Mekke Paktı: Yeni Savunma Ekseni ve İran İçin Fırsat Tartışması

The Mecca Pact could be an opportunity for Iran

The Mecca Pact ranks among the most momentous developments to have reshaped the Middle East since the upheavals that followed the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023. Though defensive in nature, the agreement — which creates a mutual defense commitment between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey — could have major repercussions for the regional balance of power. Much hinges on how its signatories define the threats they must face and, more critically, on how other regional players, especially Iran and Israel, react to its creation. Although the pact has come into being amid the ongoing U.S.‑Iran confrontation, it need not be construed as an expressly anti‑Iran coalition. On the contrary, Tehran has good reason to view it favorably. The Turkish foreign minister indicated that preparations for the agreement had been underway for over two years. The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Riyadh and Islamabad was finalized within weeks of Israel’s attack on Qatar last year and may have been partially precipitated by it. Meanwhile, Egypt reportedly floated a proposal to establish a NATO‑style defense architecture in the region. Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran is not the target of the Mecca Pact. This distinction matters in deciphering Iran’s position. One of the objectives underpinning Tehran’s war strategy was to demonstrate to regional states that an American military footprint could itself become a source of insecurity. Should Iran succeed in that aim, those governments are likely to pursue alternative security arrangements. Hence, the emergence of alternative regional defense frameworks would not necessarily signify a failure of Iranian strategy. So far, Iran has expressed cautious optimism toward the pact. “Any plan that is based on the ⁠geopolitical and historical realities of the region, is comprehensive and inclusive, and correctly identifies the enemy ⁠and the threat, has a chance of helping to strengthen security ⁠and prevent instability and abuses by the Zionist enemy ⁠and its allies,” an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson said last week. Tehran has strong incentives to continue viewing the Mecca Pact with an open mind. The Mecca alliance has opened its doors to “all brotherly countries” seeking “lasting peace and stability,” meaning there is a possibility that Tehran could one day join the alliance. This isn’t as much of a long shot as it might seem. After all, Iran has previously expressed openness to participating in the SMDA. If Tehran were prepared to enter into an alliance with Saudi Arabia, it would be all the less reluctant to do so when Turkey is also involved, given Ankara’s role in forestalling an Israel-backed Kurdish incursion into Iran this year. Moreover, Turkey and Pakistan share deep historical, cultural, and religious ties with Iran. Iran’s broader regional narrative continues to resonate, to some degree, within their societies. These bonds do not erase differences but they suggest that neither country is likely to morph overnight into an implacable foe of Iran. This leaves Iranian strategists with a clear choice. As it has done so far, Tehran should refrain from treating the pact as an anti‑Iran coalition. A pragmatic approach would keep alive the prospect of Iranian engagement with the emerging regional security architecture. Should U.S.‑Iranian diplomacy eventually yield a comprehensive nuclear agreement, many of the impediments to Iran’s participation in regional arrangements could also diminish. The alternative would be to respond to the pact as an inherently anti‑Iran project, a reaction that risks turning into a self‑fulfilling prophecy. The alliance would then be compelled to organize its collective defense explicitly around the Iranian threat. Iran would also risk losing popular goodwill in the broader Muslim world. In this respect, strategic restraint may be Tehran’s best option. The Israel factor In practice, Iran may simply need to wait and see until time casts its spells. After Hamas’s October 7 attack on southern Israel, Tel Aviv’s security doctrine acquired a somewhat peculiar pre‑emptive bent toward Ankara, with threats being tackled even before they had fully materialized. Since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, for example, former Israeli officials have repeatedly labeled Turkey a “New Iran.” This narrative raises the prospect that regional strategic competition could gradually shift from an Israel‑Iran confrontation toward a more complex rivalry involving Israel and Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey’s stake in Syria’s stability and Israel’s incursions into Syrian territory could eventually place them on a collision course. Israel’s insistence on maintaining “security zones” in various neighboring countries, including Lebanon, likewise betrays Tel Aviv’s reluctance to accommodate others. Over time, Israeli policies intended to forestall future threats could produce the opposite effect, spurring greater coordination among states constrained by Israeli power. Iran stands to gain from this dynamic. Its existing regional network can no longer effectively counter Israeli influence. If a new regional arrangement gradually curbs Israel’s freedom of action, Tehran could secure additional strategic breathing room without having to confront Israel directly. It would thus appear to have a strong interest in allowing regional alignments to evolve. The possible expansion of the Mecca Pact could reinforce this tendency. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has indicated that Egypt could join the agreement. Egypt’s history with Israel, combined with Turkey’s competing interests with Israel in the eastern Mediterranean, could eventually lead Israel to perceive an enlarged Mecca Pact as a mechanism of strategic containment. Such a perception would carry its own perils. If Israel opts to counterbalance — as it is likely to do — both Israel and the bloc could fall victim to the security dilemma. Israel would seek more robust regional security partnerships, for instance with Somaliland and even with India, while members of the Mecca Pact might respond by further institutionalizing and expanding their collective defense arrangements. From Tehran’s vantage point, such a development could offer opportunities. If Israel were forced to manage a broader array of regional rivalries, Iran would enjoy greater strategic space. The logic is not simply that the enemy of Iran’s enemy becomes its friend. Rather, a more complex regional equilibrium could reduce Israel’s capacity to concentrate its strategic resources on Iran and render accommodation with Tehran more appealing over time. Nonetheless, the moment of truth may arrive much sooner. Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia could eventually place Iran in direct tension with members of the Mecca Pact. Yet even here, neither side has an obvious incentive to put the alliance’s mutual‑defense commitment to the test. If Iran deliberately tested the pact by encouraging Houthi strikes, it could hasten the emergence of an explicitly anti‑Iran security posture. If Saudi Arabia invoked the pact in response to an attack, it could expose the alliance’s political limitations and reveal the thresholds for collective military action. In fact, Pakistan and Turkey may encourage Saudi Arabia to exercise restraint. Both countries have demonstrated a preference for diplomatic management of regional crises. Their diplomacy played an important part in preventing Saudi Arabia from becoming a direct participant in the U.S.‑Iran conflict following Iranian attacks on Saudi facilities. Even under the SMDA framework, Pakistan did not automatically enter the war; instead, it emphasized de‑escalation. Their participation in the Mecca Pact could consequently introduce a diplomatic buffer rather than escalation. This combination of deterrence and restraint could open up space for mutually acceptable arrangements on the Houthi question. Even if Iran is bent on regional primacy, confrontation does not serve Iran’s interests. Iran may, therefore, have more reason to welcome the Mecca Pact than to fear it. What its strategists decide will shape the contours of the region’s future strategic environment.