countries—particularly Sweden, now a NATO member—can contribute with high-tech industrial infrastructure and telecommunications giants.” Amy Loutfi, professor at the universities of Örebro and Linköping and director of the Wallenberg AI, Autonomous Systems, and Software Program (WASP); Monica Fedeli, vice rector for the Third Mission at the University of Padua; and Bernardo Palazzi, Advisor to the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN), introduced the proceedings, which featured presentations by Fredrik Heintz of Linköping University, coordinator of the RESIST (Resilience and Security for Trust AI) program, who discussed “AI, Cybersecurity, and Geopolitics,” Paolo Spagnoletti of LUISS University and President of the Cyber 4.0 Competence Center, who described how to build “Cyber Capacity” in today’s world, Panagiotis Papadimitratos, who outlined the initiatives of KTH and the Swedish system in the field of cybersecurity, while Luigi Mancini of Sapienza University of Rome presented European digital infrastructure in terms of cybersecurity and resilience. The day concluded with two presentations from the industry: David Brossard of Axiomatics, a Swedish company recently acquired by LEONARDO, and Dario Pascucci of Thales Alenia Space Italy. On the second day, KTH hosted several academic presentations: Nicola Laurenti from the University of Padua; Simin Nadjm-Tehrani from Linköping University; Alessio Merlo from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CASD); Henrik Sandberg from the Digital Futures Center, and Giulio Foletto from KTH. Three industry representatives also spoke: Mohammad Loni from Volvo Autonomous Solutions, Paolo Carrano from APS Security, and Luca Moroni from Cyber Security Angels (CSA). This was followed by a session dedicated to dynamic Italian and Swedish spin-offs in this sector: SpritzMatter and ThinkQuantum from the University of Padua, and Canary Bit from Lund University. The event also featured a major panel discussion moderated by Prof. Mauro Conti of the University of Padua and WASP Guest Professor at Örebro University on the topic “Governing Cybersecurity and the Role of Academia,” with the participation of Ambassador Michele Pala, Scientific Attaché Augusto Marcelli, Bernardo Palazzi, and Panagiotis Papadimitratos of KTH. The goal of strengthening existing collaboration between Italy and Sweden in the field of new technologies related to cybersecurity—essential elements of the social architecture and democratic functioning of our countries—was certainly achieved. In fact, the two-day event was attended by approximately 40 experts from not only the academic community but also the industrial sector, who shared their perspectives on research and opportunities. Methods and possibilities for strengthening and expanding collaboration between the two countries in the field of cybersecurity were also discussed. Read article...
İsveç ve İtalya'dan Siber Güvenlikte Stratejik DiyalogClimate action takes a backseat in federal budget FY27
• Allocations in all climate heads face cuts, except for disaster management • Experts call for transparency in climate spending, structural reforms ISLAMABAD: Climate allocations in the next fiscal year’s federal budget again fall short of putting Pakistan on a path towards a climate-smart future and inclusive growth despite the immediate risks it poses to the country. Except for disaster management finance, allocations in almost all climate categories have decreased compared to the outgoing financial year. The mitigation funds have been reduced from Rs603 billion to Rs124 billion, while adaptation money has been slashed from Rs85bn to Rs70bn. The “green component” of subsidies also experienced budget cuts, with the energy sector’s allocation declining to Rs423 billion from Rs529 billion. Similarly, the food, industry, transport, and agriculture sectors also faced cuts in the proposed budget presented by the government on June 12. Giovanni Maurice Pradipta, who is a policy adviser at global NGO Germanwatch, questioned this approach. “Given the country’s exposure to floods and heat waves, adaptation and resilience should receive at least as much attention as mitigation,” he said, adding it was equally important to prepare developing countries’ budgets and fiscal space for climate action, as it was to push for multilateral (global) solutions. Overall, the climate budget for the next year has shrunk except for the disaster spending. In addition to the newly introduced disaster tagging, the government earmarked Rs19bn under the head of reconstruction, while recovery and rehabilitation funds have risen from Rs1.1bn to Rs21 billion. Former climate change minister Malik Amin Aslam said the budget reflected a “suicidal story” as he questioned a decrease in climate allocations. “The funding or project stream for addressing climate adaptation issues, in particular heat stress, is totally missing. Two international reports [WB, University of Chicago] have rung the red warning bell for Pakistan, stating that one-third of global deaths due to heat stress could be in Pakistan, with nine districts becoming unlivable for humans by 2030,” said Mr Aslam. It may be noted that scientists have warned that floods and extreme heat will become routine events in future. One in three additional deaths due to heat will occur in Pakistan by 2050, according to a recent study. Experts believe that these concerning reports should have been reflected in the fiscal allocations, but there seems to be a general disregard for this looming disaster. The one good thing that came out of this budget is no new taxes on renewables, but energy expert Dr Khalid Waleed told Dawn that pre-budget speculations that the government would tax solar and batteries bumped the prices up nonetheless. Increase in revenue The climate spending has decreased, but revenues are on the rise. The government aims to collect Rs20bn in the EV adoption levy, a 100pc increase, and Rs50bn in the Climate Support Levy to control emissions. Will this be ringfenced? There is no clarity. Dr Abid Suleri, a member of Pakistan’s National Economic Advisory Council, said the money collected under the climate levy should be spent to address climate change instead of making it a part of a wider budget pool. For instance, Singapore and Sweden are already investing in climate solutions through carbon taxes, according to a 2025 report by ICMA International. However, the federal government used the petroleum development levy to bridge the fiscal deficit. According to climate policy expert Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, climate revenue instruments, such as the carbon tax, without a robust public transport network, merely act as exclusionary tools that punish the public in the name of climate action. The budget neglects essential investments in public health and green transit, he added. The former climate change minister agreed with the assessment. “The details of where this very focused funding is being spent are totally absent. Failing that, it is just another means of fleecing the public and throwing the collected funds in a black hole.” For Mr Sheikh, climate change must become the prism through which the government should view the entire economic and financial system, while calling out the government’s failure to prioritise ecosystem protection against slow-onset disasters, like droughts, Glofs and displacement. Climate-tagging and transparency Transparency surrounding climate finance equally concerned Dr Suleri, who welcomed the climate tagging exercise but questioned where the money was going. He suggested it needed to be transparent so that the public could know how much money was spent on climate action and where. The government needs to release quarterly or half-yearly reports and share the tangible outcomes of this exercise, he added. Malik Amin Aslam, meanwhile, criticised the climate ministry for taking a backseat in climate projects. He said since 2021, the PSDP funding for the ministry “has dropped 83pc (Rs14bn to Rs2.4bn) and even in this paltry sum, 95pc is going to only one project — Green Pakistan (10 Billion Tree Tsunami Project)”. Dr Suleri said though climate change was a federal framework, much of the climate action — water, urbanisation, flood management, and climate-smart agriculture — was led by the provinces. How climate action will pan out over the next year will depend on the provincial actions. For Mr Sheikh, it is time to move on from stopgap measures to “structural reforms” for genuinely inclusive and climate-smart development. “The state clings to the same exclusionary, non-reformist development model that caused the climate crisis in the first place,” he said. After two years of economic firefighting, it is evident that Pakistan has limited space for climate action, especially when international climate finance remains abysmally low despite commitments. But the country needs to mobilise domestic resources in addition to seeking international funding. Germanwatch’s Pradipta said Pakistan needed both more international climate finance and stronger domestic resource mobilisation. He gave the example of Indonesia’s green sukuk programme to raise money for green transition. “Pakistan can strengthen its own climate financing through better budget tagging, smarter subsidy allocation, and blended finance mechanisms with clear public oversight,” he added. Experts said the government can also renegotiate its coal and gas supply deals in light of reduced electricity demand from its household solar revolution to create fiscal space for action and also learn lessons from other Global South nations to make do with whatever little finance is available. Published in Dawn, June 21st, 2026
Pakistan'ın 2027 Bütçesi İklim Harcamalarını Kısıyor, Afet Yönetimi HariçTurkish students win 14 medals, 7 honorable mentions at international science olympiads
Students earn awards in informatics, physics and mathematics competitions held in Italy, Sweden, South Korea and Romania
Japan wary of fired up and wounded Tunisia
The Blue Samurai face a team boosted by a change of coach following a heavy 5-1 loss to Sweden in Group F.
Hyrox World Championships may draw high-spenders to Hong Kong, experts say
Hosting the Asian debut of the Hyrox World Championships could bring more high-spending visitors to Hong Kong and the city’s selection as host may have been driven by its proximity to the vast mainland China market, experts have said. The announcement that the pinnacle event of the fitness race would take place at the AsiaWorld-Expo in June next year was made on Thursday in Sweden, which is hosting the championships this weekend. An estimated 1.5 million athletes are expected to have competed in...
Ukraine war latest: Black smoke rises over Moscow as Ukrainian drones strike refinery in Russian capital
Key developments on June 18: Ukraine launches largest drone attack on Moscow since start of Russia's full-scale invasion, hits oil refinery European Council explores opening communication channels with Kremlin Kyiv denies Russian claim that Ukrainian drone struck bus carrying Belarusian children's football team Belgium, Germany, Sweden,
Rusya Yanlısı Yetkililer Kırım'da Ukrayna'yı Dört Ölümle SuçladıSweden Picks Rolls-Royce for First New Reactor Since the 1980s
Rolls-Royce SMR just added its third major European contract. Videberg Kraft, backed by Sweden’s utility Vattenfall, selected the UK design for three units on the west coast, making it Sweden’s first new nuclear plant in more than forty years. The multibillion-pound export win, actively supported by UK government trade efforts, lands on top of existing deals in the UK and Czechia and makes Rolls-Royce the only SMR developer with multiple binding commitments across the continent. We tracked when the UK advanced its own program, Great…
İsveç 40 Yıl Sonra İlk Nükleer Santral İçin Rolls-Royce SMR'yi SeçtiSweden allocates US$108m for US weapons purchases for Ukraine
Sweden is allocating US$108 million to support the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) programme, an initiative under which European NATO allies purchase American weapons for Ukraine.
İsveç, Ukrayna’ya ABD silahı alımı için 108 milyon dolar ayırdıSweden, Norway and Canada to announce defence package for Ukraine, Sweden says
(Removes reference to package being worth $100 million) HELSINKI, June 18 (Reuters) - Sweden, Norway and Canada will announce a new Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) package to supply Ukraine with U.S. weapons, Sweden's Defence Minister Pal Jonson said in Brussels on Thursday. (Reporting by Essi Lehto, editing by Terje Solsvik)
KKR eyes at least US$1 billion stake in Medicover's India hospital arm, source says
MUMBAI: KKR is in advanced talks to buy a majority stake in the Indian business of Sweden's Medicover for at least US$1 billion, a source with direct knowledge of the matter said, a deal that would expand its healthcare bet in the world's most populous nation.
NPT Review Conference Falls at Last Hurdle
NPT Review Conference Falls at Last Hurdle Tue, 06/16/2026 - 14:00 June 16, 2026 The April 28-May 22 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference failed to adopt a final consensus document on May 22 after conference president Ambassador Do Hung Viet withheld the final document for debate due to unresolvable disagreements over how to address Iran’s nuclear program and the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. This marks the third straight failure of the NPT review process. The conference, which takes place every five years, involved some 130 states-parties. The review conferences aim to review NPT commitments, reaffirm support for the treaty, and create a concrete action plan for the next five years. The conference took place during a time when each of the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – are under severe strain. Viet said at a news conference May 22 that, “No one [state] blocked consensus because I realized there was not consensus, and so I did not put the document forward.” The exchanges at the conference also revealed the discord among the nuclear five on how and whether to reduce nuclear risks and nuclear arsenals. The U.S. delegation sought to focus attention on China’s nuclear buildup and said it had proposed “multilateral strategic stability talks” on “transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear testing.” China and Russia expressed regret that the United States had failed to take up opportunities to negotiate a follow-on to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expired in February. They urged Washington to actively consider Moscow’s proposal to respect that treaty’s numerical limits for one more year and explore a follow-on agreement “in a responsible manner.” On April 29, China’s director-general for disarmament, Sun Xiaobo stated that “China has no interest in [strategic stability talks],” because China views the proposed talks as a way for the United States “to shift the responsibility for nuclear disarmament to other countries.” After the conference, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also rejected the premise of the talks, stating, “the conditions for launching a substantive, equitable, and mutually acceptable strategic dialogue, which could include a discussion of arms control, are currently fundamentally lacking.” Later this month, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw, who appeared at the review conference to briefly lead the U.S. NPT delegation, will testify June 30 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Europe subcommittee to discuss U.S. plans for “Arms Control and Nonproliferation in an Era of Great Power Competition.” –LIBBY FLATOFF, XIAODON LIANG, and MIA CLARKE For more on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference, see this month’s ACT news report: “2026 NPT Review Conference Stymied by Disputes.” NPT President Viet: NPT Failure “Not Surprising” Addressing the Arms Control Association’s Annual Meeting on June 2, Vietnamese Ambassador Do Hung Viet, the president of the 2026 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, said the inability of states-parties to reach consensus was “disappointing, but it was not surprising.” Viet addressed the annual meeting by live video, days after completing duties as president of the review conference, to share his reflections on the third consecutive failure by states-parties to agree on a final document. Viet called for a broadening of the international understanding of “risk” as a necessary next step. He suggested that the “growing attractiveness” of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence have placed pressure on key norms, seriously affecting nuclear risk reduction efforts. Expressing cautious optimism, the ambassador shared his belief that “common ground has narrowed but has remained,” and that the NPT remains a foundation for peace and security even in the face of new challenges. He also stressed the importance of sustained dialogue among the nuclear weapons states to navigate new disagreements, conflicts, and challenges. Viet concluded by emphasizing that “a safer future will not emerge automatically,” and that today’s efforts to reduce nuclear risks and increase cooperation will profoundly shape the future security environment. A full video recording of the Arms Control Association Annual Meeting, including Ambassador Viet’s remarks, is available online. Trump Claims “Denuclearization” Proposal Presented to China U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters May 15 that he had discussed “denuclearization” with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, during a May 14-15 state visit. Although Trump received “a very positive response,” the Chinese side made no commitments on the subject, according to the president. Trump noted that he would meet Xi three more times in 2026, suggesting the president hopes for a resumption of talks on the strategic nuclear relationship later this year. For more on the status of U.S.-China nuclear talks, see the June issue of Arms Control Today. SIPRI: Deployed Weapons and Stockpiles Grow The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released June 8 its 2026 annual yearbook on disarmament, including a detailed assessment of the forces, doctrines, and modernization efforts of the nuclear-armed states. The assessment, which draws on the open-source research of the Federation of American Scientists, concludes that the “world’s nuclear arsenals expanded and upgraded” during 2025, according to a press release. Although the total inventory of nuclear forces around the world likely declined due to the dismantlement and retirement of older warheads, the size of active stockpiles and the number of deployed warheads increased in 2025. Additionally, all nuclear-armed states are believed to be conducting modernization or upgrade programs to various degrees. The most notable changes occurred in China and India. China has pursued advances in missile defense and launch-on-warning systems, and has begun deploying some missiles at heightened levels of readiness in silos. Additionally, China’s number of deployed missiles increased by between 24 and 34 between January 2025 and 2026. Coupled with new deployments of warheads on missiles with mobile battalions and near-constant SSBN deterrence patrols, these changes may signal China’s transition away from the strictest interpretation of a “no-first use” policy and toward an “early warning counter strike strategy” as it seeks to reinforce its second-strike capability. India appears to have changed its policy of storing warheads and missiles separately and has begun loading missiles in canisters and deploying warheads on an SSBN conducting deterrence patrols. SIPRI reported that in January 2025 India was believed to have no warheads regularly deployed on missiles, but by January 2026, it had twelve. In conjunction with the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan, which included conventional strikes on Pakistani sites housing components of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program, this policy change may indicate increased escalation risks within the region. The yearbook also details a growing coordination and collaboration between the UK and France. Both countries are seeking to supplement and stabilize deterrence of the perceived risk of Russian aggression as the Trump administration’s anti-NATO rhetoric has intensified. Looking forward, the yearbook predicts that increases in stockpiles and deployed weapons, as well as decreases in transparency and data-sharing, will continue. France Talks Nuclear Planning with Allies With the addition of Norway and Finland, the number of NATO countries that are consulting with Paris on supporting French nuclear forces in contingencies has increased to ten. The dialogues follow the announcement in March by French President Emmanuel Macron of a new strategy of “forward” deterrence that could allow for the temporary deployment of nuclear strike aircraft outside of France. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Sweden have also expressed an intention to discuss cooperation with France. Norway’s involvement in the scheme advanced May 27 with the signing of a mutual defense agreement with France and the announcement of further consultations on participation in a “process to determine how France’s nuclear weapons can contribute to security and deterrence in Europe,” according to a Norwegian government press release. Finland’s involvement remains at a preliminary stage, with Prime Minister Petteri Orpo informing Finnish news agency STT on June 4 that Macron’s government had transferred further details regarding the proposed arrangement, which is now under discussion in Helsinki. The shift in French policy responds to perceptions in Europe of a weakened U.S. commitment to the defense of the continent. The Financial Times reported June 2 that the United States has held talks through NATO channels with several states on potentially hosting U.S. nuclear weapons under an expansion of the existing NATO nuclear sharing arrangement. The newspaper reported that sources indicate the talks were intended to demonstrate a willingness to provide a greater nuclear commitment to Europe while Washington draws down conventional forces. U.S. to Return Intermediate-Range System to Japan Japan will host U.S. intermediate-range ground-launched missiles for military exercises in June, the Japanese newswire Kyodo News reported May 21. A ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile unit will deploy to Kanoya Airbase in Kagoshima prefecture, southwestern Japan, as part of the Valiant Shield and Orient Shield joint exercises, the newswire reported. This marks the second deployment of the Typhon mid-range capability system to Japan after a unit participated in exercises last September. Although the report said that the missiles and launchers would remain in storage in Japan following the exercises, the Russian news agency TASS reported May 22 that the Japanese Embassy in Moscow had informed press the unit would be gone “by mid-October.” The Russian government criticized the move as “seriously detrimental” to the “stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region.” The missile unit is intended to contribute to long-range land- and maritime-attack capabilities of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific, mirroring similar long-range conventional weapons in the Chinese arsenal. A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson described the Tomahawk ground-launcher as “a strategic offensive weapon [that] will harm the legitimate security interests of other countries,” at a May 22 press conference. Comment Period on U.S. Plutonium Pit Production Plan Closes July 15 The Department of Energy’s semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will continue receiving written public comments on its draft programmatic environmental impact statement for plans to expand plutonium pit production until July 15. The agency invites comments from state and local governments, public interest groups, businesses, and individual members of the public. The draft programmatic environmental impact statement assesses the likely consequences of three production alternatives, none of which include no expansion of plutonium pit production capacity. The draft ultimately endorses the NNSA’s plans to produce 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Savannah River Site, as mandated by Congress. Vatican Calls for Nuclear Disarmament, Limits on Autonomous Weapons In a major May 15 theological statement, the Catholic Church called for limits on autonomous weapons and decried the “erroneous belief that nuclear deterrence is an indispensable prerequisite for security.” The statement, an encyclical promulgated by Pope Leo XIV, comes after months of rhetorical clashes with the White House over the church’s promotion of peace and disarmament. The encyclical primarily addresses the implications of artificial intelligence technologies, but also touches on other peace and security issues. In a brief section on nuclear weapons, it criticizes the belief that lower-yield “miniaturized” nuclear weapons can be “a more viable option” for use in warfare. It laments that a shared “recognition of the threat posed by weapons capable of destroying all of humanity” has been “left behind,” contributing to a new arms race. The encyclical also acknowledges the 2021 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, but notes that major nuclear powers have not acceded to the treaty. The new theological statement calls for accountability built into and responsible human control over autonomous weapons, as well as an international regime to “curb the technological arms race and ensure robust protection for civilians and the infrastructures necessary for their survival.” For further coverage of the Papal encyclical, please look forward to the July/August edition of Arms Control Today. In Case You Missed It: “2026 Adopted Resolutions: Urging the United States to Lead a Global Effort to Halt and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race,” U.S. Conference of Mayors, June 2026. “Premeditated: 2025 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending,” Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Susi Snyder, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, June 2026. “Friendly Proliferation: Assessing U.S. Perceptions on Proliferation Among Allies and Partners,” Astrid Chevreuil, Center for Strategic International Studies, June 9. “Mitigating Miscalculation: The Role of Pre-Launch Notifications in Strategic Stability,” William Alberque et al., Pacific Forum, May 2026. “Contriving Imaginary Gaps in Nuclear Deterrence,”Jay Tilden, War on the Rocks, May 29. “Trump's Nuclear Review,” Madelyn Creedon et al., RealClearDefense, May 26. “Restrain and Hedge: A New U.S. Nuclear Strategy for a Two-Peer World,” Tyler Bowen, War on the Rocks, May 15. “The “Karaganov Debate”: How Policy Entrepreneurs Shape Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Alexander Graef and Gabriela Iveliz Rosa Hernandez, Global Studies Quarterly, April 24. “Future-Proofing U.S. Nuclear Policy: Forecasting Outcomes of the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile,” Amy J. Nelson and Mariam Kvaratskhelia, New America, Feb. 26. On the Disarmament Calendar July 7: 9th anniversary of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons July 16: 81st anniversary of the Trinity test August 6 and 9: 81st anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki August 29: International Day Against Nuclear Tests September 24: 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Nov. 30- Dec. 3: First Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, New York
2026 NPT Konferansı İran ve ABD-İsrail Anlaşmazlıklarıyla ÇöktüPremium machinery maker secures nuclear plant contract
Premium British engineering company Rolls-Royce SMR will supply three small modular reactors (SMRs) for the construction of Sweden’s first new nuclear power plant in four decades, AzerNEWS reports.
The Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world
The Open Centre: Reimagining Europe’s offer to a fractured world The World Today iallan.drupal 8 June 2026 Europe must resist the temptation to become a fortress in a closed West. Instead, amid America and China’s gepolitical struggle, it has the history and values to be the place where the rest of the world finds common cause, writes Grégoire Roos. Introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’ The international order by which much of the world, for better or for worse, has lived for nearly eight decades is eroding. What might succeed it? To try to answer that question and the many others that come with it, we are introducing ‘The World Tomorrow’, a strand for fresh ideas about the direction of global order. To start, Grégoire Roos presents his vision of a new role for Europe – we hope you enjoy it and the occasional essays, interviews and conversations that will follow. Visitors to the recent exhibitions in Germany commemorating the 250th anniversary of the painter Caspar David Friedrich would have been struck by the peculiar, almost mystical, posture of his solitary figures on the edge of the void. So intent are they on the world dissolving into mist before them that they seem almost to overlook the first light gathering beyond it. Neither simply melancholic nor entirely despairful, those are figures of hesitation – poised between what is fading and what is beginning. Carney’s speech said what many European leaders hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Friedrich’s wanderers offer a fitting metaphor for Europe’s predicament today: a civilization pressed to decide whether it wishes merely to remember the world it once shaped, or to help mould the world now coming into view. That question is no longer aesthetic or philosophical alone. It has become brutally strategic for the whole continent. In this regard, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s speech at Davos earlier this year was striking not because it told us anything entirely new, but because it said plainly what many European leaders still hesitate to say aloud: we are living through a definite rupture, not a passing disturbance. Finnish president Alexander Stubb, for his part, has moved from describing a ‘triangle of power’, that is, a world order structured around three geopolitical blocs: the Global North, led by the United States and Europe, the Global East, led by China and the Global South, with no leading power. He now admits that it looks more like a ‘rectangle’, since the old transatlantic reflex can no longer be taken for granted given the accelerating split between the United States and Europe. And hovering over both is the bracing admonition of S. Jaishankar, India’s minister of external affairs, that Europe must outgrow the habit of thinking that ‘Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.’ Together, these interventions amount to a strategic summons. Europe can afford neither nostalgia nor delusion. The temptation is to respond to this moment in one of two familiar and equally sterile ways. The first is melancholy: to speak as if the answer lay in restoring the vanished certainties of the post‑1945 or post‑1989 order. The second is mimicry: to conclude that, since the age is one of hard power, Europe must simply become colder, harsher, more transactional. Both instincts miss the point. Europe’s opportunity to recover relevance and purpose lies elsewhere. A wider European grammar By Europe, what is meant here is not only the European Union but a wider civilizational basin encompassing all European societies that belong to the continent’s historical argument even when they do not sit within the same institutions. There are already faint signs of such a wider European grammar: the European Political Community, for all its looseness, convenes nearly the whole continent around a language of common stability and prosperity that reaches well beyond the EU’s formal borders. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. That opportunity is to become what one might call the centre that holds. The phrase matters. Europe has long been haunted by the fear that ‘the centre cannot hold’, W.B. Yeats’s 1919 description of post‑First World War Europe, where ‘mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’. Today’s fear is that pluralism dissolves into chaos, that compromise decays into weakness, and that openness ends in fragmentation. Yet, for the centre to hold, it cannot close itself against plurality. It must remain open. This is not civilization as enclosure, still less as the closed‑West idiom now favoured in Washington. It is civilization in a radically different sense: not walls, but, in the words of Pope Leo XIV, ‘bridges through dialogue and encounter’. A centre holds not by suppressing difference, but by giving it form – by accommodating plurality without surrendering coherence. Europe’s deepest historical achievement has never been domination as such. It has been the difficult art of giving form to plurality; of building institutions in which rival powers, rival classes, rival memories and rival truths can coexist without tearing the political fabric apart. At its best, Europe has not abolished conflict; it has somehow civilized it. — Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog. Photo: DeAgostini / Getty Images. This is not a claim of innocence. Europe knows too much of empire, hierarchy, hypocrisy and violence to indulge in moral self‑worship. It has preached universalism while practising exclusion; it has spoken in the language of law while often living by exceptions. Precisely for that reason, any serious European project for the 21st century must begin not in self‑congratulation but in humility. An ‘open centre’ is not a closed fortress with better manners. It is not a sanctimonious core issuing instructions to a wayward periphery. It is not the centre to which everyone must return, but the point at which differences can still be held in balance, and a common direction can still be forged. In that sense, it is not an exclusive point of reference, but it has the potential to act as a force for measure and equilibrium in a world of excess and instability. Jaishankar’s witty provocation should be heard in Europe not as an insult but as a moral reality check. Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa and Latin America do not organize their priorities around Europe’s anxieties. Their concerns lie elsewhere: development, debt, technology, borders, food security, urbanization, energy access and sovereign room for manoeuvre. If Europe wishes to matter in such a world, it must first accept that it is no longer the measure of all things. And, paradoxically, that act of decentring is a moral necessity as well as a geopolitical one. Europe’s ‘fourth way’ French philosopher Paul Ricœur understood early that the true test of universality in a plural world is whether it can be translated without turning imperial. His idea of ‘linguistic hospitality’ offers a clue: Europe will recover credibility not by renouncing universality, but by learning to translate it. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. Europe will matter more, not less, once it stops mistaking its own experience for the measure of the world. But accepting that the world is no longer Europe‑centric does not mean renouncing the European vocation altogether. It means redefining it. In the emerging configuration sketched by Carney and Stubb, Europe’s ‘fourth way’ would not be a nostalgic third way warmed over for a harsher age, but a path between American volatility, Chinese‑style authoritarian capitalism, and a wider world increasingly tempted by transactional hedging. Europe’s offer would be neither hegemonic nor passive, neither imperial nor merely procedural, but something rarer: a power of reconciliation. It would be the proposition that liberty can be married to protection, innovation to conscience, prosperity to social cohesion, sovereignty to cooperation, and identity to openness. Carney’s phrase – actually borrowed from Stubb – for this is ‘value‑based realism’. The term is useful precisely because it refuses both sentimental idealism and crude simplification. Yet, such a project cannot be proclaimed abroad before it is built at home. World order – or order abroad – rests on order at home. This is the point on which too much Brussels rhetoric and too much national politics across the continent still founders. Europe’s external incoherence is not only the result of institutional complexity. It is the outward symptom of an inward crisis: distrust in politics, social atomization, cultural pessimism, waning prosperity, exhausted public services, generational frustration and, perhaps worst of all, the growing sense that democratic governments are failing not only in action, but also in imagination. 58% of respondents across 10 countries in Europe were dissatisfied with how democracy was working, according to a Pew study. The malaise is measurable. In 2025, Pew found a median 58 per cent across 23 countries dissatisfied with how democracy was working, with satisfaction in Europe ranging from 75 per cent in Sweden to just 19 per cent in Greece. No society will sustain ambition abroad for long if its citizens experience only drift at home. Politics depends on the existence of what Hannah Arendt aptly called a ‘common world’ in which citizens still feel they have a stake, a voice and a future. Once that world frays, public life gives way to resentment, passivity or tribal retreat. Foreign policy follows the same rule. A society unsure of its own future cannot sustain ambition abroad for long. A Europe that doubts itself will oscillate between sermon and retreat, proclamation and paralysis. Arendt, writing in the aftermath of Europe’s totalitarian collapse, understood as much. Domestic renewal So, the first chapter of any credible European playbook for the new world order is domestic renewal. Not as a preface to geopolitics. But as geopolitics’ very condition of possibility. Europe needs a new civic and material bargain with its own citizens. It needs to prove, in visible ways, that democracy can still build, protect and inspire. That means affordable and reliable energy, yes, but also housing in which the least privileged can imagine living with a sense of pride and dignity; transport and digital infrastructures that reduce distance rather than reproduce fractures; universities and research ecosystems capable of attracting not only the best minds unsettled by America’s academic crackdown, but also talent from Africa, Latin America and Asia; culture and the arts made accessible to everyone; manufacturing strength in the sectors that will define technological sovereignty; public institutions that are competent enough to be trusted and simple enough to be legible. The World Today Related work The decline of the West and the rise of ‘the Rest’ will lead to a new world order Recent efforts to present Europe as a haven for research freedom suggest that some have begun to grasp the stakes, even if slogans still fall well short of strategy. Yet in this age, power requires more than capability. It requires promise. Europe’s greatest strategic deficit is not merely military or fiscal; it is narrative. It does not sufficiently know how to speak of itself except as a market, a rulebook or a risk‑averse peace project. None of that is irrelevant. But none of it is enough. Europe must relearn how to talk about greatness without drifting into a new form of megalomanic expansionism; about ambition without arrogance; about civilization without exclusion. It must once again sound like a place that knows where it wants to go. If it succeeds in doing so at home, then its external projection becomes clearer. The open centre would not present itself to the wider world as a tutor. It would act as a partner of choice in solving concrete problems: scaling research cooperation, widening access to education and training, financing infrastructure that is sustainable rather than extractive, designing AI and digital standards that protect human dignity and fair competition, building resilient supply chains without demanding ideological conformity or falling into moral lectures, and strengthening multilateral rules while accepting that those rules must better reflect non‑European realities. The open centre does not merely invite others into institutions Europe built yesterday; it is willing to reshape those institutions so that others can recognize themselves within them tomorrow. Inclusion is not charity That principle matters particularly in global governance. Europe cannot go on invoking the legitimacy of multilateralism while resisting any meaningful redistribution of voice within it. If the world’s demographic, economic and political gravity is shifting south and east, then institutional authority must begin to follow. That would start with Africa and greater Asia gaining a seat at the table of the permanent members of the UN Security Council – even if that alone would obviously not save the United Nations. A Europe serious about being an open centre would do the same more broadly: not out of self‑denial, but out of strategic intelligence. Inclusion is not charity. It is the condition under which legitimacy survives. Such openness also means taking science and risk seriously. A centre that holds in the 21st century cannot be merely juridical or diplomatic; it must be epistemic. It must be able to absorb uncertainty, marshal expertise and govern frontier technologies without either naivety or paralysis. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. Europe should not accept the false choice between hyper‑regulation and techno‑anarchy. It can be the place where innovation scales without shrinking the individual, and where technology remains bounded by dignity, judgment and purpose. A centre that holds is that in which citizens will see their dignity as human beings equally recognized and enshrined. The real point, then, is not that Europe should seek to become ‘No.1’. That would be to mistake yesterday’s grammar of power for tomorrow’s. Europe’s ambition should be more original than that. It should aim at becoming the indispensable organizer of cooperation among powers that do not fully trust one another but cannot flourish alone. It should become the arena in which compatibility is made possible: between markets and morals, states and societies, science and politics, plurality and cohesion. That is what an open centre is for. The virtue of steadiness This would also answer a deeper moral question. In a fragmented world, the highest political virtue is no longer purity; it is steadiness. For the centre to hold, it cannot impose uniformity as a citadel of self‑reference. It must remain open; what Édouard Glissant called a space of relation – an ‘initiation to totality without renouncing the particular’. It is to prevent disintegration. It is to create enough trust, enough credibility, enough competence and enough shared aspiration that differences do not become fatal. Having spent the past 12 centuries wrestling with plurality in a confined space, Europe is unusually equipped for that task. It has learned, often painfully, that coexistence is a political achievement, not a natural state. The world may yet find that capability useful. Viktor Orbán’s defeat may point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. None of this will happen through managerialism alone. The preliminary conclusion is therefore also an opening: Europe now needs political leadership driven by substance, steadiness and the audacity to dream. Substance, because rhetoric without delivery will deepen the contempt already stalking democratic politics. Steadiness, because the coming years will reward those who can sustain direction amid shocks. And audacity to dream, because no great political community has ever renewed itself by balance sheets alone. ‘Dream’ is not the opposite of ‘resolve’. In world politics, it is often its truest companion. Hungary’s recent turn after Viktor Orbán’s defeat may, in this respect, point to a wider truth: a politics of fortress nostalgia is unlikely to prevail indefinitely. Fear can mobilize; only a dream can awaken. That is why the next cycle of major European elections matters so much, beginning with France’s presidential contest in 2027. The question in those campaigns will not simply be who governs. It will be whether Europe continues to be narrated as a civilization in decline, oscillating between fear and nostalgia, or whether it rediscovers the ambition to shape the age in its own register. The continent does not need leaders who promise a return to the 19th century with better apps. It needs leaders willing to state, calmly and convincingly, that Europe can still be a maker of order because it is willing first to become a maker of confidence, possibility and purpose at home.
Chatham House: Avrupa, ABD-Çin Rekabetinde Açık Merkez OlmalıSweden provides nearly $3m to Afghanistan humanitarian fund: OCHA
Sweden has provided nearly $3 million to the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said.
İsveç'ten Afganistan İnsani Fonu'na 3 Milyon Dolar DestekSweden intercepts Russian fighter jets near its airspace over Baltic Sea
Sweden scrambled fighter jets to intercept Russian military aircraft operating near its airspace over the Baltic Sea in two separate incidents, authorities said June 13.
Swedish fighters intercept Russian jets near border
Swedish airspace was not violated in connection with the incidents, Sweden's military said.
Sweden defense report warns Russia could test NATO in near future
- Finland says it is closely monitoring Russian military activity near its border
İsveç: Rusya Yakında NATO'yu Test Edebilir; Finlandiya İzliyorSweden Says Russia Could Seek to Test NATO in ‘Near Term’
Sweden sees a possibility that Russia may seek to test NATO’s cohesion and its commitment to mutual defense through some kind of military attack in the “relatively near term.”
Pew poll: Negative vibes for Israel in 36 countries
After more than three years of waging war against its neighbors, Israel appears to be more negatively regarded not only in the United States, where Israel’s image has been sinking since shortly after the outbreak of its war in Gaza in October 2023, but in the rest of the world as well. According to a new poll released, majorities — in some key cases overwhelming majorities — of respondents in most of the three dozen countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center between early February and mid-May said they held an unfavorable view of Israel and had little or no confidence in its long-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. A median across the 36 countries of 67%, or two thirds, of the more than 44,000 respondents said they had either a “very” or “somewhat unfavorable” opinion of Israel, while a median of 25% said their views were either “very” or “somewhat favorable.” The poll found that views of Israel were most negative among respondents in predominantly Muslim countries; among younger adults, especially in North America and Europe; and among those who identified themselves as being on the left side of their countries’ political spectrum. Respondents who considered themselves on the right tended to be more favorable. Included in the survey were 10 European countries, 12 across Asia (including Australia), four in sub-Saharan Africa, six in Latin America, as well as Turkey, the Palestinian West Bank and East Jerusalem, Canada, and the U.S. itself. The results for the U.S. respondents of the new international survey, part of Pew’s annual Global Attitudes Project, were released in a separate report two months ago. It found that 60% of U.S. adults have an unfavorable view of Israel, an increase from 53% in 2025 and 42% in 2022. Conducted in the last week in March, it also found that majorities of respondents under 50 in both parties – albeit more among those who identified as Democrats or Independents than Republicans — viewed Israel negatively. While the global survey began interviewing respondents roughly three weeks before Israel and the U.S. launched their war against Iran February 28, Pew said most of the interviews took place after that date Views were most negative among mostly Muslim countries, led by Turkey, where 99% of respondents said they held unfavorable views (91% “very unfavorable”); Pakistan, 95% unfavorable (87% “very unfavorable”); Malaysia, 89% unfavorable (79% “very unfavorable”); Indonesia, 86% unfavorable (79% “very unfavorable); and the West Bank/E. Jerusalem 85% unfavorable (80% “very unfavorable”). In Indonesia, “unfavorable” views increased by 6% compared to 2025; in Turkey, the increase was 4%. Elsewhere in Asia, “unfavorable” views in South Korea rose by 10 points — from 60% to 70% over the past year, the biggest increase for all countries that were surveyed in both 2025 and 2026, according to the survey. In Japan, “unfavorable” views were held by 93% of respondents. The only country on the continent where favorable views of Israel were greater than unfavorable views was India: 32% favorable, 28% unfavorable. Strong majorities in every European country surveyed by Pew also voiced unfavorable views of Israel. Spain and Sweden led the pack with 78% of respondents saying their opinion was negative. They were followed closely by the Netherlands (76%), Italy (75%), Germany (73%), and Poland (70%). The biggest year-to-year increase in the percentage of respondents who voiced unfavorable views were found in Italy (9 percentage points), Germany (9 percentage points), and Poland (8 percentage points). Even in Hungary, which had long cultivated close relations with Netanyahu under long-standing but recently ousted prime minister, Viktor Orban, a 54% majority of respondents said they held unfavorable views of Israel, compared to only 32% who expressed more positive opinions. Similarly, majorities of respondents – ranging from Chile (60%) to Brazil (52%) in five of the six Latin American countries – voiced unfavorable opinions of Israel. In the sixth, Peru, a 50% plurality agreed, while 28% of Peruvian respondents said they had either “somewhat” (22%) or “very” favorable views. Particularly notable were the results in Argentina, whose right-wing president, Javier Milei, has visited Israel three times since his inauguration in 2023 and who has declared himself to be “the most Zionist president in the world.” Fifty-five percent of respondents there described their views of Israel as “unfavorable” (34% “very unfavorable”). That marked an increase of 9 points from one year ago. The only continent in which pluralities of respondents said they held “somewhat” or “very favorable” opinions of Israel were found in sub-Saharan Africa. Half of Kenyan respondents said they held favorable views, as did 49% of Ghanaians, and 47% of Nigerians. Nigeria showed a sharp increase in unfavorable views compared to 2025 – from 32% to 41%. A 58% majority of respondents in South Africa, with which Israel has had a somewhat contentious relationship since the end of apartheid, said they had unfavorable views, 44% “very unfavorable.”
İran Savaşı Sonrası 36 Ülkede İsrail'e Yönelik Negatif Algı Zirve YaptıGlobal violence reaches record levels due to war and attacks on civilians
Attacks on civilians have brought global violence to record levels. NPR's Leila Fadel talks to researcher Therése Pettersson at Uppsala University in Sweden.
Conflicts on rise globally, highest level since WWII, data shows
Global conflicts surged to the highest number tallied by Sweden's Uppsala security research group.
The FCAS fighter jet looks like it’s dead. Could that be a good thing?
The FCAS fighter jet looks like it’s dead. Could that be a good thing? Expert comment jon.wallace 8 June 2026 FCAS was already competing with the GCAP project and Swedish and Turkish fighters. Europe should combine its efforts. European states have known since the early 2000s that they will need to develop a replacement for their existing fighter aircraft. Concepts for a ‘next generation fighter programme’ go beyond the development of just a jet. Plans to include a combat ‘cloud’ and uncrewed systems to operate alongside fighter jets have been around for almost the same amount of time. But difficulties around the German-French-Spanish fighter project – the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) – demonstrate that even in a strategic context transformed by the Ukraine war and US disengagement, cooperative defence development in Europe remains fraught with difficulty. The original plans for a next generation fighter were co-developed by several European states, including the UK and Italy, in the early 2000s. In 2017-19, the FCAS grouping around France, Germany and Spain was formed, primarily driven by President Emmanuel Macron and former German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. The idea was, in part, to create an aircraft that could complement or compete with the US’s F35 next generation fighter. However, the collaboration between industrial partners Airbus and Dassault has been challenging from the start. The partners have struggled to agree how to divide work packages, leading to delays and now deadlock – several deadlines to secure the fighter’s future have passed without agreement. And both Airbus and Dassault have spoken about developing the fighter separately, or moving forward only the ‘cloud’ element, leading to speculation that the fighter collaboration is going to end. Acknowledging the project has failed would be politically very difficult: neither France nor Germany wants to admit to fumbling a decade-long, expensive defence programme. Part of the challenge has been that Germany and France are looking to develop different types of aircraft. For France, the ability to carry nuclear weapons and to land on an aircraft carrier is essential if it is to replace its existing Rafale fighter jets, which currently carry out part of France’s nuclear mission and fly from the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Germany meanwhile, is primarily looking for a conventionally armed fighter jet, without the requirement for carrier operations. Looking to develop two separate aircraft – possibly with new partners – while continuing cooperation on the joint cloud and uncrewed systems, might work. But it would presumably undo a significant part of the cost savings promised by collaboration. Leaders in Germany and France are frustrated by the disagreements at the technical level. It seems to demonstrate the limits of their ability to set incentives for private industry where industry does not want to cooperate. The competition The situation is further complicated by the many other competing European projects. There are three other significant European future fighters. Related work The UK purchase of F35As increases reliance on US systems – with limited benefits Since December 2022, the UK, Japan and Italy have been working on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). Even though this collaboration started several years after FCAS, it now seems to be on surer footing with governance structures agreed and work on some aspects of the system underway. But the UK Treasury is reportedly worried the project’s international nature will make costs hard to rein in. Separately, Saab has also announced work on a next generation fighter that would succeed its Gripen programme. Gripen was originally developed as a non-NATO alternative for states that did not want to buy US or European equipment and has become a big export hit: Most recently, Ukraine has selected Gripen to form the backbone of its fighter wing, in part for the aircraft’s ability to operate in harsh conditions and from improvised airstrips. Saab is presumably seeking to capitalize on this and other export successes with a new project. Turkey, another NATO member, is also developing a new stealthy fighter jet. Meanwhile the UK, Italy, Germany and many other European powers are purchasing the US F35 aircraft: only last year the UK doubled down on its F35 investment, announcing a purchase of the nuclear-capable F35A variant, in addition to its F35Bs. Germany is reportedly considering buying more F35s, as the FCAS project stalls. Ashes to ashes With four next-generation fighter programmes underway – perhaps soon to be five – Europe risks replicating the mistakes of late 1980s and1990s, when Europe developed three competing fighter designs: The Eurofighter Typhoon, a collaboration between the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain originally included France, but Dassault preferred to go at it alone then, too and developed Rafale separately. Gripen also competed. At that time Europe’s strategic defence partnership with the US through NATO seemed solid. That meant European defence industrial projects had the luxury of developing fighters while pursuing goals other than defence: they could be as much about investing in local industry, keeping skills and production capabilities alive, and competing for a lucrative export market. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and faltering US commitments to Europe’s security, mean these incentives have changed significantly. There is a clear need for Europe to take its own defence more seriously. The wisdom of European NATO members pursuing multiple next generation fighter projects with broadly similar capabilities is questionable. Separate programmes mean countries spreading their resources thin rather than pooling them. It also means separate projects competing for the same export business. That hardly speaks to a Europe that is pulling in one direction on defence. With US disengagement looming and the Russian threat significant, the emphasis must shift to prioritizing the quality of kit and the speed with which kit can be delivered. Part of the problem is that GCAP and FCAS still have some elements of the ‘old’ European defence procurement model, in which equal weight is given to international prestige, domestic economic growth and exportability rather than focusing on Europe’s increasingly urgent defence requirements. With US disengagement looming and the Russian threat significant, the emphasis must shift to prioritizing the quality of kit and the speed with which it can be delivered. Equally, there is no longer an argument for a separate Swedish project to target an export market that does not want to buy NATO kit: Sweden is now also a NATO member-state. There is an urgent reality that European countries must confront: if they are unable to produce a European alternative to the US F35 programme, they will be stuck relying on an increasingly unreliable US for a crucial part of their defence equipment – a platform they might conceivably have to rely on until well into the 2040s. That would dash the stated wishes of both President Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Were European countries to begin by focussing on NATO interoperability and strengthening European deterrence, it would make more sense to pool money and resources and produce a single next-generation fighter system. If Sweden and Turkey cannot be persuaded, the so called ‘E3’ powers of the UK, France and Germany should at least live up to their rhetoric and invest in a joint outcome. Of course, that raises the question of the extent to which European governments can influence their defence industries – who know how politically hard to kill international prestige projects like next generation fighter jets are. If one company does not play well with others and prefers to go it alone, what tools do governments have to influence them? The lesson of FCAS is: not many.
FCAS savaş uçağı projesinin sonu Avrupa için fırsat olabilirNato bolsters defenses around Sweden and Finland
BRUSSELS — Nato ground forces on Saturday started operations aimed at boosting defenses around Sweden and Finland, two of its newest members, the alliance said. Following Russia’s all-out 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the two Nordic countries abandoned decades of military non-alignment to join Nato. Finland entered the alliance in 2023 and Sweden did likewise the
The Strait of Hormuz energy crisis shows the EU’s carbon pricing is the right approach
The Strait of Hormuz energy crisis shows the EU’s carbon pricing is the right approach Expert comment thilton.drupal 24 April 2026 The current crisis shows that Europe must transition to renewables to reduce its dependency on volatile fossil fuels. This week’s AccelerateEU plan rightly reaffirms that goal. The global energy crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated the vulnerability of relying on fossil fuels. Even if the Strait reopens in the near future, traffic flows are likely to be lower, with insurance premiums remaining high and Iran monitoring shipping through the Strait. QatarEnergy’s production facilities also remain damaged, impacting the supply of liquified natural gas (LNG) from the world’s largest exporter. As a result, energy prices are projected to remain high for the coming months at least. Even though Europe only imports roughly 10 per cent of its LNG from the Gulf, the global supply constraint has already caused European energy prices to rise, as Europe competes with Asian buyers to bid for non-Qatari LNG. Since the war started, the European Union (EU) has paid an additional €24 billion for fossil fuel imports. The scale of the crisis has led to higher inflation and lower growth forecasts globally, with the IMF warning that eurozone countries are among the hardest hit due to their lack of energy independence. In response, the European Commission (EC) released the AccelerateEU package on Wednesday. The package contains a wide range of non-binding measures aimed at addressing rising energy costs and reducing ‘dependency on volatile fossil fuel markets.’ These include short-term measures such as deeper coordination between members on storing gas and targeted temporary subsidies alongside ways to lower energy consumption. It also strengthens existing long-term solutions such as electrification incentives and transnational grid interconnectivity. The package’s influence is likely to remain limited, given most fiscal policy remains national, and the measures are non-binding. However, it is a welcome step. Crucially, it maintains the push towards decarbonization using existing market-based instruments such as carbon pricing, through which Brussels can exert most influence. Carbon pricing To reduce Europe’s exposure to recurrent geopolitical shocks, domestic reliable clean energy is key. This has already been demonstrated in countries such as Spain or Greece, whose increased share of renewables has helped to cushion the impact on electricity prices. While renewables only provide intermittent energy, this issue can be solved by complementing renewables with batteries, which can now store energy for longer periods and are over 90 per cent cheaper than in 2010. The primary tool to incentivise the transition to renewables is carbon pricing. In Europe, this has been implemented primarily through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which caps the level of emissions the EU can emit. Under the scheme, each producer needs to buy an allowance for the number of tonnes of carbon emitted, with the allowance becoming more stringent every year. Carbon pricing remains the most efficient tool to drive decarbonization and raise revenues for the transition. The ETS has been successful in reducing emissions by half in the sectors it covers since it was launched in 2005. Though modestly increasing the price of electricity in the short-term, the ETS encourages decarbonization investments, reduces imports of fossil fuels, and ultimately leads to lower electricity prices in the long run. Without it, the EC estimates that Europe would ‘now consume’ an additional 100 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas; it consumes roughly 300bcm annually today. Importantly, the ETS generates substantial revenues that can offset any increase in electricity price to vulnerable consumers if redistributed correctly. These revenues can also be used to fund decarbonization and clean energy investments. Carbon pricing has also been instrumental in phasing out coal, which beyond catastrophic climate impacts also imposes substantial health costs. Weakening the ETS could lead to increased coal use, especially as natural gas prices rise, as seen in 2022. Countries divided Despite its success, the ETS has been at the forefront of the European energy debate ahead of its comprehensive review in July. On one side, countries such as Italy and Czechia are pushing for a pause or loosening of the policy, based on concerns over industrial competitiveness. On the other, countries including Spain and Sweden oppose it being suspended or weakened. France and Germany remain supportive of the ETS but have called for ‘flexibility’ and suggested adjustments respectively. In December 2025, the EC postponed a proposed extension of carbon pricing to the construction and transport sectors that would have incentivized the shift away from gas boilers and petrol cars. Since then, the EC’s recent proposal to adjust the Market Stability Reserve allowances is set to modestly lower the carbon price paid by producers. This could be interpreted as an attempt to manage political tensions ahead of the ETS review in July, even though industry has thus far been a net beneficiary of the scheme through compensation and free allowances. Related work Integration or deregulation? Europe’s split over how to achieve sovereignty European countries have also responded to the current energy crisis with their own national initiatives. Notably, Italy issued an ‘energy decree’ that seeks to subsidize its natural gas producers for their carbon costs with the aim of reducing electricity prices for consumers. However, the ETS is estimated to account for just three per cent of Italian household electricity bills. This approach also further locks in natural gas use and fundamentally undermines the ‘polluter pays principle,’ which has been the cornerstone of European climate policy. Ad-hoc national policies like this risk distorting the investment environment and fragmenting the European market. Short-term needs, long-term goals In the short term, Europe needs LNG – despite its high cost – to meet its energy demand as it strives to cut out Russian fossil fuels. The buildout of LNG infrastructure across Europe in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has helped provide a temporary buffer. The EU should also extend its proposed coordination of natural gas storage refilling to strengthen joint procurement with a single EU buyer, as the Draghi report outlined. Coordination with allies such as Japan and South Korea can avoid bidding wars for scarce LNG supplies. But in the long-term, Europe will need to transition away from LNG. Europe’s current reliance on importing LNG from the US has not removed the risks from market volatility and further interlinks European markets to US domestic energy policy. Even European domestic production is priced at the market rate and therefore doesn’t inherently lower prices.
The Strait of Hormuz energy crisis shows the EU’s carbon pricing is the right approachEU Countries Demand Stricter Visa Rules for Russians
“I want there to be no more shopping weekends. I want there to be no more fancy trips to Europe while Ukrainians are dying on the battlefield,” Sweden’s Migration Minister Johan Forssell said.
Salı günü CHP grubunda kim konuşacak? TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş'tan açıklama
TBMM Başkanı Numan Kurtulmuş, "Avrupa'nın 'Biz bize yeteriz.' deme lüksü kalmamıştır. Avrupa'nın içine kapanma lüksü de kalmamıştır. Avrupa içerisindeki bütün ırkçılık, İslam karşıtlığı, yabancı düşmanlığı gibi Avrupa siyasetini rotasından çıkaran gelişmelere rağmen AB mutlaka genişleyerek kendisini korumak mecburiyetindedir. Genişlemeyi düşündükleri zaman ilk görecekleri yer Türkiye'dir." ifadesini kullandı. Kurtulmuş, Finlandiya ve İsveç'e yönelik resmi ziyaretinin dönüşünde gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtladı. Finlandiya ve İsveç'in NATO süreçlerinde birtakım gerilimlerin bulunduğunu aktaran Kurtulmuş, NATO'ya girmesinden sonra her iki ülkenin Türkiye ile ilişkilerinde yeni bir dönemin başladığını dile getirdi. Ziyarete ilişkin değerlendirmelerde bulunan Kurtulmuş, her iki ülkenin meclis başkanının 28-29 Haziran'da İstanbul'da düzenlenecek NATO Parlamenter Zirvesi'ne katılacağını belirtti. Bir gazetecinin "zirveye NATO ülkelerinin tamamının meclis başkanlarının gelip gelmeyeceğine" yönelik sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, 20'nin üzerinde meclis başkanının zirveye katılacağını bildirdiğini, daha zamanın olduğunu ve son ana doğru katılacak meclis başkanı sayısının artacağını söyledi. İsveç Kralı Carl 16. Gustaf ile görüşmesinin sorulması üzerine Kurtulmuş, çok samimi bir görüşme gerçekleştirdiklerini belirterek, "Yaklaşık 40 dakika sürdü, bu da Türkiye'ye verdiği önemi gösteriyor. Hem ikili ilişkileri hem bölgesel konuları hem Avrupa'nın geleceğiyle ilgili konuları hem de dünyanın geleceğiyle ilgili konuları, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletlerin fonksiyonsuz hale gelmesi gibi başlıkları değerlendirdik. Büyük oranda müşterek fikirlere sahip olduğumuzu gördüm. İyi bir görüşme oldu." diye konuştu. Bir gazetecinin, yaptığı ziyaretlerdeki muhataplarına yönelik "Türkiye'nin etrafında ve küresel ölçekte yaşanan krizleri onlar da derinden hissediyor mu?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, bu konunun İsveç Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsündeki yuvarlak masa toplantısının soru cevap kısmında gündeme geldiğini hatırlattı. Türkiye'nin şu anda dünyayı yakından ilgilendiren hangi küresel sorun varsa hepsinin fiziki, fikri ve siyasi olarak tam ortasında yer aldığını dile getiren Kurtulmuş, Türkiye'nin, bu sorunların hiçbirine uzak duramayacağını, bigane kalamayacağını vurguladı. Kurtulmuş, bu nedenle ülkelerin, sorunların hepsiyle ilgili Türkiye'nin ne düşündüğünü öğrenmek istediğini söyledi. Türkiye için dış politikanın sadece belli kurumlar aracılığıyla yapılacak bir iş olmadığını belirten Kurtulmuş, parlamenter diplomasinin öne çıktığını, parlamenter diplomasinin ağırlığını daha fazla artıracaklarını, bu çalışmaların Türkiye için milli bir vazife, zorunluluk olduğunu dile getirdi. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Finansmana erişim konusunda ekonomi yönetimine talimat verdim! "AVRUPA'NIN 'BİZ BİZE YETERİZ' DEME LÜKSÜ KALMAMIŞTIR" Bir gazetecinin Kurtulmuş'un Finlandiya Cumhurbaşkanı Alexander Stubb ile görüşmesini ve Stubb'ın "AB, üye sayısını 40 ülkeye çıkarmak için çaba göstermeli ve İngiltere, Kanada, Türkiye, Norveç ve İzlanda'yı potansiyel üye adayları olarak göstermelidir." sözlerini sorması üzerine Kurtulmuş, ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın ikinci dönemine başlamasıyla birlikte Avrupa ile Amerika arasında, Avrupa'nın güvenliği konusunda ciddi ihtilafların ortaya çıktığını dile getirdi. AB'nin yeni perspektiflere ihtiyaç duyduğunu vurgulayan Kurtulmuş, şöyle konuştu: "Aynı tezleri tekrarlamanın bir anlamı yok. Bunları çok net şekilde, açıklıkla söylüyoruz. Burada Avrupa'nın 'Biz bize yeteriz.' deme lüksü kalmamıştır. Avrupa'nın içine kapanma lüksü de kalmamıştır. Avrupa içerisindeki bütün ırkçılık, İslam karşıtlığı, yabancı düşmanlığı gibi Avrupa siyasetini rotasından çıkaran gelişmelere rağmen AB mutlaka genişleyerek kendisini korumak mecburiyetindedir. Genişlemeyi düşündükleri zaman ilk görecekleri yer Türkiye'dir. Finlandiya'da Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Stubb'ın bunu da açıklıkla kabul ettiğini ve etrafına anlatmaya başladığını da gördüm." "Görüşmelerde, Ukrayna konusunda özellikle Trump'ın tavrı Avrupa'da güvensizlik yaratıyor duygusu oluştu mu?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, ABD-AB ilişkilerine dair görüşlerine hiç kimsenin "Hayır, öyle değil." demediğini, "Trump'ın özellikle ikinci döneminde Avrupa ile Amerika arasındaki görüş ayrılıkları NATO'yu da etkisizleştiriyor." cümlesini bilerek kullandığını söyledi. Türkiye'yi bu ülkelerin ileride vazgeçilmez görme ihtimallerinin olup olmadığının sorulması üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Oraya doğru ilerliyor." ifadesini kullandı. Artık ne iki kutuplu ne de tek kutuplu bir dünyanın var olduğunu dile getiren Kurtulmuş, hiçbir ülke, kıta ve bölgenin tek başına dünyayı yönetemeyeceğini, bunun açık bir gerçeklik olduğunu vurguladı. Halkalı-Kapıkule arasında tarihi adım! 4 saatlik yolculuk 1,5 saate düşüyor TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş, şöyle konuştu: "Bu kadar çatışmanın, kavganın ve gürültünün olmasının temel nedenlerinden birisi de bu. Ortaya çıkmaya başlayan 'çok kutupluluk' dediğimiz hatta ben bu durumu 'çok merkezlilik' kavramının daha doğru ifade ettiğini düşünüyorum, dolayısıyla çok merkezli bir dünyaya doğru gidiyoruz. Batılıların 'orta güç' olarak tanımladığı ülkelerin ortaya çıkmakta olduğunu görüyoruz. Hiç şüphesiz Türkiye bunlardan birisi. Jeostratejik önemi, jeokültürel avantajları, tarihi birikimi ve potansiyeli itibarıyla Türkiye bu ülkelerden birisidir. Türkiye birçok ülke tarafından aranılan bir müttefik haline gelecektir." "SORUNLARA ÇÖZÜM BULMAKTA AVRUPA KITASININ ÇARESİZ KALDIĞINI DÜŞÜNÜYORUM" Bir gazetecinin Avrupa'da lider sorununun bulunduğunu belirtmesi ve görüşmelerde Türkiye'nin Sudan'da, Somali'de, Libya'da yaptıklarının görülüp görülmediğine yönelik sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, Avrupa'da lider sorununun olduğunu, önemli liderlerin döneminin özellikle Angela Merkel'den sonra sona erdiğini söyledi. Avrupa siyasetinin kayda değer lider çıkaramadığını dile getiren Kurtulmuş, şöyle devam etti: "Bu sonucun Avrupa siyasetinin doğasından kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum. Kendi içlerinde politik ihtilafları başarılı bir entegrasyon tecrübesi olan Avrupa Birliği ile belli bir aşamaya kadar getirdiler, siyasi entegrasyonu sağladılar. Avrupa Parlamentosuyla, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi gibi birçok kurumla… Ekonomik açıdan para birliğini büyük oranda temin ettiler. Ama ortak bir savunma gücüne bundan 20 sene evvel sahip olabilselerdi bugün çok köklü bir Avrupa kimliğinden bahsedecektik ve bu kimlik doğal olarak da Avrupa'nın tamamına liderlik yapabilecek siyasi figürleri çıkaracaktı. Bu kadar dağınık ortamda Avrupa'yı kapsayacak kuvvetli bir siyasi figüre de çok ihtiyaçları yok. Çünkü kendi aralarında fikirleri farklılaştı. Daha kötü gelişmeler de oldu. 20 sene evvel Avrupa için düşünülemeyecek birçok çıkış, örneğin aşırı sağın bu kadar yükselmesi, yabancı düşmanlığının ana akım siyasetleri bu kadar etkiler hale gelmesi, İslam düşmanlığının artması aslında Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin 'ortak sözlü anayasası' diyebileceğimiz değerler sisteminde büyük tahribatlara neden oldu. Dolayısıyla hem siyasi birliği gerektirecek siyasal birlik atmosferinde törpülenmeler oldu hem de toplumsal normlarda özellikle aşırı sağ akımlar Avrupa siyasetinin ana gövdesini büyük oranda tahrip etti. Rusya'nın Kırım'ı işgaliyle başlayan süreçte de bir tepki geliştiremedikleri için, sorunlara çözüm bulmakta Avrupa kıtasının çaresiz kaldığını düşünüyorum." Avrupa'nın bu tablodan çıkıp çıkamayacağına yönelik soru üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Söylediklerimi zaten kendi aralarında konuşuyorlar. Benim söylediğim kadar açık söylemiyorlar belki ama gidişatın farkındalar ve bu durumdan çıkmak için gayret gösteriyorlar." dedi. "BATILI DOSTLARIMIZIN ARTIK BU MAZERETLERİ ESKİSİ GİBİ İFADE ETMEDİKLERİNİ GÖRÜYORUM" Bir gazetecinin "İsrail'in Lübnan'a, İran'a bu şekilde saldırmasının, Gazze'de bunları yapmasının Avrupa'nın güvenliğini de tehdit edecek hale geldiğini düşünüyorlar mı?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, Avrupa'nın güvenliğini tehdit edecek bir algının oluştuğunu zannetmediğini ancak bundan 1-2 sene önce Gazze konusunda, Filistin konusunda, İsrail'in saldırganlığı konusunda konuştuklarında "Öyle diyorsunuz ama şunlar da var." diyerek mazeret üreten Batılı dostların artık bu mazeretleri eskisi gibi ifade etmediklerini söyledi. TBMM Başkanı Kurtulmuş, şu ifadeleri kullandı: "Ortada açık bir saldırganlık ve soykırım var. Gazze topraklarında başlayan çok sert bir 'apartheid' rejim uygulaması var. Lübnan'da fiili bir işgal var. Bunların hiçbirisinin Amerika ve İsrail'in İran'da başlattığı savaşla uzaktan yakından ilgisi yok. İsrail artık giderek savunulamaz bir ülke konumuna geliyor. Netanyahu ve çetesinin tamamen yalnızlaşacaklarını düşünüyorum." Bir gazetecinin, Türkiye'nin savaş ortamında peş peşe barış zirveleri gerçekleştirdiğini, dünya ölçeğinde 5-6 organizasyona ev sahipliği yaptığını belirtmesi üzerine Kurtulmuş, "Ortalama bir Avrupa ülkesi bunlardan bir tanesini bir yılda ancak yapabilir. Bu da Türkiye'nin gücünü gösteriyor, algıyı çok olumlu hale getiriyor. Dışarda yeni bir perspektif sunabilen, bu kadar türbülansın ortasında istikrarı koruyabilen bir ülke olarak Türkiye'nin hem Rusya-Ukrayna hem de Amerika-İran gibi konularda arabuluculuk yapabilen, en azından uzlaştırmacı, fikir üretebilen bir ülke görüntüsü var, bunlar çok kıymetli." değerlendirmesinde bulundu. Parlamentolar Arası Birlik (PAB) 152. Genel Kurulunun İstanbul'da yapıldığının hatırlatılması üzerine Kurtulmuş, başarılı, herkesin memnun kaldığı bir organizasyonu tamamladıklarını vurguladı. Rahmi Koç'un 'Kürt kadın' ifadelerine soruşturma! "ÇOK AÇIK ŞEKİLDE İNSANLIĞA KARŞI SUÇLAR İŞLENİYOR" Bir gazetecinin "Türkiye bu tür zirveleri peş peşe gerçekleştirirken İsrail'in bölgedeki saldırganlığının önüne nasıl geçeceğiz? İsrail'in Lübnan’a saldırıları var. Bu sorun nasıl çözülecek?" sorusu üzerine Kurtulmuş, şu değerlendirmelerde bulundu: "Bunun çözümünde en kestirme yol, Netanyahu hükümetinin arkasındaki destekçilerinin bu desteklerinden vazgeçmeleridir. Çok açık şekilde insanlığa karşı suçlar işleniyor. Yapılan o kadar uluslararası müzakereye ve anlaşmalara rağmen bırakın Gazze'de ateşkesin sağlanması ve insani yardımların yapılabilmesini, dediğiniz gibi yeni bir savaşı, işgali ısrarla sürdürüyorlar. Gazze'nin işgaline ilave olarak Batı Şeria'da köy köy, kasaba kasaba, ev ev işgali devam ettiriyorlar. Beyrut'u bombalıyorlar. Daha dün Litani Nehri'nin kenarındaki tarihi kaleyi işgal eden İsrail, dur durak bilmiyor. Başta ABD olmak üzere İsrail'in arkasında bu desteği veren ülkeler İsrail kadar sorumsuzluk içerisindeler. Burada özellikle İran'a yönelik savaşın başlatılması bir kere daha ortaya koydu ki bölgedeki savaşla ilgili Amerika ile İsrail arasında hedefleri bakımından çok ciddi farklılıklar var. Netanyahu kendi kişisel siyaseti bakımından olumlu bir sonuç elde etmeye çalışıyor. Rakip ve düşman olarak ilan ettiği İran'ı bir şekilde dizginlemek, yapabilirse İran'da bir rejim değişikliği yapmak, değişiklik olmayacağını gördükten sonra kendince kazanım olarak kabul ettiği Hürmüz Boğazı’nın açık tutulması ve nükleer kapasitenin kısıtlanması gibi alanlarda alınacak kararlarla barış görüşmelerinden sonuç almak istiyor. İsrail’in aslında İran'la bir işi de yok. İsrail, bölgede Arz-ı Mevud'un artık son adımını atmak istiyor. Bölgeyi bu kadar parçalanmış bir halde bulmuşken, ABD'nin de sınırsız desteğini arkasına almışken her şeyi bitirmek istiyor. Yapabilirse Arz-ı Mevud toprakları içerisinde olan her yeri içine alabileceği son adımını atmak istiyor."
CHP'de Grup Toplantısı Krizi: Kurtulmuş'tan 'Parti Yönetmeliği' VurgusuNegative views of Israel soar across 36 countries since Iran war, survey finds
Negative views of Israel soar across 36 countries since Iran war, survey finds MEE staff on Fri, 06/05/2026 - 19:55 Pew found a marked increase in unfavourable views of Israel, with nearly every country surveyed hosting majorities with negative views A person holds a placard with a photo of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the writing "Genocidal" during a protest against the detention and treatment by Israel of activists participating in the Global Sumud Flotilla, in Milan, northern Italy, on 21 May 2026 (Piero Cruciatti/AFP) Off Negative views of both Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have soared since last year across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, according to a new poll from Pew Research Center. Out of 36 countries, majorities in 32 of them have either a very unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable view of Israel, with only respondents in India, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya holding a favourable view of the country. The survey was conducted between 8 February and 13 May of this year. The US-Israel war on Iran started on 28 February and has had an impact on countries across the world, in part likely due to the economic impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, where around 20 percent of the global oil supply passes through. Pew reported that across 36 countries, a median of 67 percent of adults held an unfavourable view of Israel, with just 25 percent holding a favourable view. Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem had the highest percentage of unfavourable views of Israel, with Turkey at 97 percent and Japan at 83 percent. (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); In the Anglophone world, specifically the US, Canada, Australia and the UK, all had majorities that held unfavourable views of Israel at 60, 65, 79, and 69 percent respectively. All ten countries surveyed in Europe also held generally unfavourable views of Israel, with Sweden and Spain topping out at 78 percent each and Hungary with the most favourable views of Israel, but still carrying a majority, 54 percent, who held unfavourable views. Israel's war on Gaza and subsequent genocide has led to a global hardening of views against the country over the past three years. But the war on Iran appears to have triggered a strong response across the world, with significant year-on-year spikes in unfavourable views of Israel. Israel's actions in Gaza, deemed a genocide by leading scholars, human rights organisations and political leaders, resulted in the death of at least 73,000 Palestinians since 7 October 2023. Its bombardment of the Gaza Strip has either destroyed or damaged 81 percent of structures in the enclave, with an estimated $18.5bn in damages according to the United Nations. Effects of war on Iran Some of the fallout from the genocide was visible in Pew's survey last year, but since then there has been another spike, likely connected to the war in Iran. From Italy to Japan, most people have negative views of Israel, poll finds Read More » Nigeria, where 47 percent have favourable views of Israel, saw a nine percent increase in unfavourable views of Israel. South Korea had the largest jump in unfavourable views, marking a ten percent jump. Germany, Italy, Argentina, Poland, the UK, and the US all recorded between a seven and nine percent jump in unfavourable views. Pew showed that people on the left of the political spectrum tended to hold more negative views of Israel than their counterparts on the right. The ideological gap was widest in the US, where 83 percent of liberals held negative views and just 37 percent of conservatives held negative views. That ideological gap is more prevalent in high-income countries but does not necessarily hold true in middle-income countries, according to the survey's authors. Only two countries, the Philippines and Kenya, had confidence in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu "to do the right thing regarding world affairs". Majorities of respondents in every other country had no confidence at all or little confidence in Netanyahu. The same leap in unfavourable views of Israel was reflected in respondents' views of Netanyahu, with prominent increases in people losing confidence in Netanyahu's leadership over the past year. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0
İran Savaşı Sonrası 36 Ülkede İsrail'e Yönelik Negatif Algı Zirve Yaptı